U.S. Department of Labor

Agency decision

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

Administrative Review Board

200 Constitution Ave. NW

Washington, DC 20210-0001

In the Matter of:

JOHN BAUCHE,

COMPLAINANT,

ARB CASE NO.

2022-0035

ALJ CASE NO.

2022-SOX-00010

DATE: September 27, 2022

MASIMO CORPORATION,

RESPONDENT.

Appearances:

For the Complainant:

John Bauche; Pro Se; San Clemente, California

For the Respondent:

David J. Schindler, Esq., Robert J. Ellison, Esq., and Alice R.

Hoesterey, Esq.; Latham & Watkins LLP; Los Angeles, California

Before HARTHILL, Chief Administrative Appeals Judge, and BURRELL

and PUST, Administrative Appeals Judges; BURRELL, Administrative

Appeals Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part

DECISION AND ORDER OF REMAND

PUST, Administrative Appeals Judge:

This case arises under the whistleblower protection provisions of Section 806

of the Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of 2002, Title VIII of the

Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), as amended, and its implementing regulations.1

Complainant John Bauche (Bauche) filed a complaint against Respondent Masimo

Corporation (Masimo) alleging that Masimo terminated his employment and took

other adverse action against him in violation of SOX. On April 1, 2022, a

Department of Labor Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) issued an Order Granting

Motion to Dismiss (D. & O.), which dismissed Bauche’s complaint. We affirm the

ALJ’s decision in part, and vacate and remand in part.

BACKGROUND2

Bauche began working for Masimo as a Social Media Strategist on or about

April 1, 2013.3 Bauche asserts that on July 20, 2016, two investigators hired by

Masimo confronted Bauche, “barricaded” him in an office, flashed fake law

enforcement credentials to him, and began accusing him of stealing nearly $1

million from the company.4 The investigators then “forcibly removed” Bauche from

the office, followed him to his bank, and forced him to give $27,000 to the

investigators.5 The investigators then followed Bauche to his home, told Bauche

that his employment with Masimo was terminated, and “threatened him and his

family with physical harm should he report illegal actions perpetrated by Masimo.”6

Bauche asserts that Masimo persisted in harassing him over the ensuing

18 U.S.C. § 1514A; 29 C.F.R. Part 1980 (2022).

We have considered and accepted as true for purposes of resolving this appeal, the

facts alleged by Bauche in his November 3, 2021 online whistleblower complaint to OSHA

(OSHA Complaint) and his December 16, 2021 Objections to the Secretary’s Findings

(Objections) initiating the proceedings before the ALJ. Although not part of his

administrative “complaint,” considering Bauche’s pro se status and the informal and liberal

pleading requirements of these administrative proceedings, we have also considered and

accepted as true the supplemented and expanded factual allegations articulated by Bauche

in his Response and Objection to Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss Complaint (Opp. to

Motion to Dismiss). See Evans v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, ARB No. 2008-0059, ALJ No.

2008-CAA-00003, slip op. at 8 (ARB July 31, 2012); see also Brown v. Whole Foods Mkt.

Grp., Inc., 789 F.3d 146, 152 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“We have previously held that a district court

errs in failing to consider a pro se litigant’s complaint in light of all filings, including filings

responsive to a motion to dismiss.” (internal quotations and citation omitted)); Ketchum v.

City of W. Memphis, 974 F.2d 81, 82 (8th Cir. 1992) (“[W]e set out additional facts contained

in Ketchum’s opposition to the City’s motion to dismiss, filed in the Court below. Because

plaintiff is proceeding pro se, we treat facts set out in this filing as de facto amendments to

the complaint.”).

Opp. to Motion to Dismiss at 11.

Id. at 12-14; accord Objections at 2.

Opp. to Motion to Dismiss at 12; accord Objections at 2.

several years, under the pretense of seeking redress for his alleged theft from the

company. According to Bauche, Masimo used its investigators’ connections and

relationships in law enforcement to cause the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

and Department of Justice to wrongly investigate Bauche.7 Allegedly spurred on by

the false information supplied by Masimo, the FBI froze Bauche’s personal and

business bank accounts on November 28, 2016.8 Then, on December 20, 2017,

Bauche was indicted on five counts of mail fraud and one count of money

laundering.9 On July 9, 2019, during the pendency of the criminal action, Masimo

also filed a civil lawsuit against Bauche in the Superior Court of California, seeking

to recover the $1 million Bauche allegedly stole from the company and to prevent

Bauche from disclosing Masimo’s confidential business information.10 Bauche also

accuses Masimo of blacklisting him and interfering with his ability to obtain

subsequent employment.11

Bauche maintains that Masimo’s accusations that he committed fraud and

stole from the company are false and pretextual. Affirmatively, Bauche asserts that

Masimo’s conduct was part of a concerted effort to: (1) create fraudulent grounds to

recover $1 million under the employee theft provision of its insurance policy; (2)

cover up its alleged insurance fraud and “related” securities fraud; and (3)

preemptively retaliate against Bauche “[f]or fear of [Bauche] uncovering their fraud

schemes.”12

Bauche, who is self-represented in this case, filed a complaint with the

Department of Labor’s Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) on

November 3, 2021, accusing Masimo of retaliating against him in violation of SOX.

On November 17, 2021, OSHA, acting on behalf of the Secretary of Labor, issued

findings which concluded that Bauche’s allegations did not make a prima facie

showing of retaliation under SOX. Bauche filed objections to OSHA’s findings on

December 16, 2021, and requested a formal hearing with the Department of Labor’s

Opp. to Motion to Dismiss at 13; Objections at 2.

Opp. to Motion to Dismiss at 14; Objections at 2; Indictment, attached as Exhibit 10

to Opp. to Motion to Dismiss; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (mail fraud); 18 U.S.C. § 1956

(money laundering). The U.S. government pursued the criminal charges against Bauche for

nearly four years, before ultimately dismissing them on November 30, 2021, on the eve of

trial. Opp. to Motion to Dismiss at 17; Order Dismissing Indictment with Prejudice,

attached as Exhibit 14 to Opp. to Motion to Dismiss.

Opp. to Motion to Dismiss at 17; Civil Complaint, attached as Exhibit 12 to Opp. to

Motion to Dismiss.

Opp. to Motion to Dismiss at 14; Objections at 2.

Opp. to Motion to Dismiss at 11-15, 32; see also Complainant’s Opening Brief (Comp.

Br.) at 8.

Office of Administrative Law Judges.

After the matter was assigned to an ALJ, Masimo filed a Motion to Dismiss

Bauche’s complaint on March 14, 2022. Masimo argued that Bauche’s complaint

was time-barred because he did not initiate contact with OSHA within 180 days of

the occurrence of the alleged adverse actions, as required by SOX. Alternatively,

Masimo argued that Bauche’s complaint failed to state a claim for relief under SOX.

Specifically, Masimo argued that Bauche did not allege that he engaged in any

activity protected by SOX before he suffered the alleged adverse action, that the

concerns Bauche articulated did not involve fraud against shareholders or otherwise

fall within SOX’s ambit, and that most of the alleged adverse actions were not

actionable under SOX. On March 28, 2022, Bauche filed a Response and Objection

to Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss Complaint, along with several exhibits.

The ALJ granted Masimo’s Motion to Dismiss on April 1, 2022. The ALJ

agreed with Masimo that Bauche’s claims were time-barred and that Bauche had

not articulated a basis to equitably modify SOX’s 180-day limitations period.

Accordingly, the ALJ dismissed Bauche’s complaint.13 Bauche appealed the ALJ’s

decision to the Administrative Review Board (ARB or the Board) on April 15, 2022.

JURISDICTION & STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Secretary of Labor has delegated to the Board the authority to review

ALJ decisions under SOX.14 The ARB reviews de novo an ALJ’s order on a motion to

dismiss.15

Under the rules governing proceedings before ALJs, “[a] party may move to

dismiss part or all of the matter for reasons recognized under controlling law, such

as lack of subject matter jurisdiction, failure to state a claim upon which relief can

be granted, or untimeliness.”16 To survive a motion to dismiss in an administrative

proceeding before an ALJ, a complainant need only provide “fair notice” of his

In light of this dispositive ruling, the ALJ declined to address Masimo’s alternative

arguments. D. & O. at 5. Although Masimo urges the Board to consider these alternative

arguments, considering our rulings herein, we decline to do so in the first instance on

appeal. The ALJ may consider these alternative arguments, to the extent deemed necessary

and appropriate, on remand.

Secretary’s Order No. 01-2020 (Delegation of Authority and Assignment of

Responsibility to the Administrative Review Board (Secretary’s discretionary review of ARB

decisions)), 85 Fed. Reg. 13,186 (Mar. 6, 2020).

Johnson v. The Wellpoint Cos., Inc., ARB No. 2011-0035, ALJ No. 2010-SOX-00038,

slip op. at 5 (ARB Feb. 25, 2013) (citations omitted).

29 C.F.R. § 18.70(c).

claim.17 A complainant provides “fair notice” by articulating: “(1) some facts about

the protected activity, showing some ‘relatedness’ to the laws and regulation of one

of the statutes in our jurisdiction, (2) some facts about the adverse action, (3) a

general assertion of causation and (4) a description of the relief that is sought.”18 In

ruling on a motion to dismiss, the ALJ and the ARB “must view the evidence, along

with all reasonable inferences, in the light most favorable to the non-moving

party.”19

DISCUSSION

SOX provides that any employee who believes he has been discharged or

otherwise discriminated against in violation of the statute must file a complaint

with the Secretary of Labor “not later than 180 days after the date on which the

violation [of SOX] occurs, or after the date on which the employee became aware of

the violation.”20 However, the 180-day limitations period is not jurisdictional and is

subject to equitable modification.21

Traditionally, the Board has recognized four principal circumstances in which

equitable modification may occur:

(1) respondent has actively misled the complainant

regarding the cause of action; (2) complainant has in some

extraordinary way been prevented from filing his or her

action; (3) complainant has raised the precise statutory

claim in issue but has done so in the wrong forum; and (4)

respondent’s own acts or omissions have lulled the

complainant into forgoing prompt attempts to vindicate his

or her rights.[22]

The Board has not considered these situations to be exclusive, and an inability to

establish one of them is not necessarily fatal for an untimely claim.23 However, the

Board has stressed that equitable modification is granted only sparingly, and only

Evans, ARB No. 2008-0059, slip op. at 9.

Id.

Garvey v. Morgan Stanley, ARB No. 2020-0034, ALJ No. 2017-SOX-00030, slip op. at

2-3 (ARB July 16, 2021) (citation omitted).

18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(D); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1980.103(d).

Lugg v. Lear Corp., ARB No. 2022-0008, ALJ No. 2021-SOX-00022, slip op. at 4

(ARB May 19, 2022) (citation omitted).

Id. (citation omitted).

upon a showing that extraordinary circumstances prevented the complainant from

timely filing his complaint.24 In addition, the Board has recognized that “courts

have generally been much less forgiving in receiving late filings where the claimant

failed to exercise due diligence in preserving his legal rights.”25 Bauche bears the

burden of justifying the application of equitable modification principles.26

As the ALJ correctly observed, Bauche did not initiate contact with OSHA

within 180 days of most of the adverse actions allegedly taken against him by

Masimo.27 It is undisputed that Bauche first contacted OSHA regarding his SOX

claim on November 3, 2021—five years after his employment was terminated and

he was referred to law enforcement, four years after he was criminally indicted, and

two years after Masimo filed the civil lawsuit against him. Nevertheless, Bauche

argued below that the limitations period should be equitably modified for three

reasons. First, Bauche argued that he did not discover Masimo’s fraud and its

retaliatory cover-up related thereto until he was preparing for his criminal trial,

shortly before he filed with OSHA. Second, Bauche argued that he had to delay

contacting OSHA during the pendency of his criminal case to preserve his Fifth

Amendment privilege to be free from self-incrimination. Finally, Bauche argued

that Masimo’s threatening and hostile conduct deterred him from filing his claim

sooner.

In the D. & O., the ALJ concluded that Bauche’s alleged lack of knowledge

about Masimo’s retaliatory motive and assertion of his Fifth Amendment privilege

did not create grounds to equitably modify the limitations period.28 For the reasons

set forth below, we agree with these conclusions and affirm the ALJ. Although the

ALJ did not address Bauche’s final argument that Masimo’s conduct deterred him

from filing a complaint with OSHA sooner, we conclude that Bauche is not entitled

to equitable modification on this basis, either. We have considered Bauche’s filings

with the ALJ and with the Board in their entirety, and, even construing the record

“liberally in deference” to Bauche’s unrepresented status,29 his filings contain no

credible factual allegations or legally sufficient arguments to create grounds to

equitably modify the long-expired filing deadline.

Id. (citation omitted).

Id. (internal quotation and citation omitted).

See id. (citation omitted).

As discussed in Section 2, infra, one potential exception is the alleged blacklisting.

D. & O. at 5.

Salyer v. Sunstar Eng’g, ARB No. 2014-0055, ALJ No. 2012-STA-00023, slip op. at 3

n.3 (ARB Sept. 29, 2015) (quoting Menefee v. Tandem Transp. Co., ARB No. 2009-0046, ALJ

No. 2008-STA-00055, slip op. at 7 (ARB Apr. 30, 2010)).

In contrast, although it is clear from Bauche’s factual allegations that most of

the adverse actions Masimo allegedly took against him—including the termination

of his employment, Masimo’s efforts to have him criminally charged, and the civil

lawsuit—are time-barred absent application of equitable modification principles,

Bauche also pled that Masimo blacklisted him and impeded his ability to secure

future employment. Bauche has not articulated the factual basis for this aspect of

his claim, and, therefore, it is not clear from the record at this stage of the

proceedings whether Bauche’s “blacklisting” claim is actionable and timely under

SOX. Accordingly, we remand to the ALJ to more adequately develop the record to

assess Bauche’s blacklisting claim.

1. Bauche Is Not Entitled to Equitable Modification of the Limitations

Period

A. Bauche’s Purported Lack of Knowledge about Masimo’s Retaliatory Motive

Does Not Toll the Limitations Period

A prospective SOX complainant must typically initiate contact with OSHA

within 180 days of receiving “final, definitive, and unequivocal notice of the adverse

employment action.”30 Bauche does not dispute that he had such notice at the time

the alleged adverse action occurred in this case. As a result, we agree with the ALJ

that Bauche’s claim accrued, and the 180-day limitations period began to run, years

before Bauche finally filed his SOX complaint with OSHA on November 3, 2021.31

Bauche contends that even if he was aware of the adverse action when it

occurred, the limitations period should be equitably tolled until he discovered that

the adverse action was motivated by Masimo’s desire to cover up its fraud and

preemptively retaliate against Bauche in anticipation of him uncovering and

blowing the whistle on its misconduct.32 According to Bauche, that discovery did not

occur until October 29, 2021, just days before he filed with OSHA, when he finally

“put [the] pieces together” concerning Masimo’s insurance and securities fraud and

its “nexus and interrelation” with the adverse action taken against him years

earlier.33 Even assuming a complainant’s purported lack of knowledge regarding a

respondent’s retaliatory motive could be sufficient, in appropriate circumstances, to

toll or modify the limitations period despite prior, unequivocal notice of the adverse

McManus v. Tetra Tech Constr. Inc., ARB No. 2016-0063, ALJ No. 2016-SOX-00012,

slip op. at 3 (ARB Dec. 19, 2017) (quoting Rollins v. Am. Airlines, Inc., ARB No. 2004-0140,

ALJ No. 2004-AIR-00009, slip op. at 2-3 (ARB Apr. 3, 2007)).

See D. & O. at 5.

Comp. Br. at 11, 13; Opp. to Motion to Dismiss at 16, 23.

Comp. Br. at 6-7, 10, 20; accord id. at 8, 11, 13.

action itself,34 we conclude that Bauche’s assertion that he did not discover

Masimo’s fraud and the fraud’s “interrelation” with the adverse action taken

against him, until October 29, 2021, is meritless and rebutted by the record and

Bauche’s own assertions and factual allegations.

Masimo argues that Bauche appears to have pulled the alleged date of his

epiphany, October 29, 2021, “out of thin air” to support his arguments in this

appeal.35 Indeed, Bauche never identified that specific date during the ALJ

proceedings as the precise moment when he finally detected or discovered Masimo’s

alleged fraud and cover-up. Instead, he only vaguely asserted that he discovered

this scheme at some point “in the course of the thorough investigation and defense

of the criminal case . . . and in preparation for trial.”36 Bauche has not meaningfully

or reasonably articulated what caused him to suddenly realize Masimo was engaged

in fraud, a cover-up, or a retaliatory scheme on October 29, 2021, nor does Bauche

explain why he could not have, with reasonable diligence, “put the pieces together”

concerning Masimo’s alleged wrongdoing far earlier in the multi-year defense of the

criminal and civil proceedings against him.

In fact, the record and Bauche’s assertions and allegations below flatly

contradict Bauche’s present assertion that he only pieced together Masimo’s

fraudulent and retaliatory scheme on October 29, 2021. Bauche acknowledged

below that he “called out” Masimo for engaging in insurance and shareholder fraud

in a filing in his criminal case on May 20, 2019, two-and-a-half years before he filed

his SOX complaint with OSHA.37 In that filing, Bauche explicitly accused Masimo of

committing insurance and shareholder fraud, and of taking adverse action against

him to “cover [it] up” and make him a “scape goat” for its wrongdoing.38 These

For purposes of our decision today, we need not, and do not, opine on this precise

legal issue. We note, however, that the issue of when a claim accrues and the limitations

period begins to run may be distinct from the issue of when the limitations period, despite

beginning to run, may be tolled or modified. See Coppinger-Martin v. Solis, 627 F.3d 745,

748-52 (9th Cir. 2010).

Respondent’s Response Brief at 14; see also Phillips v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., ARB No.

2015-0059, ALJ No. 2014-FRS-00133, slip op. at 3 n.5 (ARB Aug. 11, 2015) (“The Board

does not generally consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal . . . nor evidence

submitted for the first time on appeal.” (citations omitted)).

Opp. to Motion to Dismiss at 23.

Id. at 17, 25.

Opposition to Non-Parties Masimo Corporation and Patient Safety Movement

Foundation Ex Parte Application for Protective Order and Other Appropriate Relief (Opp.

to Protective Order) at 2, attached as Exhibit 32 to Opp. to Motion to Dismiss (stating that

his criminal indictment was the “result of the unlawful efforts of Masimo . . . to cover up the

insurance fraud [it] committed” against its carrier, and that Masimo “used Mr. Bauche as a

allegations track Bauche’s allegations of insurance and securities fraud and his

theory of retaliation in the present case,39 and amply demonstrate that by 2019,

Bauche already believed the adverse action taken against him was connected to

Masimo’s purported cover-up of its fraudulent scheme.40

Consistent with the allegations Bauche made in this filing in his criminal

scape goat to hide [its] deficient internal controls from [its] shareholders.”). Despite these

prior statements, Bauche contends on appeal that “even though [he] had whistleblower

suspicions early on, those suspicions were limited to Masimo’s insurance fraud scheme (i.e.,

mail fraud) and did not have to do with Masimo’s underlying securities fraud and violations

of SEC rules and regulations (i.e. accounting fraud) . . . that were not made known to Mr.

Bauche until October 29, 2021 . . . .” Comp. Br. at 7; accord id. at 23 (asking the Board to

take judicial notice of his criminal and civil filings, where he asserts “there is no mention of

any knowledge of any violations of [SOX] that are actionable and form the basis of Mr.

Bauche’s claims in” this case). To the contrary, Bauche’s May 20, 2019 filing in his criminal

case clearly accused Masimo of both insurance fraud and of “hid[ing] [its] deficient internal

controls from [its] shareholders.” Opp. to Protective Order at 2. These alleged hidden

deficient internal controls are part of the basis for Bauche’s accusation that Masimo

committed “securities fraud” or violated SEC rules and regulations in this case. Opp. to

Motion to Dismiss at 11 (defining Masimo’s “securities fraud” as “deficient internal

accounting controls, violations of SEC rules and regulations, tampering with financial

records of a publicly-traded company, false statements made to the SEC, inaccurate

disclosures made by Masimo’s executives to the SEC, etc.” (emphasis added)), 17

(acknowledging that Bauche’s May 20, 2019, criminal filing “mention[ed] Masimo’s deficient

controls (i.e. violations of SEC rules and regulations, and considered securities fraud

violations when coupled with Masimo’s false disclosure control validations to the SEC filed

by their CEO and CFO)” (emphasis added)). Additionally, Bauche argues that Masimo’s

insurance fraud constituted mail fraud, which is a separately enumerated category under

SOX. Id. at 11, 13; 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1); Reyna v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 506 F. Supp. 2d

1363, 1380-83 (M.D. Ga. 2007) (finding insurance fraud could constitute mail or wire fraud

under SOX). Thus, even if Bauche’s initial concerns were limited solely to Masimo’s alleged

insurance fraud, Bauche still should have acted sooner to preserve and prosecute this

aspect of his SOX claim.

Opp. to Motion to Dismiss at 11 (“This action involves a complex, multi-faceted fraud

scheme perpetrated by Masimo, through its ‘private investigator,’ and their connections in

the government (i.e. conspiracy) to commit insurance fraud (i.e. mail fraud) and efforts to

cover up its securities fraud violations . . . while trying to make Mr. Bauche the ‘fall guy’ in

the process.”), 32 (“Masimo orchestrated all of these adverse actions and this entire

insurance fraud scheme in an attempt to silence Mr. Bauche and conceal its securities fraud

violations while receiving payment on their fraudulent insurance claim . . . . All of this was

accomplished using preemptive and anticipatory retaliation”); see also Objections at 2-3.

See Gonzalez v. Planned Parenthood of Los Angeles, 759 F.3d 1112, 1115 (9th Cir.

2014) (“Although we normally treat all of a plaintiff’s factual allegations in a complaint as

true, we ‘need not accept as true allegations that contradict matters properly subject to

judicial notice or [attached to a complaint as an] exhibit.’” (citations omitted)).

case, Bauche also tacitly acknowledged below that he became aware of the basis for

his SOX claim in or around 2019 when he was engaged in discovery in connection

with his criminal case. In response to Masimo’s motion to dismiss, Bauche stated

that he “was not privy to much of the information that forms the basis for the

claims at issue [in this case] until Masimo was forced to produce it after losing a

motion for protective order” in the criminal case.41 The criminal court denied the

protective order on June 19, 2019.42 Bauche asserted that, “[w]ith that order

denying the protective order, the evidence that was then disclosed shined an even

brighter light on Masimo’s egregious conduct—including in coordination with the

government.”43

Additionally, Bauche asserted in his response below that the close proximity

between his criminal filing “calling out” Masimo’s fraud, and Masimo’s subsequent

civil lawsuit against him in July 2019, was “more than enough to prove retaliation

in this action.”44 If Bauche believes that the timing and sequence of these events in

mid-2019 was enough to prove that Masimo was retaliating against him for “calling

out” its insurance and shareholder fraud, then these events should also have been

enough to alert Bauche to his potential cause of action under SOX.

For these reasons, we reject Bauche’s new and conclusory assertion on appeal

that he did not have a basis to conclude that he was the victim of retaliation until

October 29, 2021. Instead, the record and Bauche’s own admissions and allegations

conclusively demonstrate that Bauche was aware of Masimo’s alleged fraud and

cover-up and, thus, its purported reasons for taking adverse actions against Bauche,

by 2019. Therefore, there is no factual basis to equitably toll or modify the

limitations period in these circumstances.45

Opp. to Motion to Dismiss at 4.

Id.; Order Accepting Report and Recommendation of United States Magistrate

Judge and Overruling Objections, attached as Exhibit 1 to Opp. to Motion to Dismiss.

Opp. to Motion to Dismiss at 4. Despite these admissions, Bauche asserts that “[i]n

July of 2019, Mr. Bauche didn’t have all of the evidence obtained via subpoena from third

parties during the investigation and defense of the criminal matter, and barely had

reviewed any communications and documents in the 91,000+ pages of Masimo’s discovery . .

. .” Complainant’s Reply Brief at 6. To the extent Bauche argues that he needed additional

proof of Masimo’s fraud or retaliatory motivations before he could file a complaint with

OSHA, his argument fails. The fact that Bauche may not have had every document he

believed he needed to prove his case does not mean that he did not have sufficient

information to at least be on notice of, and to file an OSHA complaint concerning, his claim.

See Coppinger-Martin, 627 F.3d at 750.

Opp. to Motion to Dismiss at 25.

Hollander v. Brown, 457 F.3d 688, 691 n.1 (7th Cir. 2006) (“[D]ismissal . . . on the

basis of a limitations defense may be appropriate when the plaintiff effectively pleads

B. Bauche’s Invocation of his Fifth Amendment Privilege Does Not Toll the

Limitations Period

Bauche alleges that, upon discovering that he was the subject of a criminal

investigation in November 2016, he retained a criminal defense attorney who

advised him to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege to be free from selfincrimination.46 According to Bauche, his desire to preserve his Fifth Amendment

privilege “prevented him from coming forward to report these whistleblower

violations sooner.”47 Numerous federal district courts have determined that a

complainant’s decision to forestall filing a civil action in an effort to preserve Fifth

Amendment rights, or for fear of otherwise adversely impacting a criminal case,

does not create grounds to extend the applicable limitations period.48 We agree with

the ALJ and these courts, and conclude that Bauche’s purported desire to invoke

and preserve his right to be free from self-incrimination in the face of his criminal

investigation and criminal charges is not a legally sufficient basis to equitably toll

the filing period in this case.

C. Masimo’s Alleged Threatening and Hostile Conduct Does Not Toll the

Limitations Period

Finally, Bauche argued below that the limitations period should be modified

because Masimo “actively misled [him] into inaction . . . through acts of harassment,

intimidation, threats, abuse of power, the instigation of a malicious prosecution

through its connections, and the frivolous civil lawsuit that it initiated against him

herself out of court by alleging facts that are sufficient to establish the defense.” (citation

omitted)); cf. Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 682 (9th Cir. 1980) (“When a

motion to dismiss is based on the running of the statute of limitations, it can be granted

only if the assertions of the complaint, read with the required liberality, would not permit

the plaintiff to prove that the statute was tolled.” (internal quotations and citation

omitted)).

Opp. to Motion to Dismiss at 7-8, 13. The Fifth Amendment to the United States

Constitution provides that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a

witness against himself.” U.S. CONST. amend V.

Opp. to Motion to Dismiss at 26; accord id. at 8-9.

Hardie v. CIT Bank, No. GJH-20-2627, 2021 WL 3617199, at *7-8 (D. Md. Aug. 16,

2021); Stoner v. Percell, No. 3:13-CV-00762-CRS, 2014 WL 6611557, at *5 (W.D. Ky. Nov.

20, 2014); Todd v. Baker, No. 2:06-CV-0889, 2007 WL 188740, at *2 (S.D. Oh. Jan. 22,

2007); Skinner v. Denny, No. 3:06-CV-00537-RLH-(RAM), 2006 WL 8448180, at *2 (D. Nev.

Dec. 8, 2006); Appel v. City of St. Louis, No. 4:05cv772 SNL, 2005 WL 8167879, at *6 (E.D.

Mo. Dec. 14, 2005).

to destroy and silence him.”49 Unlike Bauche’s other equitable modification

arguments, the ALJ did not discuss this third argument in the D. & O.

Nevertheless, our review of the record and pleadings leads us to conclude that the

facts as alleged by Bauche cannot support a basis for equitably modifying the

limitations period.50 Even taking Bauche’s allegations about Masimo’s conduct as

true and giving him the benefit of favorable inferences, Bauche cannot show that

Masimo’s alleged conduct, though of a serious nature, deterred him from reporting

its alleged wrongdoing.

In Farnham v. International Manufacturing Solutions, the Board recognized

that an employer’s acts or threats that deter an employee from timely filing his

complaint may, in appropriate and extraordinary circumstances, constitute

sufficient grounds to equitably modify the limitations period.51 However, “[t]o

establish duress sufficient to toll the running of the limitations period, [a

complainant] must do more than simply allege a subjective fear that the

Respondents might retaliate against him. Instead, he must show some act or threat

by the Respondents that precluded him from exercising his free will and judgment

and prevented him from exercising his legal rights.”52

As made clear in Farnham, an employee who, by his own conduct,

demonstrates that he has not lost his “free will and judgment” will not be entitled to

Opp. to Motion to Dismiss at 24; accord id. at 16 (stating that Masimo took actions

“to intimidate, threaten and harass Mr. Bauche to dissuade him from whistleblowing, thus

equitably tolling all retaliatory actions in this matter.”). Bauche has not reiterated this

argument with great clarity on appeal. See, e.g., Comp. Br. at 8 (stating that “[t]here has

been no shortage of adverse actions taken against Mr. Bauche by Masimo to help prove

contributing factor causation in Masimo’s ruthless attempts to dissuade Mr. Bauche

from filing this action and bringing forth his claims,” but not expressly linking this

conduct to his equitable modification arguments (emphasis added)). However, given the

adjudicative latitude afforded to Bauche as a pro se litigant, the liberal pleading standards

and the standards applicable to a motion to dismiss in these administrative proceedings,

our obligation to consider the record as a whole in the light most favorable to Bauche as the

non-moving party at this point in the proceedings, and our de novo standard of review, we

have elected to consider the argument on appeal.

It is a well-established appellate principle that appellate courts may “affirm the

[lower] court on any basis supported by the record.” U.S. v. Am. Prod. Indus., Inc., 58 F.3d

404, 407 n.2 (9th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted); accord McAdams v. McCord, 584 F.3d 1111,

1113-14 (8th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted); see also Bibeau v. Pac. Nw. Rsch. Found. Inc.,

188 F.3d 1105, 1111 n.5 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating that “it is sometimes appropriate for an

appellate court to [rule] on issues of law that the trial court did not consider,” especially

when applying a de novo standard of review, under which the trial court’s judgment would

not be entitled to deference anyway).

ARB No. 2007-0095, ALJ No. 2006-SOX-00111, slip op. at 11 (ARB Feb. 6, 2009).

Id. (citations omitted).

application of equitable modification principles.53 Like Bauche here, the

complainant in Farnham sought to salvage his untimely SOX claim by arguing that

he feared retaliation from the respondent if he filed a complaint with OSHA. Among

other things, the complainant pointed to his manager’s purported connections to a

Mexican drug cartel, his manager’s criminal record, including a conviction for

assault, and his manager’s statement that “if anyone ever (expletive) with me…I’ve

got friends.”54 Even so, the Board affirmed the ALJ’s decision that the complainant

failed to carry his burden of establishing that his employer’s conduct “precluded him

from exercising his free will and judgment.”55 As relevant to this appeal, the Board

concluded that the complainant’s actions preceding his initial contact with OSHA

were inconsistent with the notion that he feared reprisal or retaliation if he filed a

SOX claim.56 Despite complainant’s alleged fear, the complainant had instigated an

FBI investigation of the respondent’s business activities, discussed his plans to

pursue a claim against the respondent with his former co-workers, filed a

countersuit against the respondent in response to a civil action it filed against him,

and complained to his Congressman about the respondent’s business dealings.57 The

Board concluded that the complainant’s “actions [spoke] louder than his words,” and

that these were “not the actions of an individual who has lost his free will and

judgment.”58

Like in Farnham, the actions Bauche took before finally filing his OSHA

complaint, as articulated and reflected in his own filings below, amply demonstrate

that he was not under such significant duress from Masimo’s conduct as to “lose his

free will and judgment.” As noted above, during the time that Bauche alleges he

was dissuaded from filing with OSHA, he actively participated in multiple legal

interactions with and against Masimo in federal and state court and openly accused

Masimo of the same fraud and wrongdoing as alleged in this case. Bauche litigated

a defense to the criminal fraud and money laundering claims that Masimo allegedly

orchestrated with the FBI, in which he boldly “called out” Masimo for engaging in

fraud and using him as the scape goat for its own illegal activity—the same

accusations he argues he was deterred from filing in this case.59 Bauche similarly

defended a civil action Masimo filed against him in state court under the same

events. Months before Bauche filed with OSHA, he also contacted the Department

Id.

Id. at 2-3.

Id. at 11.

Id.

Opp. to Motion to Dismiss at 17, 25; Opp. to Protective Order at 2.

of Justice Office of the Inspector General about Masimo’s alleged misconduct.60 As

in Farnham, “[t]hese are not the actions of an individual who has lost his free will

and judgment.”61 Instead, they reflect a willingness, if not eagerness, to challenge

Masimo’s alleged wrongdoing.62 Accordingly, Bauche’s pleadings and filings below,

taken as true, establish that Bauche is not entitled to equitable modification of the

See Opp. to Motion to Dismiss at 11; June 28, 2021 Department of Justice Letter,

attached as Exhibit 16 to Opp. to Motion to Dismiss.

Farnham, ARB No. 2007-0095, slip op. at 11; see also Franklin v. Warmington, 709

F. App’x 373, 375 (7th Cir. 2017) (affirming district court decision that alleged death

threats did not warrant modifying the limitations period, where plaintiff complained to

police regarding threats shortly after they were made); Morales v. Robinson, No. 2:05-0509,

2007 WL 1074836, at *6 (S.D. W. Va. Apr. 6, 2007) (concluding that “plaintiff’s allegations

in her complaint conclusively establish that she was not deterred by [the defendant]’s

alleged threats,” where plaintiff promptly reported the defendant’s wrongdoing to the

defendant’s employer and a prosecutor); Moses v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 818 F. Supp. 1287,

1290 (D. Ariz. 1993) (declining to extend the limitations period due to alleged fear of

reprisal, where “[p]laintiff does not appear to have been intimidated into silence, since she

complained to her supervisors on numerous occasions about the harassment.”).

We also note that Masimo’s alleged threats and hostile conduct occurred or

commenced years before Bauche finally filed his complaint with OSHA. Bauche has not

attempted to explain why he allegedly continued to feel deterred from filing with OSHA for

so long or why, suddenly, he no longer felt under duress in November 2021. See Vergara v.

City of Chicago, 939 F.3d 882, 887 (7th Cir. 2019) (“The problem with the plaintiffs’

argument is readily apparent: They contend that the officers’ threats, which stopped two

weeks after the alleged constitutional violations, tolled the limitations period for the next

three and a half years.”); Jaso v. The Coca Cola Co., 435 F. App’x 346, 358 (5th Cir. 2011)

(“Proof of threats have been considered in tolling the statute of limitations only where the

threats themselves continue up to the point that the plaintiff brings her action.” (internal

quotation and citation omitted)); Warren v. United States, 74 Fed. Cl. 723, 726-27 (Fed. Cl.

2006) (“Assuming arguendo that duress may toll the statute of limitations . . . , in this case,

the Complaint has not demonstrated a sufficient factual basis for invoking that doctrine. . .

. Plaintiff fails to state why he has been under a continuing threat for the past fifteen years,

partly since Plaintiff has not been subject to [the defendant’s] control since his discharge in

1991.”); Tompkins v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., No. 2:12-cv-01481 JAM-GGH, 2012 WL 4643099,

at *3 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2012) (“If a plaintiff allows a claim to remain dormant for years and

does not allege that any misrepresentations, misunderstandings, or threats occurred in

those years, equitable estoppel will not apply. . . . Plaintiff has not alleged any facts

showing that in the past eleven years, Defendant has harassed Plaintiff or intimidated him

in order to discourage him from filing.”). To the extent Bauche contends that he continued

to feel deterred from filing with OSHA because the criminal and civil actions remained

pending for years after Masimo’s initial threats were made in 2016, he has not attempted to

explain why he then filed his complaint with OSHA in November 2021, before either case

had concluded.

limitations period.63

2. Bauche’s Blacklisting Claim Is Remanded for Further Development

Among the other adverse actions that Bauche alleges Masimo took against

him, Bauche accused Masimo of “blacklisting (intentionally interfering with Mr.

Bauche’s ability to earn a living and obtain future employment) through defamation

and false criminal charges.”64 Aside from this brief accusation, Bauche has not

elaborated on his blacklisting claim or explained the factual basis for it.

As stated above, a complainant’s factual allegations ultimately must provide

“fair notice” of his claim, including “some facts about the adverse action.”65

Although blacklisting is prohibited by SOX,66 Bauche’s bare and conclusory legal

assertion that Masimo “blacklisted” him, without more, does not provide “fair

notice” of his claim.67 For example, although Bauche accuses Masimo of blacklisting

him by “defaming” him, he has not articulated when the defamation occurred, who

defamed him, to whom he was defamed, what statements comprised the

defamation, why the statements were defamatory, or how the defamatory

statements prevented him from obtaining other employment. Likewise, Bauche has

not identified any specific employment position he believes he was denied because of

See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007) (“A complaint is subject to dismissal for

failure to state a claim if the allegations, taken as true, show the plaintiff is not entitled to

relief.”); Cancer Found., Inc. v. Cerberus Cap. Mgmt., LP, 559 F.3d 671, 674-75 (7th Cir.

2009) (“[D]ismissal is appropriate when the plaintiff pleads himself out of court by alleging

facts sufficient to establish the complaint’s tardiness.”).

Opp. to Motion to Dismiss at 14. Bauche made a similar, though more

circumscribed, statement in his objections to OSHA’s initial findings. Objections at 2

(accusing Masimo of “blacklisting (intentionally interfering with an employee’s ability to

obtain future employment).”).

Evans, ARB No. 2008-0059, slip op. at 9.

29 C.F.R. § 1980.102(a).

See Burnett v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., 706 F.3d 1231, 1240 (10th Cir. 2013)

(stating that allegations that contained “zero details or concrete examples” were “too

conclusory, vague and confusing to give” fair notice of the claim (citations omitted));

Williams v. Boeing Co., 517 F.3d 1120, 1131 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating that “general

allegations that [plaintiffs] were discriminated against with regard to ‘terms of

employment’ did not provide ‘fair notice’” of the claim); Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomm.,

372 F.3d 1250, 1271 (11th Cir. 2004) (“The liberal standard of notice pleading still requires

a plaintiff to provide the defendant with fair notice of the factual grounds on which the

complaint rests.”).

Masimo’s conduct.68 Indeed, it is not even clear whether Masimo’s alleged

“blacklisting” involved some identifiable, independent instance of Masimo

disseminating false or damaging information about Bauche to a specific potential or

prospective employer, or whether, instead, Bauche is merely asserting that his

future employment prospects have been generally or potentially harmed because of

the other discrete adverse actions Masimo is alleged to have committed in this

case.69

Bauche’s failure to articulate any facts in support of his blacklisting claim is

particularly problematic in this case given the timeliness concerns discussed above.

To the extent Bauche’s blacklisting claim is based on some independent, discrete

defamatory statement Masimo allegedly made to a prospective employer, his

blacklisting claim may be timely if that defamatory statement was made within 180

days of Bauche filing his initial complaint with OSHA. On the other hand, if the

alleged defamation or blacklisting occurred outside of the limitations period, or if

the blacklisting claim is simply a derivative of the other alleged forms of adverse

action, Bauche’s blacklisting claim would likely suffer from the same timeliness

issues as the other aspects of his case. As pled, we cannot yet assess the merits,

legal sufficiency, or timeliness of Bauche’s blacklisting claim.

Although Bauche has thus far failed to provide fair notice of his blacklisting

claim, we nevertheless conclude that dismissal of that claim is not appropriate at

this time. As the Board has previously explained, the complaint an employee must

file to initiate a whistleblower retaliation claim with OSHA is not governed by

formal pleading requirements.70 These initial filings tend to be informal, are often

filed without the assistance of counsel, and may not even be in writing, and it is

presupposed that the complaints will be amplified by the ensuing investigations.71

Likewise, a complainant’s objections to OSHA’s initial findings, which initiate the

adversarial proceedings before an ALJ, may also be informal, and may not include

the full range of factual allegations necessary to state a plausible retaliation

claim.72 For these reasons, the Board has stressed that although pleadings must

ultimately provide “fair notice” of a claim, “‘ALJs should [also] freely grant parties

To be clear, we do not intend to suggest that Bauche must recite every detail of the

factual underpinnings for his blacklisting claim to provide fair notice of his claim.

However, he must certainly do more than simply invoke the words “blacklisting” and

“defamation.”

See Opp. to Motion to Dismiss at 14 (stating that the alleged blacklisting derived, at

least in part, from the “false criminal charges.”).

Evans, ARB No. 2008-0059, slip op. at 6-7; 29 C.F.R. § 1980.103(b) (“No particular

form of complaint is required. A complaint may be filed orally or in writing.”).

Evans, ARB No. 2008-0059, slip op. at 7; see 29 C.F.R. § 1980.104.

See 29 C.F.R. § 1980.106; see also Evans, ARB No. 2008-0059, slip op. at 8.

the opportunity to amend their initial filings to provide more information about

their complaint before the complaint is dismissed,’ especially when ‘it appears that

a complaint may be saved by the allegation of additional facts.’”73 “Otherwise,

complainants would have to be mindful of the pleading standards when filing their

complaint with OSHA, which would be inappropriate given the nature of the

administrative whistleblower complaint process.”74

Although Bauche supplemented his factual allegations with respect to many

aspects of his claim in his response to Masimo’s motion to dismiss, his allegations

with respect to his blacklisting claim remain undeveloped and incomplete. It does

not appear from the record that Bauche understood that he should, or needed to,

articulate the factual bases for every aspect of his claim before the ALJ dismissed

his complaint, and he even expressly stated in his response brief below that the

additional factual allegations contained therein were “not meant to be all-inclusive,

but rather a brief summary of some of the underlying material facts and others that

will be fully developed with currently available evidence in Mr. Bauche’s possession,

as well as evidence yet to be subpoenaed.”75 At this stage of the proceedings and on

the current record, we cannot rule out the possibility that Bauche may be able to

articulate a sufficient factual predicate for a timely and actionable blacklisting

claim, if given the opportunity to amend and supplement his pleadings.76

Accordingly, we remand to the ALJ to permit Bauche the opportunity to

articulate the factual basis for his blacklisting claim. We do not discount the

possibility that the ALJ may, on remand, correctly determine that Bauche’s

blacklisting claim should be dismissed for failure to state a claim, for untimeliness,

McFadden v. Deutsche Bank/DB USA Core Corp., ARB No. 2022-0002, ALJ No.

2021-SOX-00023, slip op. at 4 (ARB Jan. 26, 2022) (quoting Sylvester v. Parexel Int’l LLC,

ARB No. 2007-0123, ALJ Nos. 2007-SOX-00039, -00042, slip op. at 13 (ARB May 25, 2011);

Evans, ARB No. 2008-0059, slip op. at 11)).

Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).

Opp. to Motion to Dismiss at 11.

Although we conclude that Bauche should have the opportunity to better articulate

his blacklisting claim, we do not have the same concern regarding the other forms of

adverse action alleged in this case. Bauche provided a detailed recitation of the factual

bases for the remainder of the alleged adverse actions in his response to Masimo’s motion to

dismiss below. Id. at 11-18. From these supplemented allegations, we can, and did, conclude

that Bauche’s equitable tolling arguments, discussed in Section 1, supra, cannot be “saved

by the allegation of additional facts.” McFadden, ARB No. 2022-0002, slip op. at 4 (quoting

Evans, ARB No. 2008-005, slip op. at 11). As discussed above, Bauche’s supplemental

allegations and materials provided with his response brief disproved his claim that he

lacked knowledge of Masimo’s fraud and retaliatory cover-up and that he was deterred by

Masimo’s conduct, and Bauche’s Fifth Amendment argument is legally insufficient to

justify application of equitable tolling principles.

or for some other reason recognized by the applicable procedural rules or legal

precedent.77 However, that determination can only be made after Bauche has had

sufficient opportunity to better articulate his claim.78

See 29 C.F.R. § 18.70(c).

We recognize that Bauche did not argue to the ALJ or the ARB that his blacklisting

claim should be carved out for special or independent consideration with respect to

Masimo’s motion to dismiss on timeliness grounds. It is not clear why Bauche failed to do

so, to the extent he believed that his blacklisting claim constituted an independent and

timely basis for his SOX retaliation claim. See Burrell Concurrence and Dissent, infra, at

22 (“Complainant had the motivation to appeal the ALJ’s dismissal of his claim but did not

mention the ALJ’s failure to address blacklisting in the slightest degree.”). However, we

note that it does not appear that the ALJ ever asked, or required, Bauche to supplement his

allegations with respect to his blacklisting claim, or any other aspect of his claim, or

warned Bauche of the potential consequences of failing to articulate the factual

underpinnings for each aspect of his claim. We also note that Bauche’s response to

Masimo’s motion to dismiss (which is the only opportunity Bauche had below to supplement

his factual allegations) tends to track Masimo’s motion to dismiss, which did not mention,

or address, the potential timeliness of Bauche’s blacklisting claim specifically. Likewise,

Bauche’s appellate briefs tend to track the ALJ’s D. & O. which also did not mention, or

address, the potential timeliness of Bauche’s blacklisting claim. Considering these

circumstances, and because of Bauche’s pro se status, the liberal pleading standards and

the standards applicable to a motion to dismiss in these administrative proceedings, our

obligation to consider the record as a whole in the light most favorable to Bauche as the

non-moving party at this point in the proceedings, and our de novo standard of review, we

have elected to consider this issue on appeal. We also recognize, as the partial dissent

points out, that Bauche did not explicitly request the opportunity to supplement or amend

his allegations regarding his blacklisting claim. However, in the circumstances of this case,

we conclude Bauche should still be afforded the opportunity to do so. In particular, we note

that this case, if appealed, would likely be heard by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,

which has held that “[i]n dismissing for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), a

district court should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading

was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the

allegation of other facts.” Schmitt v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan of Wash., 965 F.3d 945, 960

(9th Cir. 2020) (internal quotations and citation omitted) (emphasis added); see also Opp. to

Motion to Dismiss at 11 (acknowledging that his facts as alleged were not “all-inclusive,”

and suggesting that the facts could be “fully developed” with “currently available evidence

in Mr. Bauche’s possession . . . .”). In our view, the fact that “the ALJ may not have

appreciated that Complainant was attempting to make a separate legal claim of

blacklisting” is even more reason for this case to be remanded for the ALJ to consider the

issue. See Burrell Concurrence and Dissent at 22 n.90.

The majority affirms the ALJ’s dismissal on several points but remands due

to the ALJ’s failure to address Complainant’s allegations concerning blacklisting.80

For the reasons discussed below, I would affirm the ALJ’s dismissal.

First and foremost, Complainant did not appeal the ALJ’s failure to address

blacklisting to the ARB. This alone is grounds for deeming the matter waived or

forfeited.81

Before the ALJ, in his response to Masimo’s Motion to Dismiss, Complainant

claims, in a mosaic of alleged harassment and intimidation stemming from the

criminal and civil litigation in 2017-2019, that:

. . . Mr. Bauche has suffered unfavorable personnel actions,

all taken in preemptive and anticipatory retaliation, . . .

which include but are not limited to . . . blacklisting

(intentionally interfering with Mr. Bauche’s ability to earn

a living and obtain future employment) through

defamation and false criminal charges.[82]

This is the entirety of his blacklisting claim. He does not develop this potential

blacklisting with alleged facts supporting the claim.

Complainant’s pro se status does not permit a one-sentence claim in response

to a motion to dismiss.83 True, a pro se complainant “must be held to less stringent

The majority bases its remand on liberal pleading standards as set out in Evans v.

U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, ARB No. 2008-0059, ALJ No. 2008-CAA-00003 (ARB July 31, 2012)

(Evans II). In 2015, the Department promulgated new OALJ Rules of Practice and

Procedure expressly empowering parties to move to dismiss for failure to state a claim. 29

C.F.R. § 18.70(c). No party argues that these rules affect Evans II’s “fair notice” pleading

standard. For the reasons set out below, I would affirm the ALJ’s dismissal under Evans

II’s “fair notice” standard or modern federal pleading standards under Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6).

29 C.F.R. § 1980.110(a) (“The parties should identify in their petitions for review the

legal conclusions or orders to which they object, or the objections may be deemed waived.”).

“The premise of our adversarial system is that appellate courts do not sit as self-directed

boards of legal inquiry and research, but essentially as arbiters of legal questions presented

and argued by the parties before them.” Carducci v. Regan, 714 F.2d 171, 177 (D.C. Cir.

1983).

Opp. Motion to Dismiss (MTD) at 14.

Prior to filing the claim with OSHA, Complainant was involved in protracted

criminal and civil litigation. For purposes of this concurring and dissenting opinion, I do not

consider whether his experience warrants reducing the special consideration given to pro se

pleadings. Davidson v. Flynn, 32 F.3d 27, 31 (2d Cir. 1994).

standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” and these pleadings are “to be

liberally construed.”84 Nonetheless, a pro se litigant must still plead “more than

labels and conclusions.”85 The rules of generous construction of pro se pleadings

“do[ ] not relieve the plaintiff of the burden of alleging sufficient facts on which a

recognized legal claim could be based.”86 The Seventh Circuit in Briscoe v. LaHue,

recognized that:

Of course, [a] pro se complaint is to be liberally construed,

and should be dismissed for failure to state a claim only if

it appears “beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set

of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to

relief.” [Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972).] But

even under the generous standard of Haines, conclusory

allegations unsupported by any factual assertions will not

withstand a motion to dismiss.[87]

Complainant’s one-sentence blacklisting claim is void of any factual

allegations and appears to be cut-and-paste text from whistleblower definitional

material. It simply states a conclusion that he suffered alleged blacklisting through

defamation and false criminal charges. Complainant does not allege any facts

supporting the claim, for example, that there was a prospective employer and that

he was seeking employment but was rejected. Conclusory allegations are

insufficient to avoid a motion to dismiss.88 Complainant’s theory appears to be that

the criminal and civil litigation against him could result in potential blacklisting, if,

in the future, he seeks employment, and the prospective employer learns of this

material. As this does not provide notice of a claim, I would affirm the ALJ’s

dismissal.89

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).

Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 304 n.5 (4th Cir. 2008).

Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).

Briscoe v. LaHue, 663 F.2d 713, 723 (7th Cir. 1981).

Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986) (on a motion to dismiss, courts “are not

bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation”).

Dunn v. BNSF Ry. Co., C17-0333, 2017 WL 3670559, at *10 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 25,

2017) (court agreeing that mark on employment record creating “potential for blacklisting”

“alone does not create a ‘plausible basis to support an allegation relating to blacklisting,’

thus fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”); Bailiff v. Davenport

Transp., Inc., No. 3:13–CV–308–GCM, 2013 WL 6229150, at *6 (W.D.N.C. Dec. 2, 2013)

(Plaintiff’s allegation “that an unnamed prospective employer was told a ‘defamatory

statement’ at an unspecified time and place” was insufficient to avoid dismissal. “While the

Plaintiff is not required to plead his entire case in the Complaint, he must still allege

sufficient facts upon which to base a legal claim. Some information about the nature of the

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.