Blount v. Stroud

Docket No. 105577.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT

OF

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

JERRI BLOUNT, Appellant, v. JOSEPH STROUD et al., Appellees.

Opinion filed January 23, 2009.

CHIEF JUSTICE FITZGERALD delivered the judgment of the

court, with opinion.

Justices Freeman, Thomas, Kilbride, Garman, Karmeier, and

Burke concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

Plaintiff, Jerri Blount, appeals from a judgment of the appellate

court reversing a multimillion dollar judgment entered by the Cook

County circuit court following a jury trial on plaintiff’s federal and

state retaliation claims against defendant, Jovon Broadcasting

Corporation (Jovon). See 376 Ill. App. 3d 935. The principal issue on

appeal is whether the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction over

plaintiff’s claims or, stated differently, whether plaintiff’s sole source

of redress was through the administrative procedures set forth in the

Illinois Human Rights Act (Act) (775 ILCS 5/1–101 (West 2000)).

We hold that the circuit court had jurisdiction over plaintiff’s

claims. We therefore reverse the judgment of the appellate court and

remand to that court for further review.

BACKGROUND

On February 23, 2001, plaintiff filed a multicount complaint

against Jovon and Joseph Stroud, Jovon’s owner and general

manager, alleging various claims arising out of plaintiff’s

employment and discharge by defendants. The complaint was

amended several times. Relevant here is plaintiff’s fifth amended

complaint. Of the several counts plaintiff pled, the present appeal

involves only counts III and V.

In count III, styled a “retaliation” claim, plaintiff alleged that

defendants took adverse actions against her, including terminating her

employment, in violation of the federal Civil Rights Act of 1866 (42

U.S.C. §1981 (2000)). The gravamen of plaintiff’s federal claim is

that Stroud (an African-American) retaliated against plaintiff (also an

African-American) because plaintiff supported Bonnie Fouts (a

Caucasian coworker) in Fouts’ federal discrimination suit against

Jovon. According to the complaint, plaintiff witnessed some of the

offensive conduct of which Fouts complained, and advised Stroud

that she believed Fouts’ complaints were legitimate. She also

allegedly advised Stroud that she would testify truthfully in support

of Fouts, but that Stroud instructed plaintiff not to testify against him

in any proceeding involving Fouts’ claims or to otherwise aid Fouts.

According to the complaint, because plaintiff refused to yield,

defendants took adverse and retaliatory actions against her, including

threats and intimidation and, eventually, suspension and termination

of employment in October 2000. Although count III was directed

against both defendants, plaintiff later elected to proceed solely

against Jovon.

In count V, plaintiff alleged a common law claim for retaliatory

discharge against Jovon. Plaintiff alleged:

“It is the public policy of the State of Illinois that

witnesses testify truthfully under oath, and in government

proceedings. It is a violation of the public policy of the State

of Illinois to interfere with the testimony of a witness before

a Court of law or public body, or to attempt to compel a

witness to testify untruthfully. Perjury is a criminal offense in

the State of Illinois. 720 ILCS 5/32–2.”

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Plaintiff alleged that defendants discharged her, in part, because she

refused to commit perjury in Fouts’ discrimination proceedings, and

that such conduct violated Illinois public policy.

Early on in the litigation, defendants maintained that plaintiff’s

retaliation claims were not properly before the circuit court.

Defendants’ arguments, first raised as affirmative defenses, were later

encompassed in a section 2–619.1 motion to dismiss. See 735 ILCS

5/2–619.1 (West 2002). In their dismissal motion, defendants argued

that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate plaintiff’s

retaliation claims. Defendants relied on section 8–111(C) of the Act,

which states: “Except as otherwise provided by law, no court of this

state shall have jurisdiction over the subject of an alleged civil rights

violation other than as set forth in this Act.” 775 ILCS 5/8–111(C)

(West 2000). Defendants argued that plaintiff’s federal and state

retaliation claims fell squarely within the prohibitions contained in

the Act (see 775 ILCS 5/6–101(A) (West 2000)), and that plaintiff

was therefore required to seek redress through the Act’s

administrative procedures. Defendants also argued that plaintiff’s

claims were “inextricably linked” to a civil rights violation, as set

forth in the Act, and that the Act thus preempted plaintiff’s claims.

The trial court rejected these arguments and the case eventually

proceeded to a jury trial on the fifth amended complaint.

We find it unnecessary to recount the trial testimony because the

sufficiency of the evidence is not at issue. We do note, however, that

following the close of the evidence, the parties agreed that one

instruction encompassing both retaliation claims would be given to

the jury, rather than separate instructions on each of the two counts.

The instruction was intended to simplify matters for the jury. The jury

was instructed:

“The plaintiff has asserted the following three claims

against the defendants:

One, retaliation and wrongful termination against

defendant, Jovon, only[.]

***

*** [P]laintiff alleges that she was terminated by

defendant, Jovon, in whole or in part in retaliation for her

protected activities, including her refusal to agree to commit

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perjury and her support of Ms. Fouts’ claim of discrimination,

and/or or [sic] opposing defendants’ treatment of Ms. Fouts.

To succeed on this claim, plaintiff must prove by a

preponderance of the evidence that her protected activity was

a substantial motivating factor in defendant, Jovon’s, decision

to terminate her employment.”

The jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff on her retaliation

claims, awarding $257,350 in back pay, $25,000 for pain and

suffering, and $2,800,000 as punitive damages. The jury found in

favor of defendants on plaintiff’s other theories of recovery. The trial

court entered judgment on the jury verdict.

Defendants filed a posttrial motion arguing, in relevant part, that

defendants were entitled to judgment notwithstanding the verdict on

plaintiff’s federal and state retaliation claims because the circuit court

lacked jurisdiction.1 Defendants essentially reargued their earlier

dismissal motion, maintaining that plaintiff’s sole recourse was

before the Department of Human Rights. Defendants did not

challenge the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to either

retaliation claim. While defendants’ posttrial motion was pending,

plaintiff filed a petition for attorney fees and expenses. Plaintiff

argued that as the prevailing party in her section 1981 claim, she was

entitled to fees and expenses pursuant to section 1988 (42 U.S.C.

§1988 (2000)). The trial court denied defendants’ posttrial motion

and granted plaintiff’s fee petition, awarding fees and costs in the

aggregate amount of $1,182,832.10. Defendants appealed.

The appellate court reversed, holding that the Act “deprives

Illinois circuit courts of subject matter jurisdiction over all civil rights

claims, regardless of whether they are brought under state or federal

law.” 376 Ill. App. 3d at 949. Because the circuit court lacked

jurisdiction to entertain plaintiff’s retaliation claims, the appellate

court reversed the denial of defendants’ motion for judgment

notwithstanding the verdict as to those claims. 376 Ill. App. 3d at

1

Although the retaliation claims on which plaintiff prevailed were

directed solely against Jovon, both defendants pursued appeal, and the

parties have continually referred to “defendants,” in the plural, in their

briefs. For consistency, we will do the same.

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950. We allowed plaintiff’s petition for leave to appeal (see 210 Ill.

2d R. 315), and allowed the National Employment Lawyers

Association, the Employment Discrimination Project of the

University of Chicago Law School’s Edwin F. Mandel Legal Aid

Clinic, and the Illinois Trial Lawyers Association to file a joint brief

amicus curiae (see 210 Ill. 2d R. 345). Because this appeal presents

only issues of law, our review proceeds de novo. See In re A.H., 207

Ill. 2d 590, 593 (2003) (applying de novo standard to jurisdiction

issue); Donaldson v. Central Illinois Public Service Co., 199 Ill. 2d

63, 89 (2002) (applying de novo standard to review of the denial of

a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict).

ANALYSIS

I. Illinois Human Rights Act

The Act, adopted in 1979, is intended to secure for all individuals

in Illinois freedom from unlawful discrimination in connection with

employment, real estate transactions, access to financial credit, and

availability of public accommodations. Pub. Act 81–1216, eff. in part

December 6, 1979 (see Pub. Act 81–1216, §11–101); 775 ILCS

5/1–102(A) (West 2000). The Act consolidated what had been a

patchwork of antidiscrimination law in Illinois by repealing various

acts, but incorporating their “principal design, purpose or intent.”

Pub. Act 81–1216, §10–108 (repealing the Equal Opportunities for

the Handicapped Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, pars. 65–21 through

65–31), the Fair Employment Practices Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch.

48, pars. 851 through 867), the Illinois Fairness in Lending Act (Ill.

Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 95, pars. 301 through 307), the Illinois Equal

Employment Opportunity Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 127, pars.

63b71 through 63b90), the act which created a Commission on

Human Relations (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 127, par. 214.1 through

214.5a), the act which prohibited age discrimination in employment

(Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 48, pars. 881 through 887), the act which

prohibited conditions in leases excluding children (Ill. Rev. Stat.

1979, ch. 80, pars. 37, 38), and that part of the Criminal Code of 1961

which created the offense of a violation of civil rights (Ill. Rev. Stat.

1979, ch. 38, pars. 13–1 through 13–4)).

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To accomplish its objective, the Act created the Department of

Human Rights and the Human Rights Commission. 775 ILCS

5/1–103(E), (H), 8–101(A) (West 2000). Generally, the Department

investigates “charges” brought by “aggrieved parties” claiming “civil

rights violations,” as defined in the Act. See 775 ILCS 5/1–103(B)

through (D), 7–101(B), 7A–102(C), 7B–102(C) (West 2000). The

Commission reviews Department decisions and adjudicates civil

rights “complaints.” 775 ILCS 5/1–103(F), 8–103, arts. 8A, 8B (West

2000). The statute, together with the Department’s and Commission’s

rules and regulations, establish comprehensive administrative

procedures governing the disposition of alleged civil rights violations.

See 775 ILCS 5/arts. 7A, 7B, 8A, 8B (West 2000); 56 Ill. Adm. Code

§2520.10 et seq.; 56 Ill. Adm. Code §5300.10 et seq.

At the time the complaint in the present case was filed, the Act,

with one exception not relevant here, did not expressly authorize

private suits.2 In fact, the Act expressly limited the court’s

jurisdiction. 775 ILCS 5/8–111(C) (West 2000). Section 8–111(C)

states: “Except as otherwise provided by law, no court of this state

shall have jurisdiction over the subject of an alleged civil rights

violation other than as set forth in this Act.” 775 ILCS 5/8–111(C)

(West 2000).

Among the civil rights violations identified in the Act is one for

“retaliation.” 775 ILCS 5/6–101(A) (West 2000). Pursuant to section

6–101, it is a civil rights violation for a person to:

“Retaliate against a person because he or she has opposed

that which he or she reasonably and in good faith believes to

be unlawful discrimination, sexual harassment in employment

or sexual harassment in higher education, discrimination

based on citizenship status in employment, or because he or

she has made a charge, filed a complaint, testified, assisted, or

2

The sole exception is found in article 8B of the Act. Where a charge of

discrimination in a real estate transaction results in the filing of a complaint

with the Commission, the Act provides that a party “may elect to have the

claims asserted in that complaint decided in a civil action in a circuit court

of Illinois.” 775 ILCS 5/8B–102(A) (West 2000).

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participated in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under

this Act[.]” 775 ILCS 5/6–101(A) (West 2000).

The parties’ dispute whether, in light of sections 8–111 and

6–101, the circuit court had jurisdiction over plaintiff’s common law

retaliatory discharge claim and her federal section 1981 retaliation

claim. We consider each claim in turn.

II. Common Law Retaliatory Discharge Claim

Plaintiff’s common law claim was based on the allegations that

defendants terminated her employment in retaliation for her refusal

to commit perjury in the Fouts’ case, and that defendants’ conduct

violated Illinois public policy. Our analysis of whether the circuit

court had jurisdiction over this claim is guided by this court’s

decisions in Geise v. Phoenix Co. of Chicago, Inc., 159 Ill. 2d 507

(1994), and Maksimovic v. Tsogalis, 177 Ill. 2d 511 (1997).

In Geise, the plaintiff brought a common law tort action against

her former employer for the negligent hiring and retention of its

national sales manager. Plaintiff alleged that the manager had

sexually harassed her, then caused her to be fired from her job when

she reported his misconduct to the company. The parties agreed that

if the plaintiff’s common law action was construed as seeking redress

for a “civil rights violation” within the meaning of the Act, the circuit

court lacked jurisdiction to consider it. Although the conduct to which

the plaintiff claimed she was subjected fell within the Act’s definition

of sexual harassment (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 68, par. 2–101(E)(3)),

the plaintiff maintained that the manager’s sexual harassment was

separate and distinct from her tort claims. The tort claims, she argued,

were predicated on independent policy considerations and could not

be construed as alleging a civil rights violation under the Act, so as

to trigger the Act’s jurisdictional bar. We rejected this argument. We

held that the concept of sexual harassment is “inextricably linked” to

plaintiff’s claims of negligent hiring and negligent retention. Geise,

159 Ill. 2d at 516-17. “Absent the allegations of sexual harassment,”

the plaintiff “would have no independent basis for imposing

liability”on the company. Geise, 159 Ill. 2d at 516-17.

In Maksimovic, as in the Geise case, we considered whether the

plaintiff’s common law tort claims against her employer were

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inextricably linked with claims of sexual harassment so as to divest

the circuit court of jurisdiction under section 8–111(C) of the Act.

The plaintiff, who worked as a waitress, quit her job after her

employer allegedly made repeated sexual advances toward her. The

employer allegedly ordered her to perform oral sex, touched her

inappropriately, attempted to kiss her, and confined her to a walk-in

cooler where he made sexual advances. The plaintiff filed a sexual

harassment complaint with the Human Rights Commission, and

several months later, filed a civil suit in the circuit court alleging

assault, battery, and false imprisonment. The circuit court determined

that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff’s tort

claims were in the nature of sexual harassment and granted the

employer’s summary judgment motion. The appellate court, relying

on Geise, affirmed. Maksimovic v. Tsogalis, 282 Ill. App. 3d 576, 586

(1996). This court reversed, stating that the appellate court’s reading

of Geise was “overly broad.” Maksimovic, 177 Ill. 2d at 516. We

explained:

“Although the plaintiff in Geise dressed her claims as

‘negligent hiring’ and ‘negligent retention,’ the allegations of

negligence on the part of the employer were premised on the

allegation that the employer hired and retained a manager who

engaged in sexual harassment. Geise, 159 Ill. 2d at 518.

Absent the Act’s prohibition of sexual harassment, the

employer’s hiring and retention of an employee whose

conduct created a hostile work environment would not have

been an actionable tort. That is to say, in Geise the Act

furnished the legal duty that the defendant was alleged to have

breached. *** The rule from Geise is not that the Act

precludes the circuit court from exercising jurisdiction over

all tort claims related to sexual harassment. Rather, whether

the circuit court may exercise jurisdiction over a tort claim

depends upon whether the tort claim is inextricably linked to

a civil rights violation such that there is no independent basis

for the action apart from the Act itself.” (Emphasis in

original.) Maksimovic, 177 Ill. 2d at 516-17.

We held that under the standard of Geise, the plaintiff’s claims of

assault, battery, and false imprisonment were not inextricably linked

to her claim of sexual harassment. The plaintiff alleged sufficient

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facts to establish the elements of these long-recognized torts, without

reference to the legal duties created by the Act. Thus, the circuit court

could exercise jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s tort claims.

Maksimovic, 177 Ill. 2d at 517. Although we acknowledged the policy

preference in favor of consolidating litigation, we concluded that the

legislature must have been aware of the potential for duplicative

litigation when it adopted the Act. Maksimovic, 177 Ill. 2d at 517 n.2.

Thus, the plaintiff’s filing of a complaint with the Commission did

not adversely affect the circuit court’s jurisdiction.

Finally, we explained that our holding in Maksimovic, like our

holding in Geise, was based on the language of the Act. Maksimovic,

177 Ill. 2d at 517-18. A legislative intent to abrogate the common law

must be clearly expressed. A plain reading of the Act reveals no

legislative intent to abolish all common law torts factually related to

sexual harassment. Maksimovic, 177 Ill. 2d at 518. Moreover, because

an action to redress a civil rights violation has a purpose distinct from

a common law tort action, we concluded that the exclusive

jurisdiction provision in the Act “was intended to promote the

efficient and uniform processing of state civil rights claims–not

common law tort claims.” (Emphasis in original.) Maksimovic, 177

Ill. 2d at 518.

Applying the standard of Geise and Maksimovic to the present

case, we hold that the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction

over plaintiff’s common law retaliatory discharge claim.

The tort of retaliatory discharge was first recognized by this court

in 1978, one year prior to the legislature’s adoption of the Act. Kelsay

v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172 (1978). “The tort is an exception to

the general rule that an ‘at-will’ employment is terminable at any time

for any or no cause.” Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill.

2d 124, 128 (1981). To establish a retaliatory discharge claim, the

plaintiff must plead and prove that she was “(1) discharged; (2) in

retaliation for her activities; and (3) that the discharge violates a clear

mandate of public policy.” Hinthorn v. Roland’s of Bloomington,

Inc., 119 Ill. 2d 526, 529 (1988). Plaintiff here alleged that she was

discharged because she refused to commit perjury in the Fouts’ case,

in violation of the public policy of this state embodied in the statute

which criminalizes perjury. See 720 ILCS 5/32–2 (West 2000)

(establishing and defining the offense of perjury, a Class 3 felony).

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This court has recognized that actions for retaliatory discharge have

been allowed where the employee was discharged for refusing to

violate a statute, including a statute which makes the commission of

perjury unlawful. Palmateer, 85 Ill. 2d at 130, citing Petermann v.

International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 396, 174 Cal. App. 2d

184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959). Accord Northeast Health Management, Inc.

v. Cotton, 56 S.W. 3d 440 (Ky. App. 2001); Sides v. Duke University,

74 N.C. App. 331, 328 S.E.2d 818 (1985), overruled on other

grounds by Kurtzman v. Applied Analytical Industries, Inc., 347 N.C.

329, 493 S.E.2d 420 (1997).

Like the plaintiff in Maksimovic, plaintiff here established a basis

for imposing liability on defendants independent of the Act, i.e.,

without reference to the legal duties created by the Act. See

Maksimovic, 177 Ill. 2d at 517. Thus, it cannot be said that plaintiff’s

retaliatory discharge claim is “inextricably linked” to a civil rights

violation, and the jurisdictional bar of section 8–111 is not triggered.

We recognize that plaintiff’s allegation that she was discharged in

retaliation for her refusal to commit perjury in the Fouts’ case could

be construed as retaliation for opposing unlawful discrimination–a

violation of the Act’s retaliation provision. See 775 ILCS 5/6–101

(West 2000). Unlike the plaintiff in Geise, however, plaintiff need not

and does not rely upon the public policy embodied in the Act to

satisfy the elements of her common law tort claim.

Our holding in the present case, as in Maksimovic, rests on the

language of the Act. The statutory provision at issue here–section

8–111–provides an exclusive remedy for state “civil rights

violations,” as defined in the Act, but makes no mention of common

law tort actions. “A legislative intent to abrogate the common law

must be clearly and plainly expressed.” Maksimovic, 177 Ill. 2d at

518. Nothing in the Act indicates an intent to abolish all common law

torts factually related to incidents of retaliation. Accordingly, we

conclude that plaintiff’s claim for retaliatory discharge was properly

before the circuit court.

Corluka v. Bridgford Foods of Illinois, Inc., 284 Ill. App. 3d 190

(1996), cited by defendants, does not support a different result.

Corluka involved a civil complaint alleging, among other things,

retaliatory discharge. The plaintiff claimed that after reporting a

supervisor’s sexual harassment of other employees, the plaintiff was

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demoted and later discharged. The appellate court upheld the

dismissal of the retaliatory discharge count, holding it was preempted

by the Act. Corluka, 284 Ill. App. 3d at 193-94, citing 775 ILCS

5/8–111 (West 1994). Although Corluka did not consider whether,

under the standard in Geise, the plaintiff’s claim was “inextricably

linked” to a civil rights violation, its holding is consistent with Geise.

In both cases, the Act furnished the legal duty on which the plaintiff

relied. That is, absent the Act’s prohibition of sexual harassment, the

employer’s conduct in both Geise and Corluka would not have been

actionable. Thus, the plaintiff’s retaliatory discharge claim in Corluka

was inextricably linked to a civil rights violation. Here, however, as

already stated, plaintiff has an independent basis for her retaliatory

discharge claim–the state’s public policy against perjury, embodied

in the state’s criminal code. See 720 ILCS 5/32–2 (West 2000).

The appellate court reached a contrary conclusion based, in part,

on its determination that the evidence adduced at trial does not

support plaintiff’s allegation that she refused to commit perjury. 376

Ill. App. 3d at 943-44. Defendants, however, never challenged the

sufficiency of the evidence in their posttrial motion. Even if

defendants had challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, the

reviewing court’s determination of that issue is irrelevant to the

separate issue of the circuit court’s jurisdiction over plaintiff’s

retaliatory discharge claim. “[S]ubject matter jurisdiction does not

depend upon the ultimate outcome of the suit. A party may bring

unsuccessful as well as successful suits in the circuit court.” Belleville

Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 199 Ill. 2d 325, 340-

41 (2002). Thus, a court’s jurisdiction does not depend upon the

proofs at trial. Rather, the court’s jurisdiction is dependent upon

whether the plaintiff’s case, as framed by the complaint or petition,

presents a justiciable matter. Belleville Toyota, 199 Ill. 2d at 334.

Plaintiff here successfully invoked the jurisdiction of the circuit court.

Whether plaintiff later proved her case is beside the point.

For similar reasons we reject defendants’ argument that the

manner in which the jury was instructed impacts the court’s subject

matter jurisdiction. See 376 Ill. App. 3d at 942. Defendants maintain

that the single retaliation instruction given to the jury demonstrates

that plaintiff’s retaliatory discharge claim “went far beyond a claim

solely involving her alleged refusal to commit perjury,” thus bringing

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the claim within the coverage of section 6–101 and triggering the

jurisdictional bar of section 8–111. A fair reading of count V of the

complaint, however, reveals that plaintiff’s retaliatory discharge claim

is not as broad as defendants suggest. Count V clearly identified the

public policy on which plaintiff relied, citing the perjury statute. See

720 ILCS 5/32–2 (West 2000). The essence of count V is that

plaintiff was fired because she refused to perjure herself in the Fouts’

case.

Assuming the jury instructions on plaintiff’s retaliation claims

were less than perfect, any error in instructing the jury is simply

that–a trial error. The jury instructions–like the proofs at trial–do not

somehow divest the circuit court of the subject matter jurisdiction it

earlier acquired. See In re M.W., No. 104519, slip op. at 11 (January

23, 2009) (“Error or irregularity in a proceeding, while it may require

reversal of the court’s judgment on appeal, does not oust subject

matter jurisdiction once it is acquired”).

Plaintiff’s claim for retaliatory discharge was properly before the

circuit court.

III. Section 1981 Claim

Section 1981 provides that “[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction

of the United States shall have the same right in every State and

Territory to make and enforce contracts *** as is enjoyed by white

citizens.” 42 U.S.C. §1981(a) (2000). “[T]he term ‘make and enforce

contracts’ includes the making, performance, modification, and

termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges,

terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.” 42 U.S.C.

§1981(b) (2000).

The reach of section 1981 was disputed in the trial and appellate

courts, with defendants arguing that section 1981 does not include a

prohibition against retaliation for opposing discrimination. The

appellate court did not decide the issue, but noted that the majority of

the federal courts of appeal have concluded that section 1981

“provides an avenue of recourse for individuals who have suffered

retaliation for advocating the rights of those protected under section

1981.” 376 Ill. App. 3d at 945. The United States Supreme Court has

since held that section 1981 encompasses a complaint of retaliation

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against a person who has complained about a violation of another

person’s contract-related right. CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 553

U.S. ___, ___, 170 L. Ed. 2d 864, 869, 128 S. Ct. 1951, 1954 (2008).

Plaintiff’s allegation that defendants retaliated against her for her

support of coworker Bonnie Fouts’ federal discrimination suit fits

within the Supreme Court’s holding. Thus, any question as to whether

plaintiff properly pled a section 1981 claim has been resolved, and we

turn to the question of the circuit court’s subject matter jurisdiction

over that claim.

Defendants argue that this court need not consider the jurisdiction

issue because plaintiff did not submit a section 1981 claim to the jury

and plaintiff never received a judgment under section 1981. We

disagree.

The record clearly demonstrates that throughout this litigation

plaintiff pursued both a common law retaliatory discharge claim and

a section 1981 retaliation claim, and that defendants understood that

to be the case. Indeed, defendants argued in their posttrial motion:

“Plaintiff pursued two theories at trial to support her retaliation claim.

Plaintiff claimed that Defendant violated 42 U.S.C. §1981 and also

claimed that Defendant violated Illinois common law.” According to

defendants, “neither theory should have been presented to the jury.”

Defendants now maintain, however, that the single retaliation

instruction given to the jury demonstrates that plaintiff’s section 1981

claim was not submitted to the jury. See 376 Ill. App. 3d at 942.

Assuming, arguendo, that the single retaliation instruction blurred the

line between plaintiff’s state and federal claims, as already discussed,

a court’s subject matter jurisdiction is not dependent upon the

correctness of the jury instructions.

As to defendants’ contention that plaintiff did not obtain a

judgment under section 1981, that contention, even if true, is not

determinative of whether the court had subject matter jurisdiction.

See Belleville Toyota, 199 Ill. 2d at 340-41 (“subject matter

jurisdiction does not depend upon the ultimate outcome of the suit”).

Further, a review of the record demonstrates that plaintiff did obtain

a judgment under section 1981.

The verdict form indicates that the jury answered affirmatively the

following query: “Did Plaintiff Blount prove her claim against

Defendant Jovon that her protected activity was a motivating factor

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in defendants’ termination of her employment?” The jury awarded

damages, and the trial court entered judgment on the jury verdict on

the amounts set forth in the verdict form. The trial court later awarded

plaintiff her attorney fees. As plaintiff notes, the trial court could only

make an award of attorney fees if plaintiff was a “prevailing party” in

her section 1981 action. See 42 U.S.C. §1988(b) (2000) (allowing the

“prevailing party” in a section 1981 action a reasonable attorney fee).

In its order and memorandum opinion granting plaintiff’s fee petition,

the trial court expressly rejected the argument defendants raise here,

stating: “Plaintiff did obtain a judgment under [section] 1981. The

jury verdict was returned which awarded Plaintiff damages for her

retaliation claims.” We attach no particular significance to the fact

that the final order entered on the jury verdict and the fee petition

does not expressly refer to section 1981, instead referring generally

to plaintiff’s “claims of retaliation.” Nothing in the record indicates

that the trial court intended to retreat from its unequivocal earlier

ruling that “[p]laintiff did obtain a judgment under [section] 1981.”

We now turn to the substantive issue before us: Did the circuit

court have subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff’s federal claim,

or was plaintiff required to litigate her federal claim in the

administrative forum provided by the Act?

Plaintiff argues that only those civil rights violations specifically

enumerated in the Act are subject to the Act’s administrative

procedures, and that the federal civil rights violation she alleged is

outside the Act. See 775 ILCS 5/1–103(D) (West 2000) (defining

“civil rights violation”). Therefore, argues plaintiff, the court had

subject matter jurisdiction over her section 1981 claim. Defendants

respond that our appellate court, in cases spanning over two decades,

has held that Illinois courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over civil

rights claims brought under both state and federal law, and that such

claims are subject to the administrative procedures set forth in the

Act. See Cahoon v. Alton Packaging Corp., 148 Ill. App. 3d 480, 483

(1986); Faulkner-King v. Wicks, 226 Ill. App. 3d 962, 970-71 (1992);

Cooper v. Illinois State University, 331 Ill. App. 3d 1094, 1100

(2002); Brewer v. Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois, 339

Ill. App. 3d 1074, 1083 (2003); Meehan v. Illinois Power Co., 347 Ill.

App. 3d 761, 763-68 (2004).

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In Cahoon, the plaintiff filed an action against his former

employer for damages and reinstatement under the federal Age

Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) (29 U.S.C. §621

et seq. (1982)). Based on the language of section 8–111(C), and its

earlier decision in Mein v. Masonite Corp., 124 Ill. App. 3d 617

(1984), aff’d, 109 Ill. 2d 1 (1985), the appellate court held that an

Illinois court must dismiss an ADEA case unless state administrative

remedies have been exhausted. Cahoon, 148 Ill. App. 3d at 482.

According to the appellate court, a federal civil rights claim is not

entitled to “preferential treatment” and “must be prosecuted under the

same procedure applicable to a State civil rights claim,” i.e., through

the administrative procedures set forth in the Act. Cahoon, 148 Ill.

App. 3d at 483.

In Faulkner-King, the plaintiff filed a complaint against the

University of Illinois’ board of trustees and various individuals

alleging, inter alia, several gender-based claims under the federal

constitution (U.S. Const., amend. XIV) and federal civil rights

legislation (42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986 (1988)). The circuit court

concluded that, under section 8–111(C) of the Act, it lacked subject

matter jurisdiction over plaintiff’s federal claims. Faulkner-King, 226

Ill. App. 3d at 963-64. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that circuit

courts have concurrent jurisdiction over a claim premised on a federal

civil rights statute and that state courts are thus obligated to hear such

claims. The appellate court disagreed, noting that the plaintiff’s

argument was similar to one rejected by the appellate court in

Cahoon. Faulkner-King, 226 Ill. App. 3d at 971. The appellate court

also concluded that the Act is the exclusive source of a remedy for an

employment-discrimination claim. Faulkner-King, 226 Ill. App. 3d

at 971. Although the appellate court provided no supporting citation,

its conclusion was clearly based on its earlier discussion of Mein,

where the appellate court stated, “the Illinois Supreme Court has

spoken definitively on the issue concluding the Act was intended to

be the exclusive remedy for handling claims of employment

discrimination.” Faulkner-King, 226 Ill. App. 3d at 967, citing Mein,

109 Ill. 2d at 7.

In the Cooper case, the plaintiff filed an action against his former

employer, Illinois State University, and various individuals, alleging

that defendants violated the ADEA and Title VII of the Civil Rights

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Act of 1964 (42 U.C.S. §§ 2000e through 2000e–17 (1994)). The

appellate court affirmed the circuit court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s

complaint. Cooper, 331 Ill. App. 3d at 1100. The appellate court

stated that “Illinois courts have consistently held that by enacting

section 8–111(C), the legislature specifically provided that trial courts

do not have jurisdiction to hear independent actions for civil rights

violations.” Cooper, 331 Ill. App. 3d at 1098. The appellate court

cited several cases in support, among them this court’s decision in

Mein. Cooper, 331 Ill. App. 3d at 1098. The appellate court adhered

to Faulkner-King and Cahoon and held that “in Illinois, the Act is the

exclusive source of a remedy for employment-discrimination claims.”

Cooper, 331 Ill. App. 3d at 1100.

In Brewer, the plaintiff filed an action against the University of

Illinois and various individuals, alleging violations of Titles VI and

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. §§2000d through

2000d–4, 2000e through 2000e–17 (2000)), section 1983 (42 U.S. C.

§1983 (2000)), the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42

U.S.C. §§12111 through 12117 (2000)), and the equal protection

clause (U.S. Const., amend. XIV). Generally, the plaintiff claimed he

was discriminated against based on his race and his learning

disability. The plaintiff also alleged that the defendants retaliated

against him because he had complained of their discrimination. The

appellate court held that “Illinois courts have no jurisdiction over

plaintiff’s claims, regardless of whether he couches them in a state

statute or federal statute, because they are ‘inextricably linked’ to

alleged civil rights violations.” Brewer, 339 Ill. App. 3d at 1083,

citing Maksimovic, 177 Ill. 2d at 514. The appellate court also quoted

favorably from the Faulker-King opinion: “ ‘Congress can utilize

[s]tate courts to enforce [f]ederal rights, but it must do so subject to

all conditions which the [s]tate court imposes on other litigants.’ ”

Brewer, 339 Ill. App. 3d at 1083, quoting Faulkner-King, 226 Ill.

App. 3d at 970.

In Meehan, the plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that Illinois

Power Company violated the ADEA by discharging him because of

his age. The appellate court reviewed Cahoon and Faulkner-King and

determined that they were correctly decided. Meehan, 347 Ill. App.

3d at 765-68. Thus, the circuit court had no jurisdiction over

plaintiff’s federal claim. Meehan, 347 Ill. App. 3d at 768. The

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appellate court stated that all cases of age discrimination, whether

based on federal or state law, are barred from Illinois circuit courts.

Meehan, 347 Ill. App. 3d at 767. “Thus, federal claims of age

discrimination are treated identically to state claims of age

discrimination.” Meehan, 347 Ill. App. 3d at 767. Finally, the

appellate court, citing to the Mein opinion, stated that the Act was

intended to prevent direct access to the courts for redress of civil

rights violations, and that permitting federal claims to be brought in

state court would subvert this purpose. Meehan, 347 Ill. App. 3d at

768, citing Mein, 109 Ill. 2d at 7.

Plaintiff disagrees with the appellate court’s expansive reading of

section 8–111(C), arguing that Cahoon and its progeny have

misconstrued and misapplied this court’s holding in Mein.

In Mein the plaintiff filed a complaint against his former

employer, alleging that he was wrongfully discharged on account of

his age. We affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff’s complaint. Mein,

109 Ill. 2d at 7-8. We noted that the public policy on which plaintiff

relied in bringing his civil suit is contained in the Act (see Ill. Rev.

Stat. 1983, ch. 68, par. 1–102(A)), and that the Act contains

comprehensive procedures to investigate and adjudicate alleged

violations of this public policy. Mein, 109 Ill. 2d at 5. Considering the

language and legislative history of the Act we concluded:

“The legislature has specifically provided through section

8–111[ ] *** that courts have no jurisdiction to hear

independent actions for civil rights violations. It is clear that

the legislature intended the Act, with its comprehensive

scheme of remedies and administrative procedures, to be the

exclusive source for redress of alleged human rights

violations.” Mein, 109 Ill. 2d at 7.

Notwithstanding the broad language in the Mein opinion, the

precedential scope of our decision is limited to the facts that were

before us. See People v. Palmer, 104 Ill. 2d 340, 345-46 (1984). Mein

did not involve a civil rights claim under federal law. Thus, we agree

with plaintiff that, to the extent Cahoon and subsequent cases have

relied on Mein to hold that Illinois circuit courts have no subject

matter jurisdiction over civil rights claims brought under federal law,

their reliance is misplaced.

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Defendants counter that the legislature, through its silence, has

acquiesced in the appellate court’s interpretation of the Act’s

jurisdiction provision. Defendants note that although the legislature

amended the Act in 2007 to provide complainants, in certain

circumstances, the option of pursuing their civil rights claims in the

circuit court, the legislature made no provision for state court

jurisdiction over federal claims. See Pub. Act 95–243, eff. January 1,

2008 (amending, inter alia, sections 7A–102 and 8–111).

“Where the legislature chooses not to amend a statute after a

judicial construction, it will be presumed that it has acquiesced in the

court’s statement of the legislative intent.” Miller v. Lockett, 98 Ill. 2d

478, 483 (1983). “This presumption, however, is merely a

jurisprudential principle; it is not a rule of law.” People v. Perry, 224

Ill. 2d 312, 331 (2007). Thus, although the legislature’s failure to

amend a statute after a judicial interpretation is suggestive of

legislative agreement, it is not conclusive. People v. Foster, 99 Ill. 2d

48, 55 (1983). Further, where the meaning of the statute is

unambiguous, we will give little weight to the fact that the legislature

did not amend the statute after appellate opinions interpreting the

same. Perry, 224 Ill. 2d at 331-32; see also 2B N. Singer, Sutherland

on Statutory Construction §49.04 (6th rev. ed. 2000)

(“contemporaneous or practical interpretation will not be permitted

to control the meaning of the plain and unambiguous terms of a

statute”). We conclude that such is the case here. The appellate

court’s holding in Cahoon and its progeny is contrary to the clear

language of the Act, and the presumption of legislative acquiescence

does not apply.

Cahoon held that the plaintiff’s federal civil rights claim under

the ADEA “must be prosecuted under the same procedure applicable

to a State civil rights claim,” i.e., through the administrative

procedures set forth in the Act. Cahoon, 148 Ill. App. 3d at 483.

Implicit in this holding, and similar holdings in other appellate court

opinions, is that the Act authorizes the Department of Human Rights

and the Human Rights Commission to administer, or at least resolve

claims filed under, the ADEA or other relevant federal acts, here the

Civil Rights Act of 1866 (42 U.S.C. §1981). Nothing in the language

of the Act, however, authorizes the Department or Commission to do

so.

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The term “civil rights violation,” as used in the Act, has a

particular and limited meaning:

“ ‘Civil rights violation’ includes and shall be limited to

only those specific acts set forth in Sections 2–102, 2–103,

2–105, 3–102, 3–103, 3–104, 3–104.1, 3–105, 4–102, 4–103,

5–102, 5A–102 and 6–101 of this Act.” (Emphasis added.)

775 ILCS 5/1–103(D) (West 2000).3

This definition makes plain that a “civil rights violation,” for

purposes of the Act, is limited to civil rights violations arising under

the enumerated sections of the Act, and does not include a civil rights

violation as defined by, or arising under, federal law. Accordingly, the

administrative procedures contained in the Act, which govern the

filing and disposition of alleged “civil rights violations,” are

applicable only to civil rights violations under the Act.

Even if the facts giving rise to a civil rights violation, as defined

by the Act, could also give rise to a civil right violation as defined by

federal law, the administrative procedures in place and the authority

of the Department and Commission apply only to the former

violation, not the latter violation. In short, the Department and

Commission administer the Act–not federal law–and their authority

can extend no further. Any claim of a civil rights violation brought

before the Department or Commission must be examined through the

3

The sections of the Act referenced in the definition of “civil rights

violation” cover discrimination in employment (section 2–102);

discrimination in employment based on arrest record (section 2–103);

public contractors (section 2–105); discrimination in real estate transactions

(section 3–102); blockbusting (section 3–103); refusal to sell or rent

because a person has a guide, hearing or support dog (section 3–104.1);

restrictive covenants based on race, color, religion, or national origin

(section 3–105); discriminatory loan practices (section 4–102);

discriminatory credit card offers (section 4–103); discrimination in public

accommodations (section 5–102); civil rights violations in higher education

(section 5A–102); and additional civil rights violations, including

retaliation (section 6–101). Though section 3–104 is also included in the

statutory definition, the legislature repealed that section. See Pub. Act

86–910, §2, eff. September 11, 1989.

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lens of our state law. Thus, a party, like plaintiff here, who wishes to

pursue her rights and remedies under federal law may not do so

before the Department or Commission, as these administrative

entities have no statutory authority to entertain federal claims. See

Vuagniaux v. Department of Professional Regulation, 208 Ill. 2d 173,

186 (2003) (administrative agency possesses only those powers

granted by the legislature; any action must be authorized by the

statute under which the agency was created); Villegas v. Board of

Fire & Police Commissioners, 167 Ill. 2d 108, 126 (1995) (“an

administrative body lacks inherent or common law authority to

exercise jurisdiction not conferred upon it by legislative enactment”);

Homefinders, Inc. v. City of Evanston, 65 Ill. 2d 115, 129 (1976)

(“administrative bodies have only such powers as are conferred upon

them by statute or ordinance”).

Though our conclusion concerning the limits of the Department’s

and Commission’s authority rests on the language of the Act, we note

that it is also consistent with Supreme Court precedent recognizing

the divergence in the objectives of state administrative procedures for

resolving employment discrimination suits and a federal cause of

action to vindicate rights under the Reconstruction-Era Civil Rights

Acts (42 U.S.C. §1981 et seq.). “The goals of the federal statutes are

compensation of persons whose civil rights have been violated, and

prevention of the abuse of state power.” Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S.

42, 53, 82 L. Ed. 2d 36, 47, 104 S. Ct. 2924, 2931 (1984). In contrast,

the goals of the state administrative procedure “is the prompt

identification and resolution of employment disputes. The

administrative scheme, including a short statute of limitations,

encourages conciliation and private settlement through the agency’s

intervention in live disputes.” Burnett, 468 U.S. at 54, 82 L. Ed. 2d

at 47, 104 S. Ct. at 2932. Although the Court’s observations were

made with reference to a Maryland discrimination statute, they could

just as easily refer to the Illinois Act.

Having concluded that plaintiff here could not pursue her section

1981 claim in the Act’s administrative forum, the question remains:

Could plaintiff pursue her section 1981 claim in the circuit court? We

answer this question in the affirmative.

Circuit courts are courts of general jurisdiction (Steinbrecher v.

Steinbrecher, 197 Ill. 2d 514, 524 n.3 (2001), citing Ill. Const. 1970,

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art. VI, §9), and are presumptively competent to adjudicate claims

arising under the laws of the United States (Yellow Freight System,

Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820, 823, 108 L. Ed. 2d 834, 839, 110 S.

Ct. 1566, 1568 (1990). While states “have great latitude to establish

the structure and jurisdiction of their own courts” (Howlett v. Rose,

496 U.S. 356, 372, 110 L. Ed. 2d 332, 351, 110 S. Ct. 2430, 2441

(1990)), section 8–111 of the Act does not demonstrate an intent by

the legislature to divest the circuit courts of jurisdiction over claims

filed pursuant to section 1981.

Section 8–111, titled “Court Proceedings,” first identifies two

instances requiring judicial involvement. Under subsection (A), a

complainant or respondent may petition for “judicial review,” in the

appellate court, of any final order entered under the Act. 775 ILCS

5/8–111(A)(1) (West 2000). Under subsection (B), the Department or

an aggrieved party may seek “judicial enforcement” of a Commission

order through the filing of a complaint in the circuit court. 775 ILCS

5/8–111(B) (West 2000). Subsection (C) then sets forth a

“Limitation” on a state court’s jurisdiction:

“Except as otherwise provided by law, no court of this

state shall have jurisdiction over the subject of an alleged civil

rights violation other than as set forth in this Act.” 775 ILCS

5/8–111(C) (West 2000).

As already discussed, the term “civil rights violation,” as used in

the Act, has a particular meaning. “ ‘Civil rights violation’ includes

and shall be limited to only those acts sets forth” in certain

enumerated sections of the Act. 775 ILCS 5/1–103(D) (West 2000).

“[U]nless the context requires otherwise,” this statutory definition

controls. 775 ILCS 5/1–103 (West 2000). Nothing in section 8–111,

or article 8 as a whole, indicates that the context requires a departure

from the statutory definition. Thus, the limitation on the jurisdiction

of state courts “over the subject of an alleged civil rights violation”

is itself limited by the statutory definition of “civil rights violation.”

In other words, the limitation on the court’s jurisdiction applies only

to civil rights violations defined by and arising under the Act. The

jurisdictional limitation does not apply to civil rights violations

defined by and arising under federal law, as those violations are

outside the scope of the Act.

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Because the holding in Cahoon and subsequent cases is contrary

to the clear language of section 8–111, we do not deem the

legislature’s purported silence following these decisions as

acquiescence in the appellate court’s construction of the Act. See

Perry, 224 Ill. 2d at 331-32. Accordingly, section 8–111 did not

prohibit the circuit court from exercising jurisdiction over plaintiff’s

section 1981 claim. Plaintiff could properly pursue her rights and

remedies under federal law in the circuit court.

In light of our holding, we need not address plaintiff’s argument

that subjecting her section 1981 claim to the Act’s administrative

procedures would impermissibly burden a federal right. See Felder

v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 101 L. Ed. 2d 123, 108 S. Ct. 2302 (1988)

(where the Court held that Wisconsin’s notice-of-claim statute, which

required notice to governmental agencies before suit could be brought

against them, did not apply to the plaintiff’s section 1983 action

against a municipality and certain of its police officers, because the

statute stood as an obstacle to the purpose and effect of section 1983

and was thus preempted). Similarly, we need not consider defendants’

counterargument that plaintiff forfeited review of this issue for failure

to provide notice to the Attorney General (see 210 Ill. 2d R. 19), or

that the Act’s administrative procedures are neutral rules that are not

preempted by section 1981 (see Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911,

138 L. Ed. 2d 108, 117 S. Ct. 1800 (1997) (where the Court

distinguished Felder and held that an Idaho appellate rule limiting

interlocutory appeals applies to the denial of qualified immunity in a

section 1983 claim brought in state court)).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, we reverse the judgment of the appellate

court reversing the trial court’s denial of defendants’ motion for

judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Because the appellate court

disposed of the appeal solely on the basis of the trial court’s

jurisdiction, it never considered defendants’ other claims of error. See

376 Ill. App. 3d at 936-37. Accordingly, we remand this matter to the

appellate court to consider those claims.

Reversed and remanded.

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