Respondents Brief — Tyson Timbs, Petitioner v. Indiana
Supreme Court briefOct 4, 2018
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No. 17-1091
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
____________________
TYSON TIMBS AND A 2012 LAND ROVER LR2,
Petitioner,
v.
STATE OF INDIANA,
Respondent.
____________________________________
On Writ of Certiorari to the
Indiana Supreme Court
____________________________________
BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT
____________________________________
Office of the Attorney General
IGC South, Fifth Floor
302 W. Washington St.
Indianapolis, IN 46204
(317) 232-6255
Tom.Fisher@atg.in.gov
CURTIS T. HILL, JR.
Attorney General
THOMAS M. FISHER
Solicitor General*
KIAN J. HUDSON
Deputy Solicitor
General
AARON T. CRAFT
JULIA C. PAYNE
Deputy Attorneys
General
*Counsel of Record
Counsel for Respondent
i
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether the Excessive Fines Clause, via the Due
Process Clause, is incorporated against state in rem
forfeitures.
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
QUESTION PRESENTED ....................................... i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................... iv
INTRODUCTION .................................................... 1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................. 2
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ......................... 4
ARGUMENT ............................................................ 8
I.
The Question Before the Court Is Whether
the Excessive Fines Clause, Via the
Due
Process
Clause,
Imposes
a
Proportionality Requirement on State In
Rem Forfeitures ............................................... 8
A. The Court should ask whether a
proportionality requirement for in rem
forfeitures is a fundamental and deeply
rooted feature of American law .................. 8
B. The Court should not revisit whether
incorporation should occur via the
Privileges or Immunities Clause .............. 13
II.
History Shows That In Rem Forfeitures
Were Not Originally Understood to Be
Subject to an Excessive Fines Clause
Proportionality Requirement......................... 17
iii
A. In rem forfeitures antedate constitutional ratification and have continued
for more than two centuries ..................... 18
B. The historical rationale for in rem
forfeitures explains why they were not
understood to be subject to a
proportionality requirement..................... 37
III. History Establishes That Either the
Excessive Fines Clause Does Not Apply to
In Rem Forfeitures or the Fourteenth
Amendment Does Not Incorporate the
Clause Against the States ............................. 43
A. The better interpretation reads the
Excessive Fines Clause not to apply to
in rem forfeitures ...................................... 44
B. If the Court interprets the Excessive
Fines Clause to extend to in rem
forfeitures, history shows that the
Clause does not apply to the States ......... 58
CONCLUSION ....................................................... 60
APPENDIX ............................................................. 1a
State Constitution Excessive Fines Clauses ...... 1a
iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Aguilar v. Texas,
378 U.S. 108 (1964) ................................................9
Anonymous Case,
1 Gal. 23 (1812) ....................................................10
Apodaca v. Oregon,
406 U.S. 404 (1972) ..........................................9, 12
Apple v. State,
190 Md. 661 (Md. Ct. App. 1948) ........................28
Aravanis v. Somerset,
339 Md. 644 (1995) ..............................................28
Arizona v. Hicks,
480 U.S. 321 (1987) ................................................8
Austin v. United States,
509 U.S. 602 (1993) ...................................... passim
Barnacoat v. Six Quarter Casks of
Gunpowder,
42 Mass. 225 (1840) .............................................19
Bennis v. Michigan,
516 U.S. 442 (1996) ..............................................26
Blydenburgh v. Miles,
39 Conn. 484 (1872) .............................................28
v
CASES [CONT’D]
Boumediene v. Bush,
553 U.S. 723 (2008) ..............................................15
Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco
Disposal, Inc.,
492 U.S. 257 (1989) ............................ 13, 35, 41, 42
Buchannan v. Biggs,
2 Yeates 232 (Pa. 1797) .......................................22
C. J. Hendry Co. v. Moore,
318 U.S. 133 (1943) .................................... 1, 18, 19
C.R.M. v. State,
799 N.E.2d 555 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) ...............3, 10
Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.,
416 U.S. 663 (1974) .................................... 1, 25, 41
Commonwealth v. Certain Intoxicating
Liquors,
107 Mass. 386 (1871) .....................................21, 22
Commonwealth v. Certain Motor Vehicle,
261 Mass. 504 (1928) ............................... 52, 53, 54
Commonwealth v. Hitchings,
71 Mass. 482 (1855) .............................................28
Commonwealth v. One 1970, 2 Dr. H. T.
Lincoln Auto.,
212 Va. 597 (1972) .........................................29, 45
vi
CASES [CONT’D]
Conley v. State,
85 Ga. 348 (Ga. 1890) ..........................................28
Corfield v. Coryell,
6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) .......................56
Davidson v. Blunt,
16 Ky. 128 (1811) .................................................19
Dobbins’ Distillery v. United States,
96 U.S. 395 (1877) ................................................25
Dowda v. State,
203 Ala. 441 (1919) ..............................................32
Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145 (1968) ..........................................9, 12
Evans v. State,
214 Ga. App. 844 (1994) ......................................28
Gaines v. Fuentes,
92 U.S. 10 (1875)..................................................39
Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. United
States,
286 U.S. 49 (1932) ................................................59
Hanscomb v. Russell,
77 Mass. 373 (1858) .............................................51
Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis,
398 U.S. 306 (1970) ........................................15, 16
vii
CASES [CONT’D]
Henry v. Alquist,
127 A.D.2d 60 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987).............29, 45
House and Lot v. State,
204 Ala. 108 (1920) ............................ 28, 29, 45, 59
J. W. Goldsmith, Jr., Grant Co. v. United
States,
254 U.S. 505 (1921) ..............................................26
Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun.
Employees, Council 31,
138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018)....................................56, 57
Jones v. Root,
72 Mass. 435 (1856) .............................................32
Ex parte Keeler,
45 S.C. 537 (1896) ................................................28
In re King Properties,
535 Pa. 321 (1993) ...............................................28
Lincoln v. Smith,
27 Vt. 328 (1855) ..................................................32
The Little Charles,
26 F. Cas. 979 (C.C.D. Va. 1818) ...................24, 56
Logan v. United States,
260 F. 746 (5th Cir. 1919)..............................33, 34
Makins Produce Co. v. Callison,
67 Wash. 434 (1912) ............................................21
viii
CASES [CONT’D]
The Malek Adhel,
43 U.S. 210 (1844)..........................................24, 25
Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961) ..............................................12
McDonald v. City of Chicago,
561 U.S. 742 (2010) ...................................... passim
Medlock v. One 1985 Jeep Cherokee,
322 S.C. 127 (1996) ..............................................28
Megee v. Bierne,
39 Pa. 50 (1861) ...................................................21
Moore v. Commonwealth,
293 Ky. 55 (1943) ..................................... 29, 45, 59
Origet v. Hedden,
155 U.S. 228 (1894) ..............................................35
Our House No. 2 v. State,
4 Greene 172 (Iowa 1853) .................. 20, 21, 25, 33
Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip,
499 U.S. 1 (1991)............................................35, 36
The Palmyra,
12 Wheat. 1 (1827) ...............................................38
Peisch v. Ware,
8 U.S. 347 (1808)..................................................52
ix
CASES [CONT’D]
People v. Crotty,
22 A.D. 77 (N.Y. App. Div. 1897).........................28
Peters v. University of N.H.,
112 N.H. 120 (1972) .............................................28
Phile v. The Anna,
1 Dall. 197 (Pa. 1787) ....................................23, 24
Scott v. Willson,
3 N.H. 321 (1825) .................................................19
South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc.,
138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018)..........................................57
Southern Express Co. v. Commonwealth ex
rel. Walker,
92 Va. 59 (1895) ...................................................28
State v. Driver,
78 N.C. 423 (1878) ...............................................28
State v. Foster,
22 R.I. 163 (1900) .................................................28
State v. Griffin,
84 N.J.L. 429 (N.J. 1913) .....................................28
State v. Thornson,
170 Minn. 349 (1927) ............................... 29, 45, 59
State v. Williams,
286 N.J. Super. 507 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1995) .....................................................28
x
CASES [CONT’D]
Talmage & Van Pelt v. Fire Dep’t of New
York,
24 Wend. 235 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1840) ... 19, 20, 38, 39
United States v. $120,856 in U.S. Currency,
394 F.Supp.2d 687 (D.V.I. 1993) .........................57
United States v. $293,316 in U.S. Currency,
349 F.Supp.2d 638 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) ....................57
United States v. 107.9 Acre Parcel of Land,
898 F.3d 396 (3rd Cir. 1990) ...............................30
United States v. 18900 S.W. 50th Street,
915 F.Supp. 1199 (N.D. Fla. 1994) ......................57
United States v. 3636 Roselawn Ave.,
1994 WL 524985 (C.D. Cal. 1994) .......................57
United States v. 3639-2nd St., N.E.,
869 F.2d 1093 (8th Cir. 1989)........................30, 31
United States v. 38 Whalers Cove Drive,
954 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1992) .............................31, 58
United States v. 461 Shelby County Road
361,
857 F.Supp. 935 (N.D. Ala., 1994).......................57
United States v. 508 Depot St.,
964 F.2d 814 (8th Cir. 1992).................... 31, 41, 42
xi
CASES [CONT’D]
United States v. 6625 Zumirez Drive,
845 F.Supp. 725 (C.D. Cal. 1994) ........................57
United States v. 835 Seventh Street,
820 F.Supp. 688 (N.D.N.Y. 1993) ........................57
United States v. 916 Douglas Ave.,
903 F.2d 490 (7th Cir. 1990)................................31
United States v. Bajakajian,
524 U.S. 321 (1998) ...................................... passim
United States v. Busher,
817 F.2d 1409 (9th Cir. 1987)..............................30
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp.,
299 U.S. 304 (1936) ..............................................35
United States v. Ford Motor Co.,
442 F.Supp.2d 429 (E.D. Mich. 2006) .................57
United States v. Funds in the Amount of
$100,120,
901 F.3d 758 (7th Cir. 2018)................................26
United States v. Grande,
620 F.2d 1026 (4th Cir. 1980)..............................30
United States v. Halper,
490 U.S. 435 (1989) ..............................................47
United States v. Huber,
603 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1979) .................................30
xii
CASES [CONT’D]
United States v. La Vengeance,
3 U.S. 297 (1796)..................................................32
United States v. The Louisa Barbara,
26 F. Cas. 1000 (E.D. Pa. 1833)...........................23
United States v. On Leong Chinese
Merchants Ass’n Bldg.,
918 F.2d 1289 (7th Cir. 1990)..............................31
United States v. One 1988 White Jeep
Cherokee,
30 V.I. 75 (D.V.I. 1994) ........................................57
United States v. One Assortment of 89
Firearms,
465 U.S. 354 (1984) ..............................................40
United States v. One Saxon Auto.,
257 F. 251 (4th Cir. 1919)....................................26
United States v. One Single Family
Residence,
13 F.3d 1493 (11th Cir.1994)...........................5, 57
United States v. Premises Known as RR No.
1 Box 224,
14 F.3d 864 (3d Cir. 1994) .............................31, 47
United States v. Santoro,
866 F.2d 1538 (4th Cir. 1989)..............................30
xiii
CASES [CONT’D]
United States v. Shelly’s Riverside Heights
Lot X,
851 F.Supp. 633 (M.D. Pa. 1994) ........................57
United States v. Tax Lot 1500,
861 F.2d 232 (9th Cir. 1988).................... 30, 41, 42
United States v. Two Bay Mules,
36 F. 84 (W.D.N.C. 1888) .....................................56
United States v. Ursery,
518 U.S. 267 (1996) ............................ 40, 46, 47, 48
Upjohn Co. v. United States,
449 U.S. 383 (1981) ..............................................10
Van Oster v. Kansas,
272 U.S. 465 (1926) ..............................................33
von Hofe v. United States,
492 F.3d 175 (2d Cir. 2007) .................................57
Wolf v. Colorado,
338 U.S. 25 (1949)..................................................9
Wright v. Commonwealth,
77 Pa. 470 (1875) .................................................28
Ziglar v. Abbasi,
137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017)..........................................16
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
U.S. Const. amend. IV ................................................9
xiv
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS [CONT’D]
U.S. Const. amend. VI ................................................9
U.S. Const. amend. XIV ......................................15, 52
STATUTES
21 U.S.C. § 881(a)......................................................46
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) ...............................................16
Ind. Code § 34-24-1-1 .................................... 2, 3, 8, 10
Ind. Code § 34-24-1-3(a) ..............................................2
Ind. Code § 34-24-1-3(e) ............................................43
Ind. Code §§ 35-50-2-3 to -7 ........................................4
OTHER AUTHORITIES
4A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur Miller,
Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. (4th ed.)..........................40
Alfred Conkling, Treatise on the
Organization, Jurisdiction, and Practice
of the Courts of the United States (1864) ......39, 40
Andrew E. Taslitz, Hate Crimes, Free
Speech, and the Contract of Mutual
Indifference, 80 B.U. L. Rev. 1283 (2000) ...........36
Caleb Nelson, The Constitutionality of Civil
Forfeiture, 125 Yale L.J. 2446 (2016) ....................3
xv
OTHER AUTHORITIES [CONT’D]
Christopher Green, Our Bipartisan Due
Process Clause, Geo. Mason L. Rev.
(Forthcoming), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3249845; ...............................................34
CRS Report R43189, Federal Excise Taxes:
An Introduction and General Analysis
(2013) ....................................................................22
Department of Justice, Summary of Seizure
and Forfeiture Trends,
https://www.justice.gov/afp/file/5yr_forfeiture_trends.pdf/download ......................57
Erastus Benedict, The American Admiralty
(1850) ....................................................................39
Henry Austin, The Liquor Law in the
United States (1890) ............................................21
Joel Prentiss Bishop, Commentaries on the
Criminal Law (3d ed. 1865) ........................ passim
Joel Prentiss Bishop, Commentaries on the
Criminal Law (4th ed. 1868) ...............................20
Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the
Desegregation Decisions, 81 Va. L. Rev.
947 (1995) .............................................................36
Nicholas M. McLean, Livelihood, Ability to
Pay, and the Original Meaning of the
Excessive Fines Clause, 40 Hastings
Const. L.Q. 833 (2013) .........................................27
xvi
OTHER AUTHORITIES [CONT’D]
Rufus Waples, Treatise on Proceedings In
Rem (1882) ................................................... passim
Sir Jeffrey Gilbert, A Treatise on the Court
of Exchequer (1758) ........................................38, 43
1
INTRODUCTION
This case began with the State of Indiana’s routine
in rem forfeiture action against Tyson Timbs’s Land
Rover. Indiana law authorizes forfeiture of the Rover
because Timbs used it to traffic heroin, but he argues
that its value far exceeds the gravity of his crime and
that the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines
Clause—which he contends applies to the States under the Fourteenth Amendment—bars the forfeiture.
Timbs’s claim fails at the starting gate: The Excessive Fines Clause does not impose a proportionality
requirement on state in rem forfeitures, a feature of
American law for more than three hundred years. See
C. J. Hendry Co. v. Moore, 318 U.S. 133, 137–52
(1943). Even though forfeitures sometimes produce
harsh results—the owner’s innocence “has almost
uniformly been rejected as a defense,” Calero-Toledo
v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 683
(1974)—courts did not suggest that the Excessive
Fines Clause might limit in rem forfeitures until the
last quarter of the twentieth century. Indeed, only
five earlier state-court cases even mentioned the argument Timbs makes here; all squarely rejected it.
The history of in rem forfeitures suggests two possible conclusions: the Excessive Fines Clause does not
apply to in rem forfeitures—potentially conflicting
with Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 621–22
(1993)—or the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply
the Clause against the States. Either way, history requires the Court to reject Timbs’s claim.
2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The investigation into Timbs’s heroin trafficking
began with a tip from a confidential informant and
continued with two controlled drug purchases; each
time, officers bought two grams of heroin from Timbs
and scheduled a subsequent sale. Pet. App. 2. Police
arrested Timbs and seized the Rover while he was on
his way to the third sale. Hr’g. Tr. 13:13–25; 14:06–08
(July 15, 2015). While he was in custody, Timbs told
officers that he would use the Rover to pick up heroin
several times a week, Hr’g. Tr. 14:09–15:18, and at
the forfeiture hearing, he said that doing so put “a lot”
of miles on the vehicle. Hr’g. Tr. 36:09–14.
The State charged Timbs with two counts of Class
B felony dealing in a controlled substance and one
count of Class D felony conspiracy to commit theft.
Pet. App. 3. Timbs pled guilty to the conspiracy count
and one of the drug-dealing counts in exchange for
dismissal of the remaining dealing charge. Id. The
court sentenced Timbs to one year of home detention
and five years of probation; Timbs also agreed to pay
investigation costs of $385, an interdiction fee of $200,
court costs of $168, a bond fee of $50, and a court-certified drug-and-alcohol assessment fee of $400, for a
total of $1,203.00 in fees and costs. Id.
Indiana law authorizes the State to bring “an action for forfeiture” against property seized as an instrumentality of certain crimes, Ind. Code § 34-24-13(a), including vehicles used to transport heroin, id.
§ 34-24-1-1(a)(1)(A). The forfeiture action is entirely
separate from any criminal prosecution, and, because
3
the State brings the action against the property itself,
the action is a proceeding in rem. C.R.M. v. State, 799
N.E.2d 555, 558 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). The federal government and nearly every other State utilize similar
in rem forfeiture proceedings. See United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 333 (1998) (“Instrumentalities
historically have been treated as a form of ‘guilty
property’ that can be forfeited in civil in rem proceedings.”); Caleb Nelson, The Constitutionality of Civil
Forfeiture, 125 Yale L.J. 2446, 2451 (2016) (observing
that most States have broad laws authorizing civil
forfeiture, though eight States require predicate criminal convictions and one State has eliminated the procedure).
Accordingly, after the State seized the Rover, but
while Timbs’s criminal case was still pending, private
lawyers acting under the authority of an elected prosecuting attorney filed a complaint on the State’s behalf seeking forfeiture of the Rover under Indiana
Code section 34-24-1-1(a)(1)(A). Compl. for Forfeiture
(Aug. 5, 2013). Timbs’s answer denied the allegations
without raising any constitutional arguments. Answer (Aug. 29, 2013). After Timbs had pled guilty, the
trial court held a hearing on the State’s forfeiture action, and it found that the Rover met the statutory
criteria for forfeiture because it was used to
“transport . . . [a] controlled substance for the purpose
of committing . . . [the crime of d]ealing in a schedule
I . . . controlled substance . . . .” Ind. Code § 34-24-11(a)(1)(A); see J. Order ¶ 3 (Aug. 28, 2015).
Nevertheless, the trial court held—without hearing any argument from the parties on the point—that
4
the forfeiture would violate the Excessive Fines
Clause. Id. ¶ 8. It noted that the Rover was valued at
about $40,000, id. ¶ 1, and that the maximum fine applicable to the drug-dealing charge to which Timbs
had pled guilty was $10,000, id. ¶ 6. Although Indiana
law sets $10,000 as the maximum fine for all felonies,
including murder, Ind. Code §§ 35-50-2-3 to -7, the
trial court concluded that the approximately four-toone ratio between the value of the Rover and the maximum fine for the drug-dealing charge was “grossly
disproportional” and therefore unconstitutional under the Excessive Fines Clause. J. Order ¶¶ 7–8 (Aug.
28, 2015).
After filing an unsuccessful motion to correct error, the State appealed the trial court’s decision,
which the Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed. Pet.
App. 17–24. The State then sought transfer to the Indiana Supreme Court, which reversed, holding that
the Excessive Fines Clause does not bar the forfeiture
because the Fourteenth Amendment does not incorporate the Excessive Fines Clause against the States.
Pet. App. 9–10.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1. The question presented by this case is whether
the right Timbs claims—that is, the right to be free
from disproportionate in rem forfeitures—is “fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty” and “deeply
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.” McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 767 (2010) (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted). Timbs
5
recognizes that this question is answered by examining the historical evidence. Pet. Br. 9–25. He is mistaken, however, about which evidence is relevant. Because this case involves an in rem forfeiture, the question is not whether in personam fines were traditionally subject to proportionality review, cf. id., but instead whether proportionality requirements were historically applied to in rem forfeitures.
The Court should also reject the urging of amici to
discard the settled framework for deciding incorporation questions in favor of constructing a new incorporation doctrine from the ground up. The historically
informed, straightforward approach the Court described and used in McDonald is “well established.”
561 U.S. at 750. Upsetting current doctrine would create numerous collateral consequences, all without
changing the answer to the question presented by this
case: The right Timbs claims is neither fundamental
to, nor deeply rooted in, America’s legal tradition and
therefore does not apply against the States.
2. For the vast majority of American history, in
rem forfeitures have not been subject to a proportionality requirement. Even before the Revolution, authorities brought in rem proceedings against property
used to violate the law. These proceedings sometimes
resulted in severe consequences; courts have always
rejected, for example, the innocence of the forfeited
property’s owner as a defense. Yet, in spite of the
many opportunities to complain of “disproportionate”
in rem forfeitures, not a single decision issued prior to
the end of the twentieth century said that either a fed-
6
eral or state Excessive Fines Clause imposes a proportionality requirement on these forfeitures—even
though virtually every State has such a Clause and
even though courts regularly enforced Excessive
Fines Clauses against criminal fines. The only five
state-court cases prior to 1988 even to acknowledge
the possibility of an Excessive Fines Clause limit on
in rem forfeitures all explicitly rejected it. The courts’
silence is powerful evidence that no such proportionality requirement exists, particularly in light of other
challenges occasionally brought against in rem forfeitures based on constitutional provisions having nothing to do with proportionality.
The traditional conception of in rem forfeitures explains why the Excessive Fines Clause is inapplicable
here. As multiple nineteenth-century treatises explained, in rem forfeitures are not penalties, and the
Excessive Fines Clause applies only to a “punishment
for some offense,” Austin v. United States, 509 U.S.
602, 610 (1993) (quoting Browning-Ferris Indus. of
Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 265
(1989)). And it is hard to see how any proportionality
requirement could be squared with courts’ consistent
approval of in rem forfeitures suffered by innocent
owners.
3. The historical evidence establishes that, both
before and after the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the American legal tradition did not consider in rem forfeitures to be subject to a proportionality requirement. Accordingly, two potential interpretations are available. The better interpretation
reads the Excessive Fines Clause not to apply to in
7
rem forfeitures and thereby fully harmonizes the historical evidence: It explains why Timbs cites many
courts and commentators calling excessive fines unconstitutional but no authorities saying the same
about in rem forfeitures. And Austin, which held that
the Excessive Fines Clause does apply to two specific
federal in rem forfeitures, is no reason to refuse to
hold the Excessive Fines Clause inapplicable to state
in rem forfeitures. If anything, the Court’s subsequent
decisions—to say nothing of the historical evidence—
have undermined Austin’s reasoning.
If the Court interprets the Excessive Fines Clause
to encompass in rem forfeitures, however, historical
evidence permits just one other interpretation—that
the Clause does not apply to the States. No evidence
demonstrates that the American legal tradition ever
recognized a rule prohibiting state in rem forfeiture of
an instrumentality of crime where the value of the
property is disproportionate to the seriousness of the
violation. In short, no right of in rem forfeiture proportionality is “deeply rooted” in American history or
tradition. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 767. The right
Timbs claims, therefore, cannot be applied against
the States.
8
ARGUMENT
I.
The Question Before the Court Is Whether
the Excessive Fines Clause, Via the Due
Process Clause, Imposes a Proportionality
Requirement on State In Rem Forfeitures
A.
The Court should ask whether a proportionality requirement for in rem
forfeitures is a fundamental and
deeply rooted feature of American law
Reaching the right answer in this case requires
first asking the right question. Cf. Arizona v. Hicks,
480 U.S. 321, 333 (1987) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)
(“The Court today gives the right answer to the wrong
question.”). Here the right question is not whether the
Excessive Fines Clause is incorporated as a general
matter, but whether the Clause, in conjunction with
the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits the particular
state action against which Timbs has lodged a constitutional objection—the in rem forfeiture of his Rover
as an instrumentality of drug trafficking. See Ind.
Code § 34-24-1-1. Timbs claims a constitutional right
to be free from “disproportionate” in rem forfeitures.
See Pet. Br. 6–7 (discussing decisions below accepting
this argument); United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S.
321, 334 (1998) (“The touchstone of the constitutional
inquiry under the Excessive Fines Clause is the principle of proportionality.”). To enforce this right
against Indiana, he must show that it “is fundamental
to our scheme of ordered liberty, or as we have said in
a related context, . . . is deeply rooted in this Nation’s
history and tradition.” McDonald v. City of Chicago,
9
561 U.S. 742, 767 (2010) (internal quotation marks
and emphasis omitted).
1. The Court must examine the history of in rem
forfeitures because the Court’s incorporation cases
frame the incorporation question in terms of the specific right asserted. In McDonald, for example, the
Court did not look at the history of the Second Amendment in general but examined the history of the “right
to keep arms for self-defense.” Id. at 768; see also id.
at 789 (rejecting arguments against “the case for incorporation of the right to keep and bear arms for selfdefense”).
The Courts’ other incorporation cases have taken
the same right-specific approach. For example, rather
than incorporate all of the rights encompassed by the
first clause of the Fourth Amendment all at once—
“the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated,” U.S.
Const. amend. IV—the Court first incorporated the
Clause’s reasonableness requirement, Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), and about fifteen years later
incorporated the Clause’s warrant requirement, Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964). See also McDonald,
561 U.S. at 764 n.12. Similarly, rather than incorporate the “right to . . . an impartial jury,” U.S. Const.
amend. VI, wholesale, the Court has held that this
Clause requires States to provide a jury trial to defendants charged with serious offenses, Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), but that it does not
incorporate a right to a unanimous verdict, Apodaca
v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972).
10
Focusing on the specific claimed right is particularly important here because the forfeiture Timbs
challenges is very different from the criminal fines to
which his historical evidence relates. The State imposed the forfeiture pursuant to an in rem civil proceeding against the Rover, not an in personam criminal proceeding against Timbs. See C.R.M. v. State,
799 N.E.2d 555, 558 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003); see also
Anonymous Case, 1 Gal. 23 (1812) (Story, J.) (“[I]t is
not true, that informations in rem are criminal proceedings. On the contrary, it has been solemnly adjudged that they are civil proceedings.”). The validity
of the forfeiture therefore turns not on Timbs’s culpability but on the Rover’s—whether it was used to
transport drugs for the purpose of drug dealing. See
Ind. Code § 34-24-1-1. And Indiana courts determine
which—or how much—property goes to the State by
considering the property’s involvement in the crime,
not the crime’s severity. Id.
Timbs ignores this distinction. He frames the
question presented at a high level of generality, asking “[w]hether the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive
Fines Clause is incorporated against the States under
the Fourteenth Amendment,” without addressing in
rem forfeitures in particular. Pet. Br. i. And virtually
all of the historical evidence he presents relates to
criminal fines, not in rem forfeitures. Id. at 11–27.
Timbs’s focus on criminal fines ignores the rightspecific nature of the Court’s incorporation cases, and
it ignores the Court’s role, which is “to decide concrete
cases and not abstract propositions of law.” Upjohn
Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 386 (1981).
11
Whether the Constitution would prohibit a hypothetical $40,000 criminal fine for Timbs’s crime is irrelevant. The only relevant question is whether the Constitution—specifically, the Excessive Fines Clause,
via the Fourteenth Amendment—imposes a proportionality requirement on the State’s in rem forfeiture
of his Rover.
2. Even if the Court were to view the incorporation
question at a higher level of generality and ask
whether the Excessive Fines Clause as a whole is fundamental to, and deeply rooted in, the American legal
tradition, the history of in rem forfeitures still would
be essential to reaching the right answer. The Excessive Fines Clause can be “incorporated in the concept
of Due Process” in toto only if all its protections—including its purported protection against disproportionate in rem forfeitures—are “fundamental
to our scheme of ordered liberty” and “deeply rooted
in this Nation’s history and tradition.” McDonald, 561
U.S. at 767 (internal quotation marks and emphasis
omitted). The historical pedigree of the Excessive
Fines Clause’s restriction against disproportionate
criminal penalties cannot by itself justify applying
other purported constitutional limitations against the
States.
The Court has never applied a purported constitutional limitation against the States after finding that
it fails the “fundamental . . . or . . . deeply rooted” test.
McDonald, 561 U.S. at 767. In McDonald, for example, the Court marshalled statements from the founding and Fourteenth Amendment ratification periods
demonstrating that “the Framers and ratifiers of the
12
Fourteenth Amendment counted the right [to keep
and bear arms for self-defense] among those fundamental rights necessary to our system of ordered liberty.” Id. at 767–78. See also, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643, 656–57 (1961) (“We find that . . . as to the
States, the freedom from unconscionable invasions of
privacy and the freedom from convictions based upon
coerced confessions do enjoy an ‘intimate relation’ in
their perpetuation of ‘principles of humanity and civil
liberty (secured) . . . only after years of struggle.’” (second ellipsis in original)); Duncan, 391 U.S. at 149
(“Because we believe that trial by jury in criminal
cases is fundamental to the American scheme of justice, we hold that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right of jury trial in all criminal cases.”).
Contrariwise, in Apodaca, the Court concluded
that the jury-unanimity requirement is not sufficiently fundamental to justify application against the
States. See 406 U.S. at 373 (Powell, J., concurring in
the judgment) (explaining that “[t]he question . . . is
whether unanimity is in fact so fundamental to the
essentials of jury trial that this particular requirement of the Sixth Amendment is necessarily binding
on the States under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment”).
In short, there is no precedent for incorporating all
limitations recognized by a clause in the Bill of Rights
where some of those limitations lack fundamental
grounding in American history and traditions.
***
13
Whether the Court views the incorporation inquiry on a right-by-right or a clause-by-clause basis,
it should focus on in rem forfeitures specifically—not
merely in personam fines. Timbs must identify historical evidence showing that the American legal tradition has consistently applied, and recognized as significant, his claimed right to a proportionality requirement for in rem forfeitures. See McDonald, 561
U.S. at 767. History is particularly important here because the meaning of the Excessive Fines Clause, as
in “other Eighth Amendment contexts,” is “illuminated by its history.” Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt.,
Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 264 & n.4
(1989). “The applicability of the Eighth Amendment
always has turned on its original meaning, as demonstrated by its historical derivation.” Id. at 264 n.4
(quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 670 n.39
(1977)). The history forecloses Timbs’s argument: In
rem forfeitures have been common throughout American history, but courts did not recognize the right
Timbs claims—much less declare it fundamental—
until the end of the twentieth century. See infra, Part
II.
B.
The Court should not revisit whether
incorporation should occur via the
Privileges or Immunities Clause
As Timbs recognizes, the Court’s incorporation
doctrine has long “been built upon the substantive
due process framework,” Pet. Br. 37 (quoting McDonald, 561 U.S. at 812 (Thomas, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment)). Timbs briefly suggests that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or
14
Immunities Clause provides an alternative basis for
incorporating the Excessive Fines Clause against the
States, id. 37–38, but—unlike some amici, Cause of
Action Inst. Amicus Br. 10–16; Am. Civil Rights Union Amicus Br. 12–20—he wisely does not ask the
Court to depart from its “long established and narrowly limited” incorporation doctrine. McDonald, 561
U.S. at 791 (Scalia, J., concurring). The Court should
not use this case to rebuild incorporation doctrine on
a new foundation.
1. First, there is no reason for the Court “to reconsider” incorporation via the Privileges and Immunities Clause, “since straightforward application of settled doctrine suffices to decide [this case].” Id. Timbs
does not argue that considering incorporation under
the Privileges or Immunities Clause would meaningfully change the analysis here. Pet. Br.at 38 (asserting that the right to be free from excessive fines “was
regarded as fundamental long before the Founding”
and citing prior historical discussion arguing for incorporation under the Due Process Clause). And there
is no reason to believe it would: In McDonald, the
Court’s most recent incorporation case, Justice
Thomas’s concurrence concluded that the Privileges
or Immunities Clause incorporates the right to bear
arms for self-defense on the basis of much of the same
historical evidence discussed in the Court’s Due Process Clause analysis. See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 844–
50 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment); id. at 838 (“As the Court demonstrates, there can be no doubt that § 1 was understood
to enforce the Second Amendment against the
States.” (citing the opinion of the Court)).
15
Under both the Due Process Clause and the Privileges or Immunities Clause, the imposition of a proportionality requirement to States’ in rem forfeitures
turns on whether historical evidence shows widespread acceptance and recognition of the importance
of this rule.
2. Second, changing the foundation of the Court’s
incorporation doctrine at this late date—after it has
considered incorporation of nearly every provision in
the Bill of Rights—could create a host of unpredictable consequences and sow confusion among lower
courts and state and local governments.
For example, while the Due Process Clause applies
to “any person,” the Privileges or Immunities Clause
protects “citizens of the United States,” U.S. Const.
amend. XIV, and a change in the Court’s doctrine
could leave the country wondering which provisions
of the Bill of Rights would apply only to citizens. Compare McDonald, 561 U.S. at 815 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“The
group of rights-bearers to whom the Privileges or Immunities Clause applies is, of course, ‘citizens.’”); with
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 743 (2008) (“Because the Constitution’s separation-of-powers structure, like the substantive guarantees of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments . . . protects persons as well
as citizens, foreign nationals who have the privilege
of litigating in our courts can seek to enforce separation-of-powers principles.” (citations omitted)); Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306, 309 & n.5
(1970) (“[O]nce an alien lawfully enters and resides in
this country he becomes invested with the rights
16
guaranteed by the Constitution to all people within
our borders. Such rights include those protected by
the First and the Fifth Amendments and by the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
One amicus seizes on this difference to argue in
favor of adopting a Privileges or Immunities Clause
theory of incorporation, contending that the Excessive
Fines Clause thereby protects only citizens. See Am.
Civil Rights Union Amicus Br. 10–11. Accepting the
invitation to reconsider Privileges or Immunities
Clause doctrine would require the Court to confront
whether and how the Bill of Rights protects all persons from unlawful state action.
Discarding the Court’s current approach could
raise other serious questions. Would the rules the
Court has imposed against States and localities pursuant to other provisions of the Bill of Rights remain
“clearly established” for the purpose of the Court’s
qualified immunity doctrine? See Ziglar v. Abbasi,
137 S. Ct. 1843, 1866 (2017). Would these prior decisions remain “clearly established Federal law” for the
purpose of federal habeas proceedings? See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)(1). These questions would require urgent
answers, and the Court is in no position to provide
them prior to a decision to reconsider the basis of incorporation. Such a change is not only unnecessary as
a matter of doctrine, but is also irrelevant here.
The Court should continue to apply the standard
it has “well established” over numerous cases,
McDonald, 561 U.S. at 750, and ask whether a proportionality requirement for in rem forfeitures is a
17
“fundamental” and “deeply rooted” feature of our
country’s legal tradition, id. at 767.
II.
History Shows That In Rem Forfeitures
Were Not Originally Understood to Be
Subject to an Excessive Fines Clause
Proportionality Requirement
The historical evidence all points in a single direction: The right Timbs claims is neither fundamental
to, nor deeply rooted in, America’s legal tradition. Although in rem forfeitures have always existed in American law—and frequently have been harsh—from before the Revolution through most of the twentieth century, no court even suggested that a state or federal
Excessive Fines Clause imposed a proportionality requirement on these forfeitures. Unchallenged practice
is highly probative of the Constitution’s original
meaning, and it is particularly so here in light of the
other constitutional challenges occasionally brought
against in rem forfeitures, and in light of the application of the Excessive Fines Clause’s proportionality
requirement to in personam fines. Observers sometimes suggested that the Due Process Clause imposes
limitations on in rem forfeitures—albeit limitations
unrelated to proportionality—which makes it all the
more striking that they did not identify any proportionality limitation stemming from the Excessive
Fines Clause.
The historical understanding of in rem forfeitures
both explains the silence regarding any Excessive
Fines Clause limitation and further substantiates the
18
significance of this silence. American law has long distinguished in rem forfeitures from in personam fines;
the former are not penalties, while the latter are. Because the Excessive Fines Clause applies only to penalties, it does not apply to in rem forfeitures. Moreover, any proportionality requirement would fundamentally contradict the longstanding rule that the
guilty property of even an innocent owner can be the
subject of in rem forfeiture, and would do nothing to
further the original central purpose of the Excessive
Fines Clause.
A.
In rem forfeitures antedate constitutional ratification and have continued
for more than two centuries
1. Authorities in England and America have
brought in rem proceedings to forfeit property used to
violate the law for well over three hundred years. See
C. J. Hendry Co. v. Moore, 318 U.S. 133, 138 (1943).
The English admiralty courts and the Court of Exchequer heard in rem proceedings against “articles
seized . . . for the violation of law.” Id. at 137. The
Common Law “established [in rem procedures] . . . certainly as early as the latter part of the
seventeenth century,” and courts used in rem procedures to combat piracy, smuggling, and unlawful fishing. Id. at 137–39 & nn. 2–3 (collecting cases).
The American colonies adopted in rem procedures
and used them in both admiralty and common law
courts. Id. at 139. For example, the colonies adopted
in rem forfeitures to enforce the Navigation Acts as
19
well as laws regulating imports and the sale and storage of commodities. See id. at 139–48 & nn.4–14 (collecting colonial statutes and cases). The procedure
“had become a recognized part of the common law system as developed in England and received in this
country long before the American Revolution.” Id. at
149. The American States continued to employ in rem
forfeitures after separating from Great Britain, both
during the period of the Articles of Confederation and
following the Constitution’s ratification. Id. at 149–
51.
The Constitution gave the federal government
control “over the regulation of trade, navigation and
customs duties which had been prolific sources of forfeiture proceedings in the state courts,” id. at 152, and
federal courts, therefore, heard many in rem forfeiture proceedings. Such proceedings persisted at the
state level after the ratification of the Constitution as
well. Antebellum state statutes imposed in rem forfeitures for violations of various state laws, including
fishing, gambling, waterway, gunpowder, and alcohol
regulations.1
1 See, e.g., C. J. Hendry Co., 318 U.S. at 150 & n.15 (collecting
cases regarding state fishing laws); Davidson v. Blunt, 16 Ky.
128, 128 (1811) (discussing 1799 Kentucky statute subjecting to
in rem forfeiture “all money, or property, staked or betted”); Scott
v. Willson, 3 N.H. 321, 321 (1825) (discussing 1809 New Hampshire statute subjecting to in rem forfeiture all un-rafted timber
found in the Connecticut river); Barnacoat v. Six Quarter Casks
of Gunpowder, 42 Mass. 225, 225 (1840) (describing 1833 Massachusetts law subjecting to in rem forfeiture gunpowder kept in
violation of municipal regulations); Talmage & Van Pelt v. Fire
Dep’t of New York, 24 Wend. 235, 236 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1840) (de-
20
Federal and state use of in rem forfeitures continued during the Civil War and expanded into the twentieth century. For example, by the mid-nineteenth
century federal revenue laws provided for the in rem
forfeiture of any property held for the purpose of evading payment of applicable duties. See George
Boutwell, The Tax-Payer’s Manual 23–24 (1865);
Rufus Waples, Treatise on Proceedings In Rem 215–
16 (1882) (providing an extensive list of property forfeitable in an in rem proceeding under federal revenue laws), cited in United States v. Bajakajian, 524
U.S. 321, 330 (1998); Joel Prentiss Bishop, Commentaries on the Criminal Law § 698 & n. 5 (3d ed. 1865)
(collecting cases).2 The use of in rem forfeitures to enforce state revenue laws was similarly extensive and
scribing 1830 New York law subjecting to in rem forfeiture gunpowder held in quantities exceeding statutory limits); Our House
No. 2 v. State, 4 Greene 172, 174 (Iowa 1853) (discussing Iowa
statute providing for the in rem forfeiture of “dram shops”).
2 The third edition of Bishop’s Commentaries on the Criminal
Law, published in 1865, was the most recent edition circulating
during the period of the Fourteenth Amendment’s framing and
ratification. The fourth edition of Bishop’s treatise was published in 1868, the year the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, and its discussion of in rem forfeitures is virtually identical
to the third edition’s. See Joel Prentiss Bishop, Commentaries on
the Criminal Law §§ 694–709 (4th ed. 1868). Because the third
edition offers the most direct evidence of the understanding of
constitutional rights held by the Fourteenth Amendment’s framers and ratifiers, all citations to Bishop in the main text refer to
the third edition of his work. Cf. McDonald v. City of Chicago,
561 U.S. 742, 778 (2010) (relying largely on pre-ratification evidence to conclude that “the Framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment counted the right to keep and bear arms
among those fundamental rights necessary to our system of ordered liberty”).
21
well-established. See Our House No. 2 v. State, 4
Greene 172, 175 (Iowa 1853) (“[T]he revenue laws of
every state in the union authorize proceedings in rem
against the property alone, in the event of failure to
pay taxes, and such laws are not considered unconstitutional.”); Megee v. Bierne, 39 Pa. 50, 64 (1861)
(“[T]he seizure and condemnation of the goods under
the revenue laws was strictly a proceeding in rem.”);
Makins Produce Co. v. Callison, 67 Wash. 434, 439,
(1912) (“A judgment . . . declaring the condemnation
or forfeiture of goods seized for a breach of the excise
or revenue laws, is strictly in rem.” (quoting 2 Black
on Judgments, § 799)).
Courts also employed in rem forfeitures to enforce
alcohol regulations. In 1871, for example, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court explained that
“[t]he seizure of liquors . . . because they are kept for
sale illegally, is a proceeding in rem,” and observed
that “[l]egislation of this character is not novel.” Commonwealth v. Certain Intoxicating Liquors, 107 Mass.
396, 399 (1871). In 1890, one commentator observed
that “[i]n all of the states, liquor that is intoxicating
and kept for illegal sale, with the vessels containing
it, is subject to seizure and condemnation.” Henry
Austin, The Liquor Law in the United States 123
(1890).
The latter half of the nineteenth century saw in
rem forfeitures become especially important when
revenue laws and alcohol regulation overlapped. Congress partially relied on excise taxes to fund the Civil
War; after the war, it repealed most of the excise
taxes, but kept taxes on distilled spirits and tobacco.
22
CRS Report R43189, Federal Excise Taxes: An Introduction and General Analysis 2–3 (2013). The excise
taxes on spirts and tobacco continued to raise enormous sums: “In the decades after the Civil War, [they]
accounted for between one-third and one-half of all
federal revenue . . . [and] were the single largest
source of internal revenue during this era.” Id. at 3.
The large amount of money at stake inevitably made
smuggling untaxed alcohol highly profitable, and authorities often used in rem forfeitures to address the
problem. See, e.g., Buchannan v. Biggs, 2 Yeates 232,
233–34 (Pa. 1797); Commonwealth v. Certain Intoxicating Liquors, 107 Mass. 386, 396 (1871). One 1882
treatise, for example, justified the “rather severe” nature of tax-related in rem forfeitures by reference to
the “difficulty of collecting government dues,” a difficulty created by “the fact that in some parts of the
country the distillery business has carried illicit
whisky-making to that degree of refinement which is
the poetry of crime. . . . ‘Moonshiners’ . . . are likely to
afford material for many a tale by the future romancer.” Waples, supra, § 149.
In rem forfeitures have continued into the present
day, though authorities now focus on illicit drug traffickers rather than moonshiners.
2. Whether imposed by States or the federal government, in rem forfeitures have often produced draconian consequences for property owners. An 1819
federal statute, for example, limited the number of
passengers a ship could carry to two-fifths its weight
in tons, plus an additional twenty passengers; if it car-
23
ried more, the entire ship was liable to federal forfeiture. See United States v. The Louisa Barbara, 26 F.
Cas. 1000, 1001 (E.D. Pa. 1833).
In the notable The Louisa Barbara case, the
weight-limit law yielded the forfeiture of an enormously valuable, nearly four-hundred-ton vessel
whose 178 passengers exceeded the limit by a single
traveler. Id. The ship’s owners pointed out that a
large portion of the ship’s passengers “were children,
who paid nothing for their passage,” and opposed forfeiture on statutory, not constitutional, grounds, arguing that the children could not “be considered or
taken to be passengers within the intention of the
law.” Id. The court rejected this contention, holding
that it had “no such power” to prevent the forfeiture,
and that any such power rested with “that department of our government, which administers its liberality and mercy, and may forbear to execute the rigour of the law, where it is believed that its violation
has been innocent or excusable.” Id. at 1002; see also
Phile v. The Anna, 1 Dall. 197, 207 (Pa. 1787) (upholding the in rem forfeiture of a ship in spite of the lack
of evidence that its owners “meant to do any thing unfairly,” because the law did “not speak of the
knowledge of any person,” and “if the policy of the
Legislature seems to bear hard on the subject, we are
not to judge, and determine upon its propriety”).
The Louisa Barbara illustrates the harsh consequences that may result from the traditional rule that
even the property of an innocent owner could be susceptible to in rem forfeiture. Notably, this rule is
24
among the most widely accepted and consistently applied in all of American law.
For instance, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
endorsed the traditional innocent-owner rule even before the ratification of the Constitution, id., and in
1818, Chief Justice Marshall, riding circuit, affirmed
the rule in ordering the forfeiture of the Little Charles
for its violation of an American embargo. The Little
Charles, 26 F. Cas. 979, 982 (C.C.D. Va. 1818). The
ship’s owner objected to the introduction of the captain’s report, which showed that the vessel had illegally proceeded to a foreign port, on the ground that
“in a criminal case, the declarations of the captain
cannot affect the owner.” Id. at 981. Chief Justice
Marshall dismissed the objection, explaining that the
case was “a proceeding against the vessel, for an offence committed by the vessel, which . . . does not the
less subject her to forfeiture, because it was committed without the authority, and against the will of the
owner.” Id. at 982.
In 1844, the Court reaffirmed the irrelevance of
the owner’s innocence to in rem forfeitures, holding
that the owner’s innocence cannot “withdraw the ship
from the penalty of confiscation under the act of Congress.” The Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. 210, 233 (1844). Considering the question settled by Chief Justice Marshall’s decision in The Little Charles, the Court explained that the guilt of the “thing to which the forfeiture attaches” is determined “without any reference
whatsoever to the character or conduct of the owner.”
Id. (emphasis added).
25
Courts did not limit the innocent-owner rule to forfeitures of ships. By 1844, courts had “familiarly applied [the doctrine] to cases of smuggling and other
misconduct under our revenue laws . . . [and] other
kindred cases, such as cases arising on embargo and
non-intercourse acts,” id. at 233–34, and cases soon
arose applying it to in rem forfeitures of property on
land, see, e.g., Our House No. 2, 4 Greene at 172–73
(holding that an in rem forfeiture proceeding against
a “dram shop” did not need to allege the owner’s
“knowledge of the unlawful traffic”).
And in 1877, the Court enforced the doctrine
against a distillery and its associated real estate, restating the rule announced in The Little Charles and
The Malek Adhel and holding it irrelevant whether
“the owner of the property should have knowledge
that the lessee and distiller was committing fraud on
the public revenue.” Dobbins’ Distillery v. United
States, 96 U.S. 395, 399 (1877). Summarizing the previous century of case law, the Court observed that
“[c]ases often arise where the property of the owner is
forfeited . . . even when the owner is otherwise without fault . . . and it has always been held in such cases
that the acts of the master and crew bind the interest
of the owner of the ship, whether he be innocent or
guilty.” Id. at 401; see also Waples, supra, § 140 (“The
owner may be perfectly innocent of any offense, yet
his property may be guilty.”). In sum, “the innocence
of the owner of property subject to forfeiture has almost uniformly been rejected as a defense.” CaleroToledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663,
683 (1974).
26
Courts were well aware, of course, that the innocent-owner doctrine could seem technical and “may
appear to be harsh.” United States v. Two Barrels of
Whisky, 96 F. 479, 480 (4th Cir. 1899), overruled on
other grounds in part by United States v. One Saxon
Auto., 257 F. 251 (4th Cir. 1919). But they recognized
that they had no power to “refuse to carry [it] into effect, or allow [themselves] to be controlled by consideration of the supposed or real hardship of these enactments, nor open the door to opportunities of perpetual evasion.” Id. The rule was simply “too firmly
fixed in the punitive and remedial jurisprudence of
the country to be now displaced.” J. W. Goldsmith, Jr.,
Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 511 (1921)
(collecting cases); see also One Saxon Auto., 257 F. at
254–55 (collecting cases). It has thus remained in
force throughout the twentieth century up to the present day. See Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 446
(1996) (“[A] long and unbroken line of cases holds that
an owner's interest in property may be forfeited by
reason of the use to which the property is put even
though the owner did not know that it was to be put
to such use.”); United States v. Funds in the Amount
of $100,120, 901 F.3d 758, 768 (7th Cir. 2018).
3. Although in rem forfeitures have frequently
arisen in a variety of contexts since the beginning of
American history, prior to the late twentieth century
not a single court held them limited by a state or federal Excessive Fines Clause, and the five state courts
to consider the argument dismissed it. Because every
State has a constitutional provision limiting the excessiveness of fines, litigants had every opportunity to
27
argue that Excessive Fines Clauses impose a proportionality requirement on in rem forfeitures, and the
high stakes of forfeiture cases gave them every reason
to do so. Indeed, given their acknowledgement of in
rem forfeitures’ harsh effects, courts had every reason
to discuss the argument that the Clause might limit
such forfeitures. The dearth of any such discussion in
the case reports is therefore powerful evidence that
the American legal tradition did not understand the
Excessive Fines Clause to impose any proportionality
requirement on in rem forfeitures.
Even before the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment, litigants had many opportunities to
raise federal Excessive Fines Clause challenges to
federal in rem forfeitures and to raise state Excessive
Fines Clause challenges to analogous state forfeitures. As demonstrated by the citations collected in
the accompanying appendix, from the Revolution onward, nearly every constitution adopted by a State included an Excessive Fines Clause. And today, every
State in the Union has a state constitutional provision
prohibiting the imposition of excessive fines. See
Nicholas M. McLean, Livelihood, Ability to Pay, and
the Original Meaning of the Excessive Fines Clause,
40 Hastings Const. L.Q. 833, 876–77 & n.177 (2013)
(explaining that forty-seven States have clauses prohibiting “excessive fines” and that the remaining
three States have clauses either requiring proportionality for penalties or prohibiting excessive punishments generally). Courts regularly enforced state Excessive Fines Clauses—against in personam penalties—through the nineteenth and into the twentieth
28
century.3 And, as the cases discussed above demonstrate, surely many in rem forfeitures arguably imposed “disproportionate” losses on owners.
The 1920 decision in House and Lot v. State was
the first to suggest that the federal Excessive Fines
Clause or a state equivalent imposes a proportionality
limitation on in rem forfeitures. 204 Ala. 108 (1920).
The case involved a challenge to a state law providing
for the in rem forfeiture of “all property used in connection with [a distillery], together with the buildings
and lots or parcels of ground constituting the premises.” Id. at 109. The Alabama Supreme Court rejected the argument that any proportionality requirement applied to the in rem forfeiture, holding that
Magna Carta’s prohibition on disproportionate
amercements and the State’s constitutional prohibition on “excessive fines” had “nothing to do with the
case, for they relate to legislative punishment,”
3 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hitchings, 71 Mass. 482, 486 (1855);
Blydenburgh v. Miles, 39 Conn. 484, 490 (1872); Wright v. Commonwealth, 77 Pa. 470 (1875) (per curiam); State v. Driver, 78
N.C. 423, 429 (1878); Conley v. State, 85 Ga. 348 (Ga. 1890);
Southern Express Co. v. Commonwealth ex rel. Walker, 92 Va. 59
(1895); Ex parte Keeler, 45 S.C. 537 (1896); People v. Crotty, 22
A.D. 77, 79 (N.Y. App. Div. 1897); State v. Foster, 22 R.I. 163
(1900); State v. Griffin, 84 N.J.L. 429, 432 (N.J. 1913); Apple v.
State, 190 Md. 661, 668 (Md. Ct. App. 1948); Peters v. University
of N.H., 112 N.H. 120, 121 (1972). Notably, state Excessive Fines
Clauses were not applied to in rem forfeitures until after this
Court’s decision in Austin, if ever. See, e.g., In re King Properties,
535 Pa. 321, 330–31 (1993); State v. Williams, 286 N.J. Super.
507 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1995); Evans v. State, 214 Ga. App.
844, 846 (1994); Aravanis v. Somerset, 339 Md. 644, 664–65
(1995); Medlock v. One 1985 Jeep Cherokee, 322 S.C. 127, 132
(1996).
29
whereas the statute “is justified on the ground that it
is a provision for the abatement of nuisances.” Id.
No contemporaneous decisions disagreed with
House and Lot. The first edition of the American Jurisprudence volume on forfeitures cited House and
Lot for the proposition that “[s]tatutes which provide
for the forfeiture of property used in connection with
the violation of certain laws do not violate the constitutional provisions against cruel and unusual punishment.” Am. Jur. 1 Forfeitures and Penalties § 3
(1939). And four state courts later came to the same
conclusion, holding that their respective state Excessive Fines Clauses do not apply to in rem forfeitures.
See State v. Thornson, 170 Minn. 349, 352–53 (1927)
(citing and agreeing with House and Lot); Moore v.
Commonwealth, 293 Ky. 55 (1943) (same); Commonwealth v. One 1970, 2 Dr. H. T. Lincoln Auto., 212 Va.
597, 599 (1972) (“[The Constitution prohibits] the imposition of excessive bail or fines or infliction of unusual punishment. The forfeiture of offending property
does not fall within any of these categories.”); Henry
v. Alquist, 127 A.D.2d 60, 65 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987)
(“To the extent that the trial court’s determination
may be interpreted as a holding that the forfeiture . . .
would violate the State and Federal constitutional
proscriptions against cruel and unusual punishment
. . . we find it to be in error.”).
Beyond these state-court decisions rejecting application of state Excessive Fines Clauses to in rem forfeitures, no federal court even mentioned the possibility that the federal Excessive Fines Clause might im-
30
pose a proportionality requirement on in rem forfeitures until the Ninth Circuit’s 1988 decision in United
States v. Tax Lot 1500, 861 F.2d 232 (9th Cir. 1988),
issued only five years before Austin v. United States,
509 U.S. 602 (1993). And the Ninth Circuit observed
that it could find “no case holding the eighth amendment applicable to civil forfeiture actions.” 861 F.2d
at 233.4 It therefore rejected the argument that the
Excessive Fines Clause imposes a proportionality requirement against in rem forfeitures. Id. at 235.
Shortly after the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Tax
Lot 1500, the Third and Fourth Circuits also held that
the Eighth Amendment does not apply to in rem forfeitures. See United States v. 107.9 Acre Parcel of
Land, 898 F.3d 396, 400–01 (3rd Cir. 1990); United
States v. Santoro, 866 F.2d 1538, 1543–44 (4th Cir.
1989). Around the same time, however, three separate concurrences suggested, without any explanation, that the Excessive Fines Clause may impose
some proportionality requirement on in rem forfeitures. See United States v. 3639-2nd St., N.E., 869
4 The Second Circuit’s decision in United States v. Huber, 603
F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1979), comes close to making this suggestion,
but it rejected an Eighth Amendment challenge to an in personam forfeiture. Id. at 396–97. In doing so, it observed that in rem
forfeitures “have been upheld even where . . . the effect is to deprive an owner of property where that owner is not the person
guilty,” and that “[a]t least for this purpose, there is no substantial difference between an in rem proceeding and a forfeiture proceeding brought directly against the owner.” Id. Far from suggesting that the Eighth Amendment can invalidate in rem forfeitures, this reasoning points to the opposite conclusion. Accord
United States v. Grande, 620 F.2d 1026 (4th Cir. 1980); United
States v. Busher, 817 F.2d 1409 (9th Cir. 1987).
31
F.2d 1093, 1098 (8th Cir. 1989) (Arnold, J., concurring); United States v. On Leong Chinese Merchants
Ass’n Bldg., 918 F.2d 1289, 1298–99 (7th Cir. 1990)
(Cudahy, J., concurring); United States v. 916 Douglas Ave., 903 F.2d 490, 495 (7th Cir. 1990) (Flaum, J.,
concurring).
Finally, in 1992 the Second Circuit became the
first court to accept the argument the Ninth Circuit
had rejected in Tax Lot 1500, applying the Excessive
Fines Clause against an in rem forfeiture of a condominium that had been used to traffic a small amount
of drugs. United States v. 38 Whalers Cove Drive, 954
F.2d 29, 32 (2d Cir. 1992); see also United States v.
Premises Known as RR No. 1 Box 224, 14 F.3d 864,
873 (3d Cir. 1994) (“Prior to Austin, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was the only
court of appeals to hold that the Eighth Amendment
potentially limited civil forfeitures.”). The Second Circuit ultimately rejected the Excessive Fines Clause
challenge, however, concluding that the forfeiture
was not “‘grossly disproportionate’ to the crime committed.” 38 Whalers Cove Drive, 954 F.2d at 38 (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290–92 (1983)). Two
months later, the Eighth Circuit “adopt[ed] the Ninth
Circuit’s analysis” and held that the Excessive Fines
Clause does not apply to in rem forfeitures, United
States v. 508 Depot St., 964 F.2d 814, 817 (8th Cir.
1992)—a holding this Court then reversed in Austin.
4. That no court applied a state or federal Excessive Fines Clause to in rem forfeitures until 1992—
more than two hundred years after the Constitution’s
ratification—strongly implies that no one understood
32
the Excessive Fines Clause to impose a proportionality requirement on these forfeitures. And that owners
of forfeited property raised other constitutional challenges against in rem forfeitures—albeit unsuccessfully—further bolsters the power of this implication.
Bishop’s 1865 treatise observed that while it is possible that in rem forfeitures “may be restrained by the
constitution of the State . . . our constitutions have
few if any direct restrictions in the matter; those
which exist resulting from provisions introduced with
a primary regard to other objects, if indeed any exist.”
Bishop, supra, § 707.
The very existence of other constitutional challenges to in rem forfeitures indicates that the absence
of Excessive Fines Clause objections resulted from the
widespread understanding that the Clause simply did
not apply (rather than lack of opportunities). Litigants occasionally argued, for example, that in rem
proceedings violated the owner’s right to a jury trial
(objections that courts generally rejected). See, e.g.,
United States v. La Vengeance, 3 U.S. 297, 301, (1796)
(“It is a process of the nature of a libel in rem; and
does not, in any degree, touch the person of the offender. In this view of the subject, it follows, of course,
that no jury was necessary.”); Lincoln v. Smith, 27 Vt.
328, 362–63 (1855) (rejecting jury-trial challenge to in
rem forfeiture proceedings); Jones v. Root, 72 Mass.
435, 438–39 (1856) (same); Dowda v. State, 203 Ala.
441, 443 (1919) (same).
Similarly, property owners occasionally subjected
the innocent-owner doctrine to due process objections
(again, unsuccessfully). For example, a claimant
33
raised such a challenge against a mid-nineteenth century Iowa law that provided for the in rem forfeiture
of “dram shops,” without requiring proof of the
owner’s “knowledge of the unlawful traffic.” Our
House No. 2, 4 Greene at 172–73. Rejecting the challenge, the Iowa Supreme Court explained that
“[u]nder our federal, as well as under state constitutions, it is not uncommon to pass laws declaring articles to be forfeited, when they are used for illegal or
criminal purposes . . . Still the constitutionality of
those acts have never been questioned.” Id. at 174–75
(emphasis added). The constitutionality of in rem proceedings had been “conclusively settled by the highest
judicial tribunal in our country . . . [T]he revenue laws
of every state in the union authorize proceedings in
rem against the property alone, in the event of failure
to pay taxes, and such laws are not considered unconstitutional.” Id. at 175. The Iowa Supreme Court concluded, “[t]his proceeding . . . does not deprive a person of his property without due process of law.” Id.
Subsequent decisions reiterated this view. See,
e.g., Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465, 468 (1926) (“It
has long been settled that statutory forfeitures of
property intrusted by the innocent owner or lienor to
another who uses it in violation of the revenue laws of
the United States is not a violation of the due process
clause of the Fifth Amendment.”); Logan v. United
States, 260 F. 746, 748–49 (5th Cir. 1919) (“The long
history of forfeitures in this country, for violation of
internal revenue and customs laws, of property, regardless of ownership, whether innocent or guilty, repels the idea that such forfeitures conflict with the
owner's right to due process of law.”).
34
Not only case reports, but also the Congressional
record, demonstrate the nineteenth century understanding that the Excessive Fines Clause does not apply to in rem forfeitures. In the debate over the Confiscation Act of 1862, which authorized in rem forfeiture of rebel-owned property, critics argued that the
Act violated “all of the provisions of the Fifth, Sixth,
and Seventh Amendments,” but the record of the debate contains few mentions of “the excessive-fines
provision of the Eighth.” Christopher Green, Our Bipartisan Due Process Clause, Geo. Mason L. Rev.
(Forthcoming) 13, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3249845;
see also id. at 46 n.248 (noting that “[a] couple of congressmen made passing references to the Excessive
Fines Clause in their complaints about confiscation
proposals in 1862”). Most of the Act’s critics focused
on due process objections to the Act. And among the
criticisms that claimed the Act was too harsh, the vast
majority were explicitly based on policy or morality,
not the Constitution. Id. at 46–50. The relative absence of Excessive Fines Clause arguments implies
that members of Congress simply did not think the
Clause relevant to the Confiscation Act’s in rem forfeitures.
Amidst other constitutional challenges to in rem
forfeitures, the absence of any historical application
of a proportionality requirement suggests that the
American legal order did not understand the Excessive Fines Clause to establish one. If such an understanding existed, surely some litigant would have
raised it and some court would have at least mentioned it.
35
5. Inferring contextual limits on constitutional
rights from a longstanding and uninterrupted historical practice has a long pedigree in constitutional interpretation. “If a thing has been practised for two
hundred years by common consent, it will need a
strong case for the Fourteenth Amendment to affect
it.” Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 17
(1991) (quoting Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717,
730 (1988)); see also Origet v. Hedden, 155 U.S. 228,
238 (1894) (holding that the practice of charging administrative officials with determining dutiable value
of imported articles was “open to no constitutional objection” because it dated to “the earliest history of the
government.”); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 327–328 (1936) (observing
that evidence of a longstanding legislative practice
“goes a long way in the direction of proving the presence of unassailable ground for the constitutionality
of the practice”). Indeed, in Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., the Court
refused to subject a punitive-damages award to scrutiny under the Excessive Fines Clause because the
practice of awarding such damages “was well recognized at the time the Framers produced the Eighth
Amendment.” 492 U.S. 257, 274 (1989).
The historical absence of any judicial recognition
of the constitutional right Timbs claims is especially
powerful here because—unlike, for example, the constitutional prohibition on laws requiring racial segregation—no political considerations would lead litigants or judges systematically to ignore the right
Timbs asserts. Continued enforcement of racial segre-
36
gation even after adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment does not imply that ratifiers understood racial
segregation to be constitutional; fear of negative political repercussions and even violent retaliation easily explain why courts refused to invalidate it. Andrew E. Taslitz, Hate Crimes, Free Speech, and the
Contract of Mutual Indifference, 80 B.U. L. Rev. 1283,
1385–86 (2000). Here, however, no similar collateral
concerns would explain courts’ failure to impose a proportionality requirement on in rem forfeitures, which
could be imposed on anyone, not just members of a
politically disfavored group. Besides, political considerations did not prevent courts from imposing a proportionality requirement on in personam penalties.
See supra, n.4. And unlike the numerous constitutional arguments Radical Republicans made against
racial segregation, see, e.g., Michael W. McConnell,
Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 Va.
L. Rev. 947, 984–1005 (1995), the second half of the
nineteenth century saw virtually no lawyer, scholar,
or court argue that the Excessive Fines Clause applies
to in rem forfeitures.
At bottom, Timbs’s argument for incorporation
maintains that the forfeiture of his Rover violates the
Due Process Clause. But the Court has held that “[i]f
the government chooses to follow a historically approved procedure, it necessarily provides due process.” Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 499 U.S. at 31.
37
B.
The historical rationale for in rem
forfeitures explains why they were not
understood to be subject to a
proportionality requirement
The long-established understanding of in rem forfeitures explains why the Excessive Fines Clause does
not apply here. As multiple nineteenth-century treatises explicated, in rem forfeitures are not penalties,
and the Excessive Fines Clause applies only to a “punishment for some offense,” Austin, 509 U.S. at 610
(quoting Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 265). Practical
considerations also explain why in rem forfeitures
would not have been understood to be subject to a proportionality requirement: The doctrine establishing
the irrelevance of the property owner’s innocence is
flatly inconsistent with such a requirement, and in
rem forfeitures by definition will never result in an
individual’s incarceration, which means they do not
implicate the traditional concern behind the Excessive Fines Clause. The Court cannot reconcile the theory and practice of in rem forfeitures with any proportionality test.
1. Because courts have long understood in rem proceedings as actions against property, the American legal tradition has not considered in rem forfeitures—
unlike in personam fines or forfeitures—as “punishments” to which the Excessive Fines Clause applies.
The distinction between in rem forfeitures and in
personam fines antedates even the colonies’ separation from Great Britain. A treatise by Sir Jeffrey Gilbert, renowned legal scholar and Lord Chief Baron of
38
the Court of Exchequer, explains, for example, that
“the Forfeiture was appointed in rem, and likewise a
Penalty was laid upon the Person transgressing the
Law.” Sir Jeffrey Gilbert, A Treatise on the Court of
Exchequer 181 (1758) (last emphasis added; spelling
modernized). Courts enforced the forfeiture in an in
rem proceeding and enforced the “Penalty” via a “Personal Information,” and owners often avoided the
“Penalty” by declining to contest the forfeiture. Id.
Just a few decades after the Constitution’s ratification, the Court issued what remains the most-cited
decision regarding the distinction between in rem and
in personam proceedings, The Palmyra, 12 Wheat. 1
(1827). Writing for the Court, Justice Story explained
that while in personam forfeitures could not be imposed without a judgment of conviction, “this doctrine
never was applied to seizures and forfeitures, created
by statute, in rem.” Id. at 14. A judgment of conviction
is unnecessary for an in rem forfeiture because “[t]he
thing is here primarily considered as the offender, or
rather the offence is attached primarily to the thing.”
Id. Justice Story observed that there are “[m]any
cases” featuring an in rem forfeiture but no in personam penalty and “[m]any cases” where both arise. Id.
But either way “the proceeding in rem stands independent of, and wholly unaffected by any criminal
proceeding in personam.” Id. at 15; see also Talmage
& Van Pelt v. Fire Dep’t of New York, 24 Wend. 235,
236 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1840) (explaining that a New York
law imposing fines and forfeitures for storing too
much gunpowder imposed “two forfeitures . . . [t]he
39
pecuniary penalty must, of course, be recovered by action; but the mode of asserting the other forfeiture, is
by seizing the property and storing it in a magazine”).
Reflecting the consensus in the case law, treatises
written in the years leading up to the Civil War routinely emphasized the distinction between in rem and
in personam forfeitures. Erastus Benedict’s antebellum admiralty treatise, for example, explained that
“[s]uits and proceedings in Admiralty are divided into
two great classes—suits and proceedings in rem, and
suits and proceedings in personam.” Erastus Benedict, The American Admiralty § 359 (1850). In rem
proceedings “are against a thing itself, and the relief
sought is confined to the thing itself,” while in personam proceedings “are against a person, and the relief
is sought against him without reference to any specific property or thing.” Id. The former sort of proceedings are never criminal, while the latter can be. Id.
§ 360.
Widely respected treatises published during and
shortly after the Civil War—close in time to the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment—reflected the
conceptual distinction. Judge Conkling, whose treatise was “a work long used with approbation by the
profession,” Gaines v. Fuentes, 92 U.S. 10, 24 (1875)
(Bradley, J., dissenting), underscored that an in rem
proceeding “is strictly a prosecution against a thing,
which has been seized as forfeited . . . on account of
some imputed illegal act in regard to it. No inquiry is
instituted . . . concerning [its] ownership,” Alfred
Conkling, Treatise on the Organization, Jurisdiction,
40
and Practice of the Courts of the United States 540–41
(1864).
Moreover, Bishop’s 1865 treatise—“prominent”
among the profession, Austin, 509 U.S. at 626—similarly explains that while an in personam forfeiture is
“inflicted as a punishment for crime,” Bishop, supra,
§ 701, an in rem forfeiture “is neither a punishment
for crime . . . nor a damage awarded for a civil injury,”
id. § 702. An in rem forfeiture thus “differs from a
mulct, or fine” as well as “those forfeitures which in
the English law attend corruption of blood.” Id. § 697.
An in rem forfeiture proceeds upon its own logic: “Law
is the creator of property; and the province of a creator
is to prescribe to the thing created the conditions of
its being. When the conditions are violated, the property falls.” Id. § 696.
The distinction between in rem and in personam
proceedings remains in force today, as the Court has
consistently reaffirmed. See, e.g., United States v. One
Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 363 (1984)
(“In contrast to the in personam nature of criminal actions, actions in rem have traditionally been viewed
as civil proceedings, with jurisdiction dependent upon
seizure of a physical object.”); United States v. Ursery,
518 U.S. 267, 278 (1996) (“In rem civil forfeiture is a
remedial civil sanction, distinct from potentially punitive in personam civil penalties such as fines.”); 4A
Charles Alan Wright & Arthur Miller, Fed. Prac. &
Proc. Civ. § 1070 (4th ed.) (“[I]t still is important to
distinguish actions based on property from those
based on personal jurisdiction because of their different legal consequences.”).
41
In rem forfeitures are not punishments because
“the only effect is the immediate change of status: that
is, the property changes owners.” Waples, supra,
§ 140. Accordingly, courts and commentators have
understood in rem forfeitures not to be subject to the
Excessive Fines Clause, which has always applied
only to “punishments.” “[A]t the time of the drafting
and ratification of the Amendment, the word ‘fine’
was understood to mean a payment to a sovereign as
punishment for some offense.” Browning-Ferris, 492
U.S. at 265 (emphasis added).
2. In addition to this conceptual problem, on a
practical level there is no way to reconcile a proportionality requirement with the traditional practice of
in rem forfeitures.
First, courts have long imposed in rem forfeitures
against the property of owners who have no awareness of or involvement in the activity that justifies the
forfeitures. Subjecting such forfeitures to a “proportionality” analysis is inconsistent with the innocentowner rule: Leasing a yacht to an individual who later
uses it to transport marijuana—even when the decision is taken without knowledge of the lessee’s intended use—is plainly not “proportionate” with punishing the owner with a loss equivalent to the value of
the yacht. See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 665–68. The
innocent-owner rule is justified by the long-held view
that the forfeiture is not punishment at all. “If the
constitution allows in rem forfeiture to be visited upon
innocent owners who were imprudent in choosing
bailees, the constitution hardly requires proportional-
42
ity review of forfeitures imposed on the guilty who assumed the risk of forfeiture.” Tax Lot 1500, 861 F.2d
at 234; accord 508 Depot St., 964 F.2d at 817.
Second, unlike in personam penalties, in rem forfeitures cannot deprive individuals of their liberty,
and for this reason they are as a practical matter unrelated to the central original concern of the Excessive
Fines Clause, which was to prevent judges from incarcerating individuals on the basis of unpayable discretionary fines. Similar provisions of Magna Carta and
the 1689 English Bill of Rights inspired the Excessive
Fines Clause, and the arguments made during a significant early case involving these provisions, The
Case of William Earl of Devonshire, 11 How. St. Tr.
1353 (Parl. 1689), indicate that the provisions’ “critical purpose” was to prevent discretionary, unpayable
fines from becoming a tool for incarcerating political
enemies. Eighth Amendment Scholars Amicus Br. 20.
“‘[I]f the Judges may commit the Party to Prison till
the Fine be paid, and withal set so great a Fine as is
impossible for the Party to pay into Court, then it will
depend upon the Judges pleasure, whether he shall
ever have his Liberty.’” Id. (quoting The Works of the
Right Honourable Henry late L. Delamer[e], and Earl
of Warrington 576 (1694)); see also Browning-Ferris,
492 U.S. at 267 (noting that the Excessive Fines
Clause in the 1689 English Bill of Rights was motivated by the experience of “some opponents of the
King [who] were forced to remain in prison because
they could not pay the huge monetary penalties that
had been assessed”).
43
Unlike in personam fines, an in rem forfeiture by
definition targets property already seized. An in rem
proceeding therefore does not permit the government
to obtain additional exactions. If the property’s owner
chooses not to appear in the proceeding, the worst possible consequence is a judgment of forfeiture. See, e.g.,
Gilbert, supra, at 180; Ind. Code § 34-24-1-3(e). Because in rem forfeitures do not implicate the core concern of the Excessive Fines Clause, it is unsurprising
no one understood the Clause to apply to them.
III. History Establishes That Either the
Excessive Fines Clause Does Not Apply to
In Rem Forfeitures or the Fourteenth
Amendment Does Not Incorporate the
Clause Against the States
The historical evidence thus establishes that from
before the American Revolution, through the Civil
War and the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, and up to the end of the twentieth century, the
American legal tradition did not understand in rem
forfeitures to be subject to any proportionality requirement. Only two possible interpretations of the
Excessive Fines Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment comport with this longstanding and widespread
understanding. The more compelling interpretation is
that the Excessive Fines Clause does not apply to in
rem forfeitures: This interpretation fully explains the
history and the Court need not extend Austin so as to
interfere with it. But if the Court were to conclude
that Austin already requires applying the Excessive
Fines Clause to in rem forfeitures, the history recounted above precludes interpreting the Fourteenth
44
Amendment to incorporate the Excessive Fines
Clause. Either way, the historical evidence squarely
forecloses any constitutional interpretation requiring
proportionality for the in rem forfeiture Timbs challenges here.
A.
The better interpretation reads the
Excessive Fines Clause not to apply to
in rem forfeitures
The Court can best resolve this case by interpreting the Excessive Fines Clause not to apply to in rem
forfeitures. This interpretation would reconcile all of
the relevant historical evidence, including the evidence Timbs identifies, and would be consistent with
the Court’s current Excessive Fines Clause jurisprudence. Although the Court’s decision in Austin applied the Excessive Fines Clause to federal in rem forfeitures, Austin said nothing about state forfeitures;
because a proportionality requirement applied to in
rem forfeitures is neither “fundamental to” nor
“deeply rooted in” America’s legal tradition, there is
no reason to expand Austin’s holding to States.
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 767
(2010). And regardless, the Court’s subsequent decisions have fatally undermined the reasoning on which
Austin relied.
1. From the very beginning, every State and the
federal government has imposed in rem forfeitures on
the instrumentalities of crimes, even while state or
federal constitutional provisions prohibiting excessive fines have restrained virtually all of these gov-
45
ernments. In rem forfeitures were often harsh, and litigants sometimes challenged them on constitutional
grounds. Yet—even after the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification—no court applied a state or federal Excessive Fines Clause to in rem forfeitures until
the late twentieth century. And the five earlier statecourt decisions to address the question specifically rejected application of a constitutional prohibition on
excessive fines to in rem forfeitures. House and Lot v.
State, 204 Ala. 108 (1920); State v. Thornson, 170
Minn. 349, 352–53 (1927); Moore v. Commonwealth,
293 Ky. 55 (1943); Commonwealth v. One 1970, 2 Dr.
H. T. Lincoln Auto., 212 Va. 597, 599 (1972); Henry v.
Alquist, 127 A.D.2d 60, 65 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987).
The obvious explanation for the historical silence
surrounding Excessive Fines Clause limitations on in
rem forfeitures is that America’s lawyers and judges
have not understood the federal Excessive Fines
Clause—or its state analogues—to apply to these forfeitures. The Clause applies only to punishments,
and—as decades of cases and treatises have explained—in rem forfeitures are not punishments.
Notably, this interpretation not only explains the
lack of any Excessive Fines Clause objection to in rem
forfeitures, but it also reconciles all of the historical
evidence Timbs has marshalled. Again, the Excessive
Fines Clause has antecedents in Magna Carta and the
1689 English Bill of Rights, and every state constitution includes some version of its proportionality principle. See Pet. Br. 10–19. Yet courts have historically
enforced state and federal Excessive Fines Clauses
only against in personam penalties. See supra, n.3.
46
Understanding the Excessive Fines Clause to apply
only to in personam penalties explains that historical
practice.
2. The Court’s decision in Austin does not require
the Court to interpret the Excessive Fines Clause to
apply to state in rem forfeitures. In Austin, the Court
“limited [its] review to the question ‘whether the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment applies to forfeitures of property under 21 U.S.C.
§§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7),” two provisions of a federal forfeiture statute. United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267,
281 (1996). Austin held only that the Excessive Fines
Clause applies to in rem forfeitures under these two
specific provisions. Austin v. United States, 509 U.S.
602, 604–05 & n.1 (1993). The Court need not—and
plainly, in light of the historical record explored
above, should not—extend this holding to state in rem
forfeitures.
More important, the Court’s subsequent decisions
have undermined Austin’s reasoning. Austin began
from the presumption that “[t]he Excessive Fines
Clause limits the government’s power to extract payments, whether in cash or in kind, ‘as punishment for
some offense.’” Id. at 609–10 (quoting Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S.
U.S. 257, 265 (1989)). It thus framed the question as
whether a forfeiture under the federal statutes at issue “is punishment.” Id. at 610 (emphasis added). And
in answering this question, the Court relied heavily
on its decision in United States v. Halper, 490 U.S.
47
435 (1989), which addressed when the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits a second punishment for the
same offense.
Austin quotes Halper’s definition of “punishment,”
the term on which Austin’s entire analysis turns: “[A]
civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve
a remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained
as also serving either retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment, as we have come to understand
the term.” Austin, 509 U.S. at 621 (quoting Halper,
490 U.S. at 448) (second emphasis added); see also id.
at 610 (same); United States v. Premises Known as RR
No. 1 Box 224, 14 F.3d 864, 873 (3d Cir. 1994) (“In
Austin, the Supreme Court relied on United States v.
Halper and Browning Ferris Industries v. Kelco Disposal, Inc. in reaching its conclusion that the civil forfeiture statutes constitute a ‘punishment.’” (citations
omitted)). Austin held that the challenged forfeitures
qualified as punishment—and therefore were subject
to the Excessive Fines Clause—because “forfeiture
statutes historically have been understood as serving
not simply remedial goals but also those of punishment and deterrence.” Austin, 509 U.S. at 622 n.14.
Austin thus made Halper’s definition of “punishment” the foundation of its conclusion, but the Court
soon demolished this foundation. Three years after
Austin, the Court explicitly “limited [Halper] to the
context of civil penalties,” Ursery, 518 U.S. at 282, and
held that a civil forfeiture proceeding results in a
“punishment” for the purposes of the Double Jeopardy
Clause only if it is “so punitive in fact as to persuade
us that [it] may not legitimately be viewed as civil in
48
nature,” id. at 288 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Ursery refused to apply Halper’s definition of punishment to in rem forfeitures because it recognized
that the Court has long drawn “a sharp distinction between in rem civil forfeitures and in personam civil
fines: Though the latter could, in some circumstances,
be punitive, the former could not.” Id. at 275. Ursery
explained that it is nonsensical to apply any sort of
proportionality test to in rem forfeitures: It makes no
sense to “compare the harm suffered by the Government against the size of the penalty imposed” because
in rem forfeitures, “in contrast to civil penalties, are
designed to do more than simply compensate the Government . . . Though it may be possible to quantify the
value of the property forfeited, it is virtually impossible to quantify, even approximately, the nonpunitive
purposes served by a particular civil forfeiture.” Id. at
284.
In explaining why Austin did not overrule Halper,
Ursery suggested that Austin and Halper were unconnected, id. at 286, which, alas, completely ignores
Austin’s reasoning. Ursery correctly observed that
Halper used a “case-by-case approach,” while Austin
employed “a categorical approach” whereby the Excessive Fines Clause would apply depending on the
statutory authority for, rather than factual circumstances of, the forfeiture. Id. at 287; see also Austin,
509 U.S. at 622 n.14. But the difference in the way the
two decisions applied the definition of “punishment”
does not decouple their rationales. Austin quoted
Halper four times to support the expansive definition
49
of “punishment” it employed to subject forfeitures under two federal forfeiture provisions to the Excessive
Fines Clause; Austin held that these forfeiture provisions imposed punishments because they “‘cannot
fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose,’” even
if they “serve some remedial purpose.” Id. 621 (quoting Halper, 490 U.S. at 448).
The Court’s criticisms of Halper culminated in
Hudson v. United States, where it directly overruled
Halper, concluding that the decision’s “test for determining whether a particular sanction is ‘punitive,’
and thus subject to the strictures of the Double Jeopardy Clause, has proved unworkable.” 522 U.S. 93,
102 (1997). The Double Jeopardy Clause thus no
longer applies to “punitive” civil penalties but “protects only against the imposition of multiple criminal
punishments for the same offense.” Id. at 99.
The Court’s Double Jeopardy Clause opinions in
Ursery and Hudson undermine Austin’s reliance on
Halper, and the decision in United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1998), vitiates any remaining
support for Austin’s reasoning. In Bajakajian, the
Court confronted an Excessive Fines Clause challenge
to an in personam forfeiture imposed as part of a criminal sentence for a federal currency-reporting violation. Id. at 325. Because the forfeiture was “imposed
at the culmination of a criminal proceeding and require[d] conviction of an underlying felony,” the Court
had “little trouble concluding that . . . [it] constitute[d]
punishment.” Id. at 328. Notably, the Court distinguished this in personam forfeiture from “traditional
50
civil in rem forfeitures,” which it said “were historically considered nonpunitive.” Id. at 330.
The Court surveyed its early decisions involving in
rem forfeitures and observed that each recognized
that “[t]he theory behind such forfeitures was the fiction that the action was directed against ‘guilty property,’ rather than against the offender himself,” which
implied that “the owner of forfeited property could be
entirely innocent of any crime.” Id. Accordingly,
“[t]raditional in rem forfeitures were thus not considered punishment against the individual for an offense.” Id. at 331. And “[b]ecause they were viewed as
nonpunitive, such forfeitures traditionally were considered to occupy a place outside the domain of the Excessive Fines Clause.” Id. (emphasis added) (observing
that in Usery the Court “[r]ecogniz[ed] the nonpunitive character of such proceedings”).
The Court’s statement in Bajakajian that in rem
forfeitures historically have not constituted punishments unequivocally contradicts Austin’s assertion
that “forfeiture proceedings historically have been understood as imposing punishment despite their in rem
nature.” 509 U.S. at 616 n.9.
3. Austin’s unsupported statement that in rem
forfeitures impose punishment is no reason to ignore
the historical evidence that the Excessive Fines
Clause has nothing to do with in rem forfeitures.
Austin first claimed that eighteenth-century dictionaries “confirm that ‘fine’ was understood to in-
51
clude ‘forfeiture’ and vice versa.” Id. at 614 n.7. Although “forfeiture” and “fine” were sometimes used interchangeably, see Eighth Amendment Scholars Amicus Br. 32–33, the word “fine” was also used in a “restricted and technical sense” to mean “only those pecuniary punishments of offences, which are inflicted
by sentence of a court in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction,” Hanscomb v. Russell, 77 Mass. 373, 374–75
(1858); see also Eighth Amendment Scholars Amicus
Br. 33 (noting Hanscomb).
More fundamentally, treating “fine” and “forfeiture” as synonyms ignores the crucial distinction between in personam and in rem forfeitures. Bishop’s
1865 treatise clarified that an in rem forfeiture “differs from some other things in the law, known by the
same name,” such as “a mulct, or fine, whereby, under
sentence of the court . . . a specific article of property . . . is transferred to the government.” Bishop, supra, § 697; see also id. § 701 (“[F]orfeiture is sometimes inflicted as a punishment for crime,” and this
forfeiture “differ[s] in nature from the forfeiture discussed in this chapter [entitled ‘where the thing, as
distinguished from its owner, is in the wrong’].”).
Bishop notes that a later section of his treatise mentions these other fines. Id. § 701. This later section in
turn explains that statutes sometimes require the forfeiture of “particular articles of property,” and “such
forfeitures . . . rest on the same reasons as fines.” Id.
§ 723. It also reiterates the distinction between in personam forfeitures and in rem forfeitures: The latter
“restrain men from making injurious uses of their
property,” and are “not to be regarded as punishments.” Id.
52
Austin also suggested that in rem forfeitures are
punishments because the Court has “expressly reserved the question whether [an in rem forfeiture
could] forfeit the property of a truly innocent owner.”
509 U.S. at 617. Austin inferred that if in rem forfeitures “had been understood not to punish the owner,
there would have been no reason to reserve the case
of a truly innocent owner . . . it is only on the assumption that forfeiture serves in part to punish that the
Court’s past reservation of that question makes
sense.” Id.
Austin’s inference is mistaken. An in rem forfeiture is not “punishment,” but it is nevertheless a
“depriv[ation] . . . of property”; when that deprivation
occurs pursuant to a statute that declares property
guilty which is in fact innocent, the deprivation occurs
without “due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
The due process limitation on in rem forfeitures is the
reason courts have sometimes suggested that the innocent-owner rule may not apply if the owner’s property was stolen. See, e.g., Peisch v. Ware, 8 U.S. 347,
365 (1808) (“[T]he law is not understood to forfeit the
property of owners or consignees, on account of the
misconduct of mere strangers, over whom such owners or consignees could have no controul.”); Commonwealth v. Certain Motor Vehicle, 261 Mass. 504, 509–
10 (1928) (holding that the in rem forfeiture of a motor
vehicle containing liquor intended for sale was not a
“taking of property without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment,” but declining
to “pass upon the further question . . . whether the
right to forfeit extends to property the actual control
53
of which the true owner has never intentionally relinquished to another, that is, to property taken from
him by a thief”).
As one nineteenth-century treatise explained,
while spirits produced by an illicit distillery in Maine
can be made forfeitable, the Due Process Clause
would prohibit a legislature from imposing an in rem
forfeiture on spirits the illicit distiller imported into
New Orleans: The imported spirits would not be
guilty “either in fact or under the fiction known to legal science.” Waples, supra, § 156. There would be “no
jus in re,” and “[t]o take such property by proceedings
in rem would not be to take it by ‘due process of law.’”
Id.
Importantly, this due process limitation was not
related to a concern with proportionality between the
value of the forfeited property and the egregiousness
of the crime. The same treatise endorsed clearly disproportionate forfeitures. It observed, for example,
that the federal government had regulated distilleries’ bookkeeping and had provided for the in rem forfeiture of the distillery and land it occupied if the distillery’s books did not comply with these requirements, even by the “omission of the distiller to enter
some of the minor matters required—the quantity of
ice—the weight of a certain washtub.” Id. § 162. The
treatise explained that the in rem forfeiture in that
circumstance was constitutional because “Congress
cannot constitutionally provide that property shall be
condemned as guilty by proceedings in rem where
there is no offense to be imputed; but it can provide
54
for such condemnations for offenses resting upon apparently unimportant facts.” Id. (emphasis added).
Justice Scalia was thus correct to suggest in Austin that the Constitution prevents the government
from taking, on an in rem theory, “property that cannot properly be regarded as an instrumentality of the
offense.” Austin, 509 U.S. at 627–28 (Scalia, J., concurring). He located this constitutional limitation,
however, in the wrong provision. Cases and commentators have recognized that this requirement, that
property subject to in rem forfeiture be connected to
the violation of the law, is an implication of the Due
Process Clause, not the Excessive Fines Clause. See
Certain Motor Vehicle, 261 Mass. at 509–10; Waples,
supra, § 156.
Moreover, the Excessive Fines Clause, whose
“touchstone . . . is the principle of proportionality,” Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 334, cannot justify this requirement. Whether a sufficient link exists between a particular property and a particular crime has nothing to
do with proportionality—a comparison of significance—but has instead to do with causal connection
between the property and the crime. See Waples, supra, § 162.
Other than the (incomplete) overlap between
“fines” and “forfeitures” and the occasional observations courts have made regarding limits to the innocent-owner doctrine, the only other justification Austin provided for the proposition that in rem forfeitures
are punishments is that the forfeiture provisions at
55
issue “expressly provide[d] an ‘innocent owner’ defense,” which Austin suggested made those provisions
“look more like punishment, not less.” 509 U.S. at 619.
Here again, however, the historical evidence corrects
modern misconceptions. As Bishop’s treatise explained, the essential attribute of an in rem forfeiture
is that it proceeds against the property itself and is
justified “by reason of [the property’s] circumstances,”
such as how the property has been used. Bishop, supra, § 709. Such a forfeiture “is not to be deemed a
punishment inflicted on its owner,” and “it follows,
that, if the law, in its clemency, permits the owner
still to retain his property and avoid the forfeiture on
showing himself innocent of any wrong in the matter,
there is no more a punishment involved in the case
than there was before.” Id. (emphasis added).
The historical evidence thus indicates that a legislature’s decision to provide relief from an in rem forfeiture if the owner shows himself to be innocent is
irrelevant to whether the forfeiture is a penalty and
thus irrelevant to the applicability of the Excessive
Fines Clause. Indeed, making the Excessive Fines
Clause’s applicability turn on the existence of an exception for innocent owners would encourage precisely the sort of draconian rules the Clause is meant
to prevent: It would motivate legislatures to refuse to
grant any exceptions to innocent owners, lest they
subject in rem forfeitures to proportionality review by
courts. Statutory exceptions for innocent owners have
long been used to mitigate the sometimes-harsh consequences of in rem forfeitures. See Waples, supra,
§ 148 (“[T]he general principle, that forfeiture is irre-
56
spective of owner, is subject to legislative modification.”). For good reasons, no court has held that such
exceptions transform in rem forfeitures into penalties.5
4. If the Court were to reconsider Austin, the factors pertinent to “deciding whether to overrule a past
decision” all weigh in favor of overturning it. Janus v.
Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Employees, Council
31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2478 (2018). As discussed above,
Austin is not “consisten[t] with other related decisions,” id., and the historical evidence shows the poor
“quality of [its] reasoning.” Id.
In addition, overturning Austin would not frustrate significant “reliance” interests. Id. at 2479,
2484. Austin expressly declined to articulate any
Historical evidence also flatly contradicts the contention of
amici that historical in rem forfeitures were different than modern-day in rem forfeitures because the “essential evidence underlying” historical forfeitures “was both indisputable and borne by
the defendant property itself as found and seized without more.”
Cause of Action Institute Amicus Br. 21. Nineteenth-century in
rem forfeiture proceedings frequently required evidence in addition to the res itself. See generally Waples, supra, § 148 (listing
examples of statutory in rem forfeitures). A ship, for example,
could not by itself show that it was used to violate an embargo;
the captain would need to testify where the ship docked. See, e.g.,
The Little Charles, 26 F.Cas. 979, 982 (C.C.D. Va. 1818). Nor
could a ship demonstrate that it was used to violate a state fishing law; witnesses would need to testify regarding where and
how the ship was used. See, e.g., Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823). Similarly, without witness testimony, a
court could not know whether vehicles transporting alcohol were
used for the purpose of evading the revenue laws. See, e.g.,
United States v. Two Bay Mules, 36 F. 84 (W.D.N.C. 1888).
5
57
standard for assessing the excessiveness of in rem forfeitures, 509 U.S. at 622–23, much less “define[] . . . a
clear or easily applicable standard,” South Dakota v.
Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2098, (2018); see also
Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2484.
In any case, Austin has prompted no significant
practical consequences. In the quarter-century since
the decision, federal courts have held in rem forfeitures to be unconstitutionally excessive only a dozen
times.6 The number of unconstitutional in rem forfeitures is strikingly low, particularly in light of the tens
of thousands of assets—to say nothing of the dollar
value of those assets—the Department of Justice
seizes each year. Department of Justice, 5-yr Summary
of
Seizure
and
Forfeiture
Trends,
https://www.justice.gov/afp/file/5-yr_forfeiture_trends.pdf/download.
6 United States v. One Single Family Residence, 13 F.3d 1493
(11th Cir.1994); von Hofe v. United States, 492 F.3d 175, 191 (2d
Cir. 2007); United States v. $120,856 in U.S. Currency, 394
F.Supp.2d 687 (D.V.I. 1993); United States v. 835 Seventh Street,
820 F.Supp. 688 (N.D.N.Y. 1993); United States v. 461 Shelby
County Road 361, 857 F.Supp. 935, 940 (N.D. Ala., 1994); United
States v. 6625 Zumirez Drive, 845 F.Supp. 725, 742 (C.D. Cal.
1994); United States v. One 1988 White Jeep Cherokee, 30 V.I.
75, 80 (D.V.I. 1994); United States v. Shelly’s Riverside Heights
Lot X, 851 F.Supp. 633 (M.D. Pa. 1994); United States v. 3636
Roselawn Ave., 1994 WL 524985 (C.D. Cal. 1994); United States
v. 18900 S.W. 50th Street, 915 F.Supp. 1199 (N.D. Fla. 1994);
United States v. $293,316 in U.S. Currency, 349 F.Supp.2d 638
(E.D.N.Y. 2004); United States v. Ford Motor Co., 442 F.Supp.2d
429, 437 (E.D. Mich. 2006).
58
B.
If the Court interprets the Excessive
Fines Clause to extend to in rem
forfeitures, history shows that the
Clause does not apply to the States
If the Court concludes that Austin requires rejecting an interpretation of the Excessive Fines Clause
that applies the Clause only to in personam penalties,
the historical evidence demands reading the Fourteenth Amendment not to incorporate the Excessive
Fines Clause against the States. The Fourteenth
Amendment was ratified in 1868. Yet no court applied
the Excessive Fines Clause to any in rem forfeitures—
state or federal—until 124 years later. See United
States v. 38 Whalers Cove Drive, 954 F.2d 29, 32 (2d
Cir. 1992). States imposed countless in rem forfeitures during that long stretch of history; it is highly
unlikely that litigants and courts went nearly oneand-a-quarter centuries without an opportunity to argue that in rem forfeitures might be limited by the
federal constitution. Much more likely is that the
Fourteenth Amendment’s ratifiers did not understand the Amendment to apply a proportionality requirement to States’ in rem forfeitures.
Even beyond evidence of the Fourteenth Amendment’s original meaning, historical evidence establishes that the right Timbs asserts here—to be free
from “disproportionate” in rem forfeitures—is neither
“fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty,” nor
“deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”
McDonald, 561 U.S. at 767 (internal quotation marks
and emphasis omitted). Far from being fundamental
59
or deeply rooted, the rule Timbs seeks to apply
against the States is a mere twenty-five years old. In
contrast, the practice here, the “[f]orfeiture of vehicles
bearing [contraband,] is one of the time-honored
methods adopted by the government for the repression of . . . crime.” Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v.
United States, 286 U.S. 49, 56 (1932).
No contemporaneous evidence attests to the existence, much less the fundamentality, of a rule requiring in rem forfeitures to be proportional, and the few
cases to consider this rule before the late twentieth
century rejected it. See House and Lot, 204 Ala. 108 at
108–09; Thornson, 170 Minn. at 352–53; Moore, 293
Ky. at 55. A greater contrast with the voluminous evidence the Court compiled in McDonald is scarcely
imaginable. Cf. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 767–78. If the
Excessive Fines Clause applies to in rem forfeitures,
it cannot apply to the States.
60
CONCLUSION
The judgment should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
Office of the Indiana
Attorney General
IGC South, Fifth Floor
302 W. Washington St.
Indianapolis, IN 46204
(317) 232-6255
Tom.Fisher@atg.in.gov
CURTIS T. HILL, JR.
Attorney General
THOMAS M. FISHER*
Solicitor General
KIAN J. HUDSON
Deputy Solicitor
General
AARON T. CRAFT
JULIA C. PAYNE
Deputy Attorneys
General
*Counsel of Record
Dated: October 4, 2018
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.