Case law

Stuyvesant Town, Inc. v. Ligham

17 N.J. 473 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Feb 14, 1955

Ed. 721 , 739 (1949) : “* * * g0 far as concerns private persons claiming immunity for their ordinary business operations (even though in connection with governmental activities), no implied constitutional immunity can rest … ground for implying a constitutional immunity, there is equally a want of any ground for assuming any purpose on the part of Congress to create an immunity.’ ” We find in the State Eent Control Act of 1953, ante, and in

Mendoza v. Monmouth Recycling Corp.

288 N.J. Super. 240 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Mar 7, 1996

The facts surrounding his entry were never really established. Petitioner testified through an interpreter, and his illegal status was apparently regarded by the judge as proved by petitioner's own testimony. … cannot qualify for workers' compensation benefits.

Housing Authority of Newark v. Sagner

142 N.J. Super. 332 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jun 1, 1976

Its employees enjoy civil service status under guidelines established by the State. N.J.S.A. 55:14A-6.1. … In that case the National Housing Agency was held to be immune from the operation of a local zoning ordinance. That agency was clearly a federal one and not a state one. Leslie Miller, Inc. v.

Snyder v. American Ass'n of Blood Banks

282 N.J. Super. 23 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jun 5, 1995

Clearly, then, the Legislature was aware of the non-immunity holding of Jacobs . It had the option of overruling it entirely. It did not. … She clearly had the discretion to rule differently.

AHS Hospital Corp. v. Town of Morristown

28 N.J. Tax 456 · New Jersey Tax Court · Jun 25, 2015

Simply put, the Hospital has failed to meet its burden of proof under law establishing that it meets the criteria to qualify for the exemption. … Clearly the failure of the Subject Property to qualify under the profit test would be some other reason to deem it ineligible for tax exemption, even if the use test is satisfied.

Pisack v. B & C Towing, Inc.

455 N.J. Super. 225 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jun 14, 2018

A plaintiff bringing a claim under the TCCWNA must establish that he or she is an "aggrieved consumer," and the defendant violated a "clearly established legal right" or "responsibility." … Charges not permitted by the Towing Act violate a "clearly established legal right" or "responsibility." Finally, if the vehicle owner paid for unauthorized services, the owner has suffered *1103 an ascertainable loss.

Kleinke v. City of Ocean City

163 N.J. Super. 424 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Oct 24, 1978

sections and there are no exceptions in the statute which preclude such immunity. … The statute clearly applies to the physical condition of the premises itself, not to the super imposition of an artificially created hazard thereon.

HEARD

District Court, D. New Jersey · Feb 24, 2026

According to Heard, qualified immunity does not provide a safe harbor given that the more lenient reasonableness standard is both clearly established and unmet—regardless of whether probable cause is the proper standard … Accordingly, Heard’s Cross Motion is DENIED. 7 For purposes of qualified immunity, which requires courts to consider whether a right was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct—without more—the

Daniel v. State, Dept. of Transp.

239 N.J. Super. 563 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Mar 19, 1990

Although the Legislature clearly intended to ameliorate the harsh results of strict application of the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity, the basic approach of the Act is to broadly limit public entity liability. … In any event, it cannot fairly be argued that the immunity provided by subsection c was established as a matter of law.

Morris v. Krauszer's Food Stores, Inc.

300 N.J. Super. 529 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · May 9, 1997

The duty of the owner or possessor of land to protect business invitees from foreseeable harm is well established. … The poor lighting made the interior of the store too dark to be clearly visible.

E. A. Williams, Inc. v. Russo Development Corp.

82 N.J. 160 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Feb 20, 1980

Tevis, 79 N.J. 422, 427-430 (1979) (acknowledged analogy of common law immunity to statutory period of limitation in determining that the immunity did not constitute substantive element of common law tort but served rather … established by 1967 as to make it reasonable to assume that the Legislature took this trend into account in enacting the statute.

ELLIS

District Court, D. New Jersey · Oct 15, 2025

The doctrine of qualified immunity “shields officials from civil liability so long as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” … Plaintiff has not identified, and this Court is not aware of, a case that clearly establishes such a right.

Shieldalloy Metallurgical Corp. v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection

743 F. Supp. 2d 429 · District Court, D. New Jersey · Oct 14, 2010

These principles, of course, are related, as a waiver that does not ‘clearly’ extend to a separate lawsuit generally would not preclude a State from asserting immunity in that separate action. … Both cases clearly establish that a prior sovereign immunity waiver does not extend to a subsequent suit simply because that suit is between the same parties and involves the same subject matter as the previous suit.

Brooks v. Odom

150 N.J. 395 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jul 15, 1997

Significantly, the court further found that the evidence established that plaintiff’s injuries were permanent. … We read the provision in the light of the general legislative intent *402 in the Act to establish immunity as the general rule and to subject a public entity for liability only as the Act provides. N.J.S.A 59:2-1.

Brown v. State

356 N.J. Super. 71 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Dec 17, 2002

"A statute must `clearly and irremediably violate[]' the ban on special legislation to be invalidated." City of Jersey City v. Farmer, 329 N.J.Super. 27, 38 , 746 A. 2d 1018 (App. Div.) … We have said that: In order to establish a violation of Title II of the ADA by these defendants, a plaintiff must show: (1) that he or she "has a disability"; (2) "is otherwise qualified for the employment or benefit"; (3

Manning Engineering, Inc. v. Hudson County Park Commission

74 N.J. 113 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jul 26, 1977

Factual Basis for Reopening the Judgment The trial court’s findings clearly indicate the propriety of reopening the judgment in this case. … Referring to the use immunity provided by 18 U. S.

Singer v. State

95 N.J. 487 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Mar 19, 1984

The court in Nadeau prescribed a two-fold test to determine whether a litigant qualifies as a prevailing party. … In addition, plaintiff must establish that the relief granted had some basis in law.

State v. Graham

41 N.J.L. 15 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Feb 15, 1879

According to the English routine, an entire immunity appears to have been, so far as I have observed, the result, without exception, of the judicial application • but in this country there is one recorded case, at least, … From my examination of the authorities, and from my knowledge of the course of practice, I am clearly of opinion, as I have already said, that it is entirely within the rightful province of this court to assent to and advise

WASHINGTON v. THE CITY OF JERSEY CITY

District Court, D. New Jersey · Jun 23, 2025

“The doctrine of qualified immunity shields government officials who perform discretionary functions ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or … Welsh, 466 U.S. at 749–50.7 The next question under the qualified immunity analysis is whether the constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the violation.

A.F. v. D.L.P.

339 N.J. Super. 312 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Apr 20, 2001

However, the Court clearly announced that “the standard we enunciate is applicable to all persons who have willingly, and with the approval of the [biological or adoptive] parent, undertaken the duties of a parent to a child … Without such a requirement, a paid nanny or babysitter could theoretically qualify for parental status.