Interim Decision i1549`

Interim Decision i1549`

Mar= or CORRAL-FRA.G080 *

In Deportation Proceedings

A-6127552

Decided by Bpard January 14., 1966 '

A lawful permanent resident alien's return to the United States following a

visit with his family in Mexico, during which absence he was involved ID

criminal conduct in violation of 8 V.B.O. 1824(a) (2), for which be stand,"

convicted, made upon his return an entry on which to predicate a ground of

deportation [Rosenberg v Mesti, 874 U.S. 449, inapplicable] and is precluded

by the provisions of section 101(f) (8) of the Act from establishing good

moral char-Rotor_

Qum :

()Mu:. Act of 1952—Section 241(a) (13) 18 U.S.C. 1251]—Knowingly and

for. gain encouraged, induced, assisted, abetted or

aided any other alien to enter the United States in

violation of law.

This cast( is before -us' on appeal from a special inquiry officer's

order of October •2, 1965; finding the respondent ineligible for discretionary relief and directing that he be deported from the United

States to Mexioo' in the manner provided by law on the charge contained' in the order to 'show cause. The appeal will be dismissed.

The respondenti•a 57year-old male alien, a. native and national of

Mexico, was admitted to the United States' for permanent residence

on December 8, 1926. His wife and their child are natives, nationals and residents of Mexico. He last entered the United States

at O. Paso,' Texas, following .a -visit with his family in Juarez,

Meiico, on or about July 1965'.

On or about July 2, 1965, the respondent made arrangements with

Cresencio Salas-Guevara, a native and national of Mexico, in Juarez,

- Mexico, to take the latter to Chicago, Illinois. Cresencio Salas-Guevara told the respondent he did not have papers orb a passport to

•See also, Matter of Corral-Fragoso, Int. Dec. No. 1564, of which the alien

in this ease is also the subject.

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legally enter the United States. Respondent .told Cresencio SalesGuevara in Juarez, Mexico, that he would have to pay the respondent $50 for taking him to Chicago. After Cresenclo Salas-Guevara

entered. the United States illegally, he gave the respondent $50 before getting into the letter's car in El Paso for the trip to Chicago.

On or about July 3, 1965, in Juarez, Mexico the respondent made

arrangements to transport Arturo Alcantar-Guereca, a native and

national of Mexico, to Chicago, Illinois. He .knew that Arturo

Alcantar-Guereca, was only in possession of a local passport. In

Juarez, Mexico, Arturo Alcantar-Guereca promised to pay the respondent $100 for his assistance after he arrived. in Chicago and

found work.

On July 4, 1965, the respondent was arrested in Alamogordo, New

Mexico, en route to Chicago, Illinois, with the two aliens named

above and three other aliens illegally is the United States, in his

automobile. He had picked them up in El Paso after his return from

Juarez and subsequent to their illegal entry into the United States,

in accordance with arrangements made with them in Juarez. Subsequently, in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, El Paso Division, the respondent pleaded guilty to

five counts of an indictment charging him with transporting, moving and attempting to transport and move certain aliens named

therein, including the two named above, knowing that they had not

been duly admitted by an immigration officer of the United States

and were not lawfully entitled to enter and reside in this country,

in violation of 5 U.S.C. 1324(a) (2..

The special inquiry officer's opinion contains a. thorough discussion of the reasons why the foregoing renders the respondent deportable on the charge contained in the order to show cause, including a recitation of precedent decisions supporting his conclusion.

Their repetition herein would serve no useful purpose. Suffice it

to say that we concur in the special inquiry officer's conclusion for

the reasons and on the basis of tne precedent decisions set forth in

his opinion. The only additional comment required on. this point is

that this aspect of the case stands unchallenged on appeal.

The only reason given for the taking of this appeal is that the

respondent made no "entry" within the contemplation of the immigration laws on which to predicate deportability when he returned

to the United States at El Paso, Texas, from Juarez, Mexico, on or

about July 4, 1965. The claim is that the facts of this case bring

it squarely within the Scope of the decision of the Supreme,Court of

the United. States in the case of Rosenberg v. Fiend (374 U.S. 449).

In that case, it was ruled. by the Supreme Court that an "entry" with479

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in the contemplation of the immigration laws depends upon a departure from the United States which can be regarded as meaningfully

interruptive of the alien's permanent residence in this country. We,

however, find that the ruling therein is not controlling here, for the

reasons hereinafter set forth.

In construing the term "entry" as used in section 101(a) (18) of

the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101), the Supreme

Court of the United States in the Fleuti case, supra, concluded that

it effectuates Congressional purpose to construe the "intent" exception in that definition as meaning an intent to depart from the

United.'States in a manner which can be regarded as meaningfully

interruptive of the alien's permanent residence here. One of the

major factors set forth by the Court relevant to a determination

of whether such intent can be inferred, was the purpose 'of the visit,

for if the purpose of leaving the country was to accomplish some

object which was itself contrary to some policy reflected in our immigration laws, it would appear that the interruption of residence

thereby occurring would. properly be regarded as meaningful. We

believe that the purpose of this respondent's visit, as found by the

special inquiry officer, in the hilt of all the facts of record, appears not to have been the innocent, casual and brief trip which occurred in the Fleuti case. Clearly on the evidence of record, which

stands undisputed in this respect, this respondent's absence from the

United. States - preceding his last return to this country Invoked

conduct branded criminal by the Immigration and Nationality Act,

and for it. he stands convicted. Accordingly, we agree with the

special inquiry officer that the facts and circumstances of this case

vary so much from those in the Fleuti case - as to render the hOlding therein inapplicable. In other words, the purpose of this respondent's visit to Mexico, as established by the uncontested facts of 'record,

appears not to have been the innocent, casual and brief type of trip

necessary to'bring this case within the judicial precedent relied upon.

Finally, we note that the respondent has not made an application

for any form of discretionary relief. In this connection, he does

not appear to be eligible for any such relief, as the special inquiry

officer has pointed out. The reason is that he may not be regarded

as a person of good moral character because of the provision in section 101(f) (3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.

1101) that no person shall be regarded as, or found to be, a person

of good moral character who during the period for which good

moral character is -required to be established, is or was a person described in section 212(a) (31) of the Act (8 U.S.C. 1182). That

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section in substance, provides that any alien who at any time shall

have, knowingly and for gain, encouraged, induced, assisted, abetted

or aided any other alien to enter or try to enter the United States

in violation of law shall be ineligible to 'receive a visa and shall be

excluded from admission into the United States. Clearly, in view

of the foregoing, the special inquiry officer has correctly applied the

facts of this case to the pertinent provisions of the statute. No

claim to the contrary has been raised.

ORDER: It is ordered that the appeal be and the same is hereby

dismissed.

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