UNITED STATES TAX COURT

T.C. Memo. 2005-286

UNITED STATES TAX COURT

ROBERT E. CRANDALL, Petitioner v.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent

Docket No. 7599-03L.

Filed December 15, 2005.

P filed a petition for judicial review pursuant to

sec. 6330, I.R.C., in response to a determination by R

that levy action was appropriate.

Held: Because P has advanced groundless

complaints in dispute of the notice of intent to levy,

R’s determination to proceed with collection action is

sustained.

Held, further, a penalty under sec. 6673, I.R.C.,

is due from P and is awarded to the United States in

the amount of $3,000.

Robert E. Crandall, pro se.

Rollin G. Thorley, for respondent.

- 2 MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION

WHERRY, Judge:

This case arises from a petition for

judicial review filed in response to a Notice of Determination

Concerning Collection Action Under Section 6330.1

decision are:

The issues for

(1) Whether respondent may proceed with collection

action as so determined, and (2) whether the Court, sua sponte,

should impose a penalty under section 6673.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found.

The stipulations of the parties, with accompanying exhibits, are

incorporated herein by this reference.

This case involves petitioner’s 1998 and 1999 income tax

liabilities.

With respect to 1998, petitioner initially filed a

Federal income tax return reporting a balance due and not

accompanied by full payment.

On July 19, 1999, respondent

assessed the reported tax, as well as statutory additions and

interest.

Notices of balance due for 1998 were also promptly

sent to petitioner.

Petitioner subsequently submitted an amended

return, received by respondent on September 21, 2000, reflecting

no income or tax liability and requesting a refund of

withholdings.

1

By letter dated December 26, 2001, the Internal

Unless otherwise indicated, section references are to the

Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, and Rule references

are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.

- 3 Revenue Service (IRS) notified petitioner of disallowance of the

refund claim and of his right to contest the denial by filing a

lawsuit in the U.S. District Court or U.S. Court of Federal

Claims.

With respect to 1999, the IRS examined petitioner’s filed

return and issued a statutory notice of deficiency.

Petitioner

did not file a petition with this Court in response to the notice

of deficiency, and respondent assessed the tax, an addition to

tax, and interest for 1999 on November 19, 2001.

Notices of

balance due were promptly sent to petitioner with respect 1999.

Thereafter, on August 5, 2002, respondent issued to

petitioner a Final Notice of Intent To Levy and Notice of Your

Right To a Hearing regarding his unpaid liabilities for 1998 and

1999.

Petitioner timely submitted to respondent a Form 12153,

Request for a Collection Due Process Hearing, setting forth his

disagreement with the levy, as follows:

“NOT LIABLE, MORE

DETAILS TO FOLLOW”.

By a letter dated February 20, 2003, Julieanne M. Petersen,

the Appeals officer to whom petitioner’s case had been assigned,

scheduled a hearing for March 20, 2003, in Las Vegas, Nevada.2

The letter briefly outlined the hearing process, advised that

audio or stenographic recording of hearings was not allowed, and

2

The explanation attached to the Apr. 23, 2003, notice of

determination apparently refers in error to Mar. 28, 2003, as the

date initially scheduled for the requested hearing.

- 4 explained the opportunity to present and discuss “non-frivolous”

material.

The letter also warned petitioner as follows:

“THE

COURTS HAVE DEEMED THE ARGUMENTS THAT ARE CONTAINED IN YOUR

PREVIOUS CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE

FIRVOLOUS [sic].

THEY WILL NOT HEAR THEM AND NEITHER WILL THEY

BE ADDRESSED AT YOUR COLLECTION DUE PROCESS HEARING.”

The

hearing was subsequently rescheduled for April 10, 2003, at

petitioner’s request.

By identical letters dated March 1 and 21, 2003, petitioner

requested that enumerated documents be provided at the upcoming

hearing “before I am persuaded that I am legally obligated to pay

the taxes and penalty at issue.”

The letters also advised that

petitioner would be recording the hearing.

Petitioner appeared for the scheduled hearing on April 10,

2003, but the hearing did not proceed when the Appeals officer

refused to permit petitioner to record the meeting.

On April 23,

2003, respondent issued to petitioner the aforementioned Notice

of Determination Concerning Collection Action Under Section 6330,

sustaining the proposed levy action.

An attachment to the notice

addressed the verification of legal and procedural requirements,

the issues raised by the taxpayer, and the balancing of efficient

collection and intrusiveness.

The attachment noted that the

issues raised by petitioner in his correspondence were “frivolous

and without merit” and that petitioner had been provided with

- 5 copies of Pierson v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 576 (2000), and other

cases highlighting the invalidity of his arguments.

Petitioner’s petition disputing the notice of determination

was filed with the Court on May 20, 2003, and reflected an

address in Las Vegas, Nevada.3

Petitioner’s complaints with

respect to the administrative proceedings included the following:

No legitimate hearing under section 6330 ever took place;

petitioner was not permitted to record the scheduled hearing;

petitioner was denied the opportunity to raise issues he deemed

“relevant” (e.g., the “existence” of the underlying tax

liability); and requested documentation had not been produced

(e.g., record of the assessments, statutory notice and demand for

payment, and verification from the Secretary that all applicable

requirements were met).

Petitioner’s prayer asked this Court to

declare invalid the April 23, 2003, determination; order the IRS

to suspend enforcement activity until a hearing is held; order

the IRS to hold a hearing and to produce all requested

3

The record also contains a copy of a letter dated June 20,

2003, and addressed to the Appeals officer, disputing the notice

of determination. The letter is from a Milton H. Baxley II

alleging to hold a power of attorney to act on behalf of

petitioner. The letter focuses in particular on claimed

violations of the verification requirements of sec. 6330 and

contains a so-called offer to pay in full the amount of any tax

“upon presentment of a verified bill signed under penalty of

perjury by a person who has first hand knowledge of the facts,

and that the alleged amount is due and owing by my client, and

that the amount is true, correct, complete and not misleading.”

- 6 documentation; and order the Government to reimburse petitioner

for all costs incurred in submitting the instant petition.4

On September 20, 2004, respondent filed a motion for summary

judgment.

Petitioner filed a timely response in opposition to

respondent’s motion on October 12, 2004.

The response

essentially reprised petitioner’s demands for a recorded hearing

and documentation.

The Court on November 17, 2004, issued an

order denying the motion for summary judgment, ruling as set

forth below:

As respondent correctly notes in the motion for

summary judgment, issues raised by petitioner during

the administrative process and before us have been

repeatedly rejected by this and other courts or are

refuted by the documentary record. Moreover, the Court

observes that maintenance of similar arguments has

served as grounds for imposition of penalties under

section 6673. However, the case in its current posture

presents a procedural shortcoming.

On July 8, 2003, this Court issued Keene v.

Commissioner, 121 T.C. 8, 19 (2003), in which it was

held that taxpayers are entitled, pursuant to section

7521(a)(1), to audio record section 6330 hearings. The

taxpayer in that case had refused to proceed when

denied the opportunity to record, and we remanded the

case to allow a recorded Appeals hearing. Id. In

contrast, we have distinguished, and declined to

remand, cases where the taxpayer had participated in an

Appeals Office hearing, albeit unrecorded, and where

all issues raised by the taxpayer could be properly

decided from the existing record. E.g., id. at 19, 20;

Frey v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-87; Durrenberger

v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-44; Brashear v.

4

The Court notes that to the extent that the petition seeks

reasonable administrative and/or litigation costs pursuant to

sec. 7430, any such claim is premature and will not be further

addressed. See Rule 231.

- 7 Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-196; Kemper v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-195.

The circumstances of the instant case are

analogous to those in Keene v. Commissioner, supra, and

diverge from those where it was determined that remand

was not necessary and would not be productive.

Critically, because the conference was terminated when

petitioner refused to turn off his recorder, no hearing

was ever held. Hence, there still exists a possibility

that petitioner might have raised one or more

nonfrivolous issues if the meeting had proceeded.

In this situation, the Court declines to

characterize the failure to allow recording as harmless

error. Hence, the Court will deny respondent’s motion

for summary judgment at this time. As in Keene v.

Commissioner, supra at 19, however, we admonish

petitioner that if he persists in making frivolous and

groundless tax protester arguments in any further

proceedings with respect to this case, rather than

raising relevant issues, as specified in section

6330(c)(2), the Court may consider granting a future

motion for summary judgment. In such an instance, the

Court would also be in a position to impose a penalty

under section 6673(a)(1).

This case was called from the calendar of the trial session

of the Court in Las Vegas, Nevada, on December 6, 2004, and a

trial was held the following day.

At the outset, the Court

cautioned petitioner to be cognizant of our November 17, 2004,

order, explaining:

But I have already ruled in this order that the

Appeals Officer did deny you your right to a hearing,

which you had a right to record. The Court has

addressed that matter and we have determined that the

Respondent, the Internal Revenue Service, was wrong in

not allowing you to record your hearing.

However, we have also determined that if you don’t

have--if taxpayers, and not you, but if a taxpayer who

wants to record a hearing has only frivolous issues

which have no merit, and which this court and other

- 8 courts have continuously rejected, that there is no

reason for remanding your case to appeals to hold a

face to face hearing and waste your time, Appeals’

time, and the taxpayers’ money to simply allow you to

document on a tape all of your frivolous arguments.

So the question is as I noted in the * * *

[order], do you have any issues which I have authority

to consider, and which Appeals had authority to

consider at your hearing which you want to raise, and

presumably would have raised at the hearing had you

been given a chance to have the hearing.

An that’s why I denied the government’s motion,

because they did deny you your rights, and we don’t

know whether--I don’t know whether you have any

legitimate issue to raise or not. So that is what you

have to address here.

Petitioner responded with:

“Well, my position is that the

hearing was denied, and that I was not able to bring up the

issues that I outlined in a letter when requesting my letter for

certain documents, and et cetera, to be available, and for the

government to have at the hearing.

wanted to discuss with them.”

Those were issues that I

The Court again reiterated that

such contentions had been ruled meritless, and warned petitioner:

“Making those arguments, and continuing to make those arguments,

and costing the taxpayers a lot of money for me to deal with

them, may result in the application of additional penalties under

Section 6673.”

Petitioner’s remaining comments failed to

identify any specific colorable issues for remand and consisted

principally of vague recitations or paraphrases of the statutory

language.

- 9 Petitioner subsequently filed a posttrial brief.

He therein

recapitulated the position taken throughout these proceedings and

at trial, focusing once again on lack of a recorded hearing and

of sufficient verification and documentation of procedural

requisites.

Respondent elected not to file a brief.

OPINION

I.

Collection Actions

A.

General Rules

Section 6331(a) authorizes the Commissioner to levy upon all

property and rights to property of a taxpayer where there exists

a failure to pay any tax liability within 10 days after notice

and demand for payment.

Sections 6331(d) and 6330 then set forth

procedures generally applicable to afford protections for

taxpayers in such levy situations.

Section 6331(d) establishes

the requirement that a person be provided with at least 30 days’

prior written notice of the Commissioner’s intent to levy before

collection may proceed.

Section 6331(d) also indicates that this

notification should include a statement of available

administrative appeals.

Section 6330(a) expands in several

respects upon the premise of section 6331(d), forbidding

collection by levy until the taxpayer has received notice of the

opportunity for administrative review of the matter in the form

of a hearing before the IRS Office of Appeals.

Section 6330(b)

- 10 grants a taxpayer who so requests the right to a fair hearing

before an impartial Appeals officer.

Section 6330(c) addresses the matters to be considered at

the hearing:

SEC. 6330(c). Matters Considered at Hearing.--In

the case of any hearing conducted under this section-(1) Requirement of investigation.--The

appeals officer shall at the hearing obtain

verification from the Secretary that the

requirements of any applicable law or

administrative procedure have been met.

(2) Issues at hearing.-(A) In general.--The person may raise at

the hearing any relevant issue relating to

the unpaid tax or the proposed levy,

including-(i) appropriate spousal defenses;

(ii) challenges to the

appropriateness of collection actions;

and

(iii) offers of collection

alternatives, which may include the

posting of a bond, the substitution of

other assets, an installment agreement,

or an offer-in-compromise.

(B) Underlying liability.--The person

may also raise at the hearing challenges to

the existence or amount of the underlying tax

liability for any tax period if the person

did not receive any statutory notice of

deficiency for such tax liability or did not

otherwise have an opportunity to dispute such

tax liability.

Once the Appeals officer has issued a determination

regarding the disputed collection action, section 6330(d) allows

- 11 the taxpayer to seek judicial review in the Tax Court or a U.S.

District Court, depending upon the type of tax.

In considering

whether taxpayers are entitled to any relief from the

Commissioner’s determination, this Court has established the

following standard of review:

where the validity of the underlying tax liability is

properly at issue, the Court will review the matter on

a de novo basis. However, where the validity of the

underlying tax liability is not properly at issue, the

Court will review the Commissioner’s administrative

determination for abuse of discretion. [Sego v.

Commissioner, 114 T.C. 604, 610 (2000).]

B.

Analysis

1.

Appeals Hearing

Hearings conducted under section 6330 are informal

proceedings, not formal adjudications.

Katz v. Commissioner, 115

T.C. 329, 337 (2000); Davis v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 35, 41

(2000).

There exists no right to subpoena witnesses or documents

in connection with section 6330 hearings.

Roberts v.

Commissioner, 118 T.C. 365, 372 (2002), affd. 329 F.3d 1224 (11th

Cir. 2003); Nestor v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 162, 166-167 (2002);

Davis v. Commissioner, supra at 41-42.

Taxpayers are entitled to

be offered a face-to-face hearing at the Appeals Office nearest

their residence.

Where the taxpayer declines to participate in a

proffered face-to-face hearing, hearings may also be conducted by

telephone or correspondence.

Katz v. Commissioner, supra at 337-

338; Dorra v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-16; sec. 301.6330-

- 12 1(d)(2), Q&A-D6 and D7, Proced. & Admin. Regs.

Furthermore, once

a taxpayer has been given a reasonable opportunity for a hearing

but has failed to avail himself or herself of that opportunity,

we have approved the making of a determination to proceed with

collection based on the Appeals officer’s review of the case

file.

See, e.g., Taylor v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-25,

affd. 130 Fed. Appx. 934 (9th Cir. 2005); Leineweber v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-17; Armstrong v. Commissioner, T.C.

Memo. 2002-224; Gougler v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-185;

Mann v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-48.

Thus, a face-to-face

meeting is not invariably required.

Regulations promulgated under section 6330 likewise

incorporate many of the foregoing concepts, as follows:

Q-D6.

How are CDP hearings conducted?

A-D6. * * * CDP hearings * * * are informal in

nature and do not require the Appeals officer or

employee and the taxpayer, or the taxpayer’s

representative, to hold a face-to-face meeting. A CDP

hearing may, but is not required to, consist of a faceto-face meeting, one or more written or oral

communications between an Appeals officer or employee

and the taxpayer or the taxpayer’s representative, or

some combination thereof. * * *

Q-D7. If a taxpayer wants a face-to-face CDP

hearing, where will it be held?

A-D7. The taxpayer must be offered an opportunity

for a hearing at the Appeals office closest to

taxpayer’s residence or, in the case of a business

taxpayer, the taxpayer’s principal place of business.

If that is not satisfactory to the taxpayer, the

taxpayer will be given an opportunity for a hearing by

correspondence or by telephone. If that is not

- 13 satisfactory to the taxpayer, the Appeals officer or

employee will review the taxpayer’s request for a CDP

hearing, the case file, any other written

communications from the taxpayer (including written

communications, if any, submitted in connection with

the CDP hearing), and any notes of any oral

communications with the taxpayer or the taxpayer’s

representative. Under such circumstances, review of

those documents will constitute the CDP hearing for the

purposes of section 6330(b). [Sec. 301.6330-1(d)(2),

Q&A-D6 and D7, Proced. & Admin. Regs.]

This Court has cited the above regulatory provisions, and

corresponding promulgations under section 6320, with approval.

See, e.g., Taylor v. Commissioner, supra; Leineweber v.

Commissioner, supra; Dorra v. Commissioner, supra; Gougler v.

Commissioner, supra.

With respect to the instant matter, the record reflects that

petitioner was provided with an opportunity for a face-to-face

hearing on April 10, 2003.

The hearing did not proceed when

petitioner was not permitted to record the meeting.

As explained

in our previous order in this case, in Keene v. Commissioner, 121

T.C. 8, 19 (2003), this Court held that taxpayers are entitled,

pursuant to section 7521(a)(1), to audio record section 6330

hearings.

The taxpayer in that case had refused to proceed when

denied the opportunity to record, and we remanded the case to

allow a recorded Appeals hearing.

Id.

In contrast, again as noted in our November 17, 2004, order,

we have distinguished, and declined to remand, cases where the

taxpayer had participated in an Appeals Office hearing, albeit

- 14 unrecorded, and where all issues raised by the taxpayer could be

properly decided from the existing record.

E.g., id. at 19-20;

Frey v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-87; Durrenberger v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-44; Brashear v. Commissioner, T.C.

Memo. 2003-196; Kemper v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-195.

Stated otherwise, cases will not be remanded to Appeals, nor

determinations otherwise invalidated, merely on account of the

lack of a recording when to do so is not necessary and would not

be productive.

See, e.g., Frey v. Commissioner, supra;

Durrenberger v. Commissioner, supra; Brashear v. Commissioner,

supra; Kemper v. Commissioner, supra; see also Lunsford v.

Commissioner, 117 T.C. 183, 189 (2001).

A principal scenario

falling short of the necessary or productive standard exists

where the taxpayers rely on frivolous or groundless arguments

consistently rejected by this and other courts.

See, e.g., Frey

v. Commissioner, supra; Brashear v. Commissioner, supra; Kemper

v. Commissioner, supra.

Because no hearing had been conducted at all in petitioner’s

case, we declined to grant respondent’s motion for summary

judgment.

The record as it then existed did not foreclose the

possibility that petitioner might have raised valid arguments had

a hearing been held.

Accordingly, we provided petitioner an

opportunity before the Court at the trial session in Las Vegas to

identify any legitimate issues he wished to raise that could

- 15 warrant further consideration of the merits of his case by the

Appeals Office or this Court.

Petitioner, however, merely

continued to focus on the denial of a recorded hearing and

offered no substantive issues of merit.

Hence, despite repeated warnings and opportunities, the only

contentions other than the recorded hearing advanced by

petitioner are, as will be further discussed below, of a nature

previously rejected by this and other courts.

The record

therefore does not indicate that any purpose would be served by

remand or additional proceedings.

The Court concludes that all

pertinent issues relating to the propriety of the collection

determination can be decided through review of the materials

before it.

2.

Review of Underlying Liabilities

With respect to 1999, a statutory notice of deficiency was

issued to petitioner, and he has at no time alleged that he did

not receive the notice.

He did not timely petition this Court

for redetermination when he had the opportunity to do so.

Accordingly, petitioner is precluded under section 6330(c)(2)(B)

from disputing his underlying liability for 1999 in this

proceeding.

With respect to 1998, because the assessments were based on

petitioner’s filed return, no notice of deficiency was issued.

However, to the extent that petitioner might be entitled to

- 16 challenge his underlying liability under the rationale of

Montgomery v. Commissioner, 122 T.C. 1, 9 (2004),5 he has at no

time offered even a scintilla of evidence that would show error

in respondent’s determinations.

Since he did not address

computation of his 1998 tax liability either at trial or on

brief, even a de novo review would not avail petitioner.

Moreover, he has now forfeited his chance to suggest any

meritorious issues worthy of remand.

3.

Review for Abuse of Discretion

Petitioner has also made various arguments relating to

aspects of the assessment and collection procedures that we

review for abuse of discretion.

Action constitutes an abuse of

discretion under this standard where arbitrary, capricious, or

without sound basis in fact or law.

Woodral v. Commissioner, 112

T.C. 19, 23 (1999).

Federal tax assessments are formally recorded on a record of

assessment in accordance with section 6203.

The Commissioner is

not required to use Form 23C in making an assessment.

Commissioner, 118 T.C. at 369-371.

Roberts v.

Furthermore, section

6330(c)(1) mandates neither that the Appeals officer rely on a

particular document in satisfying the verification requirement

nor that the Appeals officer actually give the taxpayer a copy of

the verification upon which he or she relied.

5

Craig v.

Cf. Farley v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-168.

- 17 Commissioner, 119 T.C. 252, 262 (2002); Nestor v. Commissioner,

118 T.C. at 166.

A Form 4340, Certificate of Assessments, Payments and Other

Specified Matters, for instance, constitutes presumptive evidence

that a tax has been validly assessed pursuant to section 6203.

Davis v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. at 40 (and cases cited thereat).

Consequently, absent a showing by the taxpayer of some

irregularity in the assessment procedure that would raise a

question about the validity of the assessments, a Form 4340

reflecting that tax liabilities were assessed and remain unpaid

is sufficient to support collection action under section 6330.

Id. at 40-41.

We have specifically held that it is not an abuse

of discretion for an Appeals officer to rely on Form 4340, Nestor

v. Commissioner, supra at 166; Davis v. Commissioner, supra at

41, or a computer transcript of account, Schroeder v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-190; Mann v. Commissioner, T.C.

Memo. 2002-48, to comply with section 6330(c)(1).

Here, the record contains Forms 4340 for 1998 and 1999,

indicating that assessments were made for each of these years and

that taxes remain unpaid.

Petitioner has cited no irregularities

that would cast doubt on the information recorded thereon.

In addition to the specific dictates of section 6330, the

Secretary, upon request, is directed to furnish to the taxpayer a

copy of pertinent parts of the record of assessment setting forth

- 18 the taxpayer’s name, the date of assessment, the character of the

liability assessed, the taxable period, if applicable, and the

amounts assessed.

Regs.

Sec. 6203; sec. 301.6203-1, Proced. & Admin.

A taxpayer receiving a copy of Form 4340 has been provided

with all the documentation to which he or she is entitled under

section 6203 and section 301.6203-1, Proced. & Admin. Regs.

Roberts v. Commissioner, supra at 370 n.7.

This Court likewise

has upheld collection actions where taxpayers were provided with

literal transcripts of account (so-called MFTRAX).

See, e.g.,

Frank v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-88; Swann v. Commissioner,

T.C. Memo. 2003-70.

The February 20, 2003, letter to petitioner

from the Appeals officer stated that copies of “transcripts

showing the contested assessments” would be available for

petitioner.

The Court concludes that petitioner’s complaints

regarding the assessments and verification are meritless.

Petitioner has denied receiving the notice and demand for

payment that section 6303(a) establishes should be given within

60 days of the making of an assessment.

However, a notice of

balance due constitutes a notice and demand for payment within

the meaning of section 6303(a).

262-263.

Craig v. Commissioner, supra at

The Forms 4340 indicate that petitioner was sent

notices of balance due for each of the tax years involved.

Thus, with respect to those issues enumerated in section

6330(c)(2)(A) and subject to review in collection proceedings for

- 19 abuse of discretion, petitioner has not raised any spousal

defenses, valid challenges to the appropriateness of the

collection action, or collection alternatives.

As this Court has

noted in earlier cases, Rule 331(b)(4) states that a petition for

review of a collection action shall contain clear and concise

assignments of each and every error alleged to have been

committed in the notice of determination and that any issue not

raised in the assignments of error shall be deemed conceded.

See

Lunsford v. Commissioner, 117 T.C. at 185-186; Goza v.

Commissioner, 114 T.C. 176, 183 (2000).

For completeness, we

have addressed various points advanced by petitioner during the

administrative process and this litigation, but the items listed

in section 6330(c)(2)(A) were not pursued in any proceedings.

Accordingly, the Court concludes that respondent’s determination

to proceed with collection of petitioner’s tax liabilities was

not an abuse of discretion.

II.

Section 6673 Penalty

Section 6673(a)(1) authorizes the Court to require the

taxpayer to pay a penalty not in excess of $25,000 when it

appears to the Court that, inter alia, proceedings have been

instituted or maintained by the taxpayer primarily for delay or

that the taxpayer’s position in such proceeding is frivolous or

groundless.

In Pierson v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. at 581, we

warned that taxpayers abusing the protections afforded by

- 20 sections 6320 and 6330 through the bringing of dilatory or

frivolous lien or levy actions will face sanctions under section

6673.

We have since repeatedly disposed of cases premised on

arguments akin to those raised herein summarily and with

imposition of the section 6673 penalty.

See, e.g., Craig v.

Commissioner, supra at 264-265 (and cases cited thereat).

With respect to the instant matter, we are convinced that

petitioner instituted this proceeding primarily for delay.

Throughout the administrative and pretrial process, petitioner

advanced contentions and demands previously and consistently

rejected by this and other courts.

He submitted communications

quoting, citing, using out of context, and otherwise misapplying

portions of the Internal Revenue Code, regulations, Supreme Court

decisions, and other authorities.

While his procedural stance

concerning recording was correct, he ignored the Court’s explicit

warning that any further proceedings would be justified only in

the face of relevant and nonfrivolous issues.

Moreover, petitioner was, on multiple occasions, expressly

alerted to the potential use of sanctions in his case.

Yet he

appeared at the trial session in Las Vegas without any legitimate

evidence or argument in support of his position.

He instead

continued to espouse those positions that had been explicitly

addressed and rejected in this Court’s order of November 17,

2004, or in other cases previously decided by the Court.

The

- 21 Court sua sponte concludes that a penalty of $3,000 should be

awarded to the United States in this case.

To reflect the

foregoing,

An appropriate decision

will be entered.