Case law

People v. Hayes

159 Ill. App. 3d 1048 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Aug 18, 1987

The court noted the State’s indication in conference that the crimes were heinous and brutal, thus qualifying for extended term and a sentence of up to 60 years’ imprisonment. … Here, the provision for a staffer sentence if defendant failed to appear became an integral part of the plea agreement, was clearly communicated to and understood by defendant at the time of the plea, compensated for defendant

Nowak v. City of Country Club Hills

406 Ill. App. 3d 837 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Dec 27, 2010

The record establishes the following undisputed facts. … Section 1(d) of the PEDA provides that a disabled employee receiving salary benefits under that statute “shall not be entitled to any benefits for which he would qualify because of his disability under the provisions of the

Stone Street Partners, LLC v. City of Chicago Department of Administrative Hearings

2017 IL 117720 · Illinois Supreme Court · Jan 17, 2018

¶3 BACKGROUND ¶4 The standards governing this appeal are well established. … These acts did not require the expertise that only a lawyer is qualified to provide. In fact, no legal knowledge or skill was necessary to present the exhibits.

Anderson v. Illinois Department of Professional Regulation

Appellate Court of Illinois · May 13, 2004

Gorchynsky to be more qualified and giving his testimony more weight, disagreed with the ALJ. The Board found that the following acts or omissions by Dr. … The Director’s decision was not clearly erroneous and therefore must be affirmed.

Teta v. Packard

959 F. Supp. 469 · District Court, N.D. Illinois · Feb 26, 1997

When Packard removed this case to federal court, Teta’s complaint clearly attempted to allege a federal cause of action, albeit deficiently. … Because the court finds that Packard did not act under color of state law, the court need not address Packard's contentions with respect to qualified immunity.

City of Freeport v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board

135 Ill. 2d 499 · Illinois Supreme Court · Apr 18, 1990

The ranking officers clearly satisfy the third prong of the supervisory definition with respect to discipline. … The Board’s strained analysis of the principal-work prong was clearly improper.

United States v. City of Moline

82 F. 592 · District Court, N.D. Illinois · Jul 3, 1897

The power to regúlate commerce is not given in any broader terms than that to establish post offices and post roads; but, if congress wishes to take private property upon which to lmild a post office, it must either agree … It contemplated simply immunity from change in the matter of the draw until the river was needed for navigation, and it is immaterial whether that need is now declared by the legislature of the state or the government of

Chand v. Patla

Appellate Court of Illinois · Aug 6, 2003

App. 3d at 984 (the argument that an attorney fee award was barred by sovereign immunity was devoid of merit). We therefore affirm that part of the circuit court's judgment relating to the requested medical records. … The ALJ's conclusions were not clearly erroneous. See City of Belvidere , 181 Ill. 2d at 205 .

Blount v. Stroud

Illinois Supreme Court · Jan 23, 2009

See 720 ILCS 5/32–2 (West 2000) (establishing and defining the offense of perjury, a Class 3 felony). … Ct. 1800 (1997) (where the Court distinguished Felder and held that an Idaho appellate rule limiting interlocutory appeals applies to the denial of qualified immunity in a section 1983 claim brought in state court)).

Honeywell International, Inc. v. The Department of Revenue of the State of IL.

Appellate Court of Illinois · May 5, 2006

Accordingly, we apply the clearly erroneous standard of review. … AThe detention and control, or the manual or ideal custody, of anything which may be the subject of property, for one=s use and enjoyment, either as owner or as the proprietor of a qualified

Turner v. the Saloon, Ltd.

491 F. Supp. 2d 753 · District Court, N.D. Illinois · May 25, 2007

Summary Judgment Standard Well-established Rule 56 principles impose on parties wishing to prevail on summary judgment the burden of establishing a. lack of a genuine issue of material fact (Celotex Corp. v. … Sears Roebuck & Co., 417 F.3d 789, 797 (7th Cir.2005) teaches: To establish a claim for failure to accommodate, a plaintiff must show that (l)[]he is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) the employer was aware of

People Ex Rel. Warren v. Drummet

415 Ill. 411 · Illinois Supreme Court · May 20, 1953

We have considered the evidence upon the basis of which the trial judge found that the petition was signed by 106 qualified voters residing within the proposed district. The evidence amply supports that finding. … On January 22, 1949, the day on which the election establishing the Wenona District was held, Community Unit School District No. 2 of Marshall County to the west of Rutland was established by election.

Cage v. City of Chicago

979 F. Supp. 2d 787 · District Court, N.D. Illinois · Sep 24, 2013

Qualifications Harmor is qualified to offer the opinions described above. … The language from the report clearly implies that such testing was specifically requested (or at a minimum, proposed) and that Fish refused to perform it.

Williams v. City of Chicago

371 Ill. App. 3d 105 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Jan 12, 2007

Defendant's duty is limited by section 3-102(a) of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Tort Immunity Act), which provides: "[A] local public entity has the duty to exercise … Clearly, the defendant intended that plaintiff cross at the crosswalk, walk along the sidewalk toward her car, then step onto the curb and into the car.

Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Ross Bicycles, Inc.

678 F. Supp. 1336 · District Court, N.D. Illinois · Jan 25, 1988

Similarly, the Ross exercise bicycle is sold only by authorized Ross dealer bicycle shops which are clearly identified with the Ross name and contain products clearly bearing the Ross name. … The evidence indicates that some sort of fan guard is clearly necessary for reasons of safety.

Town of Ottawa v. County of La Salle

11 Ill. 654 · Illinois Supreme Court · Jun 15, 1850

The first section of the law provides, that the qualified voters of each county may vote for or against organization under the law, at the next general election after its passage j and the fourth section declares, that it … We are very clearly of opinion, that that portion of the act which confers jurisdiction over the county affairs upon the board of supervisors went into operation at the time specified in the fourth section of the first article

Department of Finance v. Goldberg

370 Ill. 578 · Illinois Supreme Court · Feb 20, 1939

The complaint is sworn to by a qualified agent of the Director of Finance. Exhibit A attached purports to be “findings and conclusions of hearing officer in the matter of the hearing granted to Mrs. S. H. … The plaintiff proceeded upon the theory that it had established a proper assessment of a deficiency tax by the Department of Finance.

Grant-Hall v. Cavalry Portfolio Services, LLC

856 F. Supp. 2d 929 · District Court, N.D. Illinois · Feb 24, 2012

This is sufficient to establish the concrete injury (time and money), causation (collection actions), and redressability (compensatory damages) necessary to establish Article III standing. See Lujan v. … It follows that the Law Firms’ immunity from suit under the ICFA does not extend, at least at this stage of the proceedings, to Calvary. IV.

Midstate Siding & Window Co. v. Rogers

Illinois Supreme Court · Apr 24, 2003

App. 3d 521, 526 (2000) (plaintiff maintained that the record fails to establish that an expert witness’ deposition fee was reasonable). … Credit Services Act In determining whether the Credit Services Act applies to the transaction at issue, we are guided by established principles.

East St. Louis Federation of Teachers, Local 1220 v. East St. Louis School District No. 189 Financial Oversight Panel

Illinois Supreme Court · Oct 17, 1997

Section 1B–20 clearly identifies the nature of the discipline and the parties to be disciplined. … We find no need to discuss any longer a clearly unsupported argument, and we reject it. See 134 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(7).