FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
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FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
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In the Matter of:
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WORKSHOP ON SECOND REQUEST AND
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MERGER INVESTIGATION BEST PRACTICES )
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JULY 10, 2002
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Room 332
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Federal Trade Commission
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600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
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Washington, D.C. 20580
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The above-entitled workshop came on for comments,
pursuant to notice, at 2:03 p.m.
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APPEARANCES:
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ON BEHALF OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION:
MARY T. COLEMAN, Deputy Director, Bureau of
Economics
MICHAEL G. COWIE, Assistant Director, Bureau of
Competition
GABRIEL H. DAGEN, Acting Assistant Director for
Accounting and Financial Analysis
ELIZABETH SCHNEIROV, Special Assistant to Director,
Bureau of Economics
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PANELISTS:
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MIKE DENGER, ESQUIRE, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher
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MEG GEURIN-CALVERT, Economists, Inc.
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RICHARD HIGGINS, LECG
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TIM DANIEL, NERA
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JOHN WOODBURY, Charles River
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DAVID PAINTER, LECG
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FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
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I N D E X
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WORKSHOP:
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Mike Denger
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Meg Geurin-Calvert
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Richard Higgins
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John Woodbury
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Tim Daniel
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David Painter
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P R O C E E D I N G S
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MS. COLEMAN:
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Good afternoon.
We're here for the
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final of the Second Request and Merger Investigation Best
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Practices Workshops and this one is involving data issues:
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accounting and financial economic data.
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I'm Mary Coleman, and I'm the Deputy Director of
Bureau of Economics.
With me is Elizabeth Schneirov who is Special
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Assistant to the Director, Bureau of Economics, Gabe Dagen,
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who is Acting Assistant Director for Accounting and Financial
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Analysis, Bureau of Economics, and Mike Cowie, who is
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Assistant Director, Bureau of Competition.
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The purpose of these workshops is to try to get
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feedback from the outside bar and consulting firms and
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practitioners on issues of the merger investigation process
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and how we can improve that process.
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And our role here is to listen and answer
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questions there are, to give any feedback to points raised by
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individuals.
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We have spoken to some people who were interested
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in speaking at this workshop, and I'll introduce them and let
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them give their discussion.
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This is being transcribed.
And we don't have a
microphone up front just to try to make this a little more
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informal, so we just ask that as people speak, that you
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identify yourself and who you work with and speak up so that
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the court reporter can hear what you're saying.
Okay, I'm just going to start by introducing
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folks.
I'll start out with Mike Denger.
He is at
Gibson,
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Dunn and Crutcher and he's worked in the antitrust field for
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many years, has done work on merger investigations over that
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time frame and he has prepared a proposed short PowerPoint
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presentation which, I think, is out in the -- as you walk in
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in the hallway.
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MR. DENGER:
Do you want me to come up there or --
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MS. COLEMAN:
No; you can just speak from your
MR. DENGER:
I always find it hard to speak with
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seat.
my back to the audience.
MS. COLEMAN:
You are welcome to -- whatever makes
you comfortable.
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MR. DENGER:
I haven't tried that.
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I always feel nervous when they ask a lawyer to
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come and talk about financial data and syndicated data and
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cost data.
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if they have me here on the data issues.
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I guess I probably don't do too well as a lawyer,
And what I want to talk about a little bit is what
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I think is the advantages in cooperation and data-sharing
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with the antitrust enforcement agencies during the merger
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review process.
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And I think from the standpoint of a party to a
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prospective merger, there are some advantages to working
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closely with the agency in this area.
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First of all, I think you can get a common frame
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of reference if you understand the data that they want and
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need and the format that they're looking at.
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I think it helps both the respondent understand
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the focus and concerns of financial analysts and economists
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and the staff at the agency and it helps for a more
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constructive dialogue where you do not have two trains
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passing in the night, so to speak, on data issues.
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It also allows the FTC, if they have the same data
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that you're working from, to replicate the type of work that
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your economists or financial analysts may do, and I think
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that is always helpful in establishing the credibility of
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counsel.
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I think if you work with the agency, you will also
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reduce the cost of compliance oftentimes limiting the
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production of duplicative or unnecessary information.
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For example, in a retail merger, if one party has
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IRI data and one has Nielsen data, if you can work together
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and sort of agree, get everybody that's concerned with we'll
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either use Nielsen or IRI, you're establishing a common
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framework from which you can have the dialogue.
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I also think it reduces the merger review time.
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It takes away a lot of time when it is focused on compliance
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issues and things that are not really the substantive issues
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and focuses of the staff.
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And I think ultimately what a party's counsel and
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probably his economist and financial analyst have to offer
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imparts their credibility and if you cut out the Mickey Mouse
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work and try to get to a common set of data that you can both
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work from, I think that helps.
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For example, let me focus first on producing
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syndicated data.
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data in the form used internally by the company, explaining
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what you can provide and what you can't provide, provide them
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some samples explaining the limitations.
It oftentimes results in the narrowing by the FTC
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I would advocate providing early samples of
staff of the information that they seek.
You know, I can probably say I've never met an
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economist or a financial analyst who didn't have data that he
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wouldn't like or she wouldn't like if they had their choice,
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but I think that the staff will be realistic if you can
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explain what they're going to waste their time on, as well as
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you wasting your time on in trying to find a meaningful data
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set.
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We had a case in a recent merger where we were
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allowed to directly communicate with the FTC analyst and
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economist to try to resolve the data problems sometimes
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without FTC lawyers on the phone, and that came as a result
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of, I think, the trust and credibility that both sides
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developed in each other.
I think if you work together, you can prioritize
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data requests.
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basis.
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I would advise providing it on a rolling
Sometimes if you give it on a rolling basis, give
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the early years first, or the most current year's first,
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oftentimes I think the FTC staff will say that's all they
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need.
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lot of information that you otherwise would have to do.
They don't really need you to go back and to upload a
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Similarly, in terms of financial data, we would --
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I think have found it very useful to provide exemplars right
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early on, oftentimes in the first meeting that you have with
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the staff of your sales data, how your cost data is
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formatted, how your data is organized, if you have customer P
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& L's that sort of thing, what their limitations are.
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And again, when you look at what data is
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reasonably available and obtainable, I think oftentimes you
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can narrow it to what is meaningful to everybody concerned.
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And also, it's not a one-way street.
I think by
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respondents learning what data the FTC is really focusing on
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and wants, you understand how they are approaching their
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analysis.
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So again, provide an early sample, sequence your
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production, arrange meetings between people who are
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knowledgeable in the company with the FTC staff that's
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actually seeking the data, the economists and the financial
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analysts, and by having people who actually know what they're
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talking about explain it, rather than always putting a lawyer
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in as an intermediary, I think we found that makes it a lot
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easier for everybody else concerned and oftentimes it leads
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to a narrowing of the search requests by the FTC staff.
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When you've agreed on what you're going to produce
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in some form, we often provide sample reports to make sure
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that everybody is agreed and understood on what each other
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wants before you go to all of the expense of running it for
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all of the years or all of the markets or all of the products
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in question.
And again, oftentimes that early cooperation can
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eliminate costs and eliminate burdens on the company, as
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well.
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I guess our philosophy is sort of this: The facts
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are the facts.
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are all speaking about the same kinds of data and the same
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facts.
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And it's easy to have a dialogue when people
It's important to have trust and credibility and I
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think that that can best be obtained by -- frankly on the
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substance, but not on all of these procedural issues.
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And don't always view the FTC staff as the enemy
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who is out to get you, which lawyers sometimes have a
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tendency to do.
The FTC employees just have a job and we expect
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them to do it thoroughly.
You also, I think if you cooperate
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with them, can avoid a lot of waste, unnecessary duplication,
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looking at data that is really not going to advance the
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analysis on either side.
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So I guess that's what I would say.
And I guess
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our philosophy in all of this has sort of been like the
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philosophy we have in litigation.
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And I will say I've tried a fair number of
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preliminary injunction merger cases over the years, but when
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you try to be hard-nosed and fight over every point, all you
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do is waste your client's money and annoy the agency.
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As every firefighter knows, blaring the siren can
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be fun, but the point of the job is to douse the flames.
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this case, the point of the job is to try to get the merger
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through in an economically viable form.
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fight over the substance all we want, but I think it really
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pays to try to work with the agency to get the data and the
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basic facts set out so then you can have a substantive
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dialogue.
Thank you.
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In
And we can
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MS. COLEMAN:
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Geurin-Calvert.
Thank you, Mike.
Next up is Meg
She's currently at Economists, Incorporated.
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She also worked at the antitrust division for a
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number of years and she is going to talk about issues related
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to transactional-level data.
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please.
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MS. GEURIN-CALVERT:
Meg, if you could come up,
Thanks, Mary.
I appreciate
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the opportunity to be here.
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and just cover some brief topics so there's lots of
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opportunity for discussion.
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And let me follow Mike's lead
The perspective I bring is, as Mary mentioned, I
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was at the antitrust division as an assistant chief and had
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been a total of ten years at the antitrust division and at
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the Federal Reserve Board with some time in between in the
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private sector as a consultant.
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And I think what I have learned best about the
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particular topic we're addressing today, which is data and
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both financial and accounting and transactional in assessing
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mergers, was when I went back to the division as an assistant
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chief working on my first second request where I understood
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better, having worked on a very large number of second
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requests on the receiving side, just what all the costs were
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that were associated with compliance and what all the effort
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was that it took to get the data together, but at the same
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time understanding the kinds of data that were available in
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firms somewhat better than I had when I had been in the
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division the first time.
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So I had more of a sense of what was out there,
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but at the same time came to a little bit more of a
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perspective of that don't ask for what you can't use.
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And so I guess I have six words to present to think on
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the topic of transactional data: testable hypotheses,
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critical loss and don't assume.
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And what I would like to put the perspective in is
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I think that there's a common goal between the private
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parties and the government agencies that are reviewing a
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given merger.
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The common goal is essentially to have a review
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process that hopefully ends in a significant review of the
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appropriate issues and from the party's perspective, a
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resolution of those issues and the mergers proceeding or from
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the government's perspective, to the extent there is a
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significant anti-competitive concern, having a strong
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litigation base built up such that you can go to court and
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demonstrate persuasively to a court that the merger actually
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does present a problem.
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To get there, I think it's the same process.
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need full integration from the beginning and up to the
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decision-making point of the data with the analysis, you need
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You
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consistency of the data analysis and the data work with the
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documentary review, the depositions, and so on, and you
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obviously need time limits.
And I think in any industry, essentially what that
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means is you need clear theories to be spelled out on both
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sides as early on very specifically as to what are the
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concerns, the product, geographic entry and competitive
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effects.
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I think everyone knows the merger guidelines and
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what needs to be laid out in-house very clearly in the
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government and the agency, particularly by the economists and
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lawyers working together as what is our theory of the case,
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what are the two or three things on which this particular
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case turns.
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That leads them to the next thing, again in-house,
which is what are the testable hypotheses.
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And that is why I agree with Mike completely that
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that's where the dialogue starts between the FTC staff and
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the outside parties as to, "Here are our hypotheses.
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are how we would like to test them.
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we're looking for," and then I think you can focus lastly on
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what are the results of the analyses.
Here
Here's the information
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You may differ on theories and have a dialogue;
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you may differ on the tests and have a dialogue; you may
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differ on the reliability or the meaning of the results and
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you can have a dialogue.
And let me briefly talk about three types of areas
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in which it plays out in different ways.
There are three
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kinds of transactional data that I think occur -- a context
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in which they occur.
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The first is what I would call industry-wide,
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where both parties, private parties and the FTC or the
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government agency have access to industry-wide databases.
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This occurs largely in healthcare, in airlines, in banking,
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in electricity.
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regulated has some pretty good data.
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Essentially anything that was or is
Everybody has transactional-level data down to the
zip code and the DRG, or whatever, with which to work.
And as a result, you can focus.
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The outside
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economists can start much earlier, can do a full-scale
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analysis.
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can proceed much more quickly to very specific kinds of
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analyses and discussions.
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They'll know what the issues are, and the dialogue
And so I think that is a case where everyone, more
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or less, has a level playing field, but where it's very, very
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critical that when the agency staff have particular concerns
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about a narrow product market or are particularly concerned
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about the standard by which one defines the geographic
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market, inclusion or exclusion of certain kinds of zip codes,
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that they articulate it so it can be discussed and tested.
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The second area Mike dealt with in terms of
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standard data, so I won't go into more other than to say that
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there I think the issue is much more so, not the availability
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of the data, but the methodologies that are applied or what
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the testable hypotheses are and the debate over the nature of
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the results.
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productive dialogues helps that.
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But I agree with Mike completely that having
I think the hard world is the third one which is,
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unfortunately, most of the transactions.
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kind deals; it's almost every manufacturing industry merger.
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It is the one of a
When you think about it, the private parties have
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extraordinary access to their own data.
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detailed set of every transaction, most likely, that they
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ever did, although it's surprising to some extent in the
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computerized world how little data certain companies have
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electronically and how much they have in hard copy, but where
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the agencies have the advantage of having third party
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discovery and third party data sets.
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They have a good and
And I think I'd give just some basic pointers to
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talk about.
I think that this is an area particularly where
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the advanced work that the consulting economists or the
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consulting legal team can do is to sit down and work with
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their clients and identify what are the likely dispositive
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issues, what are the testable hypotheses,
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issues, is it private or is it geographic market, to set up
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evaluation of critical loss as to how many consumers would
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have to leave to discipline pricing and then to work very
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well with the people inside of the company to identify what
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kind of data is available, who is knowledgeable about it and
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to get as far up the learning curve as possible about the
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data.
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I think that will help them ultimately when the
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staff at an agency wants data, that there is better
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communication in terms of what is available.
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I do think what is useful, though, having been an
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assistant chief and worked on a very large number of mergers,
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the approach I found I took after a couple circumstances of
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unfortunately having asked for data and received it and then
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found that we did not even have time to process it before the
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decision had to be reached, before a recommendation had to go
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out is I found what worked -- and this works on the outside,
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too -- is to sit everyone down before the second request goes
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out and ask two questions.
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One is what are our testable hypotheses; what is
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the key issue in this case.
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unlimited computer resources, unlimited time, what would you
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want to get to test those hypotheses;
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And if we had unlimited data,
And then to pose the second question, which is
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then, we have a budget and a time constraint.
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minimum sufficient data that you need to address that.
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What I found consistently is that when everyone
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focused together, oftentimes it was the case that people
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could look at just the top 50 customers, what they had done,
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who they had bought from, whether they had switched it or
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not.
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In a very large number of cases, one did not need
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huge transactional databases of every single transaction that
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anybody had ever done in the industry.
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The other thing I found is that it served also to
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meld the staff economists and the staff managers better with
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the legal team.
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Oftentimes there is a tendency in very complicated
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industries where there is huge transactional data for the
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economists to be doing a lot of empirical analysis that is
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running on a separate track from the data and the documentary
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-- the documentary and the evidentiary kinds of evidence.
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And I think if you focused earlier on testable
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hypotheses and minimum sufficient data, answers would be
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available.
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The last thing I say is one advantage that private
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consulting firms have that the government typically does not
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have is a lot of research assistants who are very skilled at
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manipulating huge amounts of data.
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And so to the extent, early on the FTC had to
identify testable hypotheses data and asked that it be done,
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to the extent it is doable, because more likely a lot of
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processing could get done with results being given.
In conclusion, I would just agree completely with
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Mike.
I think the process works best if there is a clear
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dialogue, and that's my last set of words of don't assume.
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I think there is a sense, because there is a very
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good respect on both sides of the table for people, that
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outside economists will understand or divine what the theory
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of concern is.
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I think the more that the staff early on can say
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here specifically is -- you know, we are worried about -- if
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I could fill in the blank -- price discrimination of this
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sort, geographic market of this scope, customer concerns of
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this type, the more it is that the outside economists can do
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their best effort to put information forward.
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If they are not able to address the concerns, I
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think that gives you a better sense of having a strong case
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for litigation.
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Then you'll know what it is that you would be up
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against in that litigation were it to occur or, more
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fortunately, could hopefully resolve the concerns.
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MS. COLEMAN:
Thank you, Mary.
Next up, I would
like to introduce Richard Higgins who is with LECG.
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He's going to talk about standard data -- and it's been
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discussed to some extent already, but he's going to discuss
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in more detail the issues that arise not only in the
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collection of standard data, but how it is used throughout
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the merger review process.
MR. HIGGINS:
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Well, actually, I was watching you
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very closely, because that's the first I heard of what I was
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to do.
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John.
I thought I was just going to wait and comment on
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MR. WOODBURY:
Oh, really.
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MR. HIGGINS:
So far I don't have anything to say
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about what was said before, except that I disagree with Mr.
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Denger about agreeing on IRI versus Nielsen.
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of disagreement.
I like the idea
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And I mean, there are a lot of parties to mergers
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and I just can't imagine getting them all in the same room
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and telling them what data set they should be using.
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And there are only two companies thanks to you all
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-- that is to say, there would have been one had it not been
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for you all.
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And I wanted to also ask a question.
Panel data
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is something that the Nielsen people and the IRI people have
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and I've never gotten to use it.
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all ever asked for those data.
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And I just wondered if you
I've not seen the second request, which was asked
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for, and I have found that the IRI and the Nielsen people are
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becoming a lot more jealous of what they ownand, in fact,
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the last couple of times I had to work with data, I had to
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sign something.
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time, but the agreement worked out.
It really wasn't onerous, but it took a long
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MR. COWIE:
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MR. HIGGINS:
Richard, what is panel data?
Well, Neilsen, for example, has
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surveyed or has a sample 40,000 households and it gives them
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a little machine that they can scan their own products.
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have their own scanner at home.
So
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They are asked -- and I guess they're paid
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something -- they are asked to scan all of their purchases.
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And the value of it is it's a different type of data; it's
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not just the time series stuff that we all have worked with.
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We usually have, you know, lots of time and
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especially if it's weekly data, and not -- well, I guess 54
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cities or whatever is enough, but this is -- I think these
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data mainly address some questions that haven't been
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addressed and, in particular, they -- I think that they
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account for couponing.
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You know, a typical problem of ours is we've got a
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merger involving products that are couponed a lot and the
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kind of data that we normally get doesn't have any couponing
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and -- in the case of ready-to-eat cereals,
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part of the price.
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would be a large
So it would be interesting to see what one could
do with the panel data.
It would be a big problem, but there
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are a lot of good economists, so I'm sure they could work
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something out.
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MR. DENGER:
Mary, could I ask one thing?
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MS. COLEMAN:
Sure.
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MR. DENGER:
On panel data, I know it's been
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requested because I believe we've provided it.
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MR. HIGGINS:
Oh, you did.
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MR. DENGER:
In fact, we've even provided it in
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Oh, okay.
the case Richard was involved in.
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But panel data can be useful because they'll
11
measure what consumer purchases are in a particular point of
12
time, say a six-month period, and what happens, say, a year
13
later and you can track brand-switching and elasticities and
14
look at the changes in price and look at not only couponing,
15
but other things, and see how particular consumers react to
16
changes in price or other developments with regard to the
17
brand.
18
It can tell you how they move from one type of
19
outlets to other types of outlets.
20
example, the degree in which brands are particularly close
21
competitors of other type -- of other specific brands.
22
23
It can tell you, for
So I think it's a very robust type of database in
a lot of industries.
24
MR. WOODBURY:
25
MR. DENGER:
Can I disagree?
Sure.
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MR. WOODBURY:
1
It's not -- I agree that there are
2
some utilities with that kind of panel data, you know, the
3
switching analysis that Nielsen and IRI can provide -- and
4
I'm guessing.
5
- but I mean, it would be great if you could have access to
6
the underlying individual data that's contained, because then
7
you could do -- there are some problems, but you could do,
8
you know, consumer level demand analysis directly using
9
individuals, rather than cities, as observations.
10
I don't want to put words in Richard's mouth -
And as Richard says, the problem with getting
11
access to the data, as far as I can tell, is -- the hurdles
12
are unsurmountable because they will never give it out.
We thought occasionally about talking to IRI and
13
14
Nielsen about providing a demand analysis, of course, at our
15
specifications, but we never see the data.
16
to do it for us.
17
--
18
But we get them
So I mean, we've never gotten that far, but
MR. HIGGINS:
Yes.
I think they've become quite
19
competitive providing their own analyses and that's one
20
treasure they have that they're holding close and then
21
request a particular study to be done.
22
MR. WOODBURY:
One thing to be leery of, which I
23
discovered recently, is that if you look at the switching
24
data, you can actually derive market shares based upon the
25
data that Nielsen and IRI give you.
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1
And if you compare those data to the national IRI
2
and Nielsen data, you will find that there's usually a
3
substantial difference.
4
representative, so you have to be really careful about how
5
you use those data, even in switching studies.
6
MR. DENGER:
7
all of that sort of thing in switching data.
8
that the data can give you some insights.
9
It turns out those panels are not
And there's also issues as to sample size and
And I agree with, Richard.
But I think
If you're talking
10
about the underlying IRI/Nielsen data, it wasn't provided.
11
But there are lots of switching studies, and so forth, based
12
on that data that can be very useful, I think, at least in
13
giving certain insights that you might not otherwise draw.
14
MS. COLEMAN:
In those cases, have you had
15
documents of Nielsen and IRI to understand what it is that
16
they did to do the switching studies and information or did
17
you get the data -- even if it was aggregated, the data in
18
enough detail yourself to understand what was done?
19
MR. HIGGINS:
I have had conversations with
20
business people, marketing people, but I don't think I ever
21
understood what was done.
22
MR. WOODBURY:
I mean, we've had direct
23
conversations.
I mean, I've had direct conversations with
24
IRI and Nielsen about some of the switching studies so I can
25
understand, particularly when I discovered that I was getting
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market shares that looked a lot different from national
2
shares, what I thought was going on and how the sample was
3
collected, and all of that.
4
Yeah, but I think -- you know, they're certainly
5
happy to talk to you about it, about how those samples are
6
constructed.
7
MS. COLEMAN:
I think that those -- I do think
8
those types of data, it's interesting, can be useful to get
9
at issues, but it encourages helping us to -- you know, as we
10
get that data, helping us to understand what the collected
11
data is and how it's collected and how these studies were
12
done.
13
14
MR. DENGER:
But all data has, you know,
limitations --
15
MS. COLEMAN:
Right.
16
MR. DENGER:
-- and we all have to be aware of
17
18
them and have to understand to effectively use the data.
MR. HIGGINS:
Well, I just -- actually, I'm going
19
to sit down and let John talk about.
20
more to say than I do.
21
MR. WOODBURY:
22
23
24
25
I know he has a lot
No, no, no, no.
I'm sorry.
I
shouldn't have -MR. HIGGINS:
No, no, no.
I know you prepared
something.
But before I do, a question I want to ask about
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standard data is are you ever going to ask for it anymore?
2
MS. COLEMAN:
3
MR. COWIE:
Yes.
I have one question.
Why do you
4
disagree with Denger that you have to see if the parties will
5
use the same -MR. HIGGINS:
6
Oh, I just think if I were working
7
for a party that was opposing the merger, however incredible
8
that may be, that you wouldn't -- they should be able to use
9
what their client has.
10
MR. COWIE:
11
merger and the FTC --
12
MR. HIGGINS:
But you agree that the parties to the
Yeah, but that means you have to do
13
it both ways because God knows what the third party will
14
show.
15
And the data are different.
John will probably
16
talk about the geographic areas are different, Nielsen and
17
IRI, and how they do it.
18
different results from time to time using the two.
19
prefer to try to comment on whatever he says.
20
MS. COLEMAN:
I don't really know, but we do get
Okay.
Well, with that, I guess
21
we'll move to John who is with CRA.
22
customer data.
23
24
25
MR. WOODBURY:
He is going talk about
Well, actually, I thought I was
talking about the vulnerable consumers.
MS. COLEMAN:
I
Right, right.
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MR. WOODBURY:
And how would you use the second
2
request data to better identify vulnerable consumers.
3
actually found myself sort of confused for a while, but I
4
think I worked my way out of the confusion.
5
6
7
And I
What I am going to do is address -- try to address
three points.
First of all, what do we mean by vulnerable
8
consumers and what might we mean by vulnerable consumers;
9
second, how does -- the second request process, how can that
10
be honed to better identify who those vulnerable consumers
11
are; and third, and frankly and most importantly, from the
12
policy stand point -- and I know it's not exactly a part of
13
this -- but what the heck do you do with the vulnerable
14
consumers when you find them.
15
16
17
In terms of definition I sort of think there are
three categories of vulnerable consumers.
One is an elasticity vulnerability, a second is
18
an over-aggregation of vulnerability, and the third is, as we
19
already mentioned, the unmentioned vulnerabilities.
20
Elasticity vulnerability, I think, is the one that
21
economists naturally think of when they think about
22
vulnerable consumers.
23
undifferentiated product, you know, like you have a product
24
where there are two groups of consumers.
25
lower elasticity and then the other group. And then the lower
These are -- think of an
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1
elasticity consumers are potentially exploitable if a
2
hypothetical monopolists can discriminate between those two.
He can discriminate between those two with two
3
4
conditions.
5
consumers are which and, second, the monopolists can prevent
6
-- hypothetical monopolist can prevent an
7
the two.
8
One is the monopolists can easily identify which
arbitrage between
So you find yourself in a relatively
9
undifferentiated industry where there are some groups that
10
have a relatively low elasticity with product.
11
thing to do is just basically apply the SSNIP test, the
12
standard, you know, market definition test to the lower
13
elasticity group and ask whether they constitute the same --
14
if they constitute their own antitrust market, so you conduct
15
a merger analysis on that basis.
16
possibilities are -- well, I call them over-aggregation
17
vulnerabilities, but they actually just may be market
18
definition mistakes.
19
The first
The other two
In the undifferentiated product context, you might
20
find that, gee, you know, in looking at a particular input
21
some materials, you know, some chemical compound, you know,
22
we might conclude that the demand -- the antitrust markets
23
all supply us with that compound and all of the customers of
24
that compound are in the same antitrust market, but it may
25
turn out that for reasons that may have to do with differing
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technologies, there is some subset of customers that, in
2
fact, can't use all of the material available, that their
3
range of choice is much more limited in that case, we've
4
identified another potentially vulnerable consumer group.
5
Similarly, if you're talking about geographic
6
markets, you might think that for some products that most
7
consumers are able to, say, input purchases or able to
8
purchase from anywhere in the United States because transfer
9
costs are relatively low, but in fact, there may be some
10
subset of purchasers for whom transport costs are pretty
11
severe and, again, their of alternatives are pretty limited.
12
And again, I call those over-aggregation mistakes,
13
but you know, they expose another set of vulnerability.
14
And the differentiated product contents of the
15
over-aggregation could arise because of our effort to try to
16
make the analysis trackable.
17
retail products, such as, you know, candy or cereals or
18
shampoo, the number of SKUs, you know, at the market level
19
can literally be in the hundreds, if not thousands, because
20
they come in different flavors, they look different, they
21
smell different, there are different package sizes.
And if you think about some
22
So in an effort to make the analysis trackable,
23
you start aggregating up as some sort of mega-brand that
24
encompasses the whole slew of different package sizes and
25
different types of products.
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In the process of doing that, we may have hidden
2
some consumers that were exposed because those consumers have
3
a relatively low elasticity for some of those products
4
compared to the average elasticity for that group as a whole.
5
Another kind of vulnerability that could result
6
again, and I'm thinking more in the consumer goods market,
7
suppose that -- suppose, in fact, that there are differences
8
in elasticities with distribution channels. By aggregating
9
all of the distribution channels will have hidden that
10
potentially vulnerable consumer.
11
Finally, there are these vulnerabilities that we
12
don't talk about very much.
13
gee, we're going to let this deal go through because there's
14
virtually no chance that a price increase will result and,
15
nonetheless, maybe some consumers are going to be harmed.
16
Suppose the agency decides that,
If we're talking about a merger between retail
17
stores, there are some consumers who are going to discover
18
that post-merger, their favorite retail store is closed and
19
they have to further or go to a less preferred retail store
20
to purchase whatever it is they want to purchase.
21
They may -- again, post-merger there may be some
22
brands that are withdrawn from the marketplace and
23
consumers again will have to go to their second preference.
24
25
some
And in many cases, we don't talk about who those
consumers are or the fact they're out there, and I'm going to
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come back to this in a second.
Now, the anti-climatic part of this topic, since I
2
3
ignored those last vulnerability concerns, the
4
unmentionables, it seems to me that the second request as it
5
is now structured is actually a pretty good vehicle for
6
identifying vulnerable consumers because it solicits the kind
7
of information that at least lets you initially get a hold of
8
an estimate of who those consumers might be.
9
You know, in the three pieces of information, I
10
think that's solicited by the second request for documents,
11
they're data that could be used for econometric analyses and
12
they're surveys.
Let me deal with this briefly one by one.
In the case of documents, this is, you know, the
13
14
usual suspects, there are planning documents, there's
15
strategic documents, they're marketing documents.
16
documents that may enable the agency, as well as the parties
17
working for -- the merger parties to identify, you know,
18
efforts by the firm to segment the
19
groups.
20
alternatives available to different consumers.
21
They're
market into different
And they may highlight, you know, different
They may actually talk about price differences
22
across what seems to be essentially the same product, but
23
across different consumer groups.
24
25
And it may be that there's enough information in
the information provided to determine whether or not the
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price cost margin differs across those consumer groups.
For undifferentiated goods, we would be looking
2
3
for things in the documents that either talk about the
4
ability to arbitrage between, you know, low elasticity groups
5
and high elasticity groups or frustration at the inability of
6
resale from the guys that get it at a low price to the guys
7
that are going to be victimized by higher prices.
8
In terms of data -- and the data, again, can come
9
in a variety of flavors.
10
talked about which allows for direct estimation of own price
11
elasticity, but it also enables us to look
12
concerned about an aggregation, that we've aggregated the
13
brands too broadly, then you can use econometrics to test
14
that proposition.
if we're
Again, I'm putting aside the ongoing concerns
15
16
One is the standard data that we
about how to interpret results from the scanner analysis.
There's some groups of services that aren't
17
18
scanned.
You know, there are other databases with market
19
data, you know, things like the airline data, and telephone
20
industry.
21
you to try to identify the extent to which you have
22
potentially vulnerable consumers.
There are sample billings all of which go by --
23
The one thing that isn't covered typically in the
24
second request, but I think would be useful in identifying
25
potentially vulnerable consumers are natural experiments.
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In virtually every industry there are
2
unanticipated events that will affect pricing.
These can be,
3
you know, the sudden exit of a player, a firm.
It could be
4
the disruption of a distribution pattern or a temporary plant
5
shutdown, all of which can generate price increases.
6
And those allow you to determine, you know, are
7
there any difference in price effects felt by different
8
consumer groups; again, a signal that there may be more,
9
rather than less, vulnerable consumer groups.
10
Third, and I think this is really the large thing
11
to differentiate product surveys, surveys of the companies,
12
the merging parties themselves implement to try to understand
13
differences between consumer segments and whether or not, in
14
fact, there are strategies for separating those segments in
15
pricing differently between them.
16
All of that, of course, should be followed by
17
post-second request interviews of, you know, the rival
18
sellers, of customers, as well as the merging parties walking
19
them through concrete sales efforts to determine, you know,
20
exactly what kind of considerations play into this.
21
Now, once you've identified, of course, the
22
vulnerable consumer, that is at the end of the analysis, so
23
you have to ask the question, "Gee, if they pass the SSNIP
24
test, are there other alternatives that can prevent the
25
prices from increasing."
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1
2
For example, there could be buyer strategies that
could counter any attempts to engage in price discrimination.
3
4
But there is still something important, I think,
5
finance and policy questions, and I don't have any answers,
6
about how we weight some of these differences.
7
Let me give you the clearest example.
8
suppose that there is a merger between an upstream firm
9
decides to acquire one of its customers and it's that
10
customer that has been in an undifferentiated market, has
11
been playing the role of arbitrager between the high
12
elasticity groups and the low elasticity groups.
13
I mean,
that
So to eliminate that arbitrager, the upstream firm
14
acquires the downstream firm.
15
we'll have higher prices for the low elasticity guys, but
16
we're going to have lower prices for high elasticity guys.
17
The question is, well, how do we balance those --
18
the gains versus the losses and should that play a role in
19
policy formulation, as opposed to sort of when we go forward
20
legally in court.
21
The post-merger effect is that
And to give another example, suppose that there
22
are two firms that produce, you know, products A and B and
23
they merge.
24
variable cost synergies with production of product A.
25
And as a result of the merger, there are
And as a result, the price falls and the cost
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1
falls, but they fall in such a way, that the price cost
2
margin for product A is now higher than it was pre-merger.
Well, now, the merging firm will have an incentive
3
4
to raise the price of product B, so as to divert customers
5
from B to the relatively higher margin of product A.
Now, customers of A, they benefit by the merger;
6
7
customers of B are going to lose.
8
the losses to one group versus the gains of another group.
9
How do we weigh, you know,
I don't think it's a defense to say that -- you
10
know, that we never do that merger analysis.
11
of the time.
12
ones that occur all of the time.
We do that all
And the unmentionable vulnerabilities are the
So implicitly, there is some balancing of those
13
14
losses against the gains to the consumers who benefit from
15
the merger.
I don't have an answer to the question.
16
I just
17
raise it.
18
be dealing with when they deal with the agencies: how do we
19
evaluate instances in which mergers will provide clear gains
20
to some groups of consumers, but the potential of loss is to
21
other groups.
22
23
24
25
But I think it's an important one for parties to
Thanks.
MS. COLEMAN:
Thanks, John.
I have one comment on
the second request about natural experiments.
What do you think could be done to improve that to
make sure --
I agree that it can be very useful for a number
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of things.
MR. WOODBURY:
2
I think it would start to do things
3
like ask a party to identify -- take a list of potentially
4
disrupted events, say, plant shutdowns, recent plant
5
shutdowns, firm exits, sudden shortages of input and supply
6
and ask questions about have any of these occurred in the
7
past X-years and that will give you a basis to start.
8
9
MS. COLEMAN:
And what kind of data would you
MR. WOODBURY:
Well, if you're doing econometrics,
think --
10
11
I mean, you think about doing before and after studies where
12
we look at the price before and after the event.
13
But it doesn't have to be econometrics.
14
simply look at averages because you can learn a lot of other
15
things.
16
the outcomes of these natural experiments even in somewhat
17
statistically more crude terms.
18
MR. DENGER:
You can
But it would be insightful effort to look at some of
The only thing I would say, Mary, is
19
you may not ask for it specifically, but I think you pretty
20
adequately if you understand the second request bring within
21
the scope these natural experiments and other events in the
22
marketplace.
23
You may not know what they are unless you review
24
the documents, but I think that to the extent that there are
25
these events in the industry, you will pick them up.
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MR. WOODBURY:
Oh, yeah, that may well be true.
2
You do it for the second -- if I'm sitting with this guys, I
3
do a second request.
4
5
And you know that we on the other side would be
looking for those things.
6
MS. COLEMAN:
Does anybody have any --
7
MS. GEURIN-CALVERT:
I think one of the things,
8
too, is that this is an area where we're assuming that what
9
is going on consecutive with the second request is a lot of
10
meetings between -- or phone calls between the economists and
11
lawyers within the agency and the economists and lawyers on
12
behalf of the merging parties.
13
again, what is useful is to identify events that people think
14
really are representative natural marketing experiments.
It would seem,
15
And I think where the -- what I would say as well,
16
is it is oftentimes very difficult at that point for anybody
17
to have sufficient data to be doing really good econometrics
18
in the sense that the merging parties in most industries do
19
not have a complete data set.
20
21
22
They've got their own data which can give some
insights, but oftentimes is not sufficient.
The agencies probably are not at a point to have
23
had the full data set either, and so the more people can come
24
up with what it is they expect the natural market experiment
25
to be showing, what it is they're looking for and, as a
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result, where information can be brought to bear that is
2
empirical in terms of actual data analysis, but also
3
documentary, and so on, would be, I think, be very helpful to
4
try and potentially reach some closure as to whether or not
5
the next stage needs to be occurring.
6
MR. WOODBURY:
7
think that's absolutely right.
8
9
10
Actually, let me step back.
I
I focus on experimental -- you know, natural
experimental context for identifying vulnerable consumers.
But obviously, a natural experiments, you need
11
some referrals including data entry, looking at substitution,
12
and the like.
13
And I'm glad you pointed that out.
MS. GEURIN-CALVERT:
One example would be a lot of
14
manufacturing cases involve hundreds, if not thousands, of
15
consumers.
16
It is -- there are some industries where there are
17
three or four very, very substantial consumers.
18
typically, it is the case that there are at least a hundred
19
fairly good-sized consumers.
20
More
And if the concern at issue is that certain
21
customers are more vulnerable to a price increase than
22
others, I think it's a useful point to lay out, you know, in
23
terms of -- particularly if the staff has at this point
24
significant complaints from customers is to identify we
25
believe from each segment of your customer base, we have at
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least one complaining customer; you know, show us for each
2
customer grouping in the context of a natural experiment for
3
others why it is they have a plausible alternative other than
4
the merging parties.
5
I think again the more you can move from what
6
inherently is a customer database to the key issues, it helps
7
both sides.
8
MR. DANIEL:
I would -- in a similar framework or
9
frame of mind, I would hope there would be open dialogue and
10
frequent dialogue between the agencies and the parties if the
11
vulnerable consumer issue is at work because it's a little
12
bit at odds with the Meg's point, which is maybe you can
13
learn all you need to learn from maybe the top 50 customers.
14
You can learn a lot from the top 50 customers, but
15
if there are 200 or 500 customers, you might be able to find
16
some down there that would not have as many alternatives.
17
But allowing for those discussions as early and as
18
frankly and as openly as possible animated with whatever
19
support you can share with the parties, given the
20
confidentiality of information, would really be helpful
21
because oftentimes those vulnerable customers pop up
22
relatively late in the process and then you try to figure out
23
how can we analytically track where they are and what their
24
options are.
25
MR. DENGER:
That's why the interviews with the
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customers is so important to understand if they feel
2
potentially victimized or why they feel vulnerable and the
3
source of that vulnerability.
4
MS. COLEMAN:
Okay, thank you.
5
MR. WOODBURY:
Richard.
6
MR. HIGGINS:
I just want to know what an example
7
is of a vulnerable customer.
8
numbers.
9
10
MR. WOODBURY:
You must have worked those
I've never found a vulnerable
customer -- no.
11
You know, it's the usual.
It's the residential
12
versus business consumer, and for example, a long distance
13
company.
14
I mean, at least there's the conventional wisdom
15
that a residential consumer is more at the mercy of long
16
distance companies than the business consumer.
17
18
19
It's the leisure versus business travel with the
airlines, you know, those kinds of distinctions.
You know, it's the generic versus brand-named
20
drugs, those preferring the generic when the generics come
21
out, then the prices rise.
22
MR. HIGGINS:
I thought it was something new.
23
MR. WOODBURY:
No.
24
MR. HIGGINS:
All right, thank you.
25
MS. COLEMAN:
Next up is Tim Daniel from NERA He's
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2
3
4
going to talk about a different type of data.
MR. DANIEL:
Thanks, Mary.
Thanks for the
opportunity to be here.
Switching gears a little bit, I guess, and what
5
Mary has asked me to talk about involves mergers where the
6
competition arises in bidding- or auction-kind of
7
environments.
8
In looking at some of the second requests that
9
we've worked on where auction or bidding issues have arisen,
10
the bid specs, if there are such things, they can be pretty
11
sparse and limited and I don't think that's necessarily a
12
failure of the second request so much as a recognition, if
13
you will, that when bidding is involved -- what I'm thinking
14
of here is not so much bidding in a formal process, as the
15
government tenders, where you're going to know exactly what
16
the bid is for, but rather, competition that occurs for a
17
durable product in the medical business for a CAT scan or a
18
purchase of electric generation equipment by a utility where
19
it puts out a request for bid in a less formal sense, but the
20
competition is very much in that kind of framework where the
21
sellers are negotiating with the customer, and vice-versa,
22
and that's how the competition is described.
23
The data on that kind of competition are often
24
pretty idiosyncratic to the firm at issue and sometimes even
25
within the firm are very different qualities of data
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1
collected across different product lines and divisions and
2
geographic areas.
And I think that what I would take from that at
3
4
least in the process of doing a merger investigation is that
5
there's even a bigger benefit early on after the parties and
6
the government sit down and try and understand what data the
7
companies do, in fact, have when the competition occurs in
8
that kind of a bidding environment because it can be very
9
spotty in certain areas, it can be quite incomplete and it
10
can be quite frustrating down the road.
11
If the expectations are higher, I mean, I think
12
that the parties would keep good records on their bidding
13
competitions, good records on what their rivals are bidding,
14
good records on why they won or why they lost certain bids,
15
when, in fact, that's not the case.
One option I think that I would entertain early
16
17
on, therefore, is if you do have those dialogues and discuss
18
what is available in the companies is if you do hone in on a
19
particularly rich set of data, be it on a limited product
20
line or a limited time period or a limited geographic area, I
21
think the discussion could ensue at that point as to whether
22
or not a careful analyses of the good data might provide
23
enough of a basis to generalize to the markets what are at
24
issue.
25
That's a potentially difficult discussion to have,
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but I think one worth thinking about.
It's essentially the
2
same, I guess, as to whether you can take a sample of the
3
data.
If you happen to have data records that might be
4
5
complete, but they're on all paper and they're, again,
6
difficult to deal with, they're not Nielsen data, they're not
7
IRI data, they are just messy bid records, and you want to go
8
back five or ten years, or whatever time period you're
9
interested in, I mean, it might be possible early on to agree
10
to take a sample of those records.
11
When I was here at the FTC and doing consumer
12
protection matters and we talked about discrimination and
13
lending practices, that was a common occurrence when you had
14
a large number -- thousands and thousands of applications for
15
credit to just take a sample of those, work with the parties
16
to draw up a representative sample and then agree that those
17
are the data that are going to form the basis of the analysis
18
or for the decision at least up through the investigative
19
period.
20
One issue that I think is particular to an auction
21
or bidding environment that has to be taken into account is
22
if you look back at the economic models and ask what is the
23
likely price effects from a merger when two firms get
24
together in a bidding situation; is the expected price
25
increase from a unilateral context.
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1
the costs and the offerings of the non-merging parties.
2
So to get the two low cost firms in a bidding
3
competition merged, your typical concern is they're going to
4
raise the price up to the cost of another third-level lowest
5
cost provider.
6
What that means is that very often there's an even
7
bigger asymmetry, I think, between the information available
8
to the government who can obviously subpoena and gather
9
information from all of the major players in the market and
10
the information immediately available to the parties.
11
That's not a gap that's going to be necessarily
12
closable, but I think it needs to be recognized and, again,
13
to me, at least counsels for as much open dialogue and as
14
much disclosure on the part of the agencies as to what's
15
animating their concerns, what's driving their analytical
16
framework and why they came and those competitions in those
17
situations of merger might be likely to raise prices.
18
Virtually, everything else I have on my short set
19
of bullets has been raised already, and so I think I'm going
20
to leave it there just with an endorsement of what Mike had
21
said about having open dialogue and discussions with the
22
agency as early as possible, agreement, if possible, between
23
the agencies -- agency and the parties regarding what data
24
will be sufficient to test the hypotheses and, if possible,
25
early on to agree on the economic model at issue because the
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economic models that underline an auction or bidding
2
environment are very different from the models underlying
3
standard differentiated product or homogenous product merger
4
concerns.
5
And if those agreements can be reached up front,
6
yes, indeed, this is the kind of analysis that we need to do,
7
then that can help to hone in on what information the parties
8
will have as a matter of course and what part of the
9
information the parties will not have, particularly on the
10
cost of their rivals as a matter of course, and then trying
11
to deal with some of the information and asymmetries that I
12
think are even more pronounced in these kinds of mergers and
13
these kinds of investigations that are made.
14
MS. COLEMAN:
Okay, thank you.
15
MS. GEURIN-CALVERT:
Does anyone --
I just want to echo what Tim
16
said about -- I think it is particularly the case where the
17
evidence to resolve the specific concern does not reside
18
within the merging parties and is not likely to be readily
19
available in public form as data on cost, but could only
20
maybe be inferred from particular things.
21
It is very important, I would echo his words, to
22
identify what the specific theory is because one could think
23
in a bid model a concern that it really is the case that two
24
merging parties, as Tim expressed, the lowest cost and that
25
there is no real sense that the non-merging parties may have
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in any way changed their cost position from the last time the
2
bidding occurred or could not do so somehow post-merger,
3
there really is a circumstance where there is a reason for
4
concern.
5
I think the more it is articulated that the
6
concern is a cost difference as opposed to, let's say, a
7
likelihood of somebody even submitting a bid.
8
One of the things I think that I found both in the
9
antitrust division and outside is people spend a lot of time
10
focusing on the wrong question because they thought it was
11
the correct question, that they thought, you know, the
12
agency's concern was we want to know about likelihood, as
13
opposed to we want to know about magnitude or we want to know
14
about likelihood and magnitude.
15
And I know that sounds relatively simplistic, but
16
I think that the more the questions can be articulated very
17
clearly and early on, the more there is the opportunity to
18
come back with information.
19
The other thing is I think it highlights the
20
circumstance where transactional level data, particularly if
21
it's old, may or may not be informative of what the post-
22
merger competitive process will be like.
23
If it's an industry that -- where the occurrence
24
of who has won in the past is different from, say, who hasn't
25
won in the last year, you can end up with a very different
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merger result than if you -- or merger prediction than if
2
what happened in the last year is almost identical to what
3
happened in previous years.
4
So I would respond to Tim's statement a little bit
5
that in terms of viewing any sampling, it would be worthwhile
6
to give the parties an opportunity to address whether or not
7
the past is truly a prologue or not.
8
9
10
MR. DANIEL:
In the natural experiment, again, I
would raise the same point.
A lot of the markets with large durable medical
11
equipment, electrical equipment have seen a lot of mergers in
12
the last half dozen years and someone might be able to use
13
that information and a change in market structure to see
14
whether or not past mergers, of which this current merger in
15
front of you may be somewhat similar in appearance, one might
16
be able to do some kind of prediction with these models.
17
MS. COLEMAN:
Thank you, Tim.
I'm going to switch
18
gears a little bit here and move more to the accounting
19
financial side.
20
David Painter with LECG, also formerly with the
21
FTC, is going to talk about some of those key issues that
22
arise looking at a different type of accounting and financial
23
data that he worked with.
24
MR. PAINTER:
And I appreciate this opportunity to
25
speak to you on this, as well.
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I guess let me reiterate at the outset something
2
Mike said and I think everybody else has certainly agrees
3
with and that is that having been here for 30 years, the FTC
4
is not the enemy.
The facts are the facts.
And I think that while I'm going to speak to
5
6
financial and accounting data, it can probably apply to
7
anything.
8
that, for merging parties to take is to provide the factual
9
information they think the Commission is seeking.
And that is the best strategy, if I can call it
10
I think it behooves the Commission and certainly I
11
think the merging parties, the lawyers representing merging
12
parties should make every effort to have a sharing of
13
theories because, clearly, a sharing of theories, once the
14
theories are honed in on, allow them to come up with the
15
accounting, with the factual information of what is financial
16
and accounting information, the Nielsen information or
17
anything else.
18
theories as early as possible is something that would be
19
essential.
20
theories are, that it behooves the merging parties through
21
the lawyers, through retained consultants to provide a
22
crystal clear road map and analysis that takes that factual
23
information and melds it into something that presumably comes
24
up with some conclusion and explain it to the Commission.
25
So I think that the sharing of
And I think last recognizing what those
With that said, let me just sort of tell you that
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I'm going to limit my focus because so much else has been
2
said, as well, the use of accounting and financial
3
information for purposes of preparing an expert analysis,
4
such as a failing company and efficiencies or for that
5
matter, econometrics, or anything else.
6
And I guess I've been on the outside for five
7
years, but I was with the Commission for 30 and perhaps that
8
30 years is what's going to drive me to sort of suggest the
9
conclusion.
10
It was a long time in trying to get there.
My experience at the Federal Trade Commission, and
11
it's confirmed I think in large part on the basis of my
12
experience on the outside, is that the underlying support
13
that is provided by the merging parties with respect to any
14
expert analysis is too frequently -- not always, but
15
frequently incomplete or inadequate for the Commission staff
16
to try, if they might, to be able to get a complete
17
understanding of the analysis in a way that says -- allows
18
them to say it's reliable.
19
it reliable.
20
I mean, this is the key thing: is
And that isn't because there is some inadequacy in
21
the second request.
The second request is as thorough as is
22
imaginable and, in fact, I just recently right before I came
23
here looked at the second request, the one that was received
24
by the merging parties in a case that I worked on, and
25
essentially it asked for the identification of all experts
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1
and consultants retained by merging firms and all documents
2
and data that were provided to such experts and consultants
3
and also asked for all instructions, programs and other
4
documents that are necessary to use and interpret the
5
finished analyses prepared by these consultants and the data
6
that was used to prepare the finished analyses.
7
covers it all.
8
And that
And yet, despite that -- and I'm assuming this
9
dates back certain years.
10
was similar when I was here -- expert analyses often are
11
fruitless.
12
It wasn't that exact language.
Efforts are made to submit them in a way that's
13
understandable.
14
them in a way that allows them to factor it into the
15
decision.
16
and my feeling is that what's lacking is the road map.
17
Efforts are made by the staff to understand
But somewhere along the way, something is lacking,
And I think we all might be able to better
18
appreciate this if you look at the Efficiencies Amendment,
19
the Efficiencies Amendment before it came out, before
20
submitting anything and everything that we could to try to
21
demonstrate efficiencies.
22
It
And we all had a sense that they had
23
practitioners on the outside, most of us that worked on the
24
inside what was needed with the Efficiencies Amendment and
25
sort of laid out a road map as to what is going to count with
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respect to at least the efficiency claim and this could have
2
been applied.
3
You could have an econometrics amendment or you
4
could have failing company amendment in some respects, and so
5
forth, but the bottom line to it was that -- what it said was
6
that, look, we know we're requesting everything in the second
7
request, it gets in everything, but despite that, independent
8
of the second request, we are going to tell you now that you
9
have to substantiate the efficiencies in a way that allows
10
the staff to verify it.
11
12
13
You know, I think it could apply it to anything, I
think, and that's the key.
And so I think that from my standpoint, I think
14
that there are lots of shortcuts with respect to accounting
15
information data.
16
We're all aware of -- that doesn't mean that
17
they're not -- that they can't be meaningful when put into an
18
expert analysis.
19
shortcomings are and what the strengths are and coming to
20
some sort of a reasoned conclusion that allows the staff to
21
say yea or nay on it.
22
It's a matter of explaining what the
I will tell you that if all of you are going to
23
count on the outside with the submission of boxes and boxes
24
of documents that underlies the efficiencies claim, it's not
25
going to do the trick.
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And the staff is not going to be able to uncover
1
2
it.
3
to do that through depositions and investigational hearing.
4
I mean, I was here for 30 years and we tried desperately
You know, as cooperative as the merging parties
5
attempt to be and the lawyers representing the merging
6
parties attempt to be, it's just extremely difficult to sort
7
of get at the subtleties, get at the sort of fine-tuning of
8
what these analyses are all about in a way that allows you to
9
say, hey, it's reliable.
10
So here is what I am suggesting.
I am suggesting
11
that the Efficiencies Amendment, whether formally or whether
12
on the outside, effectively use it as a tool, as a backdrop
13
for what we submit to the staff on other kinds of analyses
14
involving accounting and financial data be the -- be an
15
additional standard, if I can call it that, that standard
16
being a substantiation that allows the Commission to verify.
17
And I can tell you having worked on the Staples
18
case and having worked on the Heinz baby food case that it
19
isn't a matter of whether you are submitting five boxes of
20
documents or five hundred boxes of documents to support your
21
position; it's the road map.
22
On Staples, I worked, I'm sure, a thousand hours
23
trying to go through hundreds of boxes of depositions,
24
hearings, everything else to get to the truth.
25
And even there, half of the efficiencies were
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effectively dismissed because there was no way of verifying
2
whether they were valid or not.
3
On the other hand, I worked on the Heinz baby food
4
case and there were a fraction, a small fraction of the same
5
number of documents and -- but there was a road map, I
6
believe.
7
Now, that doesn't mean that the Commission
8
accepted it.
9
don't think there was a dispute as to the numbers themselves
10
and what the numbers were saying.
11
They didn't.
We all know that.
But at least I
There were theories that effectively refuted what
12
was being presented.
13
then I think we can make some reasonable arguments for and
14
against.
15
And if we can get down to that, I mean,
So I think that if we recognize that what's needed
16
is a road map, what's needed is really some really crystal
17
clear explanation, we realize that most of these analyses
18
that we sent to the Commission were started long before the
19
initial filing even took place.
20
We recognized that we have the benefit on the
21
outside of talking to business people at length, ad nauseam,
22
you know, time and time again.
23
We were able to pick and choose based on those
24
discussions all of the documents we wanted.
25
these constraints are, time constraints are with respect to
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1
the HSR process.
2
I think we can better appreciate what the
3
Commission is faced with and we can better serve our clients
4
because we have a strong incentive to get this merger to pass
5
muster, so we have a very strong incentive to make it crystal
6
clear to the Commission.
7
We can better serve our clients by getting these
8
things done in a way that allows them to have -- to be given
9
some weight.
10
11
MR. HIGGINS:
But they never give us their -- the
benefit of their advantage.
12
MR. PAINTER:
The Commission staff?
13
MR. HIGGINS:
Yes.
They're sitting there with a
14
document from Bicardi that talks about whether they're going
15
to make the pineapple rum or not.
16
us if they're trying to get a rum deal.
17
MR. PAINTER:
They're not going to tell
You know, again, I can't speak for
18
the staff here, but I can tell you that when I was here,
19
while I may not have named parties and I might not have named
20
names, I think that, conceptually, the notion was thrown out
21
that, you know, what would preclude somebody from entering,
22
you know, by some means -- I mean, it was obvious -- and
23
maybe those exact historical examples that so many of you
24
have talked about, you know, were actually identified in a
25
request and explanation was made.
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Yeah, it may not be an absolute perfect two-way
2
street, but I don't think that -- since we want this merger
3
to get through, you know, it's just something we, perhaps,
4
have to face.
5
MR. COWIE:
Richard, there are confidentiality
6
concerns that at times prevent us from telling you what kind
7
of rum Bicardi is planning to make.
8
The fact of the matter is it's very difficult to
9
share third-party information.
10
MR. HIGGINS:
I've been bluffed by Mr. Newborn
11
enough times to know there's more to it than that.
12
suggesting that it is an adversarial situation.
13
contest and I don't see where we should --
14
MR. PAINTER:
But I am
It is a
You know, again, I will tell you
15
from experience, I mean, obviously, this is a short --
16
everybody has their own view, but if it becomes a contest and
17
you have an economic analysis that can't be -- you know, that
18
the staff is unable to sort of discern whether it's reliable
19
or not, then your best is case is going to court.
20
That's your best case because I don't think
21
they're going to accept it and go through, you know, without
22
an understanding of whether it's really, you know, an expert
23
analysis that's presumably supporting the arguments that
24
we're making to the staff and they're not sure if it's
25
reliable or not.
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1
So, you know, maybe we can win in court and maybe
2
-- you know, I may be saying tomorrow the direct opposite,
3
but if we want to take our chances in court, then obviously
4
that's something that's factored into the overall strategy
5
from day one when we make the initial filing.
But again, I don't want to -- I think that's more
6
7
the exception than the rule.
I think that the facts are
8
going to come out.
9
late, so that the theories -- you know, it's better that the
10
explanation theory comes out early, so that, in fact, there
11
are valid considerations on both sides, that they can be
12
explored.
It's better that they come out early than
13
MS. COLEMAN:
Okay.
14
MS. GEURIN-CALVERT:
15
you.
16
it is so difficult to do.
Mary.
I in many respects agree with
I have one point of disagreement just because I think
17
I think your idea of having a clear road map as to
18
what is the task, how do we do it and to be able to present
19
it in a form that stays objective and as verifiable as
20
possible is the best for everyone because I think that's
21
ultimately, as well, what is going to be presented in court
22
if it has to get there.
23
That's the same standard.
I think where it is useful to have this workshop I
24
think where it is particularly difficult now to apply that
25
road map, although I think the most effort needs to go -- is
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in large transactions where there is not a Nielsen and an IRI
2
or an industry database where what you are working with is a
3
huge number of consumers, very large and messy transactional
4
or customer databases in the merging parties so that even as
5
the economists start six months ahead of time working with
6
the most accommodating client to say let's understand what is
7
going on here, to the extent -- and this just is picking up
8
on what John said -- to the extent for whatever reason,
9
whether it's third-party information, or otherwise, the staff
10
has a concern about a particular customer group that they
11
believe has inelastic demands and a particular other group
12
they view may have more elastic demands.
13
I think the sooner that that can get articulated
14
by the staff to say we are particularly concerned about this
15
kind of set of customer, then I think it is more feasible for
16
the economists on the outside to try to marshal the data and
17
put it together in as testable form as possible.
18
But I think it's frustrating for everyone if the
19
way a meeting or a set of meetings proceeds as we have an
20
overall concern about lack of availability of substitutes.
21
I think the more progressed in the direction is
22
something you indicate on the efficiency side where everybody
23
agrees on what are we looking for, the better
24
industries.
25
and it's more straightforward for the staff to ask for the
in some
It's very straightforward to do that early on
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information in the second request.
2
And I would just say where you're having to ask
3
for huge transactional databases and it's a wide range of
4
industries it helps everybody to give more guidance from both
5
sides.
6
MR. PAINTER:
Absolutely.
7
MR. DENGER:
If I could add just one thing here
8
and it transcends data issues, but I think it's really
9
important.
10
I think the key thing is everyone wants to get a
11
sound merger policy and to do that, you have to have dialogue
12
on the issues that are of concern.
And I agree totally with Dave to the extent that
13
14
we can learn from the parties to the mergers with respect to
15
what the concerns of the agency are early on.
16
that there are confidentiality concerns that you have to
17
protect.
And I realize
18
On the other hand, you have to be careful that you
19
don't use confidentiality concerns as an excuse for blocking
20
a dialogue.
21
think, surface issues oftentimes.
22
You can protect confidentiality, but still, I
And nothing is more frustrating to a party to a
23
merger as to make a presentation and not really understand
24
what the concerns are coming back.
25
And I would urge the agency -- and I realize
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oftentimes you don't fully understand all of the concerns
2
early on in the process until you've conducted your
3
investigation and talked to customers and so forth -- but I
4
would think that the thing that will make for the best merger
5
policy for the dialogue is to let's take off our litigation
6
hats just for a little bit at the beginning and try to have a
7
dialogue where we can understand the concerns of each side
8
and try to address them and try to provide the substantiation
9
if we can and I think that will make for the most
10
constructive approach in the data areas, as well as others.
11
MR. WOODBURY:
But if I could echo, you know, a
12
little bit of Richard's presentation and focus on
13
econometrics, for example, I know CRA, and working with
14
Richard on some projects, LCEG has produced you know, pretty
15
detailed road maps.
But if I can make an analysis given the agency
16
17
given the underlying data that -- and frequently they come
18
back and say well, we ran something a little bit different.
19
Well, what was it?
Well, it was just a little bit
20
different, and you get frustrated because you don't
21
understand what they do, you know, how sensitive.
22
no idea how different it is.
23
You have
And this has been an ongoing -- as you probably
24
all know, an ongoing issue, particularly scanner data
25
analysis.
In the mass econometric projects, it would be nice
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to have a completely two-way street.
And you're right, you can't win the contest.
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3
We're bound to lose it.
4
can't understand sometimes what's going on on the other side
5
in terms of why they find our results, you know, not
6
credible.
7
MS. COLEMAN:
But it's just frustrating that we
It's very clear from the discussions
8
that have been happening that the dialogue process is the key
9
to all of this and this is something that (inaudible) data
10
myself, trying to encourage as much as possible and as early
11
as possible, you know early discussion among the economists
12
and certainly the lawyers, as well, about the issues in
13
trying to come to agreement or at least an understanding of
14
what the theories are and what data tasks and other types of
15
analyses would be useful.
16
And also, we'll encourage to the extent we can,
17
given the confidentiality concerns, potentially where we are
18
in the process if it's got a very late date, this dialogue,
19
you know, the results that we're finding in as much detail as
20
we can so that those types of issues don't arise.
21
It's clearly something that both Dave and I have -
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- are encouraging as much as we can.
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continue to encourage that.
And we're going to
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Allen, did you have a comment?
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ATTENDEE:
One comment from the perspective from
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someone on the inside.
So many times parties have come up with, let's
2
3
say, white papers with documentation where the white papers
4
documentation would have been very effective but they tend to
5
come after everything has gone to the Commission and at the
6
last minute they come forth with the arguments.
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late.
8
That's too
The one time I was working on a case where I
9
thought the expert was most effective was when they received
10
the materials very early while we were still in the midst of
11
the investigation and that expert's analysis went a long way
12
toward resolving the concerns and getting the merger through.
13
14
There have been times when I've seen parties come
15
up with some material that really devastated the case or sort
16
of devastated the case, but it came up after all of the
17
memos, including the Directors' memos were forwarded to the
18
Commission, and it was too late.
19
MS. COLEMAN:
I would, again, comment that the
20
later that these types of analyses come in, the less weight
21
they're going to be given and the less chance that we'll have
22
to not only look at them and the dialogue back.
23
That leads me to the question I sort of wanted to
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throw out.
We have a few more minutes.
25
and some of the other workshops point of issues have been
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raised, nature of the data request and how long it takes to
2
gather the data particularly when we ask for it in ways that
3
the company's keep it and we end up getting the data
4
sometimes when the compliance happens and the data ends up
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being a waste of everyone's time because by the time we get
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the data, when it's that late, we can't do anything with it.
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It's just too late in the process.
8
throw out a question about what can be done to encourage
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people to submit data earlier as they get it and to enable
10
the process to be able to actually gather it early enough.
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MS. GEURIN-CALVERT:
So I wanted to
One thing that may not work
12
in every case, but let's assume we're at the second request
13
stage or a point where there's been, you know, a voluntary
14
agreement for data, I think that is exactly the time to sit
15
down first internally and ask what exactly do we want, what
16
are we trying to test, what are our highest priority types of
17
information.
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Obviously, in industries you've worked in before,
19
you know what you're looking for.
20
worked in before, you're less likely to know. And then to sit
21
down and have that dialogue with not just the attorneys, but
22
also the economists on the other side, and to identify as
23
clearly as possible what kinds of levels of data you're
24
needing in the highest level of priority and have the
25
shortest turnaround that you can to get back -- either to
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have a discussion just with that group again or to identify
2
the relevant business people.
3
effective, both on the outside and in the government, to go
4
into the equivalent of a plant tour, to go do a data tour and
5
have people go down and see what are the forms in which the
6
data exist and that I have found expedites, even if it's on a
7
rolling production, data as quickly as possible in as
8
formatted a form as possible to get to you.
9
I have found it's
And I think that covers also the issue of the
10
white paper.
11
not gotten the data either in a form that's really usable
12
much in advance of the time frame in which the staff gets it;
13
and so, again, to the extent issues can be identified and the
14
data identified sooner.
15
Sometimes it is that the outside parties have
But I think having conference calls and visits
16
with the data people is one way to expedite it and try as
17
quickly as possible, Tim's point, if sampling is going to
18
work, have somebody come up with an agreed-upon method as
19
quickly as possible if it has to be the universe.
20
I was in one negotiation a long time back when I
21
was an assistant chief and it turns out that the parties had
22
a very small data set that was exactly what we wanted, that
23
they were able to turn over on a diskette the next day.
24
25
But that we never would have found it if we hadn't
been kind of sitting and having that kind of dialogue.
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that's what I would recommend, particularly if you're looking
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at large companies that have not done a lot of work in the
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industry before.
MR. DENGER:
4
5
Let me just add one other thing, that
we have used lots of times, and I think it's very helpful.
The first meeting we come to to negotiate; the
6
7
second meeting we use to bring a couple of people who are
8
very knowledgeable about the data, samples and everything
9
like that.
10
And oftentimes, you can say here's what we got
11
from this person and you say, well, we can't do it that way,
12
but we can do it this way, and it will cost us X-zillion
13
dollars to do it this way, but if you can take this, we'll
14
provide it to you very quickly.
And if you take -- and a lot of people like to
15
16
bring very knowledgeable data people to the first meeting.
17
But I think it oftentimes helps to focus the
18
request to get it in quickly to weed out a lot of data that's
19
really not going to be meaningful because even if you've had
20
it all, there are some limitations to it that effectively
21
preclude you from using it for the purposes you might want to
22
use it.
23
And rather than have the lawyers go back and try
24
to find people in the company, and so forth, assume you've
25
got some knowledgeable people, bring them along and let's get
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the dialogue going and here's what we got and here's what we
2
can do for you and then if we can't do this, what about this
3
as an alternative.
And I think sometimes the lawyers get in the way
4
5
and slow things down by not having the business people there,
6
and you can bring your accountants -- to tell you we looked
7
at the data and this won't work.
8
Give me this type of economic analysis and this
9
will work and I think that speeds things along and allows a
10
more meaningful focus earlier in the process.
11
MS. COLEMAN:
12
MR. DAGEN:
Does anyone else have any questions?
Just there aren't as many attorneys
13
here as maybe there might be, but is there a reason why a law
14
firm wouldn't want to engage in the process you're
15
describing, Mike?
MR. DENGER:
16
Yeah, there are a lot of reasons.
17
One they can think they'll be in litigation with you and they
18
will think that information flow is a one-way street as you
19
sit there and you talk and you talk and you talk and you
20
don't get any dialogue coming back from the concerns.
21
There are a whole host of reasons why you wouldn't
22
do it.
You would be worried if you bring some businessman,
23
there is always a risk that he or she could say something
24
that you may not wish that they would say and you might
25
rather have that occur in a context where you can control it
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a little more.
But I think in balance, when you have to weigh
2
3
these, I sort of go back to the day that let's not start out
4
looking at each other as the enemy.
You've got a job to do and we have a transaction
5
6
we want to clear and let's try to see if we can have an
7
informed merging decision.
8
And the way to do that with the least burden and
9
the least cost on everybody I think is to step up to the
10
plate as early on the process.
11
step-up.
And it's got to be a two-way
12
The agency has to be -- the personnel have to be
13
reasonably candid about what their concerns are as soon as
14
they have them keeping in mind the confidentiality respect.
15
MS. COLEMAN:
16
questions or comments?
17
(No response.)
18
MS. COLEMAN:
19
coming.
20
your input.
21
Anyone else?
Okay.
Does anyone have any
Well, thank you all for
This wraps up the workshop sessions.
We appreciate
(Whereupon, the proceedings concluded.)
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C E R T I F I C A T I O N
O F
R E P O R T E R
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WORKSHOP ON SECOND REQUEST/MERGER
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INVESTIGATION BEST PRACTICES
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DATE: JULY 10, 2002
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that the transcript contained herein
8
is a full and accurate transcript of the recording/stenomask
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taken by me at the hearing on the above cause before the
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FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION to the best of my knowledge and
11
belief.
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DATED:
JULY 10TH, 2002
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WANDA L. GRANGER, CVR
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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.