Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Satya V. Reddi, Petitioner v. Hughes & Hughes LLP, et al.

Supreme Court briefApr 19, 2018

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IN THE

uprme Court of the Uniteb tats

Satya Reddi,

Petitioner,

Hughes & Hughes, LLP, et al.,

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to

The United States Court of Appeals for

The Ninth Circuit

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Satya V. Reddi, Pro Se

2265 Lichen Lane

Tustin, CA 92780

(714)552-2469

Email: satyareddi@yahoo.com

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

For more than 70 years, the leading authority on

fraud-upon-the-court has been Hazel-Atlas Glass v.

Hartford-Empire, 322 U.S. 238, 247-248 (1944) in

which this court held, "Doubtless it is wholly

impossible accurately to appraise the influence [of

the corrupt document] exerted on the judges. * * *

[Defendants] are in no position now to dispute

[fraud's] effectiveness. Neither should they now be

permitted to escape the consequences. * * * The

question, then, is not whether relief can be granted,

but which court can grant it." (Emphasis added)

In the context of 42 U.S.0 §1983 complaint

alleging defendants' fraud-upon-the-state -court and

FRCP 12(b)(6) motion seeking its dismissal, the

questions presented are:

Whether adjudication of fraud-upon-the-court

based complaint under FRCP 12(b)(6) violates

plaintiffs constitutional right to due process with

minimized risk of judicial errors when courts

assent to, entertain, or even hear defenses and

objections predicated on or implicated by the

movant's fraud-upon-the -court in conflict with

clean hands doctrine; Hazel-Atlas Glass

Hartford-Empire, 322 U.S. 238 (1944); and

Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal and

Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979).

Whether private attorney who successfully

deceived the court shall be considered state actor

and liable for the damages.

RULE 14.1 (b) STATEMENT

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING BELOW

All the parties to the proceedings below are

parties in this Court.

Petitioner is Satya Reddi ("Satya"), an

individual, Plaintiff below.

Respondents are Defendants Hughes & Hughes

LLP, Lisa Bergman Hughes, Bruce Alan Hughes,

David Ewing Wald, Jason James Coleman, Navid

Moshtael, Richard Paul Sullivan, Ann Michelle

Coleman, Lori Hunt Kennedy, Tamira Lopez Cooper,

Arelis Hughes, Samantha Hughes, Jonathan Mark

Kaiho, Teresa McNamara Màttos, Robin Elizabeth

LeMaster-Farrimond, CandyMadanipour, Svapna

Alan Trivedi, and DOES 1 Through 20,

(Collectively "Hughes")

111

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ............ i

RULE 14.1 (b) STATEMENT ..................................ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS ......................................... iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..................................vii

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI ..........1

OPINIONS BELOW..................................................1

JURISDICTION ....................................................... 1

STATUTORY

CONSTITUTIONAL,

PROVISIONS, AND FEDERAL RULES OF

CIVIL PROCEDURES INVOLVED........................1

STATEMENT OF CASE..........................................2

Introduction...................................................2

California's practice of appointing

inexperienced judges to family courts

and assigning one new case per each

working hour of the judge . ............................ 2

upon

the

fraud

Defendants'

inexperienced judges ..................................... 8

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

....

Family court judges are prime targets

of attorneys' fraud and state is unable

to stop the fraud . ........................................ 15

California is unable or unwilling to

protect the constitutional rights................17

Hazel-Atlas Glass v. Hartford-Empire,

322 U.S. 238 (1944) protects plaintiff's

right to jury trial while 12(b)(6) is

putting that right at risk . .......................... 19

IV. It is "wholly impossible" for the court to

detect hidden and underlying fraud in

the defenses and objections presented

under 12(b)(6).............................................20

The law requires the court to take

factual allegations to be true but does

not authorize the court to take defenses

and objections to be true . ............................ 20

When the defense invokes res judicata,

• facial plausibility requirement for relief

traps the judge to make a wrong

decision because it is impossible for the

court to rule out that the prior

judgment was not tainted by alleged

fraud-upon-the-court when inferring

scienter and relief........................................21

12(b)(6) shields attorneys' theft of

properties and retirement funds in

family courts as legal fees in the nature

of domestic support under 11

U.5.C523(a)(5) because court can't

detect fraud in defenses and objections......23

12(b)(6) shields attorneys' fraud forcing

plaintiff into servitude until death to

pay legal fees under 11 U.S.0 §523(a)(5)

because court can't detect fraud in

defenses and objections ............................... 24

12(b)(6)makes the court an abettor of

iniquity because court can't detect fraud

in defenses and objections...........................24

12(b)(6) shields defendants' role in

making state court proceedings corrupt

and Corain non judice because court

can't detect fraud in defenses and

objections. .................................................... 27

Court's authority to dismiss the

complaint under 12(b)(6) does not

• extend to complaints based on fraudupon-the-court . ........................................... 27

Court does not have authority to deny

federal remedy when state court is

unable or unwilling to protect federal

rights...........................................................29

Plaintiff has constitutional right to

due process with minimized risk of

erroneous decision . .................................... 30

Private attorneys who fraudulently

obtain court orders must be held liable

as state actors.............................................32

Complaints based on fraud-upon-thecourt shall be exempt from 12(b)(6) as

a matter of law . .......................................... 34

Questions are relevant because facial

plausibility for relief requirement

under FRCP 12(b)(6) is causing failure

of the lower courts to properly address

the underlying fraud-upon-the-court

and state action

XI. This case presents an ideal vehicle in

which to resolve these important

questions ...................................................... 37

CONCLUSION.......................................................39

APPENDIX

Court of Appeal's Memorandum Dated

August 15, 2017 (Unreported)

District court order dated October 23,

2015 (unreported).

Order denying petitioner's petition for

rehearing en bane dated January 26,

2018

37a

Reporters transcript of proceedings

38a

Constitutional, statutory provisions, 49a

and federal rules of civil procedures

involved

vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Addington v. Texas,

441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979)...................................30

Alan v. Superior Court Of Orange Cty

172 Cal. App. 4th 238 (Fn 8 and 11) (2009).....18

Allen v. McCurry,

449 U.S. 90 (1980).............................................29

Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

129 5.Ct. 1937, 1941 (2009).............................19

Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School

Athletic Assn.,

531 U.S. 288.(2001)...........................................32

Board of Regents of Univ. of State of NY v. Tomanio

446 U.S. 478, 485 (1980)..................................37

Boyd v. United States,

116 U.S 616 (1886).......................................16,29

Brown v. Felsen,

442 U.S 127 (1979)............................................31

Brown v Allen,

344 U.S. 443 (1953)...........................................28

Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,

365 U.S. 715 (1961)......................................32,33

Commissioner v. Sunnen,

333 U.S. 591 (1948)...........................................23

Dixon v. CIR,

316 F. 3d 1041, 1046 (9th Circuit 2003) ..........25

Elkins v. Superior Court,

63 Ca1.Rptr.3d 483 (Cal. Supreme Court 2007) 2

Fraige v. American-National Watermattress,

Viii

996 F.2d 295 (Federal Circuit 1993) ................19

Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal and Correctional

Complex,

442 U.S. 1 (1979)................................................30

Guardianship of Levy,

137 Cal.App.2d 237(Ca1.Court of Appeal 1955)14

Hazel-Atlas Glass v. Hartford-Empire

322 U.S. 238 (1944)....................................passim

In re M/VPeacock,

809 F.2d 1403 (9th Circuit 1987) .....................19

Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp.,

456 U.S. 461(1982)............................................22

Marriage of Park

27 Cal.3d 337 (Cal. Supreme Court 1980) .......14

Monroe v. Pape

365 U.S. 167 (1961)......................................29,33

Morrissey v. Brewer,

408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)....................................31

Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust

339 US 306,313-314, (1950)..............................19

Neitzke v. Williams,

490 US 319, 326-327 (1989)..............................28

Olivera v. Grace,

19 Cal.2d 570 (Cal. Supreme Court 1942) ........14

Olmstead v. U.S.,

277 U.S. 438 (1928)...........................................26

Precision Inst. Mfg. v. Automotive Maintenance

Mach.,

324 U.S. 806 (1945) ...................................... 25,26

Pullman-Standard v. Swint,

456 U.S. 273, 289 Fn.19 (1982). .................. .28,29

Shawkee Mfg. v. Hartford-Empire,

322 U.S.271, 273 (1944)....................................35

Tellabs, Inc. v. Mahor Issues & Rights,

127 S.Ct, 2499 (2007)...................................15,20

Townsend v. Sam,

372 U.S. 293, 309 Fn.6 (1963) ..........................28

United States v. Shotwell Mfg.,

355 U.S. 233 (1957)...........................................23

Waialua Agr. Co. v. Maneja,

178 F. 2d 60307 (9th Circuit 1949) ...............27

STATUTES

California Business & Professions Code §6128.. 51a

California code of civil procedure §372................51a

California code of civil procedure §425.16.........52a

California family code §2032 ...............................53a

California family code §4320 ...............................54a

California family code §4322 ...............................57a

California family code §4323 ...............................57a

California family code §4332 ...............................58a

11U.S.0 §523(a)(5) ...............................................58a

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS:

42U.S.C1983 ....................................................... 59a

OTHER AUTHORITIES:

California Judicial Standard 5.30.......................49a

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) ...........59a

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

•

Satya Reddi ("Satya") respectfully petitions for a

writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the

United States Court of Appeals for The Ninth Circuit

in this case.

OPINIONS BELOW

Court of Appeal's three judge panel

MEMORANDUM dated 8/15/2017 (Unreported)

Appendix la

District court order dated 10/23/2015

(Unreported). Appendix 5a.

Petition for rehearing en banc was denied on

01/26/2018. Appendix 37a

Reporter's transcript of the proceedings is

reproduced in Appendix 38a-48a.

JURISDICTION

The Court of Appeals entered judgment on

January 26, 2018. This Court's jurisdiction is

invoked under 28 U.S.C. §1254(l).

CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY

PROVISIONS, AND FEDERAL RULES OF

CIVIL PROCEDURES INVOLVED

The relevant provisions of the FRCP 12(b)(6); 42

U.S.0 §1983; 11 U.S.0 §523(a)(5) (domestic support

California

obligation); California Rules of Court

Judicial Standard 5.30 (Family court matters);

California Business & Professions Code (BPC)

§6128; California Code of Civil Procedure (CCP)

§372, §425.16; California Family Code (FC) §2032,

§4320, §4322, §4323, and §4332 are reproduced in

Appendix starting at 49a.

STATEMENT OF CASE

Introduction

Hughes were/are attorneys for Plaintiff's ex-wife

Lakshmi Reddi ("Lakshmi") in the divorce trial and

all subsequent special proceedings thereafter since

1999.

Gravamen of Satya's complaint' is that Hughes

deceived the court to obtain court orders without

findings by taking unfair advantage of court's

internal administrative problems which includes

California's practice of appointing inexperienced

judges and heavy caseloads in family court.

(Doc#1/Pg37, CompltJ98).

California's practice of appointing

inexperienced judges to family courts

and assigning one new case per each

working hour of the judge.

"Judicial Council estimated that "although family

and juvenile cases represent 75 percent of total

filings, they account for nearly one-third of the trial

courts' judicial workload." Elkins v. Superior Court,

Satya complaint is Document 1, filed 07/02/15 case 8:15-cv1054-JVS-DFM in the U.S. Federal District Court for the

Central District of California. Supporting evidentiary

documents are attached to the complaint in three volumes

(Doc#1-1, Doc#_1-2, and Doc#_1-3). All references to the

documents are given in the format Doc#_x-xlpg-number

63 Cal.Rptr.3d 483,504 (California Supreme Court

2007). Inferring from this statement, family law case

takes many as four times the judicial resources than

a civil case.

Since 2008, 51 court houses and 205 court rooms

were closed2 in California due to budget crisis. This

case at bar proves that attorney fraud in the family

courts is a major contributing factor to such crisis.

California recognized family law as a specialty.

Judicial Standard 5.30 requires appointment of

judges with "sufficient training to perform their jobs

competently." However, a 2006 survey3 by Judicial

Council showed that 45% of judges (43 judges) did

not have any experience in family law and annual

new cases per judge is 2,500 (more than one new

case per each working hour of the judge). In 75% of

the cases, one of the parties is self-represented. So

the number of cases which have an inexperienced

judge, an attorney (who may be a specialist in family

law), and a pro se is at least 80,000 new cases per

year. Having no experience in family law, the

inexperienced judges rely on the attorneys for

interpretation of the family law. Thus the control of

the court proceedings is unwittingly transferred to

the attorneys. The following paragraphs explain how

Reinvesting In California's Justice System, A Three-Year

Blueprint for a Fully Functioning Judicial Branch, Judicial

Branch of California.

2006 Family Law Judicial Officer Survey: Judicial Officer

Background, Judicial Resource Needs, and Challenges,

Administrative Office of the Courts, ResearchUpdate, October

2009. Page 3.

attorneys target the inexperienced judges for high

legal fee orders which can be used under 11 U.S.0

§523(a)(5) to steal litigant's properties and

retirement funds. This activity also creates more

judicial workload which in turn worsens the budget

crisis.

Effect of judge's lack of experience during FC4332

finding.

This finding, called marital standard of living

(MSOL), is the most critical finding in family law as

it sets a reference point for all subsequent rulings

such as alimony, child support, and legal fees. This

finding should not take more than one hour if the

judge orders the party seeking alimony to produce

latest annual Social Security statement from SSA

which contains historical income of the family

during the marriage. Maximum marital standard of

living is the average income/ year/person calculated

from the SSA statement. To determine fairly

accurate MSOL, the court shall deduct overtime

earnings and taxes paid before calculating MSOL.

Actual MSOL would be less than the fairly accurate

MSOL because the couple is supposed to live within

their means. Alimony equals actual MSOL less exwife's earning capacity. If the ex-wife's earning

capacity is equal to or more than actual MSOL, the

judge has no legal authority to order alimony.

Fc4322.

The above procedure is not profitable to the

attorneys because it is very quick and reduces the

litigation time. Therefore, attorney engages in

financially discovery of credit card spending and

bank records of divorcing couple spanning MANY

years. The attorney does so for at least a year by

filing motions to compel the pro se and filing

numerous documents in the court to intentionally

confuse the inexperienced judge. After spending

many hours, the court then decides what the couple

can afford. In so doing, the attorneys exhaust the

judges while the pro se helplessly stands. Frustrated

with the lack of progress in the case and the

pressure of more than one new case every hour of

the day, the judge will finally make an arbitrary

decision which causes irreparable damage for the

rest of the life of pro se.

Effect of judge's lack of experience during discovery of

FC4320 factors

Attorneys mislead the inexperienced judge by

performing discovery in a manner similar to civil

case during post-judgment special proceedings such

as spousal support modification proceedings. In civil

cases, both parties are allowed to perform the

discovery simultaneously. However, that kind of

practice is illegal in family court. The family court

must first determine if the party seeking alimony is

legally eligible to receive the alimony, amount of

potential alimony, and provide the other spouse an

option to agree or oppose the amount. If the other

spouse agrees to the new amount, the hearing ends.

Otherwise, discovery of the opposing spouse's

finances is limited to what is necessary to meet the

new alimony amount.

rel

Discovery similar to civil cases is widespread

practice in family court to deceive the inexperienced

judge because the discovery process is the most

profitable for the attorney and the legal fees in the

nature of spousal support are non-dischargeable in

bankruptcy court under 11 U.S.0 §523(a)(5).

After a series of hearings, the attorney will seek

terminating sanctions against the pro se. By this

time, the judge is frustrated with the discovery

process and imposes the terminating sanctions

against the pro Se. It is almost impossible for a pro

se to win an appeal of terminating sanctions. Thus

the entire proceeding gets corrupted making the

court a tool in the hands of.the attorney to generate

fees.

Effect of judge's lack of experience during FC4328

finding

This is called change of circumstances statute.

Law mandates focus on changes in eligibility of the

supported spouse to receive alimony rather than

focus on ability of the supporting spouse to pay

alimony. In most cases. husband is generally pro se

and the ex-wife has a lawyer. Attorney's- fraud

involves misleading the inexperienced judge to do

the opposite focus on the husband's ability to pay

alimony rather than ex-wife's eligibility to receive

alimony. Attorney engages in abusive discovery of

the husband's finances and argues that there was no

change in circumstance to reduce alimony and seeks

legal fees from the husband.

Effect of judge's lack of experience during FC2032

finding.

The attorney files a motion for legal fees and

supports the motion with all the corrupt records

generated during the prior hearings. It is practically

impossible for pro se to fight this motion. Judge by

this time is under the impression that pro se was

responsible for the prior litigation and grants the

legal fees sought by the attorney. The judge asks the

attorney to draft the proposed order. The attorney

inserts a phrase in the proposed order that the legal

fees are in the nature of domestic support making

the debt non-dischargeable under 11 U.S.0

§523(a)(5) allowing the attorney to garnish pro se's

retirement income thus opening the door to steal

retirement funds.

Effect of judge's lack of experience during FC4322

finding.

This statute mandates the judge to end alimony

when ex-wife has sufficient resources to support

herself. The judge can't perform his/her judicial duty

under this statute because of court's failure in

making the previous findings. Generally, in almost

in all cases, the attorney will not let the judge

perform his/her official duties mandated in FC4322

fearing the end of litigation and fee income.

C. Defendants'

fraud

inexperienced judges

upon

the

March 2000: Hughes claimed that Lakshmi "is a

very thorough and organized person, and makes a

diligent effort to comply with all aspects of this

proceeding." Lakshmi's employments skills were

tested by a vocational counselor. Lakshmi scored low

points. Under California laws, people with low

employment skills get high alimony which actually

encourages feigning dumb. Lakshmi attended three

years of college but pretended that her mental skills

were same as 3rd grade student during vocational

testing.

August 2000: Lakshmi gave her deposition

testimony. There was no issue of her mental

incompetency.

November 2000: On the first day of scheduled

divorce trial, Hughes claimed that Lakshmi was

incompetent and requested appointment of guardian

ad litem to represent her on the basis of low

employment scores. As the trial was continued

numerous times before, to save court time, the court

appointed a guardian ad litem on the basis of

employment competency report by vocational

counselor rather than on reports by professionals

certified by the California Board of Behavioral

Sciences.

April 2001: Court issued alimony orders without all

of the findings mandated by law that Satya shall pay

alimony of $3,000 each month until his death and

carry life insurance to cover alimony arrears.

July 2001: Satya and Lakshmi were defendants in a

real estate case in civil court. Lakshmi was

represented by another law firm. Lakshmi

vigorously defended herself with her testimony

during trial of the real estate case and won. There

was no issue of her mental competency in the civil

court.

November 2003: Defendants bypassed California

Code of Civil Procedure §372 and paraded fake

guardian ad litem to deceive the judge that Lakshmi

was incompetent. Not realizing the effects of Hughes'

fraud, family court judge made the following

comment on record. (Exhibit 1, Excerpt from Nov.

14, 2003 hearing before Comm. Gale Hickman.)

["I read this case last night, and I read your

declaration, and I thought to myself: "My

goodness, this fellow, through his divorce, has

seen more money go down the drain." You know,

just there is so much money wasted. It is

absolutely you know, it is an economic tragedy.

Theirs is a Shakespeare play "Comedy of Errors,"

but there is nothing funny about this." Id.

once again, I'm not the

"and you may well

judge who will decide that, but you may well have

been victimized by your attorney, and to a certain

extent by the Court." Id.

that's why I said when I read your papers

last night, I thought to myself, "My goodness, this

fellow has really just had a horrible experience in

I saw that and I meant

this system." I mean, I

that." Id. (Emphasis added)

The court made no findings mandated by law.

December 2004: The alimony order was forcing

Satya into servitude because alimony was

unaffordable. Satya filed motion seeking reduction.

Hughes again bypassed CCP372 and paraded fake

guardian ad litem to oppose Petitioner's request for

reduction in alimony under FC4323. The court

denied the request without making findings

mandated by law.

2005: Lakshmi prepared her own federal and state

tax returns.

2006: Lakshmi prepared her own federal and state

tax returns. The alimony order was forcing Satya

into servitude because alimony was unaffordable.

Satya filed motion seeking reduction. Hughes again

bypassed CCP372 and paraded fake guardian ad

litem to oppose Petitioner's request for reduction in

alimony under FC4323. The court denied the

request without making findings mandated by law.

June 2007: Lakshmi prepared her own federal and

state tax returns. Hughes again bypassed CCP372

and paraded fake guardian ad litem to support their

motion seeking legal fees of about $50,000 from

Satya for representing Lakshmi since 2004. The fees

were awarded without findings mandated by law.

Satya appealed.

2008: Lakshmi prepared her own federal and state

tax returns.

June 2009: The alimony order was forcing Satya

into servitude because alimony was unaffordable.

Satya lost his full time employment and also reached

his retirement age. Satya filed motion seeking

reduction. Hughes again bypassed CCP372 and

paraded fake guardian ad litem to oppose

Petitioner's request for reduction in alimony under

FC4323. The court denied the request without

making findings mandated by law.

December 2009: The Court of Appeal ruled that the

judge was biased, that the judge shall be replaced,

and that the family court shall make finding under

FC2032 (Note: FC2032 finding needs to be based

on FC4320 finding at the time of hearing and has to

be compared with FC4332 finding based on couple's

finances during the marriage period from 1972 to

1999)

December 2009 to January 2011: Case was

assigned to Judge David Belz who had no experience

in family law. Hughes again bypassed CCP372 and

paraded fake guardian ad litem during the court

proceedings. Hughes increased legal fee demand

from $50,000 to $384,145. Hughes deceived Judge

Belz to avoid making the finding ordered by the

court of appeal. Judge Belz initially believed that

Lakshmi was incompetent. His later finding that

Lakshmi was competent indicates that he realized

that he was deceived. However, he granted part of

fake guardian ad litem' request for legal fees

($266,000) and assigned the fees to Hughes. (Note:

This is an unconstitutional joint state action).

Hughes also opposed Petitioner's pending request for

reduction in alimony. The court denied the request

without making findings mandated by law.

November 2011: Hughes disregarded Judge Belz'

finding that Lakshmi was incompetent. Hughes

again by passed CCP372 and paraded fake

guardian ad litem during special proceedings.

July 2012: Plaintiff filed complaint against Hughes

& Hughes (OCSC Case 30-2012-00587297-CU-CRCXC) for violating his civil rights. Hughes opposed

the complaint under CCP425.16 (Anti-SLAPP law)

which does not allow discovery under CCP425.16(g)

but allows the judge to make the final determination

(CCP425.16(b)(2) solely on the basis of initial

complaint pleadings and affidavits. Hughes

prevailed and Satya appealed. However, Hughes

used the family court records showing the presence

of fake guardian ad litem as the presence of court

appointed guardian ad litem to claim litigation

privilege and prevailed. Thus Hughes successfully

deceived the California Court of Appeal

(Comp1. 108)

Undisputed and disputed issues

Satya alleges that Hughes committed the

following frauds (collectively "fraud"):

1. Hughes litigated against Satya since

November 2000 using a guardian ad litem on behalf

of Lakshmi without ever filing any evidence to show

that Lakshmi was mentally incompetent in violation

of CCP372. Satya's evidence of Lakshmi's mental

competence and use of guardian ad litem was not

opposed by Hughes and was judicially noticed4. This

4 Appendix, PageA6 (Fn

-2)

fraud is referred to as "372 Fraud" in this petition.

Hughes reinforced their §372 fraud by

deploying an impersonator who acted like court

appointed guardian ad litem for Lakshmi during all

of the court proceedings from April 17, 2001 to at

least until July 31, 2013. Hughes verbally opposed

this allegation but did not oppose Satya's evidence

which was judicially noticed5 showing Lakshmi was

competent. Also, Hughes did not produce any court

orders to show that the court appointed guardian ad

litem for any of the special proceedings after the

divorce. This fraud is referred to as "372 Fraud

Reinforcement" in this petition.

Hughes took unfair advantage of the

inexperienced judges and new case load of one new

case per working hour of the judge to prevent the

court from making findings mandated by California

family Code §4332, 4320, 4322, 4323, and 2032 with

ruses. This fraud is referred to as "Findings

Fraud."

• 4. In the last action, Hughes prevailed by

deceiving the California Court of Appeals using

California family court's corrupted records which

showed the presence of fake guardian ad litem as the

presence of court appointed guardian ad litem to

Evidence to

falsely claim litigation privilege.

support this allegation is stated in Doc#1 (Complaint

¶108) was not opposed by Hughes and was judicially

noticed6. This fraud is referred to as "Last Action

PageA6 (Fn-2)

Appendix, PageA6 (Fn-2)

14.

Fraud."

The above actions constitute fraud-upon-thecourt punishable by imprisonment and/or fine.

California BPC6128. Also, see Olivera v. Grace, 19

Cal.2d 570,577 (California Supreme Court 1942)

[holding concealment of mental competency from the

court is a fraud upon the court], In re Marriage of

Park, 27 Cal.3d 337 (California Supreme Court

1980) [holding attorney's conduct of concealing facts

from the court is a fraud upon the court],

Guardianship of Levy, 137 CaLApp. 2d 237,245

(California Court of Appeal 1955) [holding

procurement of guardianship by misrepresentation

and concealment of fact is a fraud upon the court].

Satya claims that Hughes' §372 Fraud, §372

Fraud Reinforcement, and Findings Fraud produced

court orders without findings mandated by law and

that he is being forced into servitude until his death

to pay alimony and legal fees. If findings were made,

the court would have found out that Satya's ex-wife

was not qualified to receive any alimony and the

court did not have authority to order alimony. Satya

holds Hughes liable for depriving of his civil rights

by planning and executing the scheme to deceive the

court with intent to steal his assets and retirement

funds under the provisions of 11 U.S.0 §523(a)(5)

(domestic support obligation).

Proceedings in the Federal Court

Unable to get the state remedy, on 07/06/2015,

Satya filed a 42 U.S.0 §1983 complaint with details

of §372 Fraud, §372 Fraud Reinforcement, Findings

Fraud, and Last Action Fraud. (Case #8:15-cv-01054JVS-DFM).

Hughes opposed the complaint under the

provisions of FRCP 8a and 12(b)(6). Hughes did not

oppose Satya's evidence of §372 Fraud, §372 Fraud

Reinforcement, and Last Action Fraud which was

judicially noticed.

District court relied on the facial validity of the

judgment issued by the California Court of Appeal

dismissing Satya's complaint and ruled. it was final

on merits without addressing Satya's supporting

evidence of the underlying Last Action Fraud to

invoke res judicata on "primary rights" theory.

District court determined that there was no state

action and dismissed the complaint with prejudice

for failure to state a claim.

The three judge panel disregarded all of the fraud

allegations of Satya's complaint and disregarded the

entire due process to adjudicate FRCP 12(b)(6)

("12(b)(6)") motion set forth by this Court in Tellabs,

v. Mahor Issues & Rights, 127 S.Ct. 2499, 2502

(2007), and affirmed the district court's dismissal of

Satya's complaint with prejudice. Satya's petition for

rehearing en banc was denied on 01/26/2018.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

I. Family court judges are prime targets of

attorneys' fraud and state is unable to stop

the fraud.

First, fraud-upon-the-court is a stealthy

encroachment on federal rights to advance

unconstitutional interests. In Boyd v. United States,

116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886), this court held that, "It is

the duty of the courts to be watchful for the

constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any

stealthy encroachments thereon. Their motto should

be obsta principiis. " In Hazel-Atlas, 322 U.S supra at

246, this court admonished the lower courts, that

"The public welfare demands that the

agencies of public justice be not so impotent that

they must always be mute and helpless victims of

deception and fraud."

Second, fairness in family law is one of

backbones of this country. That is the reason

Congress enacted 11 U.S.0 §523(a)(5) (domestic

support obligation), The intent of that law will be

destroyed when attorneys misuse it to steal

properties of the families and particularly

retirement funds under the guise of legal fees related

to domestic support such as in this case. Attorney

fraud also puts the family welfare under risk and

defeats the intent of family court such as California

goal stated in judicial standard 5.0 which reads as

follows:

"The family court is an integral part of the

justice system. Decisions made by family law

judges can have significant and lasting impacts

on the lives of the parties and their children. The

work of the family court has a significant impact

on the health of families and ultimately on the

strength of the community. The parties deserve

to have adequate time to present their cases, and

the judges should have the resources they need to

enable them to make informed decisions. It is

only through the constant exertion of pressure to

maintain resources and the continuous education

of court-related personnel and administrators

that the historic trend to give less priority and

provide fewer resources to the family court can be

changed."

The above goal is already at risk because of

attorneys' fraud in the California courts and such

risk will continue to increase.

Denial of this petition will cover up the fraud in

80,000 cases each year in California family courts.

H. California is unable or unwilling to protect

the constitutional rights.

The case load per judge in California family court

is 2,500 new cases7 per year (more than one new

case for each working hour of the judge in addition to

the existing cases) which clearly indicates that

judges do not have sufficient time to adjudicate the

issues properly.

Another problem is that judges, who later realize

that they been deceived, do not want to admit that

they were deceived and do not want to go back and

reverse their own decision because of the case load

Therefore, the final victim is the pro se litigant who,

2006 Family Law Judicial Officer Survey: Judicial Officer

Background, Judicial Resource Needs, and Challenges,

Administrative Office of the Courts, ResearchUpdate, October

2009. Page 4.

under the existing laws, can be forced to keep paying

alimony and legal fees until death because the court

orders are facially valid. If the pro se somehow

decides to file a complaint against the attorney,

chances of prevailing are next to none because

attorneys use the facial value of the orders to their

advantage to seek protection under litigation

privilege and protection under FRCP 12(b)(6) like

what happened in this case.

Additionally, judges are subjected to emotional

distress when hearing about the family breakups

and the effects on children. Therefore, a number of

family court judges prefer civil courts rather than

staying in family courts. Thus, the state continues to

have the problem of recruiting and retaining family

court judges.

In 2009, the California court of Appeals stated

unacceptable conditions in California family courts.

Alan v. Superior Court Of Orange Cty., 172 Cal. App.

4th 238 (Fn 8 and 11) (2009).

In January 2014, the Chief Justice of the

California Supreme Court stated8, "We are rationing

justice, and it has become more than a fiscal

problem.* * *It is, in my view, it is now a civil rights

problem.* *We know we are denying the protections

of an American democracy."

This case is an example of state's inability to stop

8 http://www.latimes.com/local/political/la- me-pc- supreme court-justice -callsfor- more-funds -for-court- system- 20140114story.html

attorneys' fraud upon family court.

III. Hazel-Atlas Glass v. Hartford-Empire,

322 U.S. 238 (1944) protects plaintiff's right

to jury trial while 12(b)(6) is putting that

right at risk.

In Hazel-Atlas, 322 U.S at 247, this court held

that, "Doubtless it is wholly impossible accurately to

appraise the influence that the [corrupted document]

exerted on the judges." (Emphasis added.) Therefore,

fraud can't be easily uncovered in the defenses and

objections and, even if it is uncovered, its true

effectiveness can't be determined by the judge during

12(b)(6) adjudication..

12(b)(6) requires the judge to infer relief at the

pleading stage. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937,

1941 (2009). 12(b)(6) is requiring the judge to do

what is "wholly impossible" to do, that is appraising

the effectiveness of fraud to infer relief to the

plaintiff Such requirement of impossible task can't

be justified under the due process clause. Mullane v.

Central Hanover Bank & Trust, 339 U.S. 306,313314, (1950) ["A construction of the Due Process

Clause which would place impossible or impractical

obstacles in the way could not be justified."]

Hazel-Atlas, 322 U.S. at 248 also held, "The

question, then, is not whether relief can be granted,

but which court can grant it." This presumption

damages became the basis for other fraud-upon-thecourt cases such as Fraige v. American-National

Watermattress, 996 F.2d 295 (Federal Circuit 1993)

citing In re MN Peacock, 809 F.2d 1403, 1405 (9th

Circuit 1987) (where there is proof of an intentional

scheme of misconduct, damage from the misconduct

is presumed).

Thus, the determination of plausibility of relief

under 12(b)(6) in the context of fraud-upon-the-court

cases conflicts with Hazel-Atlas and deprives

plaintiff of his constitutional right to jury trial.

IV. It is "wholly impossible" for the court to

detect hidden and underlying fraud in the

defenses and objections presented under

12(b)(6).

The issue here is, how can the court be not

unduly influenced by the hidden and underlying

fraud of the documentary evidence used in the

defenses and objections to infer scienter and relief?

A. The law requires the court to take

factual allegations to be true but does

not authorize the court to take defenses

and objections to be true.

In Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, 127

S.Ct. 2499,2502 (2007), this court prescribed three

steps to adjudicate the 12(b)(6) motion. In first step,

the court "must accept all factual allegations in the

complaint as true." In the second step, the "court

must consider the complaint in its entirety." In third

step, the court "must take into account plausible

opposing inferences." Thus, accepting the allegations

that the defendants deceived the court to be true, the

court can't perform the third step because HazelAtlas and clean hand doctrine do not allow the court

to take the opposing inferences into consideration.

Thus, there is no law that authorizes the court to

take the res judicata defense as true to override the

factual allegations and dismiss the complaint under

12(b)(6). Therefore, 12(b)(6) should exempt the

fraud-upon-the-court based complaint except when

the complaint does not comply with elements of

fraud-upon-the-court.

B. When the defense invokes res judicata,

facial plausibility requirement for relief

traps the judge to make a wrong decision

because it is impossible for the court to

rule out that the prior judgment was not

tainted by alleged fraud-upon-the-court

when inferring scienter and relief.

• Eyes can lie. What is seen in the last judgment

will appear to be genuine but what is not seen is the

underlying fraud in obtaining the judgment which is

the gravamen of the complaint. It is extremely

prejudicial to the plaintiff when the court glances at

the last judgement for the sake of inferring facial

plausibility of relief. Facial plausibility for relief

requirement of 12(b)(6) prompts the judges to

seriously consider res judicata defense which leads

them into the trap of shielding defendants' fraud like

what happened in this case.

This court cautioned before about such trap when

invoking res judicata in Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S.

127, 132 (1979). ("res judicata shields the fraud and

the cheat as well as the honest person. It therefore is

to be invoked only after careful inquiry." (emphasis

added)).

Even "careful inquiry" can't prevent highly

erroneous judicial decision for three reasons: (1)

court does not have complete record to determine the

quality, extensiveness, or fairness of procedures

followed in prior litigation which is required to

invoke res judicata. Kremer v. Chemical Constr., 456

U.S. 461,481(1982). (2) Successful fraud-upon-thecourt always generates facially valid court orders

because that was the goal of the fraud. Therefore, it

is impossible for the lower court to segregate

documents which were not tainted by fraud-uponthe-court to validate the finality of the prior

judgment to invoke res judicata and avoid a fatal

error that could be extremely prejudicial to plaintiff.

(3) Even if all of the facts are in, the court already

that it is "wholly

established in Hazel-Atlas

impossible" to appraise the effectiveness of fraud on

the prior judges.

The intensity of defendants' fraud-upon-the-court

and facially valid court orders can overwhelm and

defeat the factual allegations during 12(b)(6)

hearing. For example, it is generally inconceivable to

think that five judges (Hon. Myron Brown, Gale

Hickman, Franz Miller, Nancy Pollard, and David

Belz) can be deceived by parading guardian ad litem

for a competent litigant. But under the environment

of California family courts, it can and did happen

because of the case load of one new case for each

working hour of the judge and inexperience of the

judges. In fact, Hughes are not disputing that they

used a guardian ad litem to represent a competent

litigant for over 10 years. Hughes used the facially

valid minute orders of the family court showing the

presence of fake guardian ad litem before four judges

as the presence of court appointed guardian ad litem

to convince the California Court of Appeals to

successfully seek litigation privilege. Hughes also

used corrupted judgment of California Court of

Appeals in the federal district court and the Federal

Court of Appeals for the 9th circuit to argue against

the factual allegations to successfully invoke res

judicata defense. Thus, the federal courts also

became an unwitting victim of Hughes' fraud with

Hazel-Atlas type fraud.

Therefore, 12(b)(6) has strong potential to shield

fraud when defendants use res judicata defense and

to defeat the following precedents of this court: (a)

holding of this court in United States v. Shotwell

Mfg., 355 U.S. 233,241 (1957 that corrupt court

documents shall not be used in making judicial

decisions. (b) holding of this court in Commissioner

v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591,597-598 (1948) that when

"fraud or some other factor invalidating the

judgment" is present, the doctrine of res judicata

does not apply.

C. 12(b)(6) shields attorneys' theft of

properties and retirement funds in

family courts as legal fees in the nature

of domestic support under 11

U.S.C523(a)(5) because court can't

detect fraud in defenses and objections.

The goal of attorney fraud in the family courts

involves obtaining court order for legal fees that

can be used under 11 U.S.C523(a)(5). During

adjudication of 12(b)(6) motion, it is impossible

for the federal court to determine the underlying

fraud of legal fees order in the family court.

Dismissal of the complaint will thus shield the

perpetrator from theft of plaintiff's social security

funds and 401k retirement funds.

12(b)(6) shields attorneys' fraud forcing

plaintiff into servitude until death to pay

legal fees under 11 U.S.0 §523(a)(5)

because court can't detect fraud in

defenses and objections.

When properties and retirement funds are not

enough to pay legal fees, the attorney uses 11 U.S.0

§523(a)(5) to garnish social security benefits which

indirectly forces the victim to keep working to make

up for the loss of the social security benefits during

retirement years. However, during adjudication of

12(b)(6) motion, it is impossible for the federal court

to determine the underlying fraud of how the

attorney is indirectly forcing the victim into

servitude until death. This case is a good example.

12(b)(6) makes the court an abettor of

iniquity because court can't detect fraud

in defenses and objections.

Taking the factual allegations of movants' fraudupon-the-court in the complaint as true, it must be

presumed that movant's hands are unclean.

The court in Hazel-Atlas, 322 US at 247 held

that defendants "are in no position now to dispute its

effectiveness. Neither should they now be permitted

to escape the consequences." See also Dixon v. CIR,

316 F. 3d 1041, 1046 (Court of Appeals, 9th Circuit

2003) ("Fraud on the court occurs when the

misconduct harms the integrity of the judicial

process, regardless of whether the opposing party is

prejudiced. Furthermore, the perpetrator of the

fraud should not be allowed to dispute the

effectiveness of the fraud after the fact.") (Citations

omitted).

The integrity of the judiciary is compromised

when courts assent to, entertain, or even hear

defenses and objections predicated on or implicated

by the movant's fraud-upon-the-court. As this Court

put it, the court should not "be 'the abettor of

V. Automotive

iniquity." Precision Inst.

Maintenance, 324 U.S. 806, 814-815 (1945).

In applying the doctrine, what is material is not

that defendants' hands are dirty, but that they

dirtied them in acquiring the right they now assert,

or that the manner of dirtying renders inequitable

the assertion of such rights against plaintiff.

Therefore, this court should invoke the doctrine and

exempt complaints based on fraud-upon-the-court (a

government entity) under 12(b)(6).

The clean hands doctrine derives from the

equitable maxim that "he who comes into equity

must come with clean hands." This maxim "closes

the doors of a court of equity to one tainted with

inequitableness or bad faith relative to the matter in

which he seeks relief." Precision Inst. Mfg.

Automotive Maintenance Mach., 324 U.S. 806, 814

(1945). The most dominant goal or norm that

judges ascribe to the clean hands doctrine is the

protection of what is best captured by the concept of

"court integrity." Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438, 484

(1928) (the clean hands doctrine is applied in order

to preserve the judicial process from contamination.)

Courts of justice should not abet iniquity and

wrongdoing because doing so would put their nature

as courts of justice and fairness in peril. Furthering,

tolerating, abetting, or turning a blind eye to

wrongdoing conflicts with the core normative tenets

of courts of justice, even in cases where doing so

would further a good greater than the loss in terms

of court integrity. A variant of this position is that in

cases of fraud-upon-the-court, court's integrity is put

at risk of becoming marred by the hypocrisy of the

movant whose hands are unclean. Thus courts—as a

matter of their core normative tenets—must not

"dirty their hands" by hearing, entertaining, or

assenting to motion by a movant whose hands are

unclean. Even if an all-things-considered analysis

were to justify the court's entertaining and even

assenting to a claim brought by a movant with

unclean hands, interests of court integrity shall

persist and must prevail in justifying the court in

denying the motion by employing the clean hands

doctrine, thereby washing its hands of a motion

tainted with the movant's iniquity.

In a sense, the integrity account of the clean

hands doctrine shall rest on a justification concerned

with keeping the court's own hands clean. Therefore,

under clean hands doctrine, 12(b)(6) must not

entertain any motion when the motion opposes a

fraud-upon-the-court based complaint.

F. 12(b)(6) shields defendants' role in

making state court proceedings corrupt

and Coram non judice because court

can't detect fraud in defenses and

objections.

When the complaint is a mixed question of state

court's budget crisis and defendants' fraud-upon-thestate-court, it is impossible for the federal court to

segregate the effects of each factor during

adjudication of 12(b)(6) motion. When the court fails

to make the essential findings because of alleged

fraud, then the proceeding must be considered

Coram non judice. Waialua Agr. Co. v. Maneja, 178

F. 2d 603,607 (9th Circuit 1949). Thus when the

court considers the defenses and objection under

12(b)(6), defendants' role in making state court

proceedings corrupt and Coram non judice will be

shielded.

V. Court's authority to dismiss the complaint

under 12(b)(6) does not extend to

complaints based on fraud-upon-the-court.

Denial of 12(b)(6) motion seeking dismissal of

fraud-upon-the-court is a matter of law under HazelAtlas and clean hands doctrine. However, dismissal

of fraud-upon-the-court based complaint is a matter

of fact, not a matter of law, as discussed below.

Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes a court to dismiss a

claim on the basis of a dispositive issue of law. This

procedure, operating on the assumption that the

factual allegations in the complaint are true, stream

litigation by dispensing with needless

lines

discovery and fact finding. Neitzke v. Williams, 490

US 319, 326-327 (1989). As fraud-upon-the-court is

matter of fact for the jury to decide, the court has no

authority to dismiss it as long as the complaint

meets the heightened pleading standards for all

elements of fraud-upon-the -court.

This Court has defined mixed questions as those

in which "the historical facts are admitted or

established, the rule of law is undisputed, and the

issue is whether the facts satisfy the [relevant]

statutory [or constitutional] standard, or to put it

another way, whether the rule of law as applied to

the established facts is or is not violated" PullmanStandard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 289 Fn.19 (1982).

Thus, there are three distinct steps in deciding a

mixed fact-law question. The first step is the

establishment of the "basic, primary, or historical

facts: facts 'in the sense of a recital of external

events and the credibility of their narrators .J."

Townsend v. Sam, 372 U.S. 293, 309 Fn.6 (1963)

(quoting Brown v. Allen, 344 U.5443, 506 (1953)

(opinion of Frankfurter, J)). The second step is the

selection of the applicable rule of law. The third step

and the most troublesome for standard of review

is the application of law to fact or, in

purposes

other words, the determination "whether the rule of

law as applied to the established facts is or is not

violated." Pullman-Standard, 456 U.S. at 289 Fn.19.

As defendants filed the motion before answering

the complaint, it is not possible for the court to

establish the facts. Therefore, second and third steps

are moot and court can't dismiss the complaint

under FRCP 12(b)(6).

Fraud-upon-the-court is a question of fact for the

jury to decide. Adjudication under 12(b)(6) amounts

denial of plaintiffs right to jury trial. Even if the

complaint is treated as a mixed question of fact and

law, the basis for dismissal of the complaint under

12(b)(6) is still wrong.

VLCourt does not have authority to deny

federal remedy when state court is unable

or unwilling to protect federal rights.

Fraud-upon-the-court is a stealthy encroachment

on federal rights to advance unconstitutional

interests. In Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635

(1886), this court held that, "It is the duty of the

courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of

the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments

thereon. Their motto should be obstaprineipiis."

Fraud makes the state procedural law inadequate

in practice. In Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 100101 (1980), this court stated,

"In reviewing the legislative history of §1983 in

Monroe v. Pape, [365 U.S.167 (1961)], the Court

inferred that Congress had intended a federal

remedy in three circumstances: where state

substantive law was facially unconstitutional,

KIIJ

where state procedural law was inadequate to

allow full litigation of a constitutional claim, and

where state procedural law, though adequate in

theory, was inadequate in practice. 365 U. S., at

173-174. In short, the federal courts could step in

where the state courts were unable or unwilling

to protect federal rights." (Emphasis added)

Therefore, when factual allegations of fraud are

supported by compliance with all of the elements of

fraud-upon-the-court, the court has no authority to

deny federal remedy by dismissing the complaint.

Instead, under clean hands doctrine, the court is

expected to step in and prevent the wrongdoer from

benefiting at the expense of dignity and integrity of

the court.

VII. Plaintiff has constitutional right to due

process with minimized risk of erroneous

decision.

In Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979),

this court held that courts "must be mindful that the

function of legal process is to minimize the risk of

erroneous decisions." And in Greenholtz v. Nebraska

Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1979), the court

confirmed that "the function of legal process, as that

concept is embodied in the Constitution, and in the

realm of factfinding, is to minimize the risk of

erroneous decisions."

In Hazel-Atlas, 822 U.S at 247, the court ruled

that "[I]t is wholly impossible accurately to appraise

the influence of [fraud] exerted on the judges."

(Emphasis added).

Therefore, disposition of fraud-upon-the-court

claims under 12(b)(6) carries substantial risk of

erroneous decision and greater than a trial because

it is "wholly impossible" for the court to detect any

inherent fraud in the defenses and objections

presented by the defendants and also because of lack

of discovery, testimonies, and cross-examinations.

Therefore, the "action at law" in 42 U.S.0 §1983 can

only be interpreted to mean jury trial or bench trial

as the best process to minimize the risk of error

when the gravamen of the complaint is fraud-uponthe-court.

If defendants lose, the consequences are the cost

of jury trial. If the Plaintiff loses, the consequences

are loss of liberty and property interests, and

servitude until death [like in this case at bar when

the harm originates under family law (11 U.S.0

§523(a)(5) (domestic support obligation)]. Thus, the

plaintiff is unconstitutionally exposed to the risk of

erroneous dismissal simply because the court failed

to perform its duty under clean hands doctrine. That

is not what the laws are intended for.

Accordingly, this court is required to incorporate

some flexibility into the adjudication of the motion

under 12(b)(6). Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,

481 (1972). Exempting fraud-upon-the-court claims

under 12(b)(6) protects due process rights of all

parties by letting the case go to trial.

VIII. Private attorneys who fraudulently

obtain court orders must be held liable as

state actors.

In reviewing the court's earlier cases, Justice

Souter, writing for the majority, catalogued seven

factors that can be relevant in attributing private

conduct to the State: (1) when the challenged activity

"results from the State's exercise of 'coercive power";

(2) "when the State provides 'significant

encouragement, either overt or covert"; (3) "when a

private actor operates as a 'willful participant in

joint activity with the State or its agents"; (4) when

a nominally private entity is "controlled by an

'agency of the State"; (5) when a private entity has

been "delegated a public function by the State"; (6)

when the challenged activity "is 'entwined with

governmental policies"; or (7) "when government is

'entwined in [the entity's] management or control."

Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School

Athletic Assn., 531 U.S. 288,296 (2001).

None of the above the factors address the issue of

fraud-upon-the-court; or private use of judicial

officers, court procedures and court facilities to

advance unconstitutional private interests.

In Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365

U.S. 715, 722 (1961), this court stated that, "Only by

sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the

nonobvious involvement of the State in private

conduct be attributed its true significance."

The involvement of state in the private conduct is

nonobvious when the court is deceived. It is

impossible for the court during 12(b)(6) hearing to

detect the presence or absence of nonobvious

involvement of the state because the record lacks

results of discovery.

In Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167,180 (1961), this

court held that prejudice, passion, neglect, and

intolerance are considered state actions. In the same

fashion, states' failure to prevent fraud on itself

translates into its lack of diligence (neglect) to

protect public and therefore, shall be considered a

state action.

Additionally, from Burton v. Wilmington Parking

Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961), it can be inferred

that use of government facilities to advance private

unconstitutional interests constitute state action.

The concept of fraud-upon-the-court can't exist

independent of private motivation to advance private

unconstitutional interests. Additionally, one of the

key elements of fraud-upon-the-court, presence of

officer of the court occurs when the fraud is

committed upon the court. The lesson of Burton is

simply that a private party is not entitFed to have its

wishes enforced by the government when such

enforcement would be unconstitutional. The private

motivation in such a case ceases to be private when

it becomes the basis for governmental action.

California's practice of appointing family court

judges without experience in the specialized family

court law violated California's Judicial Standard

5.30(e)(1) which requires "sufficient training to

perform their jobs competently." That practice

triggered judges' reliance on the attorneys and the

attorneys voluntarily directed the judges to make

the decisions in a certain way. Thus the state and

attorneys become joint actors in the adjudication of

the issues.

California's Judicial Standard 5.30(c)(2) requires

"adequate time to hear and decide the matters before

it." However, California's practice of assigning as

many as 2,500 news cases to the judges which equals

at least one new case per each working hour of the

judge substantially lessened the time to adjudicate

the issues on merits and constitutes state action for

42 U.S.0 §1983 action.

The issue of defendants taking unfair advantage

of court's internal administrative problems has been

raised in the complaint ¶98 (Doc#1/Pg_37). When

Hughes took unfair advantage of California's

internal administrative problems, they became part

of the state action during court's adjudication of the

issues and thus became state actors.

Also, Judge David Belz's actions from December

2009 to January 2011 indicates joint state action.

IX.Complaints based on fraud-upon-the-court

shall be exempt from 12(b)(6) as a matter of

law.

For more than 70 years, the leading authority on

fraud-upon-the-court has been Hazel-Atlas, 322 US

at 247-248 in which this court held, "Doubtless it is

wholly impossible accurately to appraise the

influence that the [fabricated evidence] exerted on

the judges. * * * [Defendants] are in no position now

to dispute [fraud's] effectiveness. Neither should

they now be permitted to escape the consequences. *

* * The question, then, is not whether relief can be

granted, but which court can grant it." (Emphasis

added)

In Shawkee Mfg. v. Hartford-Empire, 322 U.S.

271, 273 (1944), this court ruled, "The prayer for

relief of Shawkee and the others was that the court

adjudge that Hartford did not come into court with

clean hands, and that they be fully freed from

further obligations under the judgments against

them. This relief should be granted."

12(b)(6) violates the above precedents by allowing

the defendants to attack the complaint and requiring

the judge to infer relief when this court already

established that the relief should be presumed.

Justice Roberts stated in Hazel-Atlas, supra at

251 that, "No fraud is more odious than an attempt

to subvert the administration of justice." Therefore,

the court shall not allow the defendants to escape

from the consequences by allowing them to present

defenses and objections under 12(b)(6). Instead, it

must deny the motion pursuant to the admonition in

Hazel-Atlas supra at 246 that "The public welfare

demands that the agencies of public justice be not so

impotent that they must always be mute and

helpless victims of deception and fraud."

got

X. Questions are relevant because facial

plausibility for relief requirement under

FRCP 12(b)(6) is causing failure of the lower

courts to properly address the underlying

fraud-upon-the-court and state action.

The gravamen of the complaint is defendants'

fraud-upon-the-court. Doc#1.

The gravamen of the oral arguments in the

district court proceeding is defendants' fraud upon

the court. Appendix-38a.

The gravamen of the appellants briefs filed in the

lower courts is defendants' fraud upon the court.

DktEntry 4 and 19.

Yet, none of the judges addressed the impact of

the fraud-upon-the-court because the facial

plausibility of relief requirement was clouding the

judicial process. If this argument is not true, the

questions would have been answered by the lower

courts eliminating the need for this petition.

Petitioner raised the issues of res judicata in the

context of state court's failure to provide judicial

remedy even after acknowledging that petitioner

was victimized. Appendix-46a/47a. However, court is

looking at the facial value of the court orders

obtained by fraud without addressing impact of the

alleged fraud in the complaint.

Petitioner raised the issue of state action to get

answer to the 2nd question. Appendix-41a. It was

specifically alleged that the defendants conspired

among themselves to take unfair advantage of court's

administrative problems (Doc#1/3 7, ComplJ 98) and

that defendants successfully executed the conspiracy

scheme (Doc#1/47,Compliant) which is nonobvious in

the facial plausibility. The court is looking for

conspiracy between the judge and defendants to

decide the state action which is not an applicable

standard in fraud-upon-the-court case. So the 2nd

question is not answered.

In Board of Regents of Univ. of State of NY v.

Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478,485 (1980) held that 42

U.S.C. §1988 authorizes federal courts, in an action

under §1983, to disregard an otherwise applicable

state rule of law if the state law is inconsistent with

the federal policy underlying §1983. In the case at

bar, the state court admitted victimizing the

petitioner but did not provide a judicial remedy for

over 10 years. So, obviously, the state law is

inconsistent with the federal policy underlying

§1983. However, the facial plausibility for relief

requirement misled the lower courts resulting in the

dismissal of the plaintiffs complaint because it was

impossible for the lower courts to find out where the

state law was inconsistent with federal policy in the

setting of 12(b)(60 adjudication.

XI. This case presents an ideal vehicle in which

to resolve these important questions.

A check in the California court records will show

that this case is the best case to address the issues of

fraud and lawlessness in California family courts:

Reason #1 (Court's admission that family court

litigation was unfair): In November 2003, family

court admitted on the record that the underlying

litigation was comical, tragic, and horrible and that

Satya was victimized. Doc#1/Pg-5. As of today,

Hughes prevented the courts from correcting the

situation by deceiving the judges.

Reason #2: Five judges (Myron Brown, Gale

Hickman, Franz Miller, Nancy Pollard, and David

Belz) in the family court were deceived by 16

attorney defendants during a period of 10 years.

Also, three appellate judges in the California Court

of Appeals in the appeal of family court and three

appellate judges in the California court of Appeals in

the last action were deceived by defendants' use of

corrupt family court records. Total judges deceived

were 5+3+3=11.

Reason #3: (preventing legally mandated

findings): Since November 2000, Hughes prevented

the family court from making findings mandated by

FC4332, FC4320, FC4322, and FC4323. Finally,

when the California Court of Appeals ordered the

family court to make FC2032 finding (Doc#1-2/Pg251) which required to make finding of FC4320

which in turn required finding of FC4332, Hughes

tricked the inexperienced judge to make standard of

living finding based on the financial condition of

Satya 10 years after divorce (in 2010) instead of

financial conditions of Satya and his ex-wife during

marriage from 1972 to 1999 as ordered by the

California Court of Appeals.

Reason #4 (Involves repeated impersonation as

an officer of court): Hughes paraded fake guardian

RUG

ad litem since 4/17/2001. The trial court made a

finding in January 2011 that Plaintiff's ex-wife was

competent. However, Hughes did not stop using fake

guardian ad litem on behalf of ex-wife even after

that finding. Doc#1/Pg-45. (Compi ¶107)

.Reason #5 (theft of social security benefits using

court order): Family court was used as a tool to steal

social security benefits under 11 U.S.0 §523(a)(5)

(domestic support obligation) (Doc# 1/Pg-54).

Reason #6 (forcing family court litigant into

servitude): Defendants defrauded the court to force

Satya to pay alimony order and legal fees until his

death in violation of his 13th amendment rights.

Reason #7 State's budget crisis that made the

fraud-upon-the-court possible is nonobvious

justifying this court's review to determine state

action.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be

granted.

Respectfully submitted,

Satya V. Reddi, Pro Se

2265 Lichen Lane

Tustin, CA 92780

(714)552-2469

Email: satyareddi@yahoo.com

April 16, 2018

Appendix-la

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SATYA V. REDDI,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

HUGHES & HUGHES LLP; et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 15-56739

D.C. No. 8:15-cv-01054-JVS-DFM

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

James V. Selna, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted August 9, 2017**

FILED AUG 15 2017 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

Before: SCHROEDER, TASHIMA, and M. SMITH,

Circuit Judges.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication

and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth

Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is

suitable for decision without oral argument. See

Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

Satya V. Reddi appeals pro se from the

district court's order dismissing his action alleging

federal and state law claims arising from his prior

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.