Petition for Writ of Certiorari — In Re Lawrence Lynell Simmons, Petitioner

Supreme Court briefApr 3, 2018

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No. 17-

1n the

'upreme Court of the frmniteb 'tate

In Re LAWRENCE LYNELL SIMMONS,

Petitioner.

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus and

Prohibition to the Supreme Court of Michigan

PETITION FOR WRIT OF

MANDAMUS AND PROHIBITION

LAWRENCE L. SIMMONS

PETITIONER PRO SE

CITIZEN OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES

1314 EAST STOCKBRIDGE AVENUE

KALAMAZOO, MI 49001

(269) 779-9188

SPLASHDANCE2004@YAHOO.COM

APRIL 2, 2018

SUPREME COURT PRESS

• (888) 958-5705 • BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Michigan Const. 1963, art 6, sec 6 binds the

Michigan Supreme Court to provide an opinion, which.

states, "Decisions of the supreme court, including all

decisions on prerogative writs, shall be in writing and

shall contain a concise statement of the facts and

reasons for each denial of leave to appeal. When a

judge dissents in whole or in part he shall give in

writing the reason for the dissent."

In the order below, the Michigan Supreme Court

denied leave to appeal in one-sentence DENIAL through

memorandum order making the UNITED STATES

SUPREME COURT review this case blind and start

from scratch, with no notion of the issues the Michigan

Supreme Court found dispositive, to disclose the

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT is not free

simply to provide a focused analysis of the key issues

in the case; instead, it must review the entire case to

determine the key issues before making its determination.

THE QUESTION PRESENTED Is:

A. Whether Petitioner is entitled to relief pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. Sec 1651(a) to vacate the order of the

Michigan Supreme Court, or other relief as this court

deems appropriate.

ii

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

RESPONDENTS

• Chief Justice Stephen J. Markman

• Justice Brian K. Zahra

• Justice Bridget Mary McCormack

• Justice David F. Viviano

• Justice Richard Bernstein

• Justice Kurtis T. Wilder

• Justice Elizabeth T. Clement, SC-Michigan,

are the JUSTICES to whom mandamus is sought.

Note: Justice Elizabeth T. Clement appears to be the

only Justice that reviewed the application, but did not

participate because Thomas P. Clement-GC was

handling a FOIA request from Petitioner.

PETITIONER

•

LAWRENCE L. SIMMONS is the party to proceeding in the Kalamazoo County Ninth Judicial

Circuit Court case file no. B15-0159-AA

Michigan Court Appeals case file no. 329955;

and, Michigan Supreme Court case file no.

155780.

DEFENDANT

• Appellee, respondent Office of Child Support is

the party to the proceeding in the Kalamazoo

Ninth Judicial Circuit Court case file no. B150159-AA; Michigan Court of Appeals case file

no. 329955; and, Michigan Supreme Court case

file no. 155780.

111

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTIONS PRESENTED........................................i

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING ...........................ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......................................v

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS AND

PROHIBITION.....................................................1

OPINONS BELOW.....................................................1

JURISDICTION..........................................................1

STATUTES INVOLVED ............................................2

STATEMENT OF FACTS ..........................................4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE..................................11

REASON FOR GRANTING THE PETITION.........12

A. PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO REFLIEF

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. SEC 1651(A) TO

VACATE THE ORDER OF THE MICHIGAN

SUPREME COURT, OR OTHER RELIEF AS THIS

COURT DEEMS APPROPRIASTE .........................14

A Writ Will Aid This Court's Jurisdiction Because the Michigan Supreme

Courts Failure to Render a Decision

Operates to Deprive the United States

Supreme Court of Its Appellate Jurisdiction.............................................................14

The Nearly Three-Year Delay in this

Case Constitutes Extraordinary Circumstances Warranting a Writ of Mandamus. 17

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Continued

-

Page

III. No other Adequate Relief is Available to

Petitioner...................................................23

CONCLUSION..........................................................27

APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS

Order of the Supreme Court of Michigan Denying

Application for Leave to Appeal

(November 29, 2017) ..........................................la

Opinion of the Michigan Court of Appeals

(February 28, 2017) ............................................2a

Opinion and Order Affirming Decision of the

Office of Child Support Central Operations

(September 15, 2015)..........................................8a

Notice of Lien, Levy and Disclosure

(March 18, 2015) ............................................... iGa

Order of Filiation

(August 13, 1990) .............................................19a

Brief on Appeal Before the Honorable Paul J.

Bridenstine Excerpts (August 7, 2015)............25a

Appellant Brief on Appeal to the Michigan Court

of Appeals Excerpts (January 15, 2016)..........28a

Application for Leave to Appeal Excerpts

(May 13, 2017) ..................................................32a

V

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES

Armstong v. Manzo,

380 U.S. 545 (1965) ...........................................20

B P 7 v. Bureau of State Lottery,

225 Mich.App. 811,

572 N.W.2d 663 (1997)........................................9

Baldwin v. Hale,

68 U.S. 223 (1863) .............................................20

Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Holland,

346 U.S. 379, 74 5.Ct. 145,

98 L.Ed. 106 (1953) ...............................11, 14, 15

Carey v. Piph us,

435 U.S. 247 (1978) ...........................................19

Cheney v. United States District Court,

542 U.S. 380 (2004)............................................15

Citizens Protecting Michigan Constitution v.

Secretary of State,

482 Mich. 960 (2008) .......................12, 24, 25, 26

De Beers Consol. Mines v. United States,

325 U.S. 217 (1945) ...........................................15

Ex Parte United States,

287 U.S. 21 (1932) .......................................16, 17

Fuentes v. She yin,

407 U.S. 76 (1972) ..............................................20

Goldberg v. Kelly,

397 U.S. 254 (1970) ...........................................20

v1

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

Hinlcy Dinky Supermarket, Inc. V. Dept of

Comm unity Health,

261 Mich.App 604, N.W.2d 759 (2004) ...............18

In re Beck,

488 Mich. 6 (2010) ......................................passim

In re Forfeiture of Certain Personal Property,

441 Mich. 77 (1992) ............................................. 9

Johnson v. Rogers,

917 F.2d 1283 (10th Cir. 1990) .........................19

Joint anti-Fascit Refugee Committee v.

McGrath, 341 US 123 (1951) ...........................20

Knickerbocker Ins. Co. of Chicago v. Comstock,

83 U.S. 258 (1872) ............................................16

Landon Holdings, Inc. v. Grattan Twp.,

257 Mich.App 154, 66 N.W.2d 93 (2003) ..........18

Marbury v. Madison,

5 U.S. 137 (1803) .........................................15, 16

Mathews v. Eldridge,

424 U.S. 319 (1976) ...........................................20

Mettler Waion LLC v. Melrose TWP

281 Mich.App 184, 761 N.W.2d 293 (2008) ........ 9

Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,

339 U.S. 306 (1950) ...........................................20

Reed v. Reed,

404 U.S. 71 (1971) ......................................... 9, 10

Richard v. Jefferson County,

517 U.S. 793 (1996) ...........................................20

Vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n,

319 U.S. 21 (1943) .......................................15, 17

Schiagenha uf v. Holder,

379 U.S. 104 (1964) ...........................................22

US Alkali Export Ass 'n v. United States,

325 U.S. 202 (1945) ..........................................15

US. v. Johnson,

732 F.2d 379 (4th Cir. 1984) .............................19

United States v. US. Dist. Court for Eastern

Dist. ofMich., Southern Division (Keith),

444 F.2d 651 (6th Cir. 1971) .............................22

Will v. Calvert Fire Insurance Co.,

437U.5655(1978) ............................................17

Willy. US,

389 U.S. 90, 88 S.Ct. 269,

19 L.Ed.2d 305 (1967) .......................................11

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

Mich. Const. 1963, Art. I, § 17...........................passim

Mich. Const. 1963, Art. VI, § 6 ........................passim

U.S. Const. amend. XIV ..................................... passim

U.S. Const. Art. III, § 1.............................................22

U.S. Const. Art. III, § 2 ..............................................22

STATUTES

28 U.S.C. § 1254........................................................17

viii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) ............................................passim

28 U.S.C. § 2101(c)......................................1, 2, 17, 27

STATE STATUTES

M.C.L.A. § 24.304........................................................5

M.C.L.A. § 552.602......................................................3

M.C.L.A. § 552.625a(1) ............................................2, 4

M.C.L.A. § 552.625c(2).............................................2, 4

M.C.L.A. § 552.625f(2)(c)..........................................23

M.C.L.A. § 552.650.......................................................3

M.C.L.A. § 600.5809(4) ............................................3, 8

JUDICIAL RULES

Sup. Ct. R. 20.1 ..................................................passim

OTHER AUTHORITIES

16 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur Raphael

Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal

Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction 2d

Sec 3933.1 (2d ed. 1996)....................................16

More Federal Practice,

§ 204.021151 (3d ed. 2008) ...................................16

1

PETITION FOR WRIT OF

MANDAMUS AND PROHIBITION

Petitioner, respectfully petitions for writ of mandamus and prohibition to vacate the order of the Michigan

Supreme Court and prohibit such future orders.

OPINONS BELOW

The order of the Michigan Supreme Court is not

reported, but is reproduced at Pet.App.la. The Michigan

Court of Appeals Per Curiam Order is unpublished,

but is reproduced at Pet.App.2a-7a. The Michigan

Circuit Court Opinion and Order is not reported, but

is reproduced at Pet.App.8a-15a.

JURISDICTION

The Michigan Supreme Court entered Order on

November 29, 2017. This Court's jurisdiction rest on

28 U.S.C. Sec 1651(a) and 28 U.S.C. Sec 2101(c).

2

—o--.

STATUTES INVOLVED

.

Title 28 U.S.C. Sec 1651(a) provides:

(a) The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdiction and agreeable to the usage and principle

of law.

• Title 28 U.S.C. Sec 2101(c) provides:

(c) Any other appeal or any writ of certiorari

intended to bring any judgment or decree in a civil

action, suit or proceeding before the Supreme Court

for review shall be taken or applied for within

ninety days after entry of such judgment or decree.

A Justice of the Supreme Court, for good cause

shown, may extend the time for applying for a writ

of certiorari for a period not exceeding sixty days.

Michigan's Support and Parenting Time Enforcement Act, Act No. 295 of the Public acts of 1982,

being Section 552.601, particularly, MCL 552.

625c(2), incorporating MCL 552.625a(1) (hereafter

"SAPTEA") allows for specific Michigan State

Offices, particularly in this case, the Office of

Child Support (hereafter "OCS") to send facsimile

to a financial institution for lien and seizure of

financial assets; declaring, "an arrearage has

occurred in an amount that exceeds 2 times the

monthly of periodic support payments payable

under a payer's support order," the title IV-D

agency may levy against any of the following items

subject to lien, incorporating MCL 552.625a(1) on

3

the presumption of a child support order(s) on

record.

However, full disclosure the underlying support

duty Filiation Order legally terminated by court

Order of competent jurisdiction is not enforceable

under the SAPTEA and rendered moot, enforced

under in In re Beck, 488 Mich. 6 (2010), holding,

"the support duty continues unless the duty is

modified Or terminated by a court of competent

jurisdiction."

Michigan's Revised Judicature Act of 1961

(EXCERPT) Act 236 of 1961, being Section

600.101, particularly, MCL 600.5809(4) (hereafter

"RJA") allows for an action to enforce a support

order [that is enforceable] under the support and

parenting time enforcement act, Act No. 295 of the

Public Acts of 1982, being sections 552.602 to

552.650 of the Michigan Complied Laws, the period

of limitations is 10 years from the date that the

last support payment is due under the support

order regardless of whether or not the last payment

is made.

However, where it has been fully disclosed that

the support duty Filiation Order legally terminated

by Court Order of competent jurisdiction consistent

with In re Beck, supra., manifestly establish the

legally terminated support order is not enforceable

under the SAPTEA, rendering action under RJA

moot.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On March 18, 2015, OCS advanced facsimile Financial Institution Lien, Levy and Disclosure to the

Financial Institution—Kalsee Credit Union, causing

electronic seizure of Petitioner's private financial

assets totaling $1,880.90 Noticed under the Support

and Parenting Time Enforcement Act, MCL 552.625a

(i) and 552.625c(2), App. 16a-18a

On June 22, 2015 Hearing was held; upon which,

Petitioner Notified the Court that the 1990 support

duty Filiation Order legally terminated upon the child's

18th birthday in accord with the Release Clause. See.

15 Min. Mtn 11mg, 06/22/2015, Case No. 2015-0159-AA.

On August 07, 2015, within five months of March

18, 2015, PETITIONER, in BRIEF before the Kalamazoo County Circuit Court, App.25a-27a, fully disclosed under competent jurisdiction of Default Filiation Order, the Kalamazoo County Ninth Judicial

Circuit Court, Honorable Richard Ryan Lamb included

a release clause for legal termination of the 1990 support duty Filiation Order upon the child's eighteenth (18)

birthday through plain language, ORDERING, 'Defendant has a duty of support.. to said child until the

child reaches the age of eighteen (18) years, for until

further Order of the Court," App.12a-14a, clearly required entered on or before the closing escrow date of

the child's eighteenth birthday November 13, 20051,

establishing that the 1990 support duty Filiation

Order legally terminated November 13, 2005 and is not

enforceable under the SAPTEA advanced March 18,

2015, In re Beck, supra, decided Dec 20, 2010 and

.

5

equitable estoppel controlling, calling for the duty and

obligation of the Court to enforce the legal termination

with respects to petitioner's claim of review pursuant

to MCL 24.304; to wit, PETITIONER sought reimbursement order, plus interest and OCS's unlawful

seizure set-aside to end the civil litigation, App. 27a. [sic]

On August 28, 2015, OCS, acting through the

Michigan Department of Attorney General's Office

(hereafter 'Department'), filed Brief advancing the

moot none legal frivolous defense, demanding all Michigan Courts affirm financial assessment, examining

past/unpaid support from before the child reached 18

years old based on review of the case history of file no.

1990-1098-DP, dishonestly arranged under and outside the enabling clause of the SAPTEA. See, Brief On

Appeal of Appellee Office of Child Support—Central

Operations 08/28/2015, Case No. 2015-0159-AA.

On September 15, 2015, the Kalamazoo County

Ninth Judicial Circuit Court, Honorable Paul J. Bridenstine through manifest usurpation of judicial power

mandated in the ministerial duty under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the

United States Constitution and Michigan Const. 1963,

art 1, sec 17, in exercise of function on appeal from

agency decision to follow through with the material

facts fully disclosing the 1990 support duty Filiation

Order legally terminated November 13, 2005, provided

for in the conditions of the terms used in the language

of the Release Clause, "Defendant has a duty of supto said child until the child reaches the age of

port.

eighteen (18) years," under competent jurisdiction of the

Honorable Judge Richard Ryan Lamb, In re Beck, supra.

and equitable estoppel controlling and a clear abuse of

.

.

.

discretion deciding the moot none legal frivolous

defense with a single sentence, stating, "However, that

did not absolve Petitioner of his obligation to pay for

the child support that was due and remains unpaid

from before his daughter reached 18 years of age," as

the rationale for the Order and Opinion Affirming the

Decision of the Office of the Child Support Central

Operations. App.8a-15a.

On October 30, 2015 Claim of Appeal: Civil, was

filed with the Michigan Court of Appeals, See. Claim

of Appeal; Civil event 1, Case No. 329955.

On January 15, 2016, petitioner submitted Brief,

fully disclosing under the competent jurisdiction of

Default Filiation Order, the Kalamazoo County Ninth

Judicial Circuit Court, Honorable Richard Ryan Lamb

included a release clause for legal termination of the

1990 support duty Filiation Order upon the child's

eighteenth (18) birthday, being November 13, 2005,

sufficient to RULE the 1990 support duty Filiation

Order otherwise Support Order is not enforceable under

the SAPTEA, In re Beck, supra. and Equitable Estoppel

controlling; to wit, PETITIONER sought reimbursement order, plus interest; reversal of the Circuit

Court's September 15, 2015 Order; and, that the Office

of Child Support unlawful electronic seizure set-aside,

requesting Oral Argument on the briefs to end the

civil litigation. App.28a-31a

On February 18, 2016, OCS submitted Brief

through the Department, continuing the moot none

legal frivolous defense dishonestly arranged under the

SAPTEA because it was preserved at the Circuit level,

agreeing to oral arguments on the briefs. See. Brief

Appellee event 20, Case No. 329955.

7

On February 15, 2017, one year and three days

from appellee's brief, Oral Arguments commenced in

accord with Case Call, petitioner preserved the 1990

support duty Filiation Order legally terminated November 13, 2005 and is not enforceable under the SAPTEA,

sufficient to entitle petitioner the relief pled; to wit, OCS

abandoned the moot none legal frivolous defense dishonestly arranged under the SAPTEA advanced for

twenty-three (23) months, conceding the Circuit

Courts' usurpation of judicial power and clear abuse of

discretion; to wit, the Michigan Court of Appeals made

NO DECISION. See. Case Call 02/15/2017-event 58,

Case No. 32995.

On February 28, 2017, the Michigan Court of

Appeals, Honorable Judges Borrello, P.J., Markey and

M.J. Kelly, J.J., entered unpublished per cuniam opinion

through manifest usurpation of judicial power mandated in the ministerial duty under the Due Process

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United

States Constitution and Michigan Const. 1963, art 1,

sec 17, in exercise of function on appeal, as of right,

from agency decision to follow through with the material facts fully disclosing the 1990 support duty Filiation Order legally terminated November 13, 2005, provided for in the conditions of the terms used in the language of the Release Clause, "Defendant has a duty of

to said child until the child reaches the age

support.

of eighteen (18) years," under competent jurisdiction of

the Honorable Judge Richard Ryan Lamb, In re Beck,

supra., and Equitable Estoppel controlling and a clear

abuse of discretion deciding sua sponte the RJA

applied, despite failure of OCS to argue in brief preserved before the CIRCURT COURT, nor argued,

briefed or preserved before the Michigan Court of

.

.

.

RI

Appeals, falsifying the record, holding the Circuit Court

based its Opinion and Order Affirming the Decision of

OCS on the RJA, particularly, MCL 600.5809(4); fully

disclosing, the State lacked authority to act under the

SAPTEA and RJA in light of the legal termination of

the 1990 support duty Filiation Order November 13,

2005, App.2a-7a.

On May 15, 2017, petitioner submitted Application

for leave to appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court,

raising four (4) questions; in which, questions one (1)

and two (2) where consolidated and questions three (3)

and four (4) where consolidated, seeking appropriate

relief, App.32a-55a.

On May 23, 2017, OCS submitted Answer in accord

with MCR 7.3050, failing to rebut the questions presented in the application, copying and pasting the

Michigan Court of Appeals sua sponte RJA conclusion;

thereby an untimely answer, a common practice of the

Department throughout the life of this case. See. S.Ct:

Answer event 93, Case No. 155780.

On November 9, 2017, the Michigan Supreme

Court entered Memorandum Order through manifest

usurpation of judicial power mandated in the ministerial duty under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution

and Michigan Const. 1963, art 1, sec 17, in exercise of

function on application for leave to appeal to follow

through with the material facts fully disclosing the

1990 support duty Filiation Order legally terminated

November 13, 2005, provided for in the conditions of

the terms used in the language of the Release Clause,

to said child

"Defendant has a duty of support.

until the child reaches the age of eighteen (18) years,"

.

.

.

under competent jurisdiction of the Honorable Judge

Richard Ryan Lamb, In re Beck, supra., and Equitable

Estoppel controlling and a clear abuse of discretion

advancing a single sentence of non-explanation,

"because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court," prohibited

by Michigan Const. 1963, art 6, sec 6, App. la.

Surprisingly, with regards to usurpation of judicial

power, the Michigan Supreme Court manifestly states

that it is not persuaded that the Question deciding In

re Beck, supra., establishing when the support duty

terminates, where petitioner fully disclosed the support

duty legally terminated November 13, 2005 under the

competent jurisdiction of the Honorable Richard Ryan

Lamb pursuant to the language in the Release clause

of the 1990 support duty Filiation Order, "Defendant

to said child until the child

has a duty of support.

reaches the age of eighteen (18) years"; B P 7 v.

Bureau of State Lottery, supra. and Mettler Waion

LLC v. Melrose TWP, supra., prohibiting decisions on

moot issues, even when they are preserved, where

petitioner fully disclosed actions taken under the

SAPTEA and RJA moot because the State lacked the

authority to act thereunder in light the 1990 support

duty legally terminated November 13, 2005; Booth

Newspaper, Inc. supra., and In re Forfeiture of Certain

Personal Property, supra, prohibiting the sua sponte

RJA review not presented at the lower level declined

consideration before the Michigan Appellate and

Supreme Courts; and, failure to afford proper due

process on the opportunity to be heard regarding the

Michigan Court of Appeals' sua sponte advance of the

RJA, resulting in a complete miscarriage of justice;

and, Reed v. Reed, supra., in the Michigan Court of

.

.

.

10

Appeals' oppression of basic requirements of due

process, should be reviewed by this Court, abandoning

the lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction,

despite the questions raised previously ruled upon by

the Michigan Supreme Court and Michigan Court of

Appeals, entitling petitioner to those legal protections,

ending the civil litigations favoring petitioner, including but not limited to, the Michigan Supreme Court

manifestly violated Michigan Const. 1963, art 6, sec 6,

which binds the Michigan Supreme Court to provide

an written opinion, which states, "Decisions of the

supreme court, including all decisions on prerogative

writs, shall be in writing and shall contain a concise

statement of the facts and reasons for each denial of

leave to appeal. When a judge dissents in whole or in

part he shall give in writing the reason for the dissent," clearly prohibiting "the" single sentence

[because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court] of nonexplanation, Id. at la.

The Michigan Courts failed to follow through with

the facts fully disclosing legal termination of the 1990

support duty Filiation Order, which is not enforceable

under the SAPTEA or the RJA, procedurally closing

file no. C90-1098-DP with full effect November 13,

2005, legally protected under Equitable Estoppel,

barring review for any reason(s) of the legally terminated 1990 support duty Filiation Order and case file no.

C90-1098-DP under which the Order was created.

Clearly, it is unknown to petitioner why the Michigan Supreme Court manifestly created exceptional circumstances amounting to a usurpation of judicial

power and clear abuse of discretion oppressing the

11

relief entitled petitioner, justifying the invocation of

this extraordinary remedy, Will v. US, 389 U.S. 90,

95, 88 S.Ct. 269, 19 L.Ed.2d 305 (1967); Bankers Life

& Casualty Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 383, 74 S.Ct.

145, 98 L.Ed. 106 (1953).

It is equally unknown to petitioner why the

Michigan Supreme Court took the position of usurpation of judicial power mandated by Michigan Const.

1963, art 1, sec 17; Michigan Const. 1963, art 6, sec 6;

and, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

What petitioner is aware of, is that, the process

was not fair; that a reasonable minded person would

have come to the conclusion the State lacked authority

to proceed under the SAPTEA and the RJA in light the

1990 support duty legally terminated November 13,

2005, resulting in undue delay of relief entitled petitioner for over 2 years; however, to be exact, 35

months and counting.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is a civil seizure case erroneously advanced

by OCS under the SAPTEA; in which, the entire State

of Michigan Judiciary practice undue delay, usurpation

of judicial power and a clear abuse of discretion in this

case now before this United States Supreme Court.

Mandamus relief is warranted because the Michigan Supreme Court willfully violated in the Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the

United States Constitution; Michigan Cont. 1963, art 1,

12

sec 17; and, Michigan Const. 1963, art 6, sec 6, binding

decisions of the Michigan Supreme Court, including

all decisions on prerogative writs shall be in writing

and shall contain a concise statement of the facts and

reasons for each decision and reasons for each denial

of leave to appeal. When a judge dissents in whole or

in part he shall give in writing the reasons for his dissent, prohibiting a single sentence of non-explanation.

Petitioner seeks a writ of mandamus to review

the Michigan Supreme Court's Order and Orders of the

lower Michigan Circuit Court and Court of Appeals

that offered no guidance on the "essential questions,

neglecting the courts' duty to the citizens of Michigan,

which includes petitioner, Citizens Protecting Michigan Constitution v. Secretary of State, 482 Mich.

960 (2008).

REASON FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

The Michigan Supreme Court through manifest

usurpation of judicial power and a clear abuse of discretion, failed to enter a decision, operating to deprive

this United States Supreme Court of its appellate

jurisdiction.

The [inferior] Michigan Supreme Court on the

application for leave to appeal, advanced usurpation

of judicial power mandated under Michigan Const. art

6, sec 6, creating undue delay, tantamount to failure

to exercise jurisdiction, persistently and without

reason, refusing to adjudicate the case properly before

13

it entering a written opinion and final peremptory

order:

Reversing the Court of Appeals February 28,

2017 Order, App.2a-7a, as null-in-void,

RULING the action taken sua sponte under

RJA moot, as not properly before the court,

including RULING the 1990 support duty

Filiation Order legally terminated November

13, 2005 under the competent jurisdiction of

the Honorable Richard Ryan Lamb, App.19a24a, is not enforceable under the SAPTEA;

and,

Reversing the Circuit Court's September 15,

2015 Order, App.8a-15a, as null-in-void,

RULING the action taken under the SAPTEA

moot in light the 1990 support duty Filiation

Order legally terminated November 13, 2005

under the competent jurisdiction of the Honorable Richard Ryan Lamb and is not

enforceable under the SAPTEA; and,

FINDING OCS lacked jurisdictional authority to take the actions advanced under the

SAPTEA, rendering the seizure of private

financial assets under the SAPTEA unlawful, entitling petitioner to relief pled, unlawfully withheld and a clear abuse of discretion

in the single sentence non-explanation prohibited by Michigan Const. 1963, art 6, sec 6.

14

A.

PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO RELIEF PURSUANT TO

28 U.S.C. SEC 1651(A) TO VACATE THE ORDER OF

THE MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT, OR OTHER RELIEF

AS THIS COURT DEEMS APPROPRIATE.

"The . . . 'All Writs Act is meant to be used only in

the exceptional case where there is clear abuse of discretion or usurpation of judicial power'. . ." Bankers

Life & Casualty Co. v. Holland, 346 US. 379,383

(1953).

Supreme Court Rule 20.1 requires that to obtain

a writ of mandamus, a petitioner must demonstrate

that (1) the writ "will be in aid of the Court's appellate

jurisdiction," (2) "exceptional circumstances warrant

the exercise of the Court's discretionary powers," and

(3) adequate relief cannot otherwise be obtained.

I. A Writ Will Aid This Court's Jurisdiction

Because the Michigan Supreme Courts Failure

to Render a Decision Operates to Deprive the

United States Supreme Court of Its Appellate

Jurisdiction

The first prerequisite for a writ of mandamus is

the establishment the writ "will be in aid of the Court's

appellate jurisdiction," Sup. Ct. Rule 20.1.

The Michigan Supreme Court's memorandum

Order, App.la, by Rule of Law is null-in-void as a

result of usurpation of judicial power of Michigan

Const. 1963, art 6, sec 6 and a clear abuse of discretion

failing to correct the undue delay in the Circuit

Court's failure to exercise jurisdiction, Ruling OCS

lacked jurisdictional authority to continue March 18,

2015 under the SAPTEA in light the 1990 support duty

Filiation Order legally terminated November 13, 2005

15

and Failure to correct the undue delay in the Michigan

Court of Appeals' failure to exercise jurisdiction Ruling

sua sponte RJA was not properly before the appellate

court, violating the Fourteenth Amendment to the

United States Constitution due process clause and on

the underlying claim on appeal, Ruling OCS lacked

jurisdictional authority to continue March 18, 2015

under the SAPTEA in light the 1990 support duty Filiation Order legally terminated November 13, 2005,

FINDING petitioner entitled to relief pled, ending the

civil litigation.

The manifest facts clearly show that there was a

"clear abuse of discretion," Bankers Life & Gas. Co. v.

Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 383 (1953), or judicial "usurpation of power." De Beers, 325 U.S. at 217; Cheney, 542

U.S. at 380 (quoting Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n,

319 U.S. 21, 26 (1943).

This Court has made clear that mandamus relief

is available in such unique circumstances. See. US.

Alkali Export Ass'n 325 U.S. at 202 ("finding that a

writ in aid of appellate jurisdiction must be to the

Supreme Court where it has sole appellate jurisdiction").

In its seminal and historic opinion describing the

contours of its judicial review powers and other jurisdictional authority, Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (i

Cranch) 137 (1803), this Court recognized that the

writ of mandamus is the appropriate tool to protect

the Court's appellate jurisdiction. Id. at 175 ("[tb

enable this court then to issue a mandamus it must be

shown to be an exercise of appellate jurisdiction, or to

be necessary to enable [the Court] to exercise appellate jurisdiction").

16

Since Marbury," [riepeated decisions of this court

have established the rule that this court has power to

issue a mandamus, in the exercise of its appellate

jurisdiction, and that the writ will lie in a proper case

to direct a subordinate court to decide a pending

cause." Knickerbocker Ins. Co. of Chicago v. Comstock,

83 U.S. (16 Wall) 258, 270 (1872) (citations omitted).

The All Writs Act sets forth this Court's statutory

authority to issue all writs necessary or appropriate in

aid of its jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. Sec 1651(a). One noted

treatise has recognized that under the All Writs Act, "a

writ may issue on the ground that undue delay is

tantamount to failure to exercise jurisdiction." 16

Charles Alan Wright, Arthur Raphael Miller & Edward

H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction

2d Sec 3933.1, p. 557-58 (2d ed. 1996) (citations omitted).1

In Ex Parte United States, 287 U.S. 21 (1932),

this Court granted an application for a writ of mandamus compelling a federal judge to grant a bench warrant petition that the district court had incorrectly

claimed it had the discretion to deny. Id. at 24045, 249

-51.

This Court explained that the issuance of such a

writ was necessary to aid it in exercising its appellate

jurisdiction, which could otherwise be defeated by the

unauthorized inaction of the lower court. Id. at 246.

1 Moore's Federal Practice similarly explains that traditionally,

the role of mandamus was limited "to directing the lower court to

decide a pending case or to require the lower court to reinstate a

case." 19 James William Moore & Daniel R. Coquillette, More's

Federal Practice, Sec 204.02[51 (3d ed. 2008).

17

Moreover, mandamus aids the Court's appellate

jurisdiction where the lower Michigan Supreme Court

engaged in wholly unauthorized activity through the

single sentence of non-explanation, advancing and

enjoining undue delay prohibited as a matter of law

by Michigan Const. 1963, art 6, sec 6.

Over the years, this Court has continued to

recognize the appropriate use of the writ of mandamus

in aid of such perspective jurisdiction. In Will v.

Calvert Fire Insurance Co., 437 U.S 655, 661 (1978),

this Court ruled that "There can be no doubt that,

where [an inferior] court persistently and without

reason refuses to adjudicate a case properly before it,

the [superior court] may issue the writ 'in order that

[it] may exercise the jurisdiction of review given by

law" (citations omitted). See. also, Roche v. Evaporated

Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21, 25 (1943) Such jurisdiction

includes the Court's prospective jurisdiction over case

in which it will ultimately have the authority under

28 U.S.C. Sec 2101(c) to grant review by certiorari.

See. e.g., Ex Parte United States, 287 U.S at 245-46

(on the proposition of certiorari under 28 U.S.C. Sec

1254).

Thus, by granting a writ of mandamus, as requested by Petitioner in this case, this court would be

acting in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.

II. The Nearly Three-Year Delay in This Case

Constitutes Extraordinary Circumstances

Warranting a Writ of Mandamus

The second prerequisite for a writ of mandamus

is the establishment of "exceptional circumstances"

that "warrant the exercise of the Court's discretionary

powers," Sup. Ct. Rule 20.1.

Nearly, a year has passed since the Oral Hearing

February 15, 2017; in which, the Michigan Court of

Appeals has failed to exercise jurisdiction, refusing to

adjudicate the case properly before it on the underlying

claim, RULING OCS lacked jurisdictional authority to

continue March 18, 2015 under the SAPTEA in light of

material facts fully disclosing the 1990 support duty

Filiation Order legally terminated November 13, 2005

under the competent jurisdiction of the Honorable

Richard Ryan Lamb, In re Beck, supra and Equitable

Estoppel controlling, violating petitioner's property

interest in private financial assets which the State has

interfered with upon procedures that remain Constitutionally infirm or insufficient, Hinky Dinky Supermarket, Inc. v. Dept of Community Health, 261

Mich.App 604, 605-606; 683 N.W.2d 759 (2004), ground

on moot issues by an arbitrary exercise of governmental

power, equally violating substantive due process,

Landon Holdings, Inc. v. Grattan Twp., 257 Mich.App

154, 173; 66 N.W.2d 93 (2003).

The establishment of "exceptional circumstances"

regarding the undue delay in this case exhibited by

the Circuit Court for twenty-three (23) months and

Michigan Court of Appeals for twelve (12) months,

nearly three (3) years, enjoined by the Michigan

Supreme Court through manifest usurpation of judicial

power and a clear abuse of discretion, failed to end the

19

undue delay in this case, warranting the exercise of

this Court's discretionary powers.2

Clearly, by Rule of Law, the undue delay of nearly

three (3) years in the present case warrants a writ of

mandamus. Such a writ is appropriate especially in

light of the procedural posture of this case: there was

no trial, the records and transcripts are not extensive,

and the petition for mandamus is from unlawful denial

of application for leave to appeal as a result of usurpation of judicial power and clear abuse of discretion of

the Michigan Supreme Court.

This case equally involve Constitutional infringement by State Judiciary undue delay; of which, this

Court has continued to affirm in civil proceedings

regarding neutrality requirements to guarantee that

life, liberty and property will not be taken on the basis

of an erroneous or distorted conception of the facts and

law, particularly critical in such Fourteenth Amendment Due Process action to protect against undue

delay and to ensure litigants' constitutional rights are

protected through "prompt" and "speedy" judicial decisions to protect petitioner from unjustified deprivation

of property, Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259 (1978).

2 Circuit courts of appeal have also recognized that the writ of

mandamus is the appropriate remedy for causes involving a

court's undue dely. See. Johnson v. Rogers, 917 F.2d 1283, 1285

(10th Cir. 1990) (fourteen-month delay). In US. v. Johnson, 732

F.2d 379 (4th sir. 1984), the Fourth Circuit concluded that the

two-year delay in the preparation of defendant's trial transcript

justified granting a writ of mandamus, being within "the range

of magnitude of delay as a result of which courts have indicated

that due process may been denied." Id. at 382 (citations omitted).

20

This Constitutional core requirement of NOTICE

concept reasonably calculated, under all circumstances,

to apprise petitioner of the pendency of all RJA assertions and accusation, affording petitioner a meaningful opportunity to present objections, enabling petitioner to determine what is being proposed and what he

must do to prevent the deprivation of his interest,

Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339

U.S. 306, 314 (1950); Richard v. Jefferson County, 517

U.S. 793 (1996); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 26768(1970).

The Constitutional core requirement of concept

equally encompass HEARING on ALL RJA ASSERTIONS AND ACCUSATION, granted at a meaningful

time and in a meaningful manner as a "basic aspect of

the duty of government to follow a fair process of decision making when it acts to deprive petitioner of his

possessions, the particular purpose is to ensure

abstract fair play to petitioner and to protect petitioner's use and possession of property from arbitrary

encroachment," Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,

333 (1976); Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 223, 233

(1863); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 76, 80-81 (1972);

Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341

U.S 123, 170-71 (1951); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S.

545, 552 (1965).

The Michigan Court of Appeals violated the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution

"Notice" and "Hearing" requirement on all RJA

assertions and accusations, advanced sua sponte post

expiration of OCS's briefing deadline.

21

The Circuit Court; Michigan Court of Appeals and

the Michigan Supreme Court through unconventional

practices, failed IlVIPARTIAL functions.

The underlying principle of the importance of

prompt judicial decision making and Fourteenth

Amendment protections apply to the context of this

case, in which a judicial delay of nearly three (3) years

has occurred.

Finally, there are several reasons why the

procedural issue the 1990 support duty Filiation Order

or 1990 support duty Child Support Order legally

terminated upon the child's eighteenth birthday

November 13, 2005 by order of Court of competent

jurisdiction is both 'exceptional' and 'of considerable

public importance:

Citizens of the United States and Michigan

State Inhabitants are being subjected to

Fraudulent Child Support, which includes

petitioner;

The Office of Child Support perpetuate Child

Support Fraud upon the Michigan Courts, as

well documented in this case against Petitioner;

The Michigan Department Prosecuting Attorney General's Office litigation posture promotes perpetuating Child Support Fraud

upon Michigan Courts on behalf of the Office

of Child Support against State inhabitants,

which includes petitioner; and,

Based on belief, some thirty thousand

(30,000), if not greater, Michigan State

inhabitants, which includes petitioner, are

22

forced into involuntary servitude under a

1990 support duty Filiation Order or 1990

support duty Child Support Order that

legally terminated in 2005 articulated under

the plain language in the Order's Release

clause, App. 12a-14a, (language still used

today), rarely reviewed by this United States

Supreme Court. United States v. US. Dist.

Court for Eastern 121st. of Mich., Southern

Division (Keith), 444 F.2d 651, 655-56 (6th

Cir. 1971), affd, 407 U.S. 297 (1972) (quoting

Schlagenhaufv. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 110

(1964).

The unlawful practices and procedures of the State

and its actors, entitles Petitioner to clear powers of a

"prompt judicial review" and "prompt final judicial

decision Es] ," warranting the exercise of this UNITED

STATES SUPREME COURT's ministerial duty of

judicial power pursuant to Article III of the UNITED

STATES CONSTITUTION, Sections 1, "The judicial

power of the United States, shall be vested in one

Supreme Court. . " and Section 2, "The judicial power

shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising

under this Constitution, the laws of the United States,

and treaties made, or which shall be made, under

their authority;—to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction."

.

As such, the second requirement of Supreme Court

Rule 20.1 for the issuance of a writ of mandamus is

satisfied in this case.

23

III. No Other Adequate Relief is Available to

Petitioner

Finally, Supreme Court Rule 20.1 requires that a

writ of mandamus shall issue only when there is no

other adequate relief available to the petitioner.

In this case, Petitioner's attempt to induce the

Michigan Courts through formal briefing to decide the

case, fully disclosing the 1990 support duty Filiation

Order legally terminated November 13, 2005 and is

not enforceable under the SAPTEA, In re Beck, supra

and equitable estoppel controlling, requesting that a

decision be rendered to no avail.

Furthermore, undue delay is practiced at the

administrative level by OCS on April 02, 2015, oppressing legislative intent pursuant to MCL 552.625f(2)(c),

entitling petitioner, within 7 days of written challenge, to review the case with the agency on the

mistake concerning the fact the agency's decision was not

authorized by law other than those described in subdivision 2(a) and (b), rendering the Agency's decision

unreliable for any purpose, App.16a-18a.

In addition, undue delay is practiced at the Circuit

level September 15, 2015, neglecting the court's duty

to petitioner, a Citizens of Michigan, avoiding the

principal underlying 'essential questions' presented at

every level of review, App.8a-15a, in the Circuit

Court's usurpation of judicial power mandated in the

ministerial duty under the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Michigan Const. 1963, art 1, Sec 17, in exercise of function on appeal from agency decision to

RULE on the manifest evidence of material fact the

1990 support duty Filiation Order legally terminated

24

November 13, 2005, provided for in the conditions of

the terms used in the language of the Release Clause,

to said child

"Defendant has a duty of support.

until the child reaches the age of eighteen (18) years,"

under competent jurisdiction of the Honorable Judge

Richard Ryan Lamb, In re Beck, supra., and equitable

estoppel controlling, disclosing the legal option for

collection is no longer available, positively commanded,

plainly defined and peremptory (imperative) to the conditions and terms used in the language of release

clause, the 1990 support duty legally terminated

November 13, 2005 and is not enforceable under the

SAPTEA March 18, 2015 otherwise moot and a clear

abuse of discretion by the Circuit Court manifestly

deciding the moot none legal frivolous defense dishonestly arranged under and outside of the SAPTEA,

rendering the Circuit Court Order null-in-void as the

1990 support duty Filiation Order, App. 19a-24a,

legally terminated nine (9) years and four (4) months

passed, advanced by OCS, through the DEPARTMENT

for twenty-three (23) months, abruptly abandoned

during Oral Argument February 15, 2017, subjecting

Petitioner to continued undue delay. Citizens Protecting Michigan's Constitution v. Secretary of State, 482

Mich. 960 (2008).

.

.

.

Next, undue delay is practiced at the Michigan

Court of Appeals level February 28, 2017, neglecting

the court's duty to petitioner, a Citizens of Michigan,

avoiding the principal underlying 'essential questions'

presented at every level of review, App.2a-7a, in the

Appellate Court's usurpation of judicial power mandated in the ministerial duty under the Due Process

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United

States Constitution and Michigan Const. 1963, art 1,

25

sec 17, in exercise of function on direct appeal as of

right, to RULE the 1990 support duty Filiation Order

legally terminated November 13, 2005, provided for in

the conditions of the terms used in the language of the

Release Clause, "Defendant has a duty of support.

to said child until the child reaches the age of

eighteen (18) years," under competent jurisdiction of the

Honorable Judge Richard Ryan Lamb, In re Beck,

supra., and equitable estoppel controlling, disclosing

the legal option for collection is no longer available,

positively commanded, plainly defined and peremptory

(imperative) to the conditions and terms used in the

language of the release clause, the 1990 support duty

legally terminated November 13, 2005 and is not

enforceable under the SAPTEA March 18, 2015 otherwise moot and a clear abuse of discretion by the

Michigan Court of Appeals falsifying the records,

rendering the Order null-in-void ruling sua sponte the

lower Circuit Court properly affirmed the decision of

the Office of Child Support under the RJA, equally

moot, violating the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution,

subjecting Petitioner to continued undue delay.

Citizens Protecting Michian s Constitution v. Secretary

of State, 482 Mich. 960 (2008)

And, undue delay is practiced at the Michigan

Supreme Court level November 29, 2017, neglecting

the court's duty to petitioner, a Citizens of Michigan,

avoiding the principal underlying 'essential questions'

presented at every level of review, App.la, in the

Supreme Court's usurpation of judicial power mandated

in the ministerial duty under the Due Process Clause

of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution; Michigan Const. 1963, art 1, sec 17; and,

26

Michigan Const. 1963, art 6, sec 6, mandating a

written opinion, containing a concise statement of

facts and reasons in exercise of function on application

for leave on each decision the 1990 support duty Filiation Order legally terminated November 13, 2005 provided for in the conditions of the terms used in the language of the Release Clause, "Defendant has a duty of

to said child until the child reaches the age

support.

of eighteen (18) years," under competent jurisdiction of

the Honorable Judge Richard Ryan Lamb, In re Beck,

supra., and equitable estoppel controlling, disclosing

the legal option for collection is no longer available,

positively commanded, plainly defined and peremptory

(imperative)) to the conditions and terms used in the

language of the release clause, the 1990 support duty

legally terminated November 13, 2005 and is not

enforceable under the SAPTEA March 18, 2015 otherwise moot; and, the Court of Appeals sua sponte RJA

actions moot, violating the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Michigan Const. 1963, art 1, sec 17 and a

clear abuse of discretion by the Michigan Supreme

Court, rendering the Order null-in-void in the "single

sentence of non-explanation," prohibited by the

Michigan Const. 1963, art 6, sec 6, subjecting Petitioner

to continued undue delay. Citizens Protecting

Michigan Constitution v. Secretary of State, 482

Mich. 960 (2008)

.

.

.

As such, appropriate use of the writ of mandamus

in aid of such prospective jurisdiction is warranted

where the [inferior] Michigan Circuit, Appellate and

Supreme Courts persistently and without reason refuse

to adjudicate the case properly before it, engage in

practice and procedure of usurpation of judicial power

27

and clear abuse of discretion preserved in the manifest

of this case, this [superior] United States Supreme

Court may issue the writ "in order that [it] may exercise

the jurisdiction of review given by law," 28 U.S.C.

Sec(s) 1651(a); Title 28 U.S.C. Sec 2101(c) and Sup. Ct.

R. 20.1.

Clearly, under these circumstances, a writ of mandamus is the only adequate relief remaining to Petitioner. The prerequisites for a writ of mandamus have

clearly been met in this petition to the United States

Supreme Court for immediate consideration.

CONCLUSION

Petitioner respectfully request that this Court issue

a writ of mandamus directing Respondents to do all of

the following:

Reinstate case no. 155780, presently closed;

In accord with In re Beck, supra and equitable estoppel controlling, Rule the 1990 support duty Filiation Order legally terminated

November 13, 2005 and is not enforceable

under the SAPTEA or RJA; and,

Remand to the Michigan Supreme Court with

instructions to remand to the Michigan Court

of Appeals, directing remand to the Circuit

Court, Ordering the Circuit Court to enter

Reimbursement Order directing OCS to

reimburse petitioner the amount of $1,880.90,

plus interest immediately, if not sooner to

avoid further undue delay, ending the civil

litigation erroneously caused under the

SAPTEA.

Respectfully submitted,

LAWRENCE L. SIMMONS

CITIZEN OF THE REPUBLIC

OF THE UNITED STATES

1314 EAST STOCKBRIDGE AVENUE

KALAMAZOO, MI 49001

(269) 779-9188

SPLASHDANCE2004@YAHOO.COM

FEBRUARY 27, 2018

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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