Oral argument — Zeedyk v. Poole

Thank you very much, Your Honor. May it please the Senator for the Court. Your Honor, six years, almost six years after judgment was entered in this case, Mr. Poole finally brought a 214-01 petition. He didn't bring it against the company that he owns. He brought it only in his individual capacity. Of course, at that time, collection proceedings were started against him, and that's why he brought it at this time. Now, here's the problem that Mr. Poole has as a threshold issue. He alleges, and this is his amended petition, that the judgment against him was void for lack of personal jurisdiction. And we don't have to guess about that. He titles his motion, Motion to Set Aside for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction, and he argues that it was a case of mistaken identity and that it wasn't properly served. Now, 213-01 was amended, or 230-01 was amended, and the question now is whether or not personal jurisdiction can be granted retroactively. And the cases were split on this before. This Honorable Court, in the case of Deutsche National Bank v. Bartley, clearly held... Has personal jurisdiction really been argued in this case? It seems to kind of come out of a puff of smoke. But, Your Honor... That argument. And the idea of attempting to premise this case on, what is it, the Grantley case, Justice O'Malley's opus that held that the court had not been able to do a proper review, that the current language under 301, that it basically waives all objections, works backward. There are still viable cases going the other way, that it doesn't work backward, that the thrust of the law is that any kind of waiver is always prospective, not retrospective when a case is done. But in any event, how does that dispose of the issues in this case? The issues in this case being, basically, whether a pool is a proper party, properly identified, pool individually, is properly identified in the judgment that was entered in this case against precision and the pool as designated in the petition as agent of the problem in this case. Your Honor, I believe, first of all, that you want to hang him by his own words, basically, to prevent getting to what may be the core issue in this case. The question is, can you successfully do it? You know, there are other arguments that he makes besides jurisdiction, which, if anything, is whispered. You know, I read the briefs a few times, and I didn't pick up a jurisdictional argument until I read your brief. You know? So it kind of appears out of nowhere here. And does it really answer or solve the basic premises in this case, or are we just playing with words? Well, here's the thing, though, Your Honor. We expect litigants, either in the trial court or the appellate court, to stick by the theory that they're going at. I didn't raise personal jurisdiction as an issue. This is his amended response, which is where the appeal comes from. He's the one that raised it. And that was his only argument. Now, you heard in his briefs, you didn't hear anything about personal. You think he has waived his current argument because he didn't raise it below? Is that what you're saying? Absolutely. You are not allowed, according to Shannon, to pursue a different theory on appeal from that which you asserted at the trial court. And even if you were, I don't think he should still be able to prevail. Here's the thing, Your Honor. He is making an argument based on what the trial court found. The trial court came up, sui sponte, with this Cook case and said, oh, look, I found this Cook case. But Cook doesn't apply. But that's what I say, too, Your Honor. But now they're trying to fit all of his arguments into this Cook case, which doesn't apply. It's a Rule 105 case. That's why you don't see anything about personal jurisdiction in his briefs. If he were to stick to personal jurisdiction, I think it would be a dead loser. Instead, they try to finagle themselves with the Cooks. Here's the question I have. And the question comes from the way that you captioned the case below. I understand your case about the jurisdiction if you had said, James Poole, comma, agent, or James Poole, comma, employee. You put a modifier in there. You put the words AS, as. So when you say James Poole, as, you're suing him in a certain capacity. Now, can a party rely on what you're, for the reason you're bringing him in and serving him papers with, and rely on that and say, I'm not going to do anything? And not expect later on to have a personal judgment entered against him in another capacity? No, because agent and employee, I don't believe, is a legal capacity. It is a description of a relationship. And if you look at the other evidence in this case, Your Honor, this isn't IBM. This is a one-person corporation operating out of his house. If you look at the other evidence in the record, it clearly indicates that he was on notice of what was happening. If you look at the record at C-42, he was... What is the purpose of using the word as, then? Why don't you just say James Poole, agent, James Poole, also employee? That as kind of, you know, from common understanding, you're suing that person in a certain capacity. I was not the trial court attorney at that time, Your Honor. It was... I'm not blaming you. I'm just saying, looking from... What strange notion led to the joinder of Poole as agent as opposed to individual? I'm not clear, Your Honor, because that was done by another attorney. Now, there's something of a specter here posed that originally it was individually, and then having received an adverse ruling, there was an attempt to sneak him in as a different entity. But that's a work of fiction. That didn't happen. I don't think it needed to happen under the Scala case either. So, and then there's another problem that plagues me here. What's the difference between suing Poole as an agent or suing Poole individually? Is there any difference? Isn't the liability under tort law pretty much the same for an employee acting in his capacity as an agent as it would be if he were acting in his own individual right? Employees are liable for their torts. Absolutely. You know? So where is the distinction here, you know, generally? Why are we even concerned to whether he's being sued as an agent or not? Is he being sued as an agent or being sued individually? In any case, the ultimate result is he's being sued individually. If he caused, if he was the cause, the proximate cause of the injury, if his negligence was the proximate cause of the injury, he's going to be liable either way. So why would we care? I don't think you should. It's simply surplusage. That's the Barwer case. Yeah, and if it's surplusage. Or the intent. Or if, in fact, he makes a mistake of law thinking, oh, I'm being sued as an agent, I'm not individually liable, he's still liable because everybody's assumed to know the law. So I think you're absolutely right. It doesn't matter in any event. Tort law is that both the servant, the master and the servant are jointly and separately liable for this issue. This isn't contract law or corporate law where you can have a liability on the part of the principal perhaps without corresponding liability on the part of the agent. Like, not under tort. What is the negligent act you allege in your complaint that Poole committed? Well, what happened according to the complaint was that he was a power washer for FedEx Trucks. Did you allege that in your complaint? It was, yeah. Or did you simply allege he was an employee? No, we allege that he was, well, he was an employee that he individually, I believe he's also alleged in the First or Second Amendment complaint that he individually caused these acts by leaving puddles of water on steel where people that he knows, he knows workers would be delivering their packages or picking up their packages from a carousel and that they slipped and fell because of that. Go back to the bar. Did you, did you allege that, I'm sorry, did you allege, I'm looking at your complaint now, it seems that the defendant, you allege that the defendant's decision was negligent in doing that. Is there any specific allegation that you make against Poole? I didn't draft the complaint, Your Honor, but if you look at the complaint, of course a corporation has to act through its agents. So it's clear that we've identified the person that actually did it. So every employee and agent of this company is liable? No, but of course he was named in the caption, he was named in the body of the complaint. Now he was also served, wasn't he? He was served, absolutely he was served, at his home, which was good service, which is the same address for his business. We're not looking at IBM. Well, in every, in every, in every lawsuit that you file, you name the corporation IBM and you also name, say, Joe Brown agent. Is that agent also liable for any judgment you get against IBM in such a lawsuit? It would depend how you're suing him, Justice Breyer. Would it depend on the allegations in the complaint? Whether you had allegations against that agent? Well, of course I think they need to be reasonably informed. But informing him... But if you sue IBM and you got, what's the outfit that they use for service of summons down here? CT Corp? Right. Unless there's an allegation against CT Corp in your complaint, you couldn't have a judgment against CT Corp, right? Am I correct or no? Probably not. In contract, if the agent discloses his principal, he may not be liable on the contract. As a matter of fact, CT would never even answer your complaint. It merely forwarded to IBM. They wouldn't do anything, right? But, Your Honor, is there any indication whatsoever? Yeah, no. But that Mr. Polk didn't know that he was being sued individually? Well, I mean... Also counsel is what it is. I mean, you would have to look at the complaint and see what allegations you're making against him to see whether or not you're going against him individually. Clearly, he's named how many times in the complaint and in the prayer for relief. He was served with a complaint in the first amended complaint which added him. If he didn't need to be added, why was a first amended complaint filed adding him? That's what I don't quite get, and they never seem to understand that. They say, oh, he intended to sue somebody else. Well, who was it that he intended to sue other than Mr. Polk? Precision is already a party to the suit. Well, I guess the problem that they had, I guess, is the limitations issue. But Polk, once he's served as an agent or whatever he's served as, he looks at this complaint and there's no allegations of negligence directed that I can see against him. He may have been cited as one of the employees, and then you say that a large amount of water was left around and the entity, Precision Cleaners, was negligent. How does that place Poole on notice that he's being sued for negligence? What negligent act did he commit? Well, he's named in the caption of the complaint. He's named in the foreword of the complaint, and he's named in the prayer for relief as well. If he doesn't think that he's being sued, the proper thing probably would have been to file some sort of motion. Motion to dismiss, motion to strike, something of that sort. We shouldn't be here six years later guessing whether or not Mr. Poole intended or whether he knew that he was being sued for the complaint. Does there prove up damages? There was in front of Judge Shield. Whether as agent or individual. That is absolutely true, Your Honor. And the record is voluminous, which isn't included here because... I'm throwing you all these softballs, but... It certainly did. I think I want your opponent to think about these when he comes up here. The thing is, Your Honor, we're here making excuses for him as to what he did. And it's clear that he had notice. He filed, well, it's not part of the record. I do have one question, though. If this is adequate, the way you've set up this case and the way you've asked for relief against Mr. Poole, if this was adequate, the judgment against him as agent and employee was adequate, why was it necessary for you to then go forward and add individually in your judgment when that has never been done before? And as I read the record thoroughly, the only relief that Poole asked for in his 1401 petition was to strike out the individually part of it. If that's all he wants, Your Honor, I don't think it makes a difference. Because... The way you contested it vigorously below, I think that's all he requested, was that the judge be vacated as to Poole individually. But here's the thing. If a judgment is entered against him as agent and employee, I believe what Justice Gordon said was absolutely true. It's a judgment against him. There is no legal entity... But why was it changed after a default order had been entered to say individually? Because there was a notice that a different type of order would be entered? Daley, Prusak, and Selby was the attorney at that time, Your Honor. I don't know quite why it was done that way. If I might, and we sometimes have our post-impression arguments up here. If I might, I think if you view the bottom line result in this case, that the agent is liable, how is he liable? If he's sued as an agent, but you find that he committed the tort, and you find he's liable, how is he liable? There is no liability here as agent. There's only liability for himself. So regardless of the name, the result is still individual liability. I would agree with you, Your Honor, on that. So posturing that in the judgmental order is not a fiction. And that goes back to the Barber case, and it just says whatever the intent was. I think we're addressing the wrong person here. He's with us, it's just the other way around. That's why I say we're lobbing the softballs here. We want to give a little notification, foreshadowing to his opponent, as to the areas that we're really interested in. So I don't know if you've got anything further. I don't, Your Honor. It sounds like you've at least got two of us on your side. Why don't you tell me quickly, Your Honor. I think I want one other issue that you didn't open up, that ought to be addressed, frankly. And that's the allocation of judges here. Whether the transfer to Chelios took place, whether the... Whether there was a final order? Yeah, whether there was a final order, and what is the result of the wrong judge adjudicating the 1401 petition? Is there a jurisdictional problem here? According to Your Honor's cases in this district, Lafondo and Eldorado Towers, there is. Well, I'm not sure that they're jurisdictional. Are they jurisdictional? Because in one case, there's a supervisory order, and there's no need for a supervisory order if it's not jurisdictional. If it is jurisdictional, then there's a dismissal, rather than a supervisory order. Supervisory order is something that transcends what would ordinarily be the disposition. I think according to Lafondo, they said since the Section 214.01 petition wasn't filed in front of the court that actually entered the actual judgment, they reversed. Now, if... Nothing is bottom-lined up here, you know, as of the moment. But if our ruling on the substantive issues favors your position, do you really care whether we throw this case out jurisdictionally or whether we rule on the substantive issue? If, in other words, there was no jurisdiction. I would rather you rule substantively because I think jurisdictionally, he would open the... Counsel would open the argument, then we can go back since no decision was ever made on the merits, and file it in front of Judge Chiola again. And I think, of course, that would be a waste of the court's time and everybody else's. Well, the question then is, is it with? If it's personal, I suppose it is. If it's subject matter, that might be another problem. Is it a question of subject matter jurisdiction or is it a question simply of allocations? The distinction would be... The metaphor would be, is this a matter of jurisdiction or is it a matter of venue? If venue is waivable. I think you're right, Your Honor. I mean, the circuit courts of Cook County certainly have subject matter jurisdiction over this. It's really jurisdiction, what the courts sometimes call the third type of jurisdiction, jurisdiction to hear the argument or jurisdiction over the issue. And clearly, I suppose it's the latter one. And I think that would be waivable by the parties. Certainly, counsel waived it by bringing it in front of Judge Ward. I will tell you, Your Honor, I would rather have a ruling on the merits than that be waived as well. If it's waivable. If it's waivable. Now, there's not much in your brief to help us. You argued that we had to consider this case de novo. What difference would it make? Who heard it if we're going to look at it de novo here in any event? I don't know. I suppose if, in fact, it's a jurisdictional issue, it never gets up here. It's just decided on that basis. And you never really get into whether or not the applicable standard of review should ever be met. But clearly, if it gets into the merits, Vincent demands that it be a de novo review. You're going to come up with the same result, I think. That's perhaps... Either way. Yeah, that's perhaps true, Your Honor. There is case law that seems to indicate that the gravitas in this case is not with the judge who actually enters the judgment, but with the judge who enters the default, and that consequently, he may very well be the more appropriate judge who should rule on the challenge. That may be so, Your Honor. And there's a lot of law that says it's the court that has the power, not any particular judge. So it may be the fact that the court itself has the power to do it, whether a judge is sitting there and is set or not. Anything else? I don't have anything further. Thank you, Your Honor. Thank you. I'm going to try, Your Honor. Good morning, Justice, police and court. Let me see if I can start off with answering one of the questions that was raised initially as to what really is the issue here. And I think Judge Ward attempted to clarify it in his amended order. But the real question is, is whether Mr. Poole received notice as required by Supreme Court Rules 105 concerning this default judgment. Well, was he served with this complaint when he was joined as an agent? He was served with the amended complaint. Was he served with the amended complaint with process? And when you say, was he served individually? No, was he served, was the, his entity served with this complaint? Precision cleaning was in fact served. No, but was there a... Was he physically served? Served either with him personally or with the household of James Poole in whatever capacity. James Poole individually was never served. Who was served? James Poole Jr. His son was served as the... Member of the household, right? For the agent of precision cleaning, Judge. And that's a critical difference. And I think the issue... or was there only single service? Single service, Judge. So there was no service specifically to the individual. Was precision dissolved at the time of the service? Precision was dissolved, Judge. And more... And also as the record points out... So is there any real... Is there any reality at all in the proposition that this service was directed at the dissolved corporation? Judge, when I initially filed... Would it make... have made any sense in the universe of discourse to say that when the household of Poole is served that the service is directed at a non-existent corporation? I think that would have been the proper decision, which is what I argued initially when I filed my... the default petition naming clearly that precision cleaning at the time that it was even named as an entity, sworn to in the complaint, didn't even exist at the time. It had not even existed at the time this injury had occurred. Was it dissolved as of the time of the first complaint prior to the original complaint? The complaint was... The complaint was filed in 2001 and had been dissolved prior to that. So at the time that the alleged injury occurred, December 8th, 1999, precision cleaning had not even been incorporated, even though the complaint said that it had been incorporated. And so what was filed here was a two-part argument before the circuit court concerning the way this judgment was entered. In the first instance, with respect to precision cleaning, where there was an allegation made that this corporation existed on the date of this injury, when in fact it did not. And the certification that was provided from the Secretary of State clearly established that there was no question. In addition to that, how Mr. Poole was named individually after the Second Amendment complaint where that word individually was put in there, and then the collection was focused for the next... When was the word individually put in? I'm missing something. If you take a look at the appendix, what you find is that if you take a look at the appendix, Exhibit F, the original order for the amended complaint specifically directs the defendant to take out the word owner. Mr. Poole's status as an owner because they attempted to amend the complaint by adding owner, and he said no. Is this on the amended complaint? Correct. You're giving us a legislative history here of how that amendment took place. At first they wanted to designate him as owner. And this was an open court. That is correct. And if you take a look at the appendix, the circuit court at that time directed striking of the word owner and allowed only the terms as an agent or employee. There was no effort to name him individually, to sue him individually, but the way they attempted to bring him in individually was naming him as the owner of Precision. And the court expressly said no striking. And when you look at the appendix, you see that that amended complaint, the word owner was struck on every single page and in fact the order that was entered only said as agent and employee. So that now follows the next question. Yes Judge. What difference would it make whether he's being sued here as owner, as employee, or individually? What difference would it make? Because the question becomes what do you know as being notified as to your personal liability? So you're basically saying that service when you're designated an owner or a service when you're designated as an agent misleads the recipient into thinking somehow that he's not vulnerable here. The question is if a complaint leads someone particularly when you're dealing with a solely owned corporation as this probably was. I mean it tells them get a lawyer. Isn't it? Isn't that the result? The argument is should we be that concerned? If in fact he is under law liable under this complaint, should we be concerned that somehow as a layman he doesn't know it? Can we be concerned about that? And the answer, Judge, I think depends. And it depends that if in fact you have an injury that your company is responsible for or appropriately responsible for and there's been a work misconduct claim and the company that you're working for is an agent, in this case FedEx and that work misconduct claim has already been resolved and the amount that was resolved in that case was approximately $70,000. And now the only possible liability is anything in addition. And now you go from a $70,000 work misconduct to a half a million dollars. A half a million dollars. Now the question becomes where does the notification come in when you're a corporation to know? If he is sued in any status under which he would be liable if the facts were proven, isn't that enough? Should the courts be concerned about the fact that somehow he's going to be obscured from if he's unsophisticated from knowing that he will bear the brunt? You know, that's asking a lot. Because if you were sued in a capacity in which he would not be liable, then your argument is significant. But if the capacity in which he's sued, you know, is a sophisticated capacity that makes him vulnerable, makes him liable, isn't that enough? Judge, in this particular case the capacity issue is squarely at issue here because his capacity as an employee of FedEx that precision didn't even exist on the date of this injury made it very clear to him that given the nature of this claim and the date in which it happened, he had no individual personal liability with respect to this injury under no circumstances. And what you have here is that after the default was entered, there's a subsequent judgment where the word individually was added clearly outside of any instruction or any information that was provided. And I would ask the judge this. Well, adding the word individually afterwards is not a dramatic shift. Because once the court would find that this pleading gives sufficient notice to the individual that he is vulnerable if the events described in the complaint are proven, then the liability to which he is vulnerable is individual. And for the court then to clarify and say he is liable individually is no dramatic shift. Well, Judge, if you use the word individually and then it allows you in an enforcement action to place that individual in jail because it's now a personal judgment against him because of the word individually, which is what happened in this case. But a judgment against an employee in tort is a personal judgment. I understand that, Judge. But there is no provision for an employee being liable only on some sort of derivative type of fiction. I mean, you'd have to really pose that to me for me to be able to even deal with that. Judge, there was no respondeat superior allegation in this complaint. It wouldn't matter because respondeat superior hangs on the liability of the employee. If the employee is not liable, there is no respondeat superior. So it still centers, focuses on the individual liability of the employee. Which goes to Justice Halsey's comment, whereas were there any allegations specifically against Mr. Poole? And there are none, Judge. There were none in the initial complaint. There were none in the amended complaint. There were no specific allegations ever alleging that Mr. Poole did anything. The only reason that the judgment was added to come after Mr. Poole individually is because of his status. It was his status that they were trying to add. It wasn't the fact that he's an employee or the agent because that was totally unnecessary. The key was the owner. And the judge at the circuit court level saw that and said, no, you're not going to add owner at this point his status as having some liability because of his status. And therefore that's why it was added subsequently. It wasn't just simply superfluous. Individually was the way it was going to be enforced. Let's use your scenario and I hear you. You know, there is substance to that. But let's deal with that scenario. If he's liable rather than by reason of his direct involvement in causing the fall. If the attempt is to say you're liable because somebody in the corporation is liable or because the corporation is liable, it's still individual liability, isn't it? His liability ultimately, any way you describe it from whatever source you get at it is individual liability. Judge, the very essence of incorporation is to avoid the individual liability Yeah, but if you're saying they're joining him by reason of his status, what are they joining him for? They're not joining him as an ornament. I understand. And that's why they're joining him to say you're liable because of some possibly mistaken notion that if the corporation is liable, he's liable too. But it's his individual liability. There is no such thing as a liability by reason of agency except the other way to a principle. Not downward, but upward. And the issue there, Judge, is that there has to be in existence a principle to which you are alleging that the agency is derivative of. And in this case, there was no Counsel, though, the simple point is in plain English, if you get served whether you get served individually, if you personally are served, even if you're served as a corporation name, you still got served. So this guy is nailed one way or the other. So your only argument now is what Counsel Justice raised earlier, the jurisdictional issue. The service issue is it's moot. You've got one hope here, and that's if you can address the jurisdictional issue between the two judges. That's your only home run, maybe. Well, I'm not quite sure that I want to be as outspoken on this as Justice Smith is concerned, but I must say his logic has flavor. I would simply say, Judge, I'm just trying to get you to something that we can maybe buy. Well, Judge, the issue here is that the supplementary proceedings were before Judge White, who directed Counsel to Alexander White to go to the judge who issued the default judgment, which was Judge Chiodo. This was presented to Judge Chiodo, and he directed that it be referred to Judge Ward. And Judge Ward received it only after Judge Chiodo indicated that his order was only premised on the prior default that Judge Ward had entered. And therefore, he was the appropriate judge to decide this issue. The question of whether it was a final order or not, Judge Ward asked the parties to brief him. We did, and he ruled that it was a final order because of the procedure in which he was now presented with making his determination. The question became, was, at that point, because I had raised the 1401 issue regarding precision and individually, Judge Ward directed the parties, I'm not going to handle the precision cleaning issue. He specifically said that based on the request. And he said, I want to only address the issue of whether or not there was sufficient notice on James Pool individually concerning the judgment with respect to the $500,000 award that was issued. There was nothing in this record, I think Judge Gordon asked, on the prove-up. There was no record of any prove-up of anything. There was no hearing, there was no evidence, there was nothing provided whatsoever. But your position, obviously, since the jury vacated the default judgment, you want the trial judge to have jurisdiction. And so you're helping us find the rationale for dealing with this allocation as between the two judges. Absolutely, Judge. As being something that is consistent with the general requirement that judges should not be sitting in judgment on a second judge. There is no such language in 1401, but your has found that to be embedded, nevertheless. And that issue was, in fact, briefed. And it was briefed, and Judge Ward ruled, and I didn't see that in the appeal with respect to this. I don't know if that's even before you properly addressing whether Judge Ward made that decision inappropriately. In fact, that hasn't been raised. The question becomes, really, is whether or not once he issues the default, whether or not Mr. Poole individually was given notice of the 500,000 or the decision that Judge Sciola subsequently rendered. And Judge Ward looked carefully at the record. He looked at every order. He looked at every service issue. He looked at Rule 105, Supreme Court Rule, which talks about the necessary additional notice that may be required when you sue a corporation and get a default. You can stretch that line of argument in various kinds of directions. I mean, supposing you serve somebody with a complaint that is total garbage, okay, in terms of accuracy, in terms of its reasoning. So he says, I don't have to respond to this. I'll just sit on my haunches. And lo and behold, a default judgment is entered. You know, there may be some basis for arguing substantively for a vacatur, say, you know, if the court wants to buy into that argument. But if it doesn't, is there a jurisdictional issue simply because he doesn't think he's going to be injured by this pleading? Well, that's what you have here, ultimately. Except it's a more sophisticated guise, because you're saying that his characterization in the complaint would lead him to think that he's not going to get hit. But if that characterization, in fact, makes him vulnerable, then should we be the ones who then is, should he be able to claim, my God, I didn't have enough. And that issue was the square issue that Judge Ward decided, because the issue was whether or not he was provided sufficient notice to know that he could get hit. That was the issue. Does he have individual notice? Was the notice sufficient to him? Given where we are now, given the fact that he's been put in jail twice, that this judgment is being enforced for five years against him, does he have notice? And Judge Ward, after looking at everything, said, in reliance on Supreme Court counsel, we're going in circles on this. I heard what you said and I hope you heard what I said. Yes, I did. And if I can, I would just like to address the standard of review issue. Why does that make a difference in this particular case? Whether it's an abuse of discretion or a de novo standard, you think there's really going to be a difference in the outcome? I think there should be. And this is why, Justice Gordon, as I've pointed out in my brief, Judge Ward was completely and totally aware of every single order and issue that was provided in this case. He reviewed the petition filed by Mr. Poole. He also reviewed the responsive pleading. He divided the actual initial motion into two separate issues. He gave complete instructions with respect to the parties to narrow the scope of what would be argued and what would be the legal as well as the factual issues to be decided. In Vincent, the only question there was a sua sponte deficient pleading, essentially. And that's where the de novo came in. The Supreme Court case that I cite has not been addressed at all by plaintiffs in this case. And that was the Paul v. Gerald Alderman case, which is a Supreme Court case that was issued by in 2006. The Vincent case and every case cited does not even address Paul in saying that Paul is now not good law. The issue that was raised in Paul is that when you have a judge give a learned, careful, reviewed decision of the record, hear argument, and makes that decision, this Court should respect that judgment. And that's why the Abuse of Discretion Standard, I believe, is the appropriate standard given the context of this particular case. Not the case in the fact scenario that was pointed out in Vincent. And in fact, if you look at the cases Do you think that Abuse of Discretion Standard would salvage a result reached by a judge on an issue of law where he's wrong? No, that's obvious. It would apply basically only in terms of weighing evidence, wouldn't it? What we're talking about is the adequacy of the notice, Judge. If the adequacy of notice can be dealt with as a determinative factor where the complaint is directed at an individual under the guise of being an entity in which he bears individual liability. You know, I mean, that's not a question of if we're going to get into adequacy of notice as being a determinative factor. I mean, we're entering into a never-never land, aren't we? Well, I think that's essentially what the Court directed in Cook v. Burnett. In those cases, that's what you have to do. No. In Burnett, there was no service. None. The entity wasn't served. Here, there was service. Counsel, anything else? That's about all, Judge. I appreciate the time. Thank you. Good try. First of all, counsel's allegations, even though I don't think they matter, as to whether or not the word individually first comes up, it's clearly belied by the record. It doesn't come up in the judgment. If you look at the record at C-42, when he's seeking a motion to amend the complaint, he's looking to add, and I quote, James E. Poole Sr. as a defendant. On March 24, 2012, he said, that the motion to amend C-43, in an order that's entered, it's a default judgment, is entered against defendant James Poole Sr. So this agent and employee, in individual capacity, doesn't come up. Well, there's obviously some stuff here that took place that the record is insufficient to explain because there are factors here that don't jive with one's intuitive impressions. One doesn't know why there was an insistence here that Poole be characterized as something other than individual. But I suppose we have to presume in the absence of any other knowledge, that it doesn't, as far as we're concerned, change the result, although it makes the result less, something less than intuitive. I would agree, legally it doesn't matter, Your Honor, as agent and employee or individually, as simply as a legal effect doesn't have any matter. Can I address one other point as to the jurisdiction of the trial court? Clearly, 214.01 doesn't say where the petitions should be brought, but the problem is that 214.01 does say it's to attack a final judgment, and the default order is not a final judgment. So you have Judge Ward entering a default, which is not a final judgment. It's actually Judge Chiola which enters the final judgment order. So I think that solves the problem. The question is, if that is the, what is the impact of a failure to adhere to that general principle, where you do, instead of giving it to the judge who entered the order, you give it to another judge who has the jurisdiction to overrule or review another judge's work, except that the courts, like in decisions like Balestinius and other decisions, frowns upon trial judges acting as reviewing courts, except if their position is devolved through court procedures, like a judge retiring, somebody taking his place, something to that effect. But the impact of that does not appear to be jurisdictional, notwithstanding the case that's cited, and I'm hesitant on the name, but even in that case, there's no clear indication that it was jurisdictional. It's something that the court may, the Supreme Court, may interfere with under its supervisory powers just to keep it regulated, but the fact that it has to use supervisory powers negates the presumption that it's jurisdictional. That may be so, Your Honor. So, unless, if we should rule in your favor on the substance, you would be the one who would be able to trigger any reactions, supervisory reactions. Isn't that right? That may be so, Your Honor. Which I think, under the circumstances where the court has to exercise supervisory powers, I'm not sure that we can exercise those powers on our own. If it's not jurisdictional, but it's frowned upon, can an intermediate court really act on it? Can it reverse on that basis if it's not jurisdictional? The only reversal would be through normal standards of review. But if Judge Shilder heard this case, he would be in effect reviewing what Judge Ward did. So, in effect, what you're saying, Justice House, is that in effect this may not, this may have been the right allocation after all, notwithstanding the language final order, final order. If, in other words, the body and gist of that order was predetermined by something that Judge Ward did, then Judge Ward should be the one who looks at it, rather than Judge Giola, who basically rubber-stepped with the final order. There was a proof of, Your Honor, and for the record, if you look at, I included copies of the orders, Judge Ward in the beginning actually only decided that he was going to decide the default, the order of default. It wasn't until actually the next day after he vacated under 214.01 that he sent a fax with an amended order vacating the actual judgment. So he had actually decided even before that that he was simply to address the default, not the default judgment. And he reversed himself, unfortunately, the day after by faxing us that order. Anything further? I have nothing further, Your Honor. Thank you very much. Thank you, counsels.