ELLIS

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

WENDELL JOHNSON,

Plaintiff Civil Action No. 20-11472 (MAS) (RLS)

OPINION

WARDEN CHARLES ELLIS, et al.,

Defendants.

SHIPP, District Judge

This matter comes before the Court upon Warden Charles Ellis’s (“Defendant” or

“Defendant Ellis”) motion to dismiss (ECF No. 81) Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint

(“SAC”) (ECF No. 80) in this prisoner civil rights matter. Plaintiff filed opposition to the motion

(ECF No. 82), to which Defendant replied (ECF No. 86). Plaintiff also filed an improper sur-reply

without receiving leave of court. (ECF No. 87.) For the following reasons, Defendant’s motion

shall be granted, and Plaintiff's SAC shall be dismissed in its entirety.

I. BACKGROUND

During the relevant events at issue in the SAC, Plaintiff was a state-pretrial detainee facing

charges including an aggravated arson charge of which he was ultimately convicted. (See

generally ECF No. 80.) In the SAC, Plaintiff raises three sets of claims related to his time in the

county jail, operated by Defendant Ellis, during the COVID-19 pandemic in the spring and summer

of 2020: (1) a claim asserting that the COVID-19 lockdowns denied Plaintiff, a practicing Christian

who believes that frequent religious worship led by an ordained Christian minister is required by

his faith, his right to religious exercise because he was denied access to any such ministers or

regular worship for several months; (2) a claim asserting that the jail conditions during the

pandemic amounted to deliberate indifference to his medical needs in light of the COVID-19 virus

or that conditions imposed during the pandemic were overly punitive in light of the virus; and (3) a

claim in which he attempts to assert that various state prosecutorial figures, public defenders, and

legal aid organizations improperly held him without bail based on his arson charges and other

dropped charges. (Ud) Defendant Ellis moves to dismiss Plaintiff's Free Exercise claims,

apparently operating under the belief that only those claims are pending in the SAC in light of

language to that effect in the magistrate judge’s order that granted Plaintiff leave to file the

operative SAC. (ECF No. 81.)

I. LEGAL STANDARD

In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a

district court is required to accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and draw all

reasonable inferences from those allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, see Phillips

v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 2008), but need not accept as true legal

conclusions couched as factual allegations. Papasan y. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). A

complaint need not contain “detailed factual allegations” to survive a motion to dismiss, but must

contain “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v.

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A complaint “that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do,’” and a complaint will not “suffice” if it

provides only “‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Jd. (quoting Bell

All. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 557 (2007)). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.’” Jd. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility

when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that

the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” /d (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). A

complaint that provides facts “merely consistent with” the defendant’s liability “stops short of the

line between possibility and plausibility” and will not survive review under Rule 12(b)(6). Jd.

(quoting Twombly, 555 U.S. at 557). While pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed in

conducting such an analysis, pro se litigants must still “allege sufficient facts in their complaints

to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013).

Il. DISCUSSION

In his motion to dismiss, Defendant Ellis argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity

as to Plaintiffs Free Exercise claim.'! The doctrine of qualified immunity “shields officials from

civil liability so long as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional

rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Peroza-Benitez v. Smith, 994 F.3d 157,

165 (3d Cir. 2021) (quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015)). In evaluating a claim of

qualified immunity, courts apply a two pronged test: first, the court must determine if, considered

in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the facts alleged assert a violation of a constitutional

right; and second, the court must determine if the right which was allegedly violated was clearly

established such that “it would [have been] clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was

' Tn the SAC, Plaintiff again asserts that his rights are protected by RLUIPPA and the RFRA. As

the Court previously explained to Plaintiff, however, any claim Plaintiff had under RLUIPPA is

now moot as money damages are not available under the statute and any claim for declaratory or

injunctive relief under the statute became moot once Plaintiff was transferred out of the county jail

and into state prison. See, e.g., Banks v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 601 F. App’x 101, 103-04 (3d

Cir. 2015). Likewise, the RFRA applies only to burdens on religious liberty imposed by the federal

government, and does not apply to burdens, such as those here, imposed solely by state and local

governmental entities. The RFRA therefore does not apply to Plaintiffs case. See, e.g., Mathis v.

Christian Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc., 158 F. Supp. 3d 317, 326 n.5 (E.D. Pa. 2016). Thus,

to the extent Plaintiff intended to reraise his RLUIPPA claims or raise RFRA claims, those claims

are dismissed.

ny

unlawful in the situation he confronted.” /d. (quoting Lamont v. New Jersey, 637 F.3d 177, 182

(3d Cir. 2011)). A negative answer to either prong will warrant the granting of qualified immunity

to the defendant. /d. To determine whether a right was clearly established, the court must “define

the right allegedly violated at the appropriate level of specificity” and determine whether existing

caselaw at that time made the right in question “sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would

understand that what he is doing violates that right.” /d In considering this question, the court

must look first to the holdings of the Supreme Court, and the Third Circuit, and then to whether a

sufficient robust consensus of persuasive authority in the various courts of appeals exists which

would support finding the right to be clearly established. Jd. at 165-66.

Here, Plaintiff alleges that his sincerely held beliefs required access to ordained Christian

ministers for worship services on a regular basis, and that Defendant Ellis’s COVID-19 related

restrictions on jail entry denied him such access to regular worship through ordained ministers for

the several months between the onset of COVID-19 restrictions in late spring of 2020 and the filing

of this matter in August 2020. To state a claim for a violation of his First Amendment right to free

exercise of religion, a prisoner plaintiff must allege facts showing that a jail policy substantially

burdened the prisoner’s practice of religion, and that this policy was not reasonably related to

legitimate penological interests. See Tormasi v. Lanigan, 363 F. Supp. 3d 525, 534 (D.N.J. Jan.

28, 2019). A regulation that impugns a prisoner’s religious exercise thus must have a “valid,

rational connection” to the state’s proposed legitimate interest which is not arbitrary or irrational.

Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-90 (1987). In determining whether a regulation is rationally

connected to a legitimate penological interest, courts may also look to: whether the plaintiff had

alternative means of exercising his rights; the impact accommodation of the plaintiffs rights would

have on guards, other inmates, and prison resources; and the absence of ready alternatives. /d. at

90-91. In the SAC and other filings, Plaintiff essentially asserts that he was denied any and all

access to ordained ministers and appropriate worship services for several months during the

COVID-19 pandemic’s height. Considered in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, and having

considered Plaintiffs operative complaint and related filings, that claim does present an instance

in which Plaintiff’s religious exercise was substantially burdened. Plaintiff effectively could resort

to nothing but private prayer for several months and was otherwise without worship services for a

considerable period. That said, the state did have a legitimate interest in controlling the flow of

people into a county jail during a recognized pandemic. The accommodation of Plaintiffs rights

by permitting greater in person access to the jail by religious ministers and their staff would have

both affected available jail resources during the pandemic and would have potentially exposed

Plaintiff, staff, and other inmates to potential infections. Here, Plaintiff does not allege that he was

completely deprived of any ability to worship God, view televised worship services,’ or offer

prayer during the lockdowns. Considered in total, Plaintiff has a borderline free exercise claim in

which his rights to religious practice were burdened. That burden, however, was imposed as part

of a neutral policy of excluding non-essential entrants into the jail, which was most likely

sufficiently rationally related to the state’s interest in slowing the spread of COVID-19 in its jails

during an emergency situation. Plaintiff thus likely fails to state a plausible claim for a

constitutional violation.

Even if Plaintiff did state such a claim, however, Plaintiff cannot show that the violation in

question was clearly established. Defined at the appropriate level of specificity, the right Plaintiff

asserts in this matter is the right to have frequent in person access to ministers and worship services

* The Court notes that even many who were not detained were subjected to limited in person

worship opportunities during this same period, with many churches, mosques, and synagogues

being closed or worship opportunities limited by the religious institutions themselves because of

the perceived risk of COVID-19 and its spread, and were thus left with the use of outdoor or

televised services in place of regular in person worship in their churches or similar institutions.

gg

during a nationally recognized pandemic situation in which all other non-essential entry into the

jail in which the plaintiff is housed has been halted to protect the health of the inmates. Plaintiff

has not identified, and this Court is not aware of, a case that clearly establishes such a right.

Instead, the cases at hand suggest that some deference must be provided to jail staff in their

response to the novel pandemic situation during its height, and courts should not infer

constitutional violations where good faith efforts are being made to curtail what is perceived to be

deadly, difficult to contain, pathogen in the absence of clear guidance. See, e.g., Hope v. Warden

York Cnty. Prison, 972 F.3d 310, 325-331 (3d Cir. 2020). As it would not have been clear that a

temporary curtailing of in-person worship services and access to ordained ministers during the

medical emergency of a recognized pandemic during which public guidance suggested that lock

downs and limited access to jails was the wisest course for protecting inmates, the right Plaintiff

espouses was not clearly established at the time of the alleged constitutional violations. Defendant

Ellis is therefore entitled to qualified immunity as to Plaintiff's free exercise claims. Defendant

Ellis’s motion shall be granted, and Plaintiff's free exercise claims against him will be dismissed

with prejudice.*

In addition to his free exercise claims, which are the subject of Defendant’s motion,

Plaintiff also attempts to raise other claims in his SAC. First, Plaintiff tries to reassert claims that

the conditions of confinement imposed by Defendant Ellis and others during the COVID-19

pandemic violated his Due Process rights because they either amounted to punishment or

deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's needs, even though Plaintiff acknowledges the considerable

is not clear whether Plaintiff intended to raise his free exercise claim as to any of the other

Defendants Plaintiff attempts to reassert in his SAC. To the extent Plaintiff did intend to raise this

claim against anyone other than Ellis—the only person discussed clearly in Plaintiff's SAC as to

this issue—that claim must be dismissed on qualified immunity grounds or lack of clear personal

involvement.

remedial measures Ellis took by incorporating into his SAC several certifications made by Ellis to

that effect. Second, Plaintiff attempts to raise claims against the state attorney general, the state

public defender, and attorneys involved in his criminal proceedings. Plaintiff asserts that his being

held without a grant of bail was improper because Plaintiff does not believe that the aggravated

arson charge was enough to warrant detention and his other charges were ultimately dropped.* As

Plaintiff has previously been granted in forma pauperis status in this matter, the Court is required

to screen these claims and dismiss them to the extent they are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted, or are raised against immune Defendants. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B).

As this Court previously explained to Plaintiff numerous times, (see ECF No. 27 at 5-8;

ECF No, 46 at 7-8), the COVID-19 pandemic alone is insufficient to show that Plaintiff was

subjected to deliberate indifference or overly punitive conditions, and the strong remedial

measures taken by Ellis and the State to address the pandemic indicate that they were neither

deliberately indifferent to the medical needs of inmates housed in the jail during the pandemic nor

did they impose those remedial conditions with an intent to punish sufficient to warrant liability

under the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Hope, 972 F.3d at 325-31 (noting that courts must

defer to jail officials’ expertise in responding to pandemic and an inmate cannot show pandemic

conditions amount to deliberate indifference to medical needs or unconstitutional conditions of

confinement where the jail staff took concrete action to remediate the threat of the virus in the

* The magistrate judge in this matter granted Plaintiff leave to file his SAC only after reviewing

Plaintiff's free exercise claims and without comment as to Plaintiff's remaining claims. Without

an explicit finding in the order that these claims are futile, the Court cannot ignore the claims and

treat them as if they were not in the SAC. The Court, nevertheless, understands that Defendant

does not address them in his motion to dismiss in light of the magistrate judge’s discussion and

grant of leave to amend only the free exercise claim. This Court therefore screens and addresses

the other claims here sua sponte.

uncertain environment at hand during the pandemic), Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference and

conditions of confinement claims related to the COVID-19 pandemic are therefore once again

dismissed.°

Turning to Plaintiff's bail-related claim, Plaintiff essentially argues that the denial of bail

pending trial was a violation of his constitutional rights. Plaintiff believes his aggravated arson

charge alone was insufficient to warrant detention without bail and his other charges were

ultimately dropped. Plaintiff believes that this amounts to various state actors and public defenders

engaging in sham charges to keep him detained. As this Court previously explained to Plaintiff,

however, Plaintiff's arson charges alone are more than sufficient to support his detention without

bail pending trial. See, e.g., Henderson v. New Jersey, No. 20-12949, 2021 WL 487133, at *2-3

(D.N.J. Feb. 10, 2021); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 742 (1987). More to the point, a

state prisoner seeking to challenge the fact or duration of his confinement, including his pretrial

confinement, has but one remedy——a habeas corpus petition—unless or until the confinement in

question is overturned, expunged, or otherwise declared invalid, and a prisoner may not seek

monetary damages or other relief under § 1983 for such detention in the meantime. See, e.g.,

Although the Court need not address the issue in detail at this time, the Court notes that several

Defendants involved in Plaintiffs deliberate indifference, conditions of confinement, and bail-

related claims either appear to lack personal involvement in the wrongs alleged in the SAC

sufficient to infer liability, see Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207-08 (3d Cir. 1988), or

are immune from suit. See, e.g, Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318 (1981) (public

defenders are immune in a civil rights matter as they are not state actors when they act as defense

counsel); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 410 (1976) (prosecutors generally immune for

prosecutorial actions such as charging decisions); Christ the King Manor, Inc. vy. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t

of Health & Human Serys., 730 F.3d 291, 318 (3d Cir. 2013) (state and its arms are immune from

suit in federal court under the Eleventh Amendment and are not persons subject to suit in a civil

rights matter; Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 789, 806 (3d Cir. 2000) (liability under § 1983 only applies

to state actors, not private entities and actors). Likewise, to the extent that Plaintiff intended to

raise his free exercise claim against anyone other than Defendant Ellis, Plaintiff has failed to plead

facts suggesting any other Defendant was personally involved in the denial of his right to exercise

his faith, and any such claim against any other Defendant must therefore be dismissed without

prejudice at this time. Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207-08.

oO

Giallorenzeo v. Beaver County, 241 F. App’x 866, 867-68 (3d Cir. 2007). This rule applies even

when the litigant is “no longer in custody” pursuant to the challenged state court ruling and “can

no longer seek federal habeas corpus relief.” Jd. at 867. As Plaintiff never had his pretrial

detention without bail invalidated, he cannot now resort to a § 1983 claim to attack that period of

detention, notwithstanding his conviction and transfer to state prison. Plaintiffs claim is barred

unless and until he has his detention without bail invalidated through state court proceedings and

he may not raise his bail claims here. Plaintiffs bail-related claims must therefore be dismissed

without prejudice at this time.° As all of Plaintiff’s claims shall be dismissed, Plaintiffs SAC shall

be dismissed in its entirety.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons expressed above, Defendant Ellis’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 81) is

GRANTED; Plaintiff's free exercise claims against Defendant Ellis are DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE as Ellis is entitled to qualified immunity, and Plaintiff's remaining claims are all

DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. An order consistent with this Opinion will be entered.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated. October 15, 2025

° Likewise, to the extent Plaintiff's sham charges claim could be construed as a species of a

malicious prosecution claim, such a claim is barred until Plaintiff secures a favorable termination

of his claims, which Plaintiff cannot show in light of his ultimate conviction on aggravated arson

charges. See Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 296-97 (3d Cir. 2014).