Ms. Vanessa A. Countryman

Abers Capital

Paris, France

September 4, 2026

BY ELECTRONIC MAIL

Ms. Vanessa A. Countryman

Secretary

Securities and Exchange Commission

100 F Street, NE

Washington, DC 20549-1090

Re: Petition for Rulemaking Pursuant to Rule 192(a) of the Commission’s Rules of Practice,

17 C.F.R. § 201.192(a) — Request that the Commission Amend NYSE Arca Rule 7.35-E

(Auctions) Pursuant to Section 19(c) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to Restore and

Supplement the Auction Imbalance Information Disseminated by NYSE Arca, Inc.

Reference: File No. SR-NYSEARCA-2025-67, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-103886

(September 5, 2025), 90 FR 43676 (September 10, 2025)

Dear Ms. Countryman:

Pursuant to Rule 192(a) of the Commission’s Rules of Practice, 17 C.F.R. § 201.192(a), Abers

Capital (“Petitioner,” “we,” or “us”) respectfully petitions the Securities and Exchange Commission

(the “Commission”) to exercise its authority under Section 19(c) of the Securities Exchange Act of

1934 (the “Exchange Act”), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c), to amend Rule 7.35-E (Auctions) of NYSE Arca,

Inc. (“NYSE Arca” or the “Exchange”).

As Rule 192(a) requires, this petition sets forth (i) the text of the amendments requested (Part

VI), (ii) the nature of Petitioner’s interest (Part II), and (iii) Petitioner’s reasons for seeking the

amendments (Parts III through V).

I. Introduction and Summary of the Relief Requested

Through SR-NYSEARCA-2025-67, an immediately effective filing under Section 19(b)(3)(A)(iii)

of the Exchange Act and Rule 19b-4(f)(6) thereunder, NYSE Arca changed the basis on which

it calculates the Auction Imbalance Information it disseminates. Imbalance and volume figures

previously calculated at the Indicative Match Price — the price at which the auction would actually

occur — are now calculated at the Auction Reference Price, a price that is by design external

to the auction book and, for the Early Open Auction, a full trading day stale. In the same filing,

the Exchange deleted the provision under which, when the auction book contained a BBO but no

Matched Volume, the disseminated Indicative Match Price was the price of the side of the BBO

with the greater volume, and replaced it with a rule setting the disseminated Indicative Match Price

to zero.

Petitioner does not ask the Commission to reopen SR-NYSEARCA-2025-67, to disturb the Auction

Reference Price framework the Exchange adopted, or to take any position on the merits of that

framework. The Exchange’s Auction Reference Price–based fields may remain exactly as they are.

1

Petitioner asks only that the Commission restore, and require the Exchange to disseminate alongside

those fields, the small set of Indicative Match Price–based data that made the Auction Imbalance

Information a usable description of the auction book. Specifically, Petitioner requests that the

Commission amend NYSE Arca Rule 7.35-E as follows:

Request 1 — The disseminated Indicative Match Price will no longer be set to

zero merely because there is no Matched Volume. The words added to Rule 7.35E(a)(8)(D) by SR-NYSEARCA-2025-67 — providing that, if there is no Matched

Volume, the Indicative Match Price for the Auction Imbalance Information will be set

to zero — would be deleted. Rule 7.35-E(a)(8)(E), which provides that the Indicative

Match Price for the Auction Imbalance Information will be zero where there is no

Matched Volume and Market Orders on only one side of the market, would remain in

effect unchanged.1

Request 2 — The Auction Imbalance Information will disseminate the Imbalance

as an additional parameter. Rule 7.35-E(a)(4) would be amended to include the

Imbalance among the elements of the Auction Imbalance Information. Because Rule

7.35-E(a)(7) already defines Imbalance by reference to the Indicative Match Price, no

change to that definition is required: where there is Matched Volume, the disseminated

Imbalance would be calculated at the Indicative Match Price. Rule 7.35-E(a)(8)(D)

would be amended to provide that, if there is a BBO but no Matched Volume, the

Indicative Match Price and the Imbalance for the Auction Imbalance Information will

be (i) the side of the BBO that has the higher volume or (ii) if the volume of the BB

equals the volume of the BO, the BB.2

Request 3 — The Auction Imbalance Information will disseminate the Auction

Volume as an additional parameter. A new Rule 7.35-E(a)(9)(A) would define

“Auction Volume” as the number of buy and sell shares that can be matched at the

Indicative Match Price at any given time, and would provide that the Auction Volume

is disseminated as part of the Auction Imbalance Information. Rule 7.35-E(a)(4) would

be amended accordingly.

These are additive amendments. They enrich one field the Exchange already disseminates and add

two more, all computed from values it already produces. They do not alter the price at which any

auction is conducted; they do not alter the Auction Reference Price or any figure calculated from it;

they do not alter the validation of LOC, MOC, LOO or MOO Orders under Rules 7.35-E(d)(2)(A)

and 7.35-E(e)(8)(A), which would continue to reference the Total Imbalance; and they do not alter

the Trading Halt Auction extension logic under Rule 7.35-E(e)(6)(B). Every value the amendments

would require the Exchange to publish is a value the Exchange already computes or holds. What

1 Rule 7.35-E(a)(8)(E) cannot operate in the Early Open Auction. It applies only where there are Market Orders on

one side of the market, and only Limit Orders are eligible to participate in the Early Open Auction. See Rule 7.35-E(b).

A disseminated Indicative Match Price of zero in that auction can therefore arise only under Rule 7.35-E(a)(8)(D).

2“BBO” means the best bid or offer on the NYSE Arca Marketplace; “BB” means the best bid and “BO” the best

offer. See Rule 1.1. Interest resting on only one side of the auction book therefore constitutes a BBO for purposes of

Rule 7.35-E(a)(8)(D), and the requested amendment would supply both an Indicative Match Price and an Imbalance in

that case.

2

changed in SR-NYSEARCA-2025-67 is not what the Exchange calculates, but what it tells the

public.

The text of the requested amendments is set out in Part VI, in redline against the rule text currently

in effect. The Appendix sets out, for each provision this petition would amend and each it would

leave untouched, the text before SR-NYSEARCA-2025-67, the text now in effect, and the text as

this petition would leave it.

II. Nature of Petitioner’s Interest (Rule 192(a))

Petitioner is a family investment office specializing in arbitrage. By arbitrage we mean locking in

a profit by entering simultaneously into transactions in two or more markets. NYSE Arca’s Early

Open Auction and Core Open Auction — both of which rely on the Auction Imbalance Information

definitions amended by SR-NYSEARCA-2025-67 — are among the venues in which we have

historically participated.

We are, and were at all relevant times, a paying subscriber to NYSE Arca auction data, which we

receive through our broker.

We did not initially know the cause of the problem described in this petition. On November

14, 2025, some time after the operative date of SR-NYSEARCA-2025-67, we submitted our

first support ticket to our broker regarding missing or inaccurate data in NYSE Arca’s auctions,

beginning with the Early Open Auction. Having received no satisfactory response over the following

months, we submitted a formal letter of complaint to the broker on June 11, 2026. Through the

broker’s compliance department we ultimately learned that the source of the problem was not the

broker’s systems but NYSE Arca’s amendment of Rule 7.35-E under SR-NYSEARCA-2025-67.

That sequence is itself informative: we needed approximately nine months and the intervention

of a broker’s compliance department to discover that the auction data we were receiving had been

redefined into uselessness.

Our injury is concrete and twofold.

First, we continue to pay NYSE Arca’s monthly auction data fees for information that, since

SR-NYSEARCA-2025-67 became operative, no longer provides an accurate or reliable summary of

the auction process. We are paying the same price for a materially degraded product.

Second, and more significantly, we have been unable to participate fully in NYSE Arca’s auctions

and have lost specific arbitrage opportunities that depended on the information the Exchange

formerly disseminated. Where the auction book contains a BBO but no Matched Volume — a

condition that is common in the Early Open Auction and in less liquid securities, and that is

precisely the condition in which a participant’s added liquidity is most valuable — we now receive

an Indicative Match Price of zero (see Figure 1) and imbalance and volume fields that are blank or

computed at a price unrelated to the resting interest. We are told nothing that would allow us to

price an order into that auction.

Petitioner’s interest is therefore that of a directly and continuously affected market participant and

paying data subscriber.

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III. Background

A. The framework before SR-NYSEARCA-2025-67

Immediately before SR-NYSEARCA-2025-67, and in materially identical terms in the Exchange’s

2017 integrated rulebook, the provisions of NYSE Arca Rule 7.35-E on which this petition turns

read as follows.3 Under that framework:

• “Imbalance” (Rule 7.35-E(a)(7)) meant the number of buy (sell) shares that could not

be matched with sell (buy) shares at the Indicative Match Price at any given time and

unless otherwise specified, included the non-displayed quantity of Reserve Orders eligible to

participate in the applicable auction.

• “Total Imbalance” (Rule 7.35-E(a)(7)(A)) meant the net Imbalance of all buy (sell) shares

at the Indicative Match Price for all orders eligible to trade in the applicable auction. The

two terms were, as the Exchange itself has acknowledged, essentially synonymous.

• “Matched Volume” (Rule 7.35-E(a)(9)) meant the number of buy and sell shares that could

be matched at the Indicative Match Price at any given time.

• Rule 7.35-E(a)(8)(D) provided that if there was a BBO, but no Matched Volume, the Indicative

Match Price and Total Imbalance for the Auction Imbalance Information would be (i) the side

of the BBO that had the higher volume, or (ii) if the volume of the BB equaled the volume of

the BO, the BB.

• Rule 7.35-E(a)(8)(E) provided that if there was no Matched Volume and Market Orders on

only one side of the market, the Indicative Match Price for the Auction Imbalance Information

would be zero.

The organizing principle was coherent and, we submit, correct. Every disseminated imbalance and

volume figure was anchored, expressly or in substance, to the Indicative Match Price — the price at

which, on the current book, the auction would actually take place. The Indicative Match Price, the

Matched Volume and the Total Imbalance together constituted an accurate and reliable summary

of the auction book: the price, the depth at that price, and the residual interest that could not be

filled at that price. And in the one case where there was no such price because nothing crossed,

subparagraph (D) supplied the next most useful thing: the best resting price on the deeper side, so

that a participant could see where interest actually was and respond to it.

B. SR-NYSEARCA-2025-67

On August 27, 2025, NYSE Arca filed SR-NYSEARCA-2025-67, which the Commission noticed

on September 5, 2025.4 The filing was made under Section 19(b)(3)(A)(iii) of the Exchange Act and

Rule 19b-4(f)(6) thereunder, on the representation that it does not significantly affect the protection

3The

text set out in this Part is the text in effect immediately before SR-NYSEARCA-2025-67, as established by the bracketed deletions in the rule text the Exchange filed as Exhibit 5 to that filing, available at https://www.sec.gov/files/rules/sro/nysearca/2025/34-103886-ex5.pdf. The same provisions appear in

materially identical terms in the Exchange’s 2017 integrated rulebook. See Exhibit 5B to SR-NYSEArca2017-40, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-80929 (June 14, 2017), 82 FR 28157, available at

https://www.sec.gov/files/rules/sro/nysearca/2017/34-80929-ex5b.pdf.

4 Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-103886 (Sept. 5, 2025), 90 FR 43676 (Sept. 10, 2025) (SR-NYSEARCA2025-67).

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of investors or the public interest and imposes no significant burden on competition. It was effective

on filing and operative thirty days later; the Exchange stated it would implement the change no

later than the fourth quarter of 2025 and announce the implementation date by Trader Update.

The filing states that it makes the same changes as its affiliate NYSE American, LLC made in

SR-NYSEAMER-2025-52, and that each of the amendments is “based on” the corresponding NYSE

American rule “without any changes.” No written comments were solicited or received.

The filing made four changes relevant here:

1. Total Imbalance (Rule 7.35-E(a)(7)(A)) was redefined, for purposes of the Auction Imbalance

Information, as the net Imbalance calculated at the Auction Reference Price. The Exchange

expressly noted that this “would distinguish the Total Imbalance from the Imbalance,” and

that “Imbalance would continue to be calculated at the Indicative Match Price.”

2. Market Imbalance (Rule 7.35-E(a)(7)(B)) was likewise redefined at the Auction Reference

Price for dissemination purposes, while continuing to be calculated at the Indicative Match

Price for auction extension logic.

3. Matched Volume (Rule 7.35-E(a)(9)) was likewise bifurcated: at the Indicative Match Price

for auction processing, at the Auction Reference Price for the Auction Imbalance Information.

4. Rule 7.35-E(a)(8)(D) was rewritten. The subparagraph now reads in its entirety: If there is

no Matched Volume, the Indicative Match Price for the Auction Imbalance Information will

be set to zero.

At the time of SR-NYSEARCA-2025-67, Rule 7.35-E(a)(8)(A) defined the Auction Reference

Price, per auction type, as follows:

Auction

Auction Reference Price

Early Open Auction

Core Open Auction

Prior trading day’s Official Closing Price

The midpoint of the Auction NBBO or, if the

Auction NBBO is locked, the locked price. If

there is no Auction NBBO, the prior trading

day’s Official Closing Price

Last consolidated round-lot price of that trading

day and, if none, the prior trading day’s Official

Closing Price

Last consolidated round-lot price of that trading

day and, if none, the prior trading day’s Official

Closing Price (except as provided for in Rule

7.35-E(e)(7)(A))

Zero, unless the Exchange is provided with a

price for the security

Closing Auction

Trading Halt Auction

IPO Auction

The Exchange has since further amended the calculation of the Auction Reference Price.5 As

currently in effect, Rule 7.35-E(a)(8)(A) provides:

5 See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-104852 (Feb. 17, 2026) (SR-NYSEARCA-2026-15).

5

Auction

Auction Reference Price*

Early Open Auction

Core Open Auction

Prior trading day’s Official Closing Price.

• The price of the last consolidated trade of at

least one round lot of that trading day; or

• if there were no such trades, the midpoint of

the Auction NBBO; or

• if the Auction NBBO is locked, the locked

price; or

• if there is no Auction NBBO, for the initial

calculation, the prior trading day’s Official

Closing Price; for each subsequent calculation,

the most recent Auction Reference Price.**

The price of the last consolidated trade of at

least one round lot of that trading day and, if

none, the prior trading day’s Official Closing

Price.

The price of the last consolidated trade of at

least one round lot of that trading day and, if

none, the prior trading day’s Official Closing

Price (except as provided for in Rule

7.35-E(e)(7)(A)).

Zero, unless the Exchange is provided with a

price for the security.

Closing Auction

Trading Halt Auction

IPO Auction

* Auction Reference Price calculations for the Core Open Auction, Closing Auction, and Trading

Halt Auction exclude trades on Trade Reporting Facilities during the Early Trading Session or Late

Trading Session.

** Auction Reference Price calculations are based on an evaluation of the period since the last

calculation of the Auction Reference Price.

Those amendments adjust only how the Auction Reference Price is derived; they do not address,

and do not remedy, the problem described in this petition.

C. The effect in practice

The Exchange’s filing states: “The Exchange does not propose any change to its use of the Indicative

Match Price as the price at which auctions would take place.” That statement is accurate as to

auction execution. It is, we respectfully submit, misleading as to practical effect — because what a

participant sees is now systematically decoupled from what the auction does.

Three consequences follow.

First, the disseminated Indicative Match Price is now zero in exactly the circumstance where

price information is most needed. Before the amendment, when limit bids were below limit offers,

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or when limit orders rested on only one side of the book, a participant saw the price of the deeper

side of the BBO and could respond to it — improving a bid, meeting an offer, or supplying the

contra interest that would create a crossing book. Now that participant sees zero. It conveys no

information about where interest rests, in what size, or on which side. A participant cannot easily

improve a bid it cannot see.

Second, the disseminated Total Imbalance and Matched Volume no longer describe the auction

book. They describe a hypothetical book measured at a price that is, by construction, exogenous to

the auction. For the Early Open Auction, that price is the prior trading day’s Official Closing Price

— a price that may be hours or days stale and that may bear no relation to the interest actually resting

in the auction. For the Core Open Auction, the consequence is stranger still: the disseminated Total

Imbalance can change from one second to the next because the Auction Reference Price moved,

even though neither the buy side nor the sell side of the auction book has changed at all. A data

field that moves when the underlying thing it purports to measure has not moved is not enhanced

information; it is noise presented as signal.

Third, the accurate figures still exist — they are simply no longer published. This is the crux of

the matter, and it is undisputed on the face of the Exchange’s own filing. The Exchange states that

Imbalance “would continue to be calculated at the Indicative Match Price”; that it “will continue

to use the Indicative Match Price in calculating Market Imbalance for purposes such as auction

extension logic”; and that Matched Volume “will continue to be based on the Indicative Match

Price” for purposes of auction processing. Indeed, the operative rule text preserves the Indicative

Match Price calculations expressly, carving out the Auction Imbalance Information by proviso

in the case of Market Imbalance and Matched Volume, and omitting the Imbalance from the list

of disseminated fields altogether. The Exchange therefore already holds, in the ordinary course

and at least once per second, every value this petition asks it to publish. The change effected by

SR-NYSEARCA-2025-67 was, in substance, a decision to stop disclosing information the Exchange

continues to possess.

A concrete illustration makes the point. Consider an Early Open Auction in a security whose

prior trading day’s Official Closing Price — and therefore whose Auction Reference Price — is

$10.10. The auction book contains a bid for 100 shares at $10.00 and an offer of 20,000 shares at

$10.18. Nothing crosses, so there is no Matched Volume. Nor is either order eligible at the Auction

Reference Price: a $10.00 bid will not pay $10.10, and a $10.18 offer will not accept it.

Parameter

Indicative Match Price

Total Imbalance

Matched Volume

Imbalance

Auction Volume

Before

SR-NYSEARCA2025-67

Currently

in effect

Under

this petition

$10.18

20,000 (sell)

0

not disseminated

not disseminated

not disseminated

not disseminated

$10.18

unchanged

unchanged

20,000 (sell)

An empty cell indicates a field that carries no value on the participant’s display.

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Today, a participant observing this auction receives an Indicative Match Price of zero and blank

Total Imbalance and Matched Volume fields. It cannot tell whether the book is empty, whether

there is a large seller at $10.18, or whether there is a large buyer at $10.00. It has no basis on

which to price an order. Under the requested amendments, the same participant would see that there

is a 20,000-share seller at $10.18 and could enter a buy order accordingly — which is precisely

the behavior the Exchange said, in describing the former rule, that it wanted to encourage: “The

Exchange publishes the Indicative Match Price in this manner to continue to attract interest to

participate in the auction.”

Nothing in the Exchange’s filing explains why that objective ceased to be worth pursuing.

This is not hypothetical. Figure 1 reproduces the Auction Imbalance Information disseminated for

WDTE, an NYSE Arca–listed security, at 03:42:38 Eastern Time on July 6, 2026, shortly before that

day’s Early Open Auction. The auction book contained sell interest only, at prices at or below the

Auction Reference Price of $29.84. The Bid and Ask columns in the capture show the consolidated

quote. The Exchange disseminated an Indicative Match Price of 0.00, a blank Matched Volume

field, and a Total Imbalance of 3. Under the requested amendments the same auction would have

shown the price of the best resting offer and an Imbalance of 3 or lower on the sell side — a price

and a size a participant could act on.

F IGURE 1. AUCTION I MBALANCE I NFORMATION DISSEMINATED BY NYSE A RCA FOR WDTE,

E ARLY O PEN AUCTION , J ULY 6, 2026, 03:42:38 E ASTERN T IME .

Upper: the full row as displayed, with column headers. Lower: detail of the Volume,

Auc. Price, Auc. Volume and Imbalance columns of the same row.

IV. Reasons for the Requested Amendments (Rule 192(a))

A. The requested amendments would restore information that is material to auction participation and price discovery

An auction is a mechanism for aggregating dispersed interest into a single clearing price. It works

to the extent that participants can see enough of the book to decide whether and at what price to add

interest to it. The three parameters this petition would restore are the minimum sufficient description

of an auction book: the price at which it would clear (Indicative Match Price), the quantity that

would trade there (Auction Volume), and the quantity that would not (Imbalance). Taken together,

they tell a participant where the auction is, how deep it is, and what is left over. Each is meaningless

without the other two, and all three are meaningless when measured at a price at which the auction

will not occur.

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The Exchange’s stated rationale for the zeroing rule — that it “is logical because, if there is no

Matched Volume, an auction would not take place” — proves too much. Whether an auction would

take place on the current book is not the question a participant is asking. The participant is asking

whether it should cause one to take place by adding interest. That is the entire economic function

of pre-auction transparency, and the Exchange’s own prior rule was drafted to serve it. A rule that

withholds price information precisely when the book has not yet crossed is a rule that suppresses

the incremental order most likely to improve the auction.

B. The requested amendments are consistent with Section 6(b)(5) of the Exchange Act

Section 6(b)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(5), requires that the rules of an exchange be designed to remove

impediments to and perfect the mechanism of a free and open market and a national market system,

and to protect investors and the public interest. Publishing an Indicative Match Price of zero when a

real, actionable price exists in the auction book is an impediment to that mechanism, not a perfection

of it. The Exchange characterized the zeroing rule as promoting “transparency.” With respect,

replacing a true and useful price with a fixed constant is the opposite of transparency: it substitutes

a value that is knowably wrong as a description of the book for one that was right.

We note that the Exchange defended the amendment in part on the ground that “because the Total

Imbalance, Market Imbalance, and Matched Volume would, as proposed, be calculated based on

the Auction Reference Price instead of the Indicative Match Price for purposes of the Auction

Imbalance Information, the Exchange would continue to disseminate price information that could

encourage participation in the auction.” That reasoning does not survive the illustration in Part III.C.

The Auction Reference Price–based figures do not encourage participation in the auction, because

they are not about the auction. In the example above, they are blank at the same moment that the

book contains a 20,000-share seller at a real price.

C. The requested amendments are consistent with Section 11A of the Exchange Act, and with

the Commission’s own assessment of auction information

Section 11A(a)(1)(C)(iii), 15 U.S.C. § 78k-1(a)(1)(C)(iii), states that it is in the public interest and

appropriate for the protection of investors to assure the availability to brokers, dealers, and investors

of information with respect to quotations for and transactions in securities. Auction imbalance

information is precisely such information, and the Commission has said so. In adopting the market

data infrastructure rules, the Commission added auction information to the definition of core data,

explaining:

Auctions have become increasingly significant liquidity events. Information about the

orders participating in an auction can help market participants decide whether and how

to submit orders in and around an auction and understand the potential price moves

upon completion of the auction.6

That passage is a precise description of the use Petitioner made of the Auction Imbalance Information

before SR-NYSEARCA-2025-67, and of what the amendment took away. Information about “the

6 Market Data Infrastructure, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-90610 (Dec. 9, 2020), 86 FR 18596 (Apr. 9,

2021), at 27 (adopting the definition of “auction information” as an element of core data).

9

orders participating in an auction” is exactly what the Indicative Match Price, the Imbalance and the

Auction Volume convey, and exactly what figures computed at a price external to the auction do not.

The requested amendments would restore the Commission’s stated rationale to the data NYSE Arca

disseminates, at no cost to any other statutory objective.

D. The amendment did impose a burden on competition, and the requested amendments

would relieve it

The Exchange’s statement on burden on competition reads, in its entirety:

The Exchange does not believe that the proposed rule change will impose any burden

on competition that is not necessary or appropriate in furtherance of the purposes of the

Act. As noted above, the Exchange believes that the proposed change could instead

encourage competition by improving the quality of auction imbalance information

disseminated by the Exchange.

We are living evidence to the contrary. The degradation of the disseminated information has placed

us — an active auction participant whose strategies depend on that information — at a competitive

disadvantage relative to participants who do not depend on it, including those with the resources

to reconstruct the auction book from other sources or to absorb the cost of participating blind. A

market participant that can no longer compete on an equal footing is a decrease in competition,

not evidence of the improvement the Exchange claims. The predictable results — fewer orders

entering auctions in which the book has not yet crossed, thinner auction liquidity, and degraded

price discovery — are consequences the Commission is directed to weigh under Sections 3(f) and

23(a)(2) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(f) and 78w(a)(2).

We observe that the burden-on-competition analysis in SR-NYSEARCA-2025-67 consists of

two sentences, that the filing was made under a provision reserved for rule changes that do not

significantly affect the protection of investors or the public interest, that no comments were solicited

or received, and that the entire substantive justification for the zeroing of the Indicative Match Price

is the single observation that an auction would not take place if there were no Matched Volume. The

competitive effects described above were never analyzed, because the filing’s procedural posture

never required them to be.

E. The requested amendments impose minimal burden on the Exchange

The Imbalance and the Auction Volume are values the Exchange already computes for its own

auction processing, and the Indicative Match Price required by Request 1 is derived from the

Exchange’s own BBO. The requested amendments therefore require no new calculation logic —

only the inclusion of existing internal values in an existing proprietary data feed that already carries

the ten fields listed in Rule 7.35-E(a)(4) and is already updated at least once per second. The

Exchange would incur an implementation and message-size cost, which we do not minimize, but it

is a cost of publication, not of computation. Set against the restoration of a market participant’s

ability to participate in the Exchange’s auctions at all, that cost is plainly “necessary or appropriate

in furtherance of the purposes” of the Exchange Act.

10

We further note that the requested amendments are strictly additive. No existing field is removed,

renamed, or recalculated. Any participant, vendor, or system that has adapted to the Auction

Reference Price–based fields may continue to consume them unchanged. The Commission need

take no position whatsoever on whether the Auction Reference Price is a superior or inferior basis

for imbalance calculation; this petition is agnostic on that question by design.

V. The Commission’s Authority, and Why Section 19(c) Is the Appropriate

Vehicle

Section 19(c) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c), authorizes the Commission, by rule adopted

in accordance with the notice-and-comment procedures of 5 U.S.C. § 553, to abrogate, add to,

and delete from the rules of a self-regulatory organization as the Commission deems necessary

or appropriate to insure the fair administration of the self-regulatory organization, to conform its

rules to the requirements of the Exchange Act, or otherwise in furtherance of the purposes of

the Exchange Act. The requested amendments fall within the third of these grounds: they would

further the purposes of Sections 6(b)(5) and 11A by improving the accuracy and utility of auction

information disseminated to all market participants.

We recognize that Section 19(c) is an extraordinary authority and that the Commission ordinarily

and properly leaves the content of exchange rules to the exchanges in the first instance. We ask the

Commission to use it here because the ordinary alternatives are foreclosed or futile:

The SR-NYSEARCA-2025-67 proceeding is closed. The filing was immediately effective under

Section 19(b)(3)(A)(iii). Its comment period closed on October 1, 2025. The Commission’s sixtyday window to summarily suspend the rule change under Section 19(b)(3)(C) has long since passed.

We are not asking the Commission to reopen that proceeding, and we recognize that it cannot.

A comment letter has no vehicle. There is no pending filing on which to comment. The Exchange’s

subsequent filings concerning the Auction Reference Price do not touch the provisions at issue.

A request to the Exchange would not be productive. The Exchange has implemented the change,

has represented to the Commission that it imposes no burden on competition, has aligned its rules

with those of an affiliated exchange, and has no apparent incentive to reverse or supplement that

position voluntarily at the request of a single market participant.

The problem is not self-correcting. Nearly a year after the operative date, the Auction Imbalance

Information continues to publish an Indicative Match Price of zero in the circumstance where a

real price exists, and the Exchange continues to charge for the feed. The Exchange has amended

Rule 7.35-E more than once since SR-NYSEARCA-2025-67, and none of those amendments has

restored the disseminated Indicative Match Price or added the fields requested here.7

In these circumstances, Section 19(c) rulemaking is the only mechanism that can reach the defect.

And the relief requested is narrow enough that the Commission may grant it without adjudicating any

7 See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-104852 (Feb. 17, 2026) (SR-NYSEARCA-2026-15) (Auction

Reference Price calculation); Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-105670 (June 11, 2026) (SR-NYSEARCA-202660) (election by an exchange-traded product eligible for an IPO Auction to commence trading in the Early Trading

Session). Neither amends Rule 7.35-E(a)(4), (a)(7), (a)(8)(D) or (a)(9).

11

contested question of market structure: the Commission would be requiring enriched information

in one existing field and adding two data fields to a data feed, all of them computed from values

the Exchange already maintains, and leaving every other aspect of the Exchange’s auction rules —

including the entirety of the framework adopted in SR-NYSEARCA-2025-67 — intact.

VI. Text of the Requested Amendments (Rule 192(a))

Petitioner requests that the Commission, pursuant to Section 19(c) of the Exchange Act, amend

NYSE Arca Rule 7.35-E as follows. Additions are underlined; deletions are [bracketed]. The

rule text against which these amendments are shown is the text currently in effect following

SR-NYSEARCA-2025-67.8

1. Rule 7.35-E(a)(4) — Auction Imbalance Information

(4) “Auction Imbalance Information” means the information that is disseminated by

the Exchange for an auction and includes, if applicable, the Total Imbalance,

Imbalance, Market Imbalance, Indicative Match Price, Matched Volume, Auction

Volume, Auction Reference Price, Auction Collar, Book Clearing Price, Far

Clearing Price, Imbalance Freeze Indicator, and Auction Indicator.

2. Rule 7.35-E(a)(7) — Imbalance

(7) “Imbalance” means the number of buy (sell) shares that cannot be matched with

sell (buy) shares at the Indicative Match Price at any given time and unless

otherwise specified, includes the non-displayed quantity of Reserve Orders eligible

to participate in the applicable auction. The Imbalance is disseminated as part of

the Auction Imbalance Information.

3. Rule 7.35-E(a)(8)(D) — Indicative Match Price where there is no Matched Volume

(D) If there is a BBO, but no Matched Volume, the Indicative Match Price and

Imbalance for the Auction Imbalance Information will be [set to zero]:

(i) The side of the BBO that has the higher volume; or

(ii) If the volume of the BB equals the volume of the BO, the BB.

This amendment reverses, word for word, the edit made to Rule 7.35-E(a)(8)(D) by SR-NYSEARCA2025-67, except that it substitutes the defined term “Imbalance” for “Total Imbalance” to account

for the redefinition of the latter effected by the same filing. No change is requested to Rule 7.35E(a)(8)(E), which continues to provide that, if there is no Matched Volume and Market Orders on

only one side of the market, the Indicative Match Price for the Auction Imbalance Information

will be zero, or to Rule 7.35-E(a)(8)(F), relating to rounding of the Indicative Match Price to the

minimum price variation (MPV).

4. Rule 7.35-E(a)(9) — Matched Volume; new definition of Auction Volume

8The operative text of Rule 7.35-E(a)(7), (a)(7)(A), (a)(7)(B), (a)(8)(D) and (a)(9) is reproduced from Exhibit 5 to

SR-NYSEARCA-2025-67, supra note 3. Rule 7.35-E(a)(4) was not amended by SR-NYSEARCA-2025-67; its text is

reproduced as set forth in the Commission’s notice of that filing.

12

(9) “Matched Volume” means the number of buy and sell shares that can be matched

at the Indicative Match Price at any given time, provided that, for purposes of

Auction Imbalance Information, Matched Volume means the number of buy and

sell shares that can be matched at the Auction Reference Price at any given time.

(A) “Auction Volume” means the number of buy and sell shares that can

be matched at the Indicative Match Price at any given time. The Auction

Volume is disseminated as part of the Auction Imbalance Information.

Provisions expressly not affected

For the avoidance of doubt, Petitioner does not request any change to, and the amendments above

are not intended to affect:

• the definition of Auction Reference Price in Rule 7.35-E(a)(8)(A), as amended by SRNYSEARCA-2026-15;

• the definition of Total Imbalance in Rule 7.35-E(a)(7)(A) or of Market Imbalance in Rule

7.35-E(a)(7)(B), each as amended by SR-NYSEARCA-2025-67;

• the definition of Matched Volume in Rule 7.35-E(a)(9) for purposes of the Auction Imbalance

Information;

• Rule 7.35-E(a)(8)(E) or Rule 7.35-E(a)(8)(F);

• the price at which any auction is conducted, or any aspect of auction processing under Rule

7.35-E(b) through (h);

• the validation of LOC and MOC Orders under Rule 7.35-E(d)(2)(A) or of LOO and MOO

Orders under Rule 7.35-E(e)(8)(A), each of which would continue to reference the Total

Imbalance; or

• the Trading Halt Auction extension logic under Rule 7.35-E(e)(6)(B).

VII. Related Considerations

Nomenclature. Petitioner proposes the term “Auction Volume” for the volume matchable at the

Indicative Match Price because “Matched Volume” is no longer available for that purpose. Petitioner

has no attachment to the label and would have no objection to any alternative the Commission or the

Exchange prefers, provided the underlying value — the volume matchable at the Indicative Match

Price — is disseminated.

Conforming text. Petitioner requests that any amendments the Commission adopts be conformed

to Rule 7.35-E as then in effect.

Implementation. Petitioner does not request any particular implementation deadline and would

defer to the Commission and the Exchange on a reasonable period for technical implementation and

for notice to vendors and subscribers.

VIII. Conclusion

Before SR-NYSEARCA-2025-67, NYSE Arca told the market where its auctions would clear, how

much would trade there, and what would be left over — and, when nothing yet crossed, where the

13

deepest resting interest was. Today it publishes, in that last and most important case, a price of zero

and imbalance and volume fields that are either blank or measured at a price the auction will not

use. The values that would answer a participant’s actual questions are still computed or held inside

the Exchange every second; they are simply no longer disclosed.

Petitioner respectfully requests that the Commission institute rulemaking under Section 19(c) of

the Exchange Act to adopt the amendments set forth in Part VI, so that the Auction Imbalance

Information disseminated by NYSE Arca once again describes the auction to which it relates.

We are available to provide the Commission or its staff with further detail. We thank the Commission

for its consideration of this matter.

Respectfully submitted,

Guy Pointel

Chairman of Abers Capital

Paris, France

Appendix — Comparison of Rule Text

Provision

(a)(4) Auction

Imbalance

Information

(a)(7) Imbalance

(a)(7)(A) Total

Imbalance

Before

SR-NYSEARCA2025-67

Total Imbalance,

Market Imbalance,

Indicative Match Price,

Matched Volume,

Auction Reference

Price, Auction Collar,

Book Clearing Price,

Far Clearing Price,

Imbalance Freeze

Indicator, Auction

Indicator

Unmatched shares at

the Indicative Match

Price; disseminated as

the Total Imbalance

Net Imbalance at the

Indicative Match

Price

14

Currently

in effect

Under

this petition

Unchanged by

SR-NYSEARCA2025-67

Same, plus

Imbalance and

Auction Volume

Unchanged (at the

Indicative Match

Price), but not

disseminated

Net Imbalance

calculated at the

Auction Reference

Price

Unchanged in

substance; expressly

disseminated

No change requested

Provision

Before

SR-NYSEARCA2025-67

(a)(7)(B) Market

Imbalance

Unmatched Market

Orders

(a)(8)(D) No Matched

Volume

(a)(8)(E) One-sided

Market Orders

(a)(8)(F) MPV

rounding

(a)(9) Matched

Volume

(a)(9)(A) Auction

Volume

Currently

in effect

Under

this petition

At the Indicative

No change requested

Match Price, provided

that for Auction

Imbalance

Information, at the

Auction Reference

Price

If no Matched Volume: If BBO but no

If BBO but no

Matched Volume: IMP IMP = zero

Matched Volume:

and Total Imbalance =

IMP and Imbalance

deeper side of BBO; if

= deeper side of

equal, the BB

BBO; if equal, the

BB

IMP = zero

IMP = zero

No change requested

In effect

In effect

No change requested

Matchable shares at

the Indicative Match

Price

At the Indicative

Match Price, provided

that for Auction

Imbalance

Information, at the

Auction Reference

Price

(does not exist)

No change requested

(did not exist)

15

New: matchable

shares at the

Indicative Match

Price, disseminated