Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Connecticut, Petitioner v. Quavon Torres

PETITIONER’S APPENDIX

State v. Torres, 175 Conn. App. 138,

167 A.3d 365 (2017)................................................. A-1

Order of Connecticut Supreme Court Denying

Petitioner’s Petition For Certification .................. A-21

Order of Connecticut Appellate Court Granting

Stay of Execution Pending Decision of United

States Supreme Court........................................... A-23

138

AUGUST, 2017

175 Conn. App. 138

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. QUAVON TORRES

(AC 39796)

LAVINE, KELLER and BISHOP, Js.

Argued February 15—officially released, August 1,

2017

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of

New Haven, Blue, J.)

Jennifer B. Smith, for the appellant (defendant).

Laurie N. Feldman, special deputy assistant

state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were

Patrick Griffin, state’s attorney, Gary Nicholson,

supervisory assistant state’s attorney, and Michael

Dearington, former state’s attorney, for the appellee

(state).

Opinion

BISHOP, J. The defendant, Quavon Torres,

appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered

after a jury trial, of murder pursuant to General

Statutes § 53a-54a and carrying a pistol without a

permit pursuant to General Statutes § 29-35 (a). He

claims on appeal that an eyewitness’ first time incourt identification of him as the shooter should

have been excluded pursuant to our Supreme Court’s

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decision in State v. Dickson, 322 Conn. 410, 141 A.3d

810 (2016), cert. denied, U.S. (June 19, 2017) (No.

16- 866).1 We agree and reverse the judgment of the

trial court.

The jury reasonably could have found the

following facts. On July 23, 2012, the defendant and

two other young men, Marcus Lloyd and Freddie

Pickette, were at 541-543 Orchard Street in New

Haven, where the defendant’s cousin, Tasia Milton,

lived. One of them called the victim, Donald Bradley,

on the phone to ask for a ride to Farnam Courts,

also in New Haven. The victim parked his car, a four

door Honda Accord, in the CVS Pharmacy parking

lot, across the street from 541-543 Orchard Street,

and went inside CVS Pharmacy. While the victim

was in the store, the three men entered his car.

Pickette sat in the front passenger seat, Lloyd sat in

the rear passenger side seat behind Pickette, and the

defendant sat in the rear driver side seat. The victim

exited CVS and entered his car, sitting in the

driver’s seat, directly in front of the defendant.

Pickette recommended that they go to the Burger

King, which was very close to the CVS Pharmacy on

The defendant also claims that the court abused its

discretion in denying his motion for a new trial because the

verdict was against the weight of the evidence, and seeks a

reversal of his conviction and a remand for a new trial. Because

we reverse the judgment on the basis of the erroneous inclusion

of the first time in-court identification, we need not address

this claim.

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Whalley Avenue, to get some food on their way to

Farnam Courts.

While in the drive-through line, but before

ordering, the victim, then realizing that the

defendant was in the car, told him to leave. When

the defendant did not leave, the victim got out of the

car and walked over to the passenger side. He leaned

into the car, either in the front passenger seat,

where Pickette was seated, or the rear passenger

seat, where Lloyd was seated.2 The defendant exited

the car and walked toward the victim on the

passenger side of the car. The victim was then

fatally shot. The defendant, Lloyd, and Pickette

exited the car and ran.

The police arrived on the scene at approximately

7:20 p.m., and the victim was transported to the

hospital, where he ultimately died from multiple

gunshot wounds. The police were advised he was

pronounced dead at 7:51 p.m., and received

information that two suspects were inside the house

at 541-543 Orchard Street. By 9 p.m., the police had

the house surrounded. Eventually, the defendant

2 The record is unclear as to why the victim went to the

passenger side of the car, but a bat was later found on the floor

of the back of the vehicle. Pickette told the police that he saw

the victim retrieving the bat, but at trial he testified that he

did not see the victim doing so. Lloyd told the police that the

victim came to the passenger side of the car to retrieve the bat.

Regardless of whether the victim sought to retrieve the bat, the

defendant did not claim self-defense at trial.

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and Lloyd emerged from the house, and they were

arrested. The police obtained a search warrant for

the third floor of the building and seized, among

other items, a .38 caliber Colt revolver containing

two live rounds. The weapon was later identified as

the gun from which three of the four bullets found in

the victim were fired.3

Several hours after the shooting, two

eyewitnesses, Theresa Jones and Lachell Hall,

provided statements to the police. Jones reported

that she saw the shooting while standing across the

street from the Burger King at a Stop & Shop

grocery store. She told the police in her initial

statement that three black men had been arguing

around a car that was parked in the drive-through

lane at Burger King, and after the shooting, they ran

from the back of the car, past the front of Burger

King toward Orchard Street. She was shown a

photographic lineup, and identified Pickette, whom

she knew, and told the police that the shooter looked

like Pickette. She was then shown another

photographic lineup, which included the defendant’s

photograph, and she was unable to identify anyone

as the shooter. She described the shooter as thin,

about five feet seven or eight inches tall, and

wearing a blue shirt.

Hall had been standing outside of a deli near the

Burger King at the time of the shooting. She

3 The defendant did not have a permit to carry a pistol.

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recognized Pickette, her nephew, in the front

passenger seat of the vehicle wearing a black T-shirt.

She said that the victim got out of the car from the

driver’s seat and walked around the back of the car,

and she recognized him as someone she knew. She

told the police that the person in the rear driver’s

side seat got out of the car, went around the back of

the car to the passenger side, and then the shooting

began. She was shown a photographic lineup and

was unable to identify the shooter, although she

identified Pickette’s photograph from a separate

photographic lineup and told the police that he was

not the shooter. She described the shooter as a

skinny black male, around five feet seven inches tall,

wearing a black T-shirt.

Lloyd told the police that he did not see who shot

the victim and that he and Pickette left the car and

were walking toward the front of the Burger King

when they heard gunshots. He later changed his

story and said that he was still in the car when the

defendant got out of the car on the driver’s side and,

without going around to the other side of the car,

shot the victim, who was standing on the passenger

side of the car. He then chose Pickette from a

photographic lineup and wrote ‘‘Fred was just in the

car.’’ Lloyd chose the defendant from an additional

photographic lineup and identified him as the

shooter. Pickette gave a statement to the police the

day after the shooting and also chose the defendant’s

picture from a photographic lineup and identified

him as the shooter.

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Milton, who lived on the third floor of the

Orchard Street house, gave a videotaped statement

to police at 3:30 a.m. on July 24, 2012. She told

police that she was on the front porch of her house

with the defendant, Lloyd, Pickette, and the

defendant’s sister, Amber Torres, when someone

came to pick up the three men. She remained on the

porch and shortly thereafter heard gunshots. She

then ran up to the third floor, and as she was

running up the stairs, the defendant and Lloyd came

running up behind her. She stated that while

running up the stairs with them behind her, she was

still hearing gunshots. She told the police that she

saw the defendant give Amber the gun, and later

testified that Amber had the gun while they were in

Milton’s bedroom. She also told the police and

testified that the defendant told Amber to ‘‘do

something with it.’’

The defendant was subsequently charged on July

23, 2012, with murder and carrying a pistol without

a permit. Trial began on August 14, 2014. At trial,

many witnesses testified, including Jones who,

though unable to identify the shooter in a

photographic lineup shortly after the incident,

identified the defendant as the shooter in court

during her testimony. During deliberation, the jury

requested to hear a playback of Jones’ testimony.

On August 25, 2014, the jury found the

defendant guilty of murder pursuant to § 53a-54a

and guilty of carrying a pistol without a permit

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pursuant to § 29-35(a). At sentencing, on November

7, 2014, the defendant moved for a new trial. The

court, Blue, J., denied the motion and sentenced the

defendant to forty-five years of incarceration and ten

years of special parole on the murder conviction, and

five years of incarceration, to run concurrently, on

the conviction of carrying a pistol without a permit.

The total effective sentence was forty-five years of

incarceration and ten years of special parole. This

appeal followed.4 Additional facts and procedural

history will be set forth as necessary.

The defendant appealed to the Supreme Court. He

submitted his brief to the court on April 29, 2016, in which he

argued that Jones’ first time in-court identification of him as

the shooter was suggestive, and, therefore, should be analyzed

for reliability on state constitutional grounds. He argued that

the court should consider a number of different tests in doing

so. While the defendant’s appeal was pending, however, the

Supreme Court released its decision in State v. Dickson, supra,

322 Conn. 410, in which it held that ‘‘in cases in which identity

is an issue, in-court identifications that are not preceded by a

successful identification in a nonsuggestive identification

procedure implicate due process principles and, therefore must

be prescreened by the trial court.’’ (Footnotes omitted.) Id., 415.

In doing so, it overruled its prior decision in State v. Smith, 200

Conn. 465, 469, 512 A.2d 189 (1986), in which it had

determined that ‘‘an in-court testimonial identification need be

excluded, as violative of due process, only when it is tainted by

an out-of-court identification procedure which is unnecessarily

suggestive and conducive to irreparable misidentification.’’

Subsequently, the defendant moved that he be allowed to

file a supplemental brief addressing the impact of Dickson on

his case. The Supreme Court granted the motion on November

8, 2016, and ordered that the state also file a supplemental

brief, responsive to the defendant’s. The Supreme Court

(continued...)

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The defendant claims that Jones’ first time incourt identification of him as the shooter should

have been excluded pursuant to our Supreme Court’s

decision in State v. Dickson, supra, 322 Conn. 410. In

response, the state argues that the defendant waived

this claim. We disagree with the state that the claim

was waived and agree with the defendant that the

identification should have been excluded.

I

We discuss first the state’s argument that the

defendant waived his claim that Jones’ in-court

identification of him was unreliable, and, therefore,

should have been excluded.

The following additional facts and procedural

history are relevant to our analysis. Almost two

years prior to trial, on October 24, 2012, the

defendant’s original counsel filed a motion to

suppress ‘‘any out-of-court and in-court identification

of the defendant . . . .’’ The court did not rule on this

motion, and the defendant subsequently was

appointed new counsel. The day before the start of

evidence, on August 13, 2014, the court met with

defense counsel and the state’s attorney to discuss

(...continued)

additionally transferred the defendant’s appeal to this court.

The defendant filed his consolidated reply and supplemental

brief to this court on November 28, 2016. The state filed its

supplemental brief thereafter.

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any outstanding motions. Defense counsel did not

request that the court rule on the motion to suppress

identifications, and the court did not rule on it.

Thereafter, the trial began and at the time Jones

made the in-court identification, the defendant did

not object to the identification. On the basis of these

two occurrences, the state argues that the defendant

waived his claim that his due process rights were

violated by this in-court identification. We disagree.

Waiver is ‘‘an intentional relinquishment or

abandonment of a known right or privilege. . . . It

involves the idea of assent, and assent is an act of

understanding. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) State v. Kitchens, 299 Conn. 447, 469, 10

A.3d 942 (2011). Implicit waiver ‘‘arises from an

inference that the defendant knowingly and

voluntarily relinquished the right in question.’’

(Emphasis omitted.) Id., 483. The court ‘‘will indulge

every reasonable presumption against waiver of

fundamental constitutional rights and . . . [will] not

presume acquiescence in the loss of [such a right].’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Woods,

297 Conn. 569, 583–84, 4 A.3d 236 (2010).

At the time of Jones’ in-court identification of the

defendant, the state of the law regarding first time

in-court identifications was quite different than it is

now, post-Dickson. See footnote 4 of this opinion.

Our Supreme Court held, in State v. Smith, 200

Conn. 465, 469, 512 A.2d 189 (1986), that ‘‘an incourt testimonial identification need be excluded, as

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violative of due process, only when it is tainted by an

out-of-court identification procedure which is

unnecessarily

suggestive

and

conducive

to

irreparable misidentification.’’

There was no evidence that prior to Jones’ incourt identification of the defendant, there had been

any suggestive out-of-court identification procedure.

Therefore, at the time of the pretrial hearing and the

in-court identification, Jones’ identification was

permissible, and, accordingly, the defendant would

have had no reason to believe that objecting to the

identification would provide him with any relief.

Therefore, the defendant could not have waived this

argument, as being free from first time in-court

identifications was not a known right to him at the

time of his trial. Accordingly, the defendant did not

waive this claim.

II

We turn now to the merits of the defendant’s

claim that Jones’ first time in-court identification of

him should not have been admitted pursuant to our

Supreme Court’s ruling in Dickson.

The following additional facts and procedural

history are relevant to our resolution of this claim.

In support of her identification of the defendant as

the shooter, Jones testified that she saw the

shooter’s face during the incident, but she found it

difficult to pick someone out in a photograph. She

further testified that she felt if she had seen him in

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person, she would have been able to identify him

that night. Nonetheless, she did not identify the

defendant as the shooter at any point prior to trial.

When asked at trial if the shooter was in the

courtroom, she answered ‘‘yes’’ and pointed out the

defendant.

On appeal, the defendant claims that Jones’ first

time in-court identification of him as the shooter

violated his right to due process under our Supreme

Court’s holding in Dickson, and, therefore should

have been excluded. We agree.

We note first that ‘‘[w]hether [a party] was

deprived of his due process rights is a question of

law, to which we grant plenary review.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) State v. Dickson, supra,

322 Conn. 423.

‘‘In

determining

whether

identification

procedures violate a defendant’s due process rights,

the required inquiry is made on an ad hoc basis and

is two-pronged: first, it must be determined whether

the identification procedure was unnecessarily

suggestive; and second, if it is found to have been so,

it must be determined whether the identification

was nevertheless reliable based on examination of

the totality of the circumstances.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) State v. Marquez, 291

Conn. 122, 141, 967 A.2d 56, cert. denied, 558 U.S.

895, 130 S. Ct. 237, 175 L. Ed. 2d 163 (2009).

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‘‘The first suggestiveness prong involves the

circumstances of the identification procedure itself . .

. and the critical question is whether the procedure

was conducted in such a manner as to emphasize or

highlight the individual whom the police believe is

the suspect. . . . If the trial court determines that

there was no unduly suggestive identification

procedure, that is the end of the analysis, and the

identification evidence is admissible. . . . If the court

finds there was an unduly suggestive procedure, the

court goes on to address the second reliability prong,

under which the corruptive effect of the suggestive

procedure is weighed against certain factors, such as

the opportunity of the [eyewitness] to view the

criminal at the time of the crime, the [eyewitness’]

degree of attention, the accuracy of [the eyewitness’]

prior description of the criminal, the level of

certainty demonstrated at the [identification] and

the time between the crime and the [identification].’’

(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) State v. Dickson, supra, 322 Conn. 421.

Turning to the suggestiveness prong, our

Supreme Court recently has held that when the

suspect’s identity is at issue, a ‘‘first time in-court

identification by a witness who would have been

unable to reliably identify the defendant in a

nonsuggestive out-of-court procedure constitutes a

procedural due process violation.’’5 Id., 426 n.11. In

The court stated: ‘‘We agree that one-on-one in-court

identifications do not always implicate the defendant’s due

(continued...)

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doing so, the court stated: ‘‘[W]e are hard-pressed to

imagine how there could be a more suggestive

identification procedure than placing a witness on

the stand in open court, confronting the witness with

the person [whom] the state has accused of

committing [a] crime, and then asking the witness if

he can identify the person who committed the crime.

. . . If this procedure is not suggestive, then no

procedure is suggestive.’’ (Emphasis in original;

footnote omitted.) Id., 423–24.

In order to avoid such suggestive procedures, the

court announced a new procedural rule: ‘‘In cases in

which there has been no pretrial identification,

however, and the state intends to present a first

time in-court identification, the state must first

request permission to do so from the trial court. . . .

The trial court may grant such permission only if it

determines that there is no factual dispute as to the

identity of the perpetrator, or the ability of the

particular eyewitness to identify the defendant is not

at issue.’’ (Citation omitted.) Id., 445–46. This

procedural rule, the court stated, applied

prospectively and to all cases pending on review. Id.,

450–51.

(...continued)

process rights, as when identity is not an issue or when there

has been a nonsuggestive out-of-court identification procedure.

. . . [T]he specific question that we are addressing here [is]

whether the trial court is constitutionally required to prescreen

first time in-court identifications . . . .’’ (Emphasis in original.)

State v. Dickson, supra, 322 Conn. 433.

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In cases like the present one, where the

suggestive in-court identification occurred before

Dickson was decided, the court created an

alternative procedure for reviewing courts to

retroactively apply the Dickson principles and

determine

whether

the

suggestive

in-court

identification was nonetheless reliable and,

therefore, admissible. ‘‘[I]n pending appeals

involving this issue, the suggestive in-court

identification has already occurred. Accordingly, if

the reviewing court concludes that the admission of

the identification was harmful, the only remedy that

can be provided is a remand to the trial court for the

purpose of evaluating the reliability and the

admissibility of the in-court identification under the

totality of the circumstances.’’ Id., 452. Alternatively,

if the record is adequate to make a determination as

to the reliability and admissibility of the

identification, then the reviewing court could make

such a determination. Id., 452 n.35. The court in

Dickson specifically highlighted a situation in which

‘‘the eyewitness had a full and fair opportunity to

identify the defendant before trial and was unable to

do so’’ as an example of an instance in which a

reviewing court could make such a determination on

the basis of the record. Id. (‘‘[O]f course, if the record

is adequate for review of the reliability and

admissibility of the in-court identification, the

reviewing court may make this determination. For

example, if the eyewitness had a full and fair

opportunity to identify the defendant before trial and

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was unable to do so, the reviewing court reasonably

could conclude that the subsequent in-court

identification was unreliable.’’)

Turning now to the present case, we first

acknowledge that the Dickson principles apply to

Jones’ identification of the defendant. Jones’ in-court

identification of the defendant was preceded only by

her unsuccessful attempt to identify the defendant in

a photographic lineup, and the identity of the

shooter was in dispute. See id., 452–53. The record

makes plain that Jones had the opportunity, shortly

after the incident, to identify the defendant in a

photographic lineup and she could not. Her

description of the shooter at the time of the incident

was vague and contained only a description of his

clothing, approximate age, height, and build, and

race. Therefore, the record is adequate for us to

determine that her in-court identification of the

defendant, two years later, was unreliable.

Accordingly, we must determine now whether

the admission of the identification was harmless. We

conclude that it was not. ‘‘A constitutional error is

harmless when it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt

that the jury would have returned a guilty verdict

without the impermissible [evidence]. . . . That

determination must be made in light of the entire

record [including the strength of the state’s case

without the evidence admitted in error].’’ (Citation

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 453.

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We note first that the jury undoubtedly

considered Jones’ testimony important because

during deliberation it requested to hear a playback

of her testimony, and did not request to rehear any

other testimony. Additionally, without Jones’

testimony identifying the defendant as the shooter,

the state’s case would have been considerably

weakened. In addition to Jones, Hall testified about

her eye-witness account of the incident. She testified

that she saw the car park in the Burger King drivethrough and recognized Pickette, her nephew, in the

front seat of the car. She also recognized the victim

when he got out of the front driver’s side door and

walked around the car to the passenger side of the

car. She was about to go say hello but before she

could, someone got out of the rear driver’s side of the

car, walked around the back of the car, and stood

with his back facing her, and then the victim was

shot. Hall testified that she was sure that the

shooter was the person who got out of the car from

the rear driver’s side seat, but testified that she only

told the police that ‘‘because when the person got out

[of] the rear behind the driver, that’s when the

shooting started.’’ She testified that she did not see

the man who got out of the car raise his arm. She

further testified that she did not see the gun, she did

not see the shooter’s face, and she could not identify

the shooter. When asked whether she knew who shot

the victim, she testified ‘‘I just know it was somebody

in that car.’’ Additionally, her description of the

shooter wearing a black T-shirt contradicted Jones’

testimony that the shooter wore a blue shirt.

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Lloyd testified that he did not remember

anything about the shooting because he was

intoxicated and under the influence of drugs that

night. He testified that he did not see who shot the

victim, and that his father, who was present at the

police station during his statement, and the police

pressured him to choose the defendant’s picture. A

redacted version of his videotaped statement was

admitted at trial pursuant to State v. Whelan, 200

Conn. 743, 513 A.2d 86, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 994,

107 S. Ct. 597, 93 L. Ed. 2d 598 (1986).6

Pickette testified that he saw the defendant get

out of the rear driver’s side of the car and walk to the

rear passenger side, where the victim was, but on

cross-examination, testified that he did not see the

defendant get out of the car because he was

watching the victim who had come around the car to

the passenger side. He testified multiple times that

he did not see whether the defendant had a gun. He

also testified on cross-examination that he did not

see the victim get shot, but then later testified on

‘‘[I]n Whelan, [our Supreme Court] held that a prior

written inconsistent statement of a nonparty witness is

admissible for substantive purposes if the statement is signed

by the declarant, who has personal knowledge of the facts

stated, and the declarant testifies at trial and is available for

cross-examination. See State v. Whelan, supra, 200 Conn. 753.

This rule later was expanded to apply to tape-recorded

statements that otherwise satisfy the Whelan criteria. E.g.,

State v. Simpson, 286 Conn. 634, 642, 945 A.2d 449 (2008).’’

State v. Carrion, 313 Conn. 823, 825 n.3, 100 A.3d 361 (2014).

6

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recross-examination that he did see the defendant

shoot the victim. He testified that after the shooting,

he ran down the Burger King drive-through alley to

Whalley Avenue and then down to McDonald’s, not

to Orchard Street with the defendant and Lloyd.

Surveillance footage showed, however, that Pickette

crossed Orchard Street and went through the CVS

Pharmacy parking lot before retreating down

Whalley Avenue.

Milton testified that she ran up to the third floor

of her apartment building as soon as she heard

gunshots, and as she was running up the stairs, the

defendant and Lloyd were running behind her. She

testified that she was still hearing gunshots as the

defendant and Lloyd were behind her on the stairs.

She also testified that she never actually saw the

defendant with a gun, which conflicted with what

she told the police, but just assumed that he was

giving Amber a gun when she heard him tell her to

‘‘do something with it.’’ She conceded on crossexamination that somebody, but she did not know

who, gave Amber the gun. A redacted version of

Milton’s videotaped statement was admitted at trial

pursuant to State v. Whelan, supra, 200 Conn. 743.

See footnote 6 of this opinion.

Kristen Sasinouski, a forensic science examiner

for the state of Connecticut, testified regarding the

DNA and fingerprint evidence found on the gun. She

testified that she tested three areas of the gun for

DNA: the grip area, the cylinder area, and the

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trigger area. She also testified that two cartridges

were swabbed for DNA as well, on which no DNA

was found. She further testified that three DNA

profiles were found on the gun, none of which was

the defendant’s.7 When asked if that meant that the

defendant necessarily did not touch the gun, she

testified ‘‘[n]o, it does not.’’ She did testify, though,

that given the fact that the shooting occurred in hot

weather in July, and that parts of the gun had an

abrasive surface, she would have expected to find

DNA on the gun of someone who handled it.

Ultimately, the case was full of inconsistent

statements and contradictory testimony, which raise

substantial concerns. There was contradictory

testimony about what color shirt the shooter was

wearing, where the shooter was standing, where the

victim was standing, and where the defendant,

Pickette, and Lloyd ran after the shooting.

Accordingly, without Jones’ in-court identification of

the defendant, the state’s case was not so

overwhelming that we can conclude ‘‘it is clear

beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have

returned a guilty verdict without the impermissible

[evidence] . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

State v. Dickson, supra, 322 Conn. 453. Therefore,

the erroneous admission of Jones’ in-court

7 The defendant, the victim, and Lloyd were all eliminated

as contributors of the DNA profiles found on the gun. A DNA

sample was never taken from Pickette, however.

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identification was not harmless beyond a reasonable

doubt.

The judgment is reversed and the case is

remanded for a new trial.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

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SUPREME COURT

STATE OF CONNECTICUT

PSC-17-0184

STATE OF CONNECTICUT

v.

QUAVON TORRES

ORDER ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION

TO APPEAL

The State of Connecticut's petition for

certification to appeal from the Appellate Court, 175

Conn. App. 138 (AC 39796), is denied.

Laurie N. Feldman, special deputy assistant state's

attorney, in support of the petition.

Jennifer B. Smith, assigned counsel, in opposition.

Decided November 9, 2017

BY THE COURT,

/s/

ALAN M. GANNUSCIO

ASSISTANT CLERKAPPELLATE

PETITION FILED: 8/17/2017

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NOTICE SENT: NOVEMBER 9, 2017

HON. JON C. BLUE

CLERK, SUPERIOR COURT,

NNH CR12-0130661-T

CLERK, APPELLATE COURT

REPORTER OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS

STAFF ATTORNEYS' OFFICE

COUNSEL OF RECORD

hh

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APPELLATE COURT

STATE OF CONNECTICUT

AC 39796

STATE OF CONNECTICUT

v.

QUAVON TORRES

NOVEMBER 28, 2017

ORDER

THE MOTION OF THE STATE – APPELLEE,

FILED NOVEMBER 17, 2017, FOR STAY OF

EXECUTION PENDING DECISION BY THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNTIED STATES,

HAVING BEEN PRESENTED TO THE COURT, IT

IS HEREBY O R D E R E D GRANTED UNTIL

THE EXPIRATION OF THE TIME TO PETITION

TO THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT OR,

IF A PETITION IS FILED, UNTIL THAT COURT

HAS TAKEN ACTION IN THIS CASE, EITHER BY

A DENIAL OF THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI

OR, IF APPLICABLE, BY A DECISION ON THE

MERITS.

BY THE COURT,

/S/

RENE L. ROBERTSON

ASSISTANT CLERK-APPELLATE

A-23

NOTICE SENT: November 28, 2017

HON. JON C. BLUE

COUNSEL OF RECORD

CLERK, SUPERIOR COURT,

NNH CR12-0130661-T

173039

A-24