Amicus Curiae Brief — Mission Product Holdings, Inc., Petitioner v. Tempnology, LLC, nka Old Cold LLC
Supreme Court briefJul 11, 2018
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No. 17-1657
d
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
MISSION PRODUCT HOLDINGS, INC.,
Petitioner,
—v.—
TEMPNOLOGY, LLC, N/K/A OLD COLD LLC,
Respondent.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF OF
THE INTERNATIONAL TRADEMARK ASSOCIATION
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER
ELEANOR M. LACKMAN
COWAN, DEBAETS, ABRAHAMS
& SHEPPARD LLP
41 Madison Avenue, 38th Floor
New York, New York 10010
(212) 974-7474
DAVID H. BERNSTEIN
Counsel of Record
JEFFREY P. CUNARD*
JEREMY FEIGELSON
JASMINE BALL
JARED I. KAGAN
ELIE J. WORENKLEIN
DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON LLP
919 Third Avenue
New York, New York 10022
(212) 909-6696
dhbernstein@debevoise.com
*Resident in Washington,
D.C. Office
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae
The International Trademark Association
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Table of Authorities ................................................... ii
Interest of the Amicus Curiae ................................... 1
Summary of Argument .............................................. 5
Argument.................................................................... 8
I.
II.
This Court Should Grant Certiorari to
Resolve the Circuit Split by Adopting the
Sunbeam Rule .................................................... 8
A.
The Split Below Is Substantial and
Leads to Uncertainty ................................. 8
B.
The Sunbeam Rule, Treating
Rejection of a Debtor-Licensor’s
Contractual Obligations Under a
Trademark License Agreement as a
Breach but Not a Termination, Best
Promotes the Strength and Stability
of the Trademark System ........................ 14
This Case Presents a Rare Opportunity
to Clarify a Commercially Critical Area of
the Law ............................................................. 24
Conclusion ................................................................ 28
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc.,
568 U.S. 85 (2013)................................................ 2
Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League,
560 U.S. 183 (2010)............................................ 24
B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc.,
135 S. Ct. 1293 (2015).......................................... 2
Banning Lewis Ranch Co. v. City of Colo. Springs,
532 B.R. 335 (Bankr. D. Co. 2015) .................... 11
Chloe v. Queen Bee of Beverly Hills, LLC,
616 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2010) ................................. 3
Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am.
Holdings, Inc.,
696 F.3d 206 (2d Cir. 2012) ................................. 2
Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.,
539 U.S. 23 (2003)................................................ 2
Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc.,
267 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1959) ............................... 19
Dickinson v. Zurko,
527 U.S. 150 (1999).............................................. 2
Ferring B.V. Inc. v. Watson Laboratories, Inc.-Fla.,
764 F.3d 1382 (3d Cir. 2014) ............................... 2
Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v.
Coll. Sav. Bank,
527 U.S. 627 (1999).............................................. 2
Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. A.V.E.L.A., Inc.,
654 F.3d 958 (9th Cir. 2011) ............................... 3
iii
Gorenstein Enters., Inc. v. Quality Care-USA, Inc.,
874 F.2d 431 (7th Cir. 1989) ............................. 19
Hana Fin., Inc. v. Hana Bank,
135 S. Ct. 907 (2015)............................................ 2
In re Austin Dev. Co.,
19 F.3d 1077 (5th Cir. 1994) ............................. 17
In re Blackstone Potato Chip Co.,
109 B.R. 557 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1990) ...................... 9
In re Centura Software Corp.,
281 B.R. 660 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2002) ................. 9
In re Charter Commc’ns, Inc.,
691 F.3d 476 (2d Cir. 2012) ............................... 27
In re Crumbs Bake Shop, Inc.,
522 B.R. 766 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2014).............. 11, 20
In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Grp., Inc.,
138 B.R. 687 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) ................ 17
In re Exide Techs.,
607 F.3d 957 (3d Cir. 2010) ..............10, 11, 16, 19
In re HQ Global Holdings, Inc.,
290 B.R. 507 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003) ..................... 9
In re Modern Textile, Inc.,
900 F.2d 1184 (8th Cir. 1990)............................ 17
In re Rent-A-Wreck of Am., Inc.,
580 B.R. 364 (Bankr. D. Del. 2018) ................... 12
In re Select-A-Seat Corp.,
625 F.2d 290 (9th Cir. 1980) ............................. 10
In re Sima Int’l, Inc.,
Case No. 17-21761, 2018 WL 2293705
(Bankr. D. Conn. May 17, 2018) ....................... 12
iv
In re Tempnology, LLC,
879 F.3d 389 (1st Cir. 2018) .............................. 12
ITC. Ltd v. Punchgini, Inc.,
482 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2007) ................................. 3
K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.,
486 U.S. 281 (1988)........................................ 2, 24
KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc.
v. Lasting Impression I, Inc.,
543 U.S. 111 (2004).............................................. 2
Leasing Serv. Corp. v. First Tenn. Bank Nat’l Ass’n,
826 F.2d 434 (6th Cir. 1987) ............................. 17
Levi Strauss & Co. v. Abercrombie
& Fitch Trading Co.,
633 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 2011).............................. 3
Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v.
Haute Diggity Dog, LLC,
507 F.3d 252 (4th Cir. 2007) ............................... 3
Lubrizol Enters., Inc. v. Richmond
Metal Finishers, Inc.,
756 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir. 1985)..................... passim
Matal v. Tam,
137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017).......................................... 2
Med. Malpractice Ins. v. Hirsch,
114 F.3d 379 (2d Cir. 1997) ............................... 17
Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc.,
537 U.S. 418 (2003).............................................. 2
NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco,
465 U.S. 513 (1984)............................................ 18
Nordhoff Invs., Inc. v. Zenith Elecs. Corp.,
258 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 2001) ............................... 27
v
O’Neil v. Continental Airlines, Inc.,
981 F.2d 1450 (5th Cir. 1993)........................... 17
Orion Pictures Corp. v. Showtime Networks, Inc.,
4 F.3d 1095 (2d Cir. 1993) ................................. 18
Pepper v. Litton,
308 U.S. 295 (1939)............................................ 16
Pom Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co.,
134 S. Ct. 2228 (2014).......................................... 2
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co.,
514 U.S. 159 (1995).............................................. 2
Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc.,
676 F.3d 144 (4th Cir. 2012) ............................... 3
Shammas v. Focarino,
784 F.3d 219 (4th Cir. 2015) ............................... 2
Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc.,
588 F.3d 97 (2d Cir. 2009) ................................... 3
Sunbeam Prods, Inc. v. Chicago Mfg., LLC,
686 F.3d 372 (7th Cir. 2012) ...................... passim
Test Masters Educ. Servs. v. Singh,
428 F.3d 559 (5th Cir. 2005) ............................... 3
Thompkins v. Lil’ Joe Records, Inc.,
476 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2007).......................... 17
TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc.,
532 U.S. 23 (2001)................................................ 2
Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc.,
505 U.S. 763 (1992).............................................. 2
United States v. Sealy, Inc.,
388 U.S. 350 (1967)............................................ 24
vi
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros.,
529 U.S. 205 (2000).............................................. 2
Walker v. Armco Steel Corp.,
446 U.S. 740 (1980)............................................ 13
Young v. United States,
535 U.S. 43 (2002).............................................. 16
STATUTES
11 U.S.C. § 365(n) .....................................8, 10, 14, 15
15 U.S.C. § 1055 ....................................................... 19
28 U.S.C. § 158(a)..................................................... 26
28 U.S.C. § 158(d)..................................................... 26
OTHER AUTHORITIES
David J. Franklyn, The Apparent Manufacturer
Doctrine, Trademark Licensors and the Third
Restatement of Torts,
49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 671 (1999) .................. 25
David M. Jenkins, Licensees, Trademarks, and
Bankruptcy, Oh My!: Trademark Licensing and
the Perils of Licensor Bankruptcy,
25 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 143 (1991) ................... 23
Economics and Statistics Administration & United
States Patent and Trademark Office,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE U.S. ECONOMY:
2016 UPDATE (2016) ........................................... 24
Irene Calboli, The Sunset of “Quality Control” in
Modern Trademark Licensing,
57 AM. U. L. REV. 341 (2007) ............................. 25
vii
John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of
Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal
Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965 (1984) ............... 13
Joint Press Statement of Senators Cornyn and
Warren concerning Bankruptcy Venue Reform
Act of 2018 (Jan. 8, 2018),
available at https://www.cornyn.senate.gov/
content/news/cornyn-warren-introducebill-prevent-%E2%80%98forumshopping%E2%80%99-bankruptcy-cases.......... 13
Kayvan Ghaffari, The End to an Era of Neglect:
The Need for Effective Protection of
Trademark Licenses,
87 S. CAL. L. REV. 1053 (2014)........................... 26
Laura Jelinek, Equity for Brand Equity:
The Case for Protecting Trademark
Licensees in Licensor Bankruptcies,
40 AIPLA Q.J. 365 (2012).................................. 20
Licensing Industry Merchandisers’ Association,
LIMA GLOBAL LICENSING INDUSTRY SURVEY
2015 REPORT (2015) ........................................... 25
Nicholas W. Quesenberry, Risky Business: How the
Economic Impact of the Risk of Debtor Default
Mandates Application of the PresumptiveContract Interest Rate in the Case of a
Cramdown Plan against a Secured Creditor with
a Lien on Personal Property in Chapter 13,
22 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 2 Art. 5. (2013) ........... 21
S. Ct. R. 37.6 ............................................................... 1
S. Rep. No. 100-505 (1988), as reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3200 ....................................... 14, 15
viii
William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner,
Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective,
30 J. LAW AND ECON. 265 (1987).......................... 6
World Intellectual Property Organization, WORLD
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REPORT: BRANDS –
REPUTATION AND IMAGE IN THE GLOBAL
MARKETPLACE 9 (2013) ........................................ 4
1
AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF OF THE
INTERNATIONAL TRADEMARK
ASSOCIATION IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER
The undersigned amicus curiae respectfully
submits this brief in support of the petition for
certiorari filed by petitioner Mission Product
Holdings, Inc., seeking review of the decision of the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.1
INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE
Founded
in
1878,
amicus
curiae
The
International Trademark Association (INTA) is a
not-for-profit organization dedicated to the support
and advancement of trademarks and related
intellectual-property concepts as essential elements
of trade and commerce. INTA has more than 7,200
members in 191 countries. Its members include
trademark owners as well as law firms and other
professionals who regularly assist brand owners in
the
creation,
registration,
protection,
and
enforcement of their trademarks. All INTA members
share the goal of promoting an understanding of the
essential role that trademarks play in fostering
1 Both Petitioner and Respondent have provided their written
consent to INTA’s filing of a brief. This brief was authored
solely by INTA and its counsel. No party or counsel for a party
made a monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation
or submission of this brief. No person other than amicus curiae,
its members, and its counsel made such a monetary
contribution to its preparation or submission. See S. Ct. R. 37.6.
2
effective commerce, fair competition, and informed
decision-making by consumers.
INTA (formerly known as the United States
Trademark Association) was founded in part to
encourage the enactment of federal trademark
legislation after the invalidation on constitutional
grounds of the United States’ first trademark act.
Since then, INTA has been instrumental in making
recommendations and providing assistance to
legislators in connection with almost all major
trademark legislation, and has participated as
amicus curiae in numerous cases involving
significant trademark issues.2 INTA members are
2 Cases in which INTA has filed amicus briefs include: Matal v.
Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017); Hana Fin., Inc. v. Hana Bank, 135
S. Ct. 907 (2015); B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc.,
135 S. Ct. 1293 (2015); Pom Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co.,
134 S. Ct. 2228 (2014); Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85
(2013); KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I,
Inc., 543 U.S. 111 (2004); Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century
Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003); Moseley v. V Secret
Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003); TrafFix Devices, Inc. v.
Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205 (2000); Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S.
627 (1999); Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999); Qualitex
Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159 (1995); Two Pesos, Inc.
v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992); K Mart Corp. v.
Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281 (1988); Shammas v. Focarino, 784
F.3d 219 (4th Cir. 2015); Ferring B.V. Inc. v. Watson
Laboratories, Inc.-Fla., 764 F.3d 1382 (3d Cir. 2014); Christian
Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holdings, Inc., 696
F.3d 206 (2d Cir. 2012); Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 676
F.3d 144 (4th Cir. 2012); Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. A.V.E.L.A.,
3
frequent participants in licensing arrangements, are
often parties in trademark-related litigation as both
plaintiffs and defendants, and are also often parties
in bankruptcy proceedings as both debtors and
creditors.
INTA and its members have a particular interest
in this case because the question presented –
whether a debtor-licensor can terminate a
trademark license by rejection, thereby “taking back”
trademark rights it has licensed and precluding its
licensee from using the trademark – is the most
significant unresolved legal issue in trademark
licensing. That issue has led to uncertainty in the
market for trademark licenses. There is a growing
circuit split on this issue, which the First Circuit’s
decision exacerbates.
Uncertainty regarding the status of trademark
licenses involving a bankrupt licensor affects the
broader business community, given that trademarks
are the most widely used form of registered
intellectual property. World Intellectual Property
Organization, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
Inc., 654 F.3d 958 (9th Cir. 2011); Levi Strauss & Co. v.
Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co., 633 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir.
2011); Chloe v. Queen Bee of Beverly Hills, LLC, 616 F.3d 158
(2d Cir. 2010); Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc.,
588 F.3d 97 (2d Cir. 2009); ITC. Ltd v. Punchgini, Inc., 482
F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2007); Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Haute
Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252 (4th Cir. 2007); Test Masters
Educ. Servs. v. Singh, 428 F.3d 559 (5th Cir. 2005).
4
REPORT: BRANDS – REPUTATION AND IMAGE IN THE
GLOBAL MARKETPLACE 9 (2013). In light of the
importance of trademarks to businesses and the
economy, it hardly is surprising that trademark
rights, in many instances, are among a debtor’s key
assets and that trademark issues frequently arise in
the bankruptcy context.
The circuit split on the issue presented by the
petition has affected the value of trademark license
agreements, to the detriment of licensors, licensees,
and the consumers they both serve. INTA members
are interested in the development of clear,
consistent, and equitable principles for bankruptcy
proceedings that preserve and enhance the value of
trademarks for all parties. Clear, consistent, and
equitable rules not only will facilitate restructuring
for debtors in bankruptcy, but they also will enhance
the value of trademark licenses in the prebankruptcy context. These benefits, in turn, will help
trademarks better perform their core function of
helping guide consumers to the products and
services they want, with reliable assurances of
source and quality.
5
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court should grant the petition for certiorari
in order to resolve the substantial circuit split
concerning whether debtor-licensors can terminate a
trademark license by rejection, and to promote the
strength and stability of the trademark system by
adopting the rule articulated in Sunbeam Prods, Inc.
v. Chicago Mfg., LLC, 686 F.3d 372 (7th Cir. 2012).
In the decision below, the First Circuit held that
a debtor, who has the right to “reject” executory
contracts in order to eliminate contractual
obligations that may interfere with a restructuring,
may reject a trademark license agreement, and that
the effect of that rejection is to permanently
terminate the licensee’s right to use the licensed
trademark. Other courts have taken a different
approach: They have held that the rejection of a
trademark license agreement eliminates the debtorlicensor’s requirement that it perform its obligations
under the agreement (for example, the licensor need
no longer undertake or fund enforcement efforts
against infringers of the licensed mark, or defend
third-party infringement claims brought against the
licensee), but it does not terminate the licensee’s
right to continue to use the trademark under license.
The First Circuit plainly acknowledged the
existence of a circuit split on this issue. The ongoing
uncertainty harms trademark licensors, licensees,
bankruptcy creditors, and consumers alike.
6
The Court should adopt the Sunbeam approach
because it enhances the value of trademark licenses
and promotes the stability of the trademark system:
•
Licensors benefit because licensees will
pay more up front or in royalties for
licensed rights that survive a potential
bankruptcy filing by the licensor.
•
Licensees, who have substantial reliance
interests in the licensed trademarks (e.g.,
having hired employees and/or established
manufacturing capacity to take advantage
of the rights), will not suddenly find their
rights rendered valueless by the licensor’s
decision to terminate a trademark license
agreement
through
rejection
in
bankruptcy.
•
Above all, the American public will be
better off. The ultimate beneficiary of a
strong trademark system is the consumer,
who can rely on healthy trademarks as
indicators of source and quality. William
M. Landes and Richard A. Posner,
Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective,
30 J. LAW AND ECON. 265, 270 (1987).
Resolving this issue will have important
consequences beyond the effect of rejecting a
trademark license agreement. This case presents an
opportunity to clarify the effect of rejection under
7
Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code as a general
matter. The Sunbeam approach is consistent with
the broader equitable purposes of the Code, under
which rejection of a contract generally is understood
as a breach (with associated remedies) and not a
termination of the agreement.
The purpose of rejection is to free the debtor from
onerous contractual obligations that it otherwise
would be required to perform (such as equipment
lease payments or routine contracts for monthly
services). Rejection never was intended to provide
the debtor with a means to recover legal rights it had
granted pre-petition through the artifice of
unwinding trademark licenses. Adoption of the
Sunbeam rule would enable licensors to optimize the
value of licensing a trademark without stripping
licensees of rights that they have acquired and as to
which they may have made investments at
substantial expense.
Uncertainty has percolated throughout the
circuits since this Court denied certiorari in
Sunbeam, and the circuit split has widened since
then. This petition presents a rare opportunity to
resolve the conflict. The nature of bankruptcy
proceedings – with their emphasis on quick,
negotiated resolutions – is such that pure questions
of law (like the one here) often are not presented to
this Court. A grant of certiorari is especially
warranted where an issue that has split the circuits
8
arises fairly regularly in the lower courts but
infrequently is raised before this Court.
For all these reasons, INTA urges the Court to
grant certiorari and hear this case to adopt the
holding in Sunbeam.
ARGUMENT
I. This Court Should Grant Certiorari to
Resolve the Circuit Split by Adopting the
Sunbeam Rule
A.
The Split Below Is Substantial and
Leads to Uncertainty
There can be no doubt that the lower courts are
divided.
In Lubrizol Enters., Inc. v. Richmond Metal
Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir. 1985), the
Fourth Circuit held that, when a debtor-licensor
rejects an executory license agreement, the rejection
terminates the license. Because the license was
treated as terminated, it required that the licensee
discontinue all use of the licensed intellectual
property, leaving the licensee with only a prepetition damages claim for the value of the nowterminated license.
In 1987, Congress expressly abrogated Lubrizol’s
result with respect to licenses of patents, copyrights,
and trade secrets, see 11 U.S.C. § 365(n), but
expressly left open the question of the impact of
9
rejection on trademark licenses. With respect to
trademark licenses, Lubrizol remains good law in
the Fourth Circuit and courts in other circuits
continue to rely on Lubrizol in holding that a
licensee’s rights are terminated upon rejection. See,
e.g., In re HQ Global Holdings, Inc., 290 B.R. 507,
512-13 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003); In re Blackstone Potato
Chip Co., 109 B.R. 557, 560-61 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1990);
In re Centura Software Corp., 281 B.R. 660, 673
(Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2002).
In Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v. Chicago Mfg., LLC,
686 F.3d 372 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 568 U.S. 1076
(2012), the Seventh Circuit reached the opposite
conclusion. Judge Easterbrook’s opinion for the court
held that the rejection of a debtor-licensor’s
obligations under a trademark license agreement is
a breach but not a termination. That is, the rejection
relieves the licensor of any obligations under the
agreement and is a breach that may cause harm to
the licensee, for which the licensee might have a
remedy. Under the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning,
however, rejection does not terminate either the
licensee’s right to continue using the licensed mark
or its obligation to continue to comply with the
license. Those obligations might include making any
necessary royalty payments and maintaining quality
control, which the licensor may continue to enforce.
The split extends beyond the Fourth and Seventh
Circuits. Even before Lubrizol, the Ninth Circuit had
offered reasoning in line with the Seventh Circuit,
10
indicating that rejection does not impair a licensee’s
ability to use licensed intellectual property pursuant
to the contract. In re Select-A-Seat Corp., 625 F.2d
290 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).3
Similarly, in In re Exide Techs., 607 F.3d 957 (3d
Cir. 2010), Judge Ambro’s concurring opinion
advocated the Sunbeam approach. There, the
licensee, whose license had been terminated by the
debtor-licensor, had argued (1) that the license was
not executory, and (2) that the court below had erred
in determining that the rejection terminated the
licensee’s rights. The majority opinion in Exide did
not reach the second issue4 because it concluded that
3 Congress subsequently abrogated Select-A-Seat’s holding that
rejection of a contract can void an exclusivity agreement. See 11
U.S.C. § 365(n)(1)(B) (stating that, upon rejection, a licensee
can retain its rights “including a right to enforce any
exclusivity provision”). Neither that congressional action, nor
any subsequent Ninth Circuit caselaw, changes the view
expressed in Select-A-Seat as to the effect of rejection on the
licensee’s ability to use licensed intellectual property after
rejection.
4 Although the court did not expressly reject Lubrizol’s
treatment of “rejection” as termination, the decision does
conflict with Lubrizol’s analysis of whether a trademark license
is “executory.” In an attempt to avoid Lubrizol, the majority
held that the paid-up, perpetual trademark license was not
executory because both the licensor and licensee had
“substantially performed”; the licensor’s obligation to maintain
quality control was insignificant, noting that the licensor had
never defined quality standards. 607 F.3d at 963-64. This may
have distinguished Lubrizol; however, in suggesting that a
11
the license at issue was not executory. Id. at 964. In
his concurrence, Judge Ambro did address the
second issue: “a trademark licensor’s rejection of a
trademark agreement under 11 U.S.C. § 365 does
not necessarily deprive the trademark licensee of its
rights in the licensed mark.” Id. at 965 (Ambro, J.,
concurring). He emphasized that the bankruptcy
laws should not allow a licensor to take back rights
that it had bargained away. Id. at 967.
Lower courts among the various circuits also are
split. As noted above, bankruptcy courts in
Delaware, Rhode Island and California have
followed the Lubrizol approach; in contrast,
bankruptcy courts in Colorado and New Jersey have
followed the approach in Sunbeam. See, e.g.,
Banning Lewis Ranch Co. v. City of Colo. Springs (In
re Banning Lewis Ranch Co.), 532 B.R. 335, 345
(Bankr. D. Co. 2015) (“rejection of a contract does not
work a rescission of the contract and is not, itself, an
avoiding power”; holding licensees under rejected
contract could continue to use trademark rights
granted under licenses) (citing Sunbeam, 686 F.3d at
377); In re Crumbs Bake Shop, Inc., 522 B.R. 766,
770 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2014) (“This Court is not
persuaded by the decision in Lubrizol and is not
alone in finding that its reasoning has been
discredited.”); see also In re Rent-A-Wreck of Am.,
licensor had not defined quality standards, it might suggest
that the trademark license was naked.
12
Inc., 580 B.R. 364, 387 & n.156 (Bankr. D. Del. 2018)
(noting the “unsettled area of rejection of trademark
licenses,” and recognizing that, regardless of which
circuit court’s view was adopted in the case, “further
litigation” is “certain to follow” and could delay
resolution of the bankruptcy case “for years.”).
In the case that gives rise to the present petition,
the First Circuit panel (which itself was split 2-1)5
adopted the Lubrizol approach. It held that the
rejection of a license agreement terminates the
licensee’s rights to use the licensed mark. The
majority opinion expressly recognized that “other
circuits are split” on the issue. In re Tempnology,
LLC, 879 F.3d 389, 392 (1st Cir. 2018).
Since then, the split has grown even wider, with
a bankruptcy court in Connecticut agreeing with
Sunbeam and with the Tempnology dissent. See In re
Sima Int’l, Inc., Case No. 17-21761, 2018 WL
2293705, at *8 (Bankr. D. Conn. May 17, 2018).
Sima criticized the Tempnology majority, holding
that it “strains to resurrect Lubrizol, [and] is plainly
contrary to Congress’ explicit efforts to rebalance
affected rights on intellectual property and leave
5 The majority reversed the First Circuit’s Bankruptcy Appeal
Panel, which, in a 3-0 decision, rejected Lubrizol and, in
reversing the Bankruptcy Court, followed Sunbeam. In short,
four judges in the First Circuit endorsed the Sunbeam
approach and three endorsed the Lubrizol approach.
13
Section 365(g) to answer otherwise unresolved
trademark issues.”
This Court should grant the petition to resolve
this conflict. All participants in the trademark
licensing market will benefit from clear, consistent,
and equitable rules concerning the rights of a debtorlicensor in bankruptcy. Moreover, neither licensors
nor licensees should be subject to conflicts based
solely on the court where the bankruptcy petition is
filed. Forum shopping in bankruptcy proceedings
(and otherwise) is considered by many, including
this Court, to be undesirable. See Joint Press
Statement of Senators Cornyn and Warren
concerning Bankruptcy Venue Reform Act of 2018
(Jan. 8, 2018), available at https://www.cornyn.
senate.gov/content/news/cornyn-warren-introducebill-prevent-%E2%80%98forum-shopping%E2%80%
99-bankruptcy-cases (“Closing the loophole that
allows corporations to ‘forum shop’ for districts
sympathetic to their interests will strengthen the
integrity of the bankruptcy system and build public
confidence.”); see also Walker v. Armco Steel Corp.,
446 U.S. 740, 745 (1980) (describing forum shopping
as “undesirable”).
Clarity alone will benefit all. See generally John
E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of
Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal Standards, 70
Va. L. Rev. 965 (1984) (uncertainty about legal
standards leads to economic inefficiency). As set
14
forth below, INTA asks this Court to grant the
petition for certiorari and to adopt the Sunbeam
rule.
B.
The
Sunbeam
Rule,
Treating
Rejection of a Debtor-Licensor’s
Contractual Obligations Under a
Trademark License Agreement as a
Breach but Not a Termination, Best
Promotes the Strength and Stability
of the Trademark System
The state of affairs under the current split helps
no one. The Court, by granting the petition and
adopting the Sunbeam rule, not only can resolve the
ongoing uncertainty, but also can set down a rule
that is consistent with bankruptcy law and promotes
the overall health of the trademark system.
a) The Sunbeam Rule Is Consistent with
the Bankruptcy Code.
The legislative history of Section 365(n) – which,
as noted above, Congress enacted post-Lubrizol –
makes clear that Congress did not intend to enable a
debtor to cancel a pre-bankruptcy grant of
intellectual property license rights through rejection:
“[Section] 365 was [n]ever intended to be a
mechanism for stripping innocent licensee[s] of
rights.”
S. Rep. No. 100-505, at 4 (1988), as
reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3200, 3203.
“Congress never anticipated that . . . the licensee
would lose not only any future affirmative
performance required of the licensor under the
15
license, but also any right of the licensee to continue
to use the intellectual property as originally agreed
in the license agreement.” Id. at 3, as reprinted in
1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3200, 3201.
Significantly, that Section 365(n) did not include
trademarks was not itself an endorsement of
Lubrizol. Nor did it reflect a congressional intent
that trademark licenses should be terminable by
debtor-licensors. Rather, as the legislative history
makes clear, Congress expressly intended that the
courts consider and determine the effect of debtor
rejection on trademark license rights:
In particular, trademark, trade name and
service mark licensing relationships
depend to a large extent on control of the
quality of the products or services sold by
the licensee. Since these matters could
not be addressed without more extensive
study, it was determined to postpone
congressional action in this area and to
allow the development of equitable
treatment of this situation by
bankruptcy courts.
S. Rep. No. 100-505, at 5 (1988), as reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3200, 3204 (emphasis added).
Moreover, “an omission is just an omission,” and the
“limited definition [of ‘intellectual property’] in
§101(35A) means that §365(n) does not affect
16
trademarks one way or the other.” Sunbeam, 686
F.3d at 375.
Congress’ reference to bankruptcy courts
developing “equitable treatment” of the handling of
pre-petition trademark licenses granted by a debtorlicensor is entirely consistent with the basic
equitable principles underpinning the Bankruptcy
Code. See Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43, 50
(2002) (bankruptcy courts “are courts of equity and
‘appl[y] the principles and rules of equity
jurisprudence’” (quoting Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S.
295, 304 (1939))). These equitable principles have
been cited by courts that have embraced the
Sunbeam approach. See, e.g., In re Exide, 607 F.3d at
967 (noting that “[r]ather than reasoning from
negative inference to apply another Circuit’s holding
to this dispute, the Courts here should have used, I
believe, their equitable powers to give [the debtor] a
fresh start without stripping [the licensee] of its
fairly procured trademark rights.”) (Ambro, J.,
concurring).
The Sunbeam rule also is consistent with the
general principle of bankruptcy law that rejection of
an executory contract does not terminate the
contract, but simply is a breach. The purpose of
Section 365 is not “to be the functional equivalent of
a rescission, rendering void the contract and
requiring that the parties be put back in the
positions they occupied before the contract was
17
formed.” Thompkins v. Lil’ Joe Records, Inc., 476
F.3d 1294, 1306 (11th Cir. 2007); see also id.
(“[r]ejection has absolutely no effect upon the
contract’s continued existence; the contract is not
cancelled, repudiated, rescinded, or in any other
fashion terminated.” (quoting In re Drexel Burnham
Lambert Grp., Inc., 138 B.R. 687, 703 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1992))); Med. Malpractice Ins. v. Hirsch,
114 F.3d 379, 386-87 (2d Cir. 1997) (“while rejection
is treated as a breach, it does not completely
terminate the contract”); O’Neil v. Continental
Airlines, Inc. (In re Continental Airlines), 981 F.2d
1450, 1459 (5th Cir. 1993) (“[t]o assert that a
contract effectively does not exist as of the date of
rejection is inconsistent with deeming the same
contract breached”); In re Modern Textile, Inc., 900
F.2d 1184, 1191 (8th Cir. 1990); Leasing Serv. Corp.
v. First Tenn. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 826 F.2d 434, 436–
37 (6th Cir. 1987); In re Austin Dev. Co., 19 F.3d
1077, 1082 (5th Cir. 1994).
Section 365 permits the debtor to free itself from
burdensome contractual obligations that would
impede its ability to obtain a fresh start. For
example, a debtor-lessee can reject a non-residential
property lease that requires it to pay above-market
rents or a lease for equipment. In both cases, the
creditor-lessor would lose the benefit of the payment
stream (and would become a creditor with a claim for
damages against the debtor), but at least the lessor
would have its property back and could lease it to
18
another party. See generally NLRB v. Bildisco &
Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 528 (1984) (“authority to
reject an executory contract is vital to the basic
purpose of a Chapter 11 reorganization, because
rejection can release the debtor’s estate from
burdensome obligations that can impede a successful
reorganization”); Orion Pictures Corp. v. Showtime
Networks, Inc. (In re Orion Pictures Corp.), 4 F.3d
1095, 1098 (2d Cir. 1993) (“§ 365 permits the trustee
or debtor-in-possession, subject to the approval of
the bankruptcy court, to go through the inventory of
executory contracts of the debtor and decide which
ones it would be beneficial to adhere to and which
ones it would be beneficial to reject”).
Rejection of a trademark license agreement
similarly may allow a debtor-licensor to avoid some
burdensome contractual obligations in a trademark
license. These might include the obligation to pursue
or maintain trademark registrations in multiple
jurisdictions or undertake or fund enforcement
actions against third parties who are infringing the
licensed mark.
Trademark licensors have continuing statutory
obligations to maintain quality control over the
licensee’s use of the licensed trademark to preserve
their rights in the trademark. That, however, is not
the sort of contractual obligation that may be
terminated through rejection. That is because the
continuing obligation of a trademark owner to
19
maintain quality control is based on statute, see 15
U.S.C. § 1055, wholly independent of any contractual
obligations, rejected or otherwise.
As a statutory obligation, the requirement that
the licensor assert quality control over its licensee’s
use serves a broader public purpose beyond the
contractual obligations that might be at issue when
a debtor-licensor decides whether to reject a contract
in bankruptcy. See Gorenstein Enters., Inc. v. Quality
Care-USA, Inc., 874 F.2d 431, 435 (7th Cir. 1989)
(“The purpose of a trademark, after all, is to identify
a good or service to the consumer, and identity
implies consistency and a correlative duty to make
sure that the good or service really is of consistent
quality.”); Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores,
Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 367 (2d Cir. 1959) (“Without the
requirement of control, the right of a trademark
owner to license his mark separately from the
business in connection with which it has been used
would create the danger that products bearing the
same trademark might be of diverse qualities.”). The
Lubrizol rule, which would give debtor-licensors a
right in bankruptcy that would abrogate this
statutory requirement, would “make[] bankruptcy
more a sword than a shield, putting debtor-licensors
in a catbird seat they often do not deserve.” In re
Exide, 607 F.3d at 967-68 (Ambro, J., concurring).
Equitable principles support this result,
particularly given that “the standards for sufficient
20
control have become more and more lenient in recent
years.” Laura Jelinek, Equity for Brand Equity: The
Case for Protecting Trademark Licensees in Licensor
Bankruptcies, 40 AIPLA Q.J. 365, 389-90 (2012).
Any burden on the debtor-licensor to ensure that its
licensee maintains quality controls is lessened by the
licensee’s contractual obligations to maintain quality
control, including in the bankruptcy context. In re
Crumbs Bake Shop, Inc., 522 B.R. at 773.
The licensee of trademark rights should not be
forced to live in fear that the licensor, having
licensed these rights for consideration, may be
entitled years later to take them back in a
bankruptcy. Once the license is granted, the licensed
rights (as distinct from title in the underlying
trademarks) represent property of the licensee, not
of the licensor. The licensor should not be entitled to
rescind the grant and reclaim the licensed rights.
b) The Sunbeam Rule Promotes
Strength
and
Stability
of
Trademark System.
the
the
The market for trademark licenses is enormous,
diverse, and global. Licenses are granted in myriad
circumstances, from the sale of a business (where
the purchase price includes an up-front payment for
the license), to distribution and manufacturing
arrangements (where the licensed mark is central to
the success of the licensees’ business). That market
will function best under the Sunbeam rule. The
21
Lubrizol approach contributes to uncertainty over
trademark rights in bankruptcy, to the detriment of
licensors, licensees, and consumers.
Trademark licensors in non-bankruptcy contexts
have a strong interest in obtaining full value for
their assets. Yet the circuit split means that it will
be more difficult for a trademark licensor –
especially one in financial distress and trying to
stave off bankruptcy by generating cash – to obtain
full value for pre-bankruptcy licenses of its
trademarks.
It is basic economics that a potential licensee (or
any contracting party) generally will pay less to a
licensor for rights that would be impaired in the
event of a later bankruptcy. In assessing the impact
of Lubrizol on a licensor that might become
bankrupt, a rational licensee will insist on paying a
discounted price for a trademark license because
that decision puts it at the mercy of the licensor as to
whether it can continue to use the mark if the
licensor is put into bankruptcy. See Nicholas W.
Quesenberry, Risky Business: How the Economic
Impact of the Risk of Debtor Default Mandates
Application of the Presumptive-Contract Interest
Rate in the Case of a Cramdown Plan against a
Secured Creditor with a Lien on Personal Property in
Chapter 13, 22 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 2 Art. 5. (2013)
(“It is manifest that any disinterested buyer would
be willing to pay less for a riskier, less stable income
22
stream and more for a more stable and reliable
one.”).
Licensees, too, are harmed by the current
uncertainty in the law. A licensee that does not know
whether its license might be subject to termination
in bankruptcy will be less willing to invest capital in
the sort of resources – personnel, machinery or other
production capacity, advertising and promotion –
that would enable it to maximize sales and fully
profit from its license. If this results in failing to
maximize sales, that, too, will reduce royalties to the
trademark licensor, rendering the transaction less
economically beneficial for both parties.
Moreover, it is the experience of INTA’s members
that licensors and licensees alike are forced by the
uncertainty of the circuit split to engage in extensive
and costly negotiations in the pre-bankruptcy
context. Not knowing what legal rule will apply, they
must work to craft customized contract provisions to
try and mitigate the impact of a possible
termination. In some cases, to minimize the risk
created by Lubrizol, parties to a transaction may
agree to establish a bankruptcy remote vehicle that
would hold and license the trademarks, so that the
“remote” licensor would not be swept into a
bankruptcy of the operating company. This drains
resources from more productive activity, and
potentially results in lower pricing due to risk
allocation from negotiation.
23
The Sunbeam rule best resolves these concerns
and promotes stability of the trademark system as a
whole. The rule relieves the licensor of any
obligations under a trademark license agreement,
but does not terminate the licensee’s right to
continue to use the licensed mark or its obligation to
continue to comply with the license, including by
maintaining quality control over the licensed product
(which the licensor may continue to enforce), thus
also benefiting the public.
Trademark licensors also would benefit from this
regime where licensees, knowing their rights will be
more valuable in any eventual bankruptcy
proceeding, are incentivized to pay more for those
rights in pre-bankruptcy negotiations.
The Sunbeam rule also is more equitable. As
commentators have noted, licensees may be greatly
dependent upon the licensed intellectual property
rights and, as a result, could experience serious
financial and other damage if a license is terminated
upon a rejection in bankruptcy. David M. Jenkins,
Licensees, Trademarks, and Bankruptcy, Oh My!:
Trademark Licensing and the Perils of Licensor
Bankruptcy, 25 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 143, 175 (1991).
(When a licensor rejects a trademark license, “[a]
trademark licensee risks the total abrogation of its
right to use a trademark, a valuable property right
. . . [and] licensees must continue to bear the economic
burden of trademark owners’ mismanagement and
24
thus needlessly risk the loss of their investments.”).
The debtor may be protected under Lubrizol, but the
licensee has no such protection: It may find itself
severely injured financially, perhaps so badly that it
could go out of business.
In sum, Sunbeam’s approach is more equitable
because it takes both parties’ interests into account.
II.
This Case Presents a Rare Opportunity to
Clarify a Commercially Critical Area of
the Law
This Court has repeatedly recognized the
significance of trademarks and trademark licenses to
the United States economy. See, e.g., Am. Needle,
Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183 (2010)
(addressing antitrust issues concerning trademark
licensing by the National Football League); K Mart
Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281 (1988)
(addressing validity of Customs Service regulation
concerning importation of foreign-made goods where
United States trademark owner authorized use of
the mark); United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350
(1967) (addressing antitrust issues concerning
trademark licensing for mattresses). In that light,
this case is particularly important.
In 2014, trademarks accounted for $6.1 trillion in
value added to the U.S. gross domestic product.
Economics and Statistics Administration & United
States Patent and Trademark Office, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND THE U.S. ECONOMY: 2016 UPDATE 22
25
(2016). In the United States alone, trademark
licensors generated $7.3 billion in royalty revenue
from the licensing of goods and services in 2014.
Licensing Industry Merchandisers’ Association,
LIMA GLOBAL LICENSING INDUSTRY SURVEY 2015
REPORT 15 (2015). This translates into an estimated
$133.3 billion in retail sales of licensed goods and
services. Id. at 14.
Licensing provides a significant stream of
revenue for trademark licensors, not to mention
extensive commercial opportunities. Irene Calboli,
The Sunset of “Quality Control” in Modern
Trademark Licensing, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 341, 343
(2007). By allowing trademark licensors to outsource
the manufacturing or distribution of a product to
specialized licensees who can do so more cheaply or
effectively, for example, licensing allows licensors to
distribute workloads and enjoy the benefits of
economies of scale. See David J. Franklyn, The
Apparent
Manufacturer
Doctrine,
Trademark
Licensors and the Third Restatement of Torts, 49
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 671, 681 (1999). Licenses also
enable licensors to increase brand recognition and to
reach new markets.
Just as trademarks are more widely used than
other forms of intellectual property (see pp. 3-4
supra), trademark licenses are central to
bankruptcies involving intellectual property rights.
“[S]ince 1988, out of 1100 bankruptcy filings
26
concerning intellectual property, over 600 involve
trademarks.” Kayvan Ghaffari, The End to an Era of
Neglect: The Need for Effective Protection of
Trademark Licenses, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 1053, 1054
(2014). It thus is imperative that licensors and
licensees both have the benefit of the clear and
salutary Sunbeam rule.
This case presents a rare opportunity. This is the
first time since 2012 (when the Court denied
certiorari in Sunbeam) that the Court has had the
opportunity to address this issue. The relative rarity
of appeals on this issue hardly is surprising. In most
instances, bankruptcy appeals must travel through
an extra layer of appellate review to reach this
Court. A bankruptcy order ordinarily must be
appealed to the district court, and only then to the
court of appeals. 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(a), (d). Given the
need to preserve the assets of the bankruptcy estate,
a trustee or licensee often will be unwilling to
continue litigating a case through four different
courts, and thus may decline to appeal or to seek
certiorari, or may choose to settle rather than go
through multiple rounds of appellate review.
Even where the litigants are willing to take a
bankruptcy case all the way to this Court, the
bankruptcy doctrine of “equitable mootness” may
preclude appellate review. Under that doctrine, an
appellate court may decline to review the merits of a
bankruptcy appeal “when, even though effective
27
relief
conceivably
could
be
fashioned,
implementation of that relief would be inequitable”
because the debtor’s plan of reorganization has been
confirmed and “substantially consummated.” E.g., In
re Charter Commc’ns, Inc., 691 F.3d 476, 481-82 (2d
Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). That doctrine is not
applicable here because no plan of reorganization
has been filed, and there plainly is monetary relief
that could be granted to petitioner.6
Despite the fact that the issue presented by the
petition is not likely to come again soon before this
Court, it frequently is litigated below and is of dayto-day concern to trademark owners and
practitioners as it affects essentially every
trademark license. As long as there is continued
uncertainty, that will continue to harm licensors,
licensees, and the consuming public. INTA urges this
Court to take advantage of the opportunity before it
to resolve the split and to adopt the approach taken
in Sunbeam.
6 The equitable mootness doctrine has been criticized because it
“can easily be used as a weapon to prevent any appellate
review of bankruptcy court orders confirming reorganization
plans.” Nordhoff Invs., Inc. v. Zenith Elecs. Corp., 258 F.3d 180,
192 (3d Cir. 2001) (Alito, J., concurring).
28
CONCLUSION
The Court should grant the petition for a writ of
certiorari.
July 11, 2018
Respectfully submitted,
ELEANOR M. LACKMAN
COWAN, DeBAETS,
ABRAHAMS & SHEPPARD
LLP
41 Madison Avenue
New York, NY 10010
(212) 974-7474
DAVID H. BERNSTEIN
Counsel of Record
JEFFREY P. CUNARD*
JEREMY FEIGELSON
JASMINE BALL
JARED I. KAGAN
ELIE J. WORENKLEIN
DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON
LLP
919 Third Avenue
New York, NY 10022
(212) 909-6696
dhbernstein@debevoise.com
*Resident in Washington,
D.C. Office
COUNSEL FOR AMICUS CURIAE
THE INTERNATIONAL TRADEMARK ASSOCIATION
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.