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  • Anthony A. Parish v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

    Indiana Court of Appeals · Sep 9, 2020

    Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED regarded as precedent or cited before any Sep 09 2020, 8:47 am court except for the purpose of establishing … Appellate assistance will be considered deficient, however, if the omitted issue was clearly stronger than the issues presented. Bieghler v.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Hundt v. LaCrosse Grain Co., Inc.

    425 N.E.2d 687 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Sep 21, 1981

    the same reason, we similarly cannot agree with Lacrosse’s contention that the regulations in question should have been listed as exhibits in the trial court’s pre-trial order, and that Goodwin should have been properly qualified … The instant instruction is clearly nonmandatory since it does not “attempt to set forth specific facts such that the jury is required to reach a certain result upon a finding of those facts,” Kroger v.

    Reversed on other grounds by Hundt v. La Crosse Grain Co., Inc., 1983 Ind. LEXIS 785 (1983)Cited 10 timesPublished
  • Daniel P. Wahl v. State of Indiana

    36 N.E.3d 1163 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jun 30, 2015

    We will first establish whether Wahl has met his initial two-part inquiry of prejudice. A. … A trial court abuses its discretion if its “decision is clearly against the logic and effects of the facts and circumstances before’ it” or if it “misinterprets or misapplies the law.”"

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • Jennifer Pennington v. Memorial Hospital of South Bend, Inc.

    Indiana Supreme Court · Jan 9, 2024

    We think that Beacon failed to carry its initial burden of establishing these facts. … Sawyer was clearly qualified to give an expert opinion on Beacon’s standard of care as an operator involved in designing the pool.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Buntin v. City of Indianapolis

    838 F. Supp. 2d 849 · District Court, S.D. Indiana · Dec 7, 2011

    Under the indirect method, a plaintiff must begin by establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. … For the reasons delineated below, we conclude that Buntin cannot establish a prima facie case because she clearly was not meeting her employer’s legitimate job expectations.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Ellington Jeffrey, a minor by his mother and father, Victor Jeffrey and Lynell Jeffrey and Victor and Lynell Jeffrey, individually v. Stephen Robertson, Insurance Commissioner (mem. dec.)

    Indiana Court of Appeals · Mar 13, 2018

    Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any FILED court except for the purpose of establishing Mar 13 … The language of the release document signed by Victor and Lynell and Methodist clearly sets forth their intent that the settlement meet the statutory minimum and allow Victor and Lynell to proceed

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • State of Indiana ex rel. Richard M. Allen v. Carroll Circuit Court

    Indiana Supreme Court · Feb 8, 2024

    United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988), which includes his choice of qualified counsel, Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 624 (1989). … The opinion cites nothing from our Court—or any court—establishing this rule.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Plumbers & Pipefitters Local Union 719 Pension Fund v. Zimmer Holdings, Inc.

    673 F. Supp. 2d 718 · District Court, S.D. Indiana · Dec 1, 2009

    These allegations in the Complaint do not suffice to establish the materiality of Defendants’ omissions. b. … To qualify as “strong” within the intendment of [the PSLRA], we hold, an inference of scienter must be more than merely plausible or reasonable — it must be cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing inference of nonfraudulent

    Cited 13 timesPublished
  • Kenneth M. Jordan v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

    Indiana Court of Appeals · Feb 14, 2017

    He argues that State’s Exhibit 1 Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Opinion 44A03-1603-CR-503 | February 14, 2017 Page 7 of 30 was hearsay, and therefore should not have qualified for admission under … Vanderkolk, 32 N.E.3d 775, 779 (Ind. 2015), a Fourth Amendment case, our supreme court very broadly held that probationers “who have consented or been clearly informed that the conditions of their probation

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Public Service Commission v. City of Indianapolis

    193 Ind. 37 · Indiana Supreme Court · Dec 22, 1922

    Electric Corporation for purposes of rates which it may make in the future will be made and determined entirely independent of - and unaffected by its finding herein,” and that such finding shall not affect rates to be established … Interpreted in the light of the facts we have stated, the provisions last quoted clearly authorize any and all corporations organized and operating as public utilities to buy from and sell to each other, on terms fixed by

    Cited 16 timesPublished
  • Walker v. State ex rel. Stinson

    176 Ind. 40 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jun 9, 1911

    If payment as claimed were clearly shown by the evidence, appellants’ contention *51 would have to be sustained. … Clearly it was never lessened.

    Cited 3 timesPublished
  • DeVault v. State

    254 Ind. 546 · Indiana Supreme Court · Aug 24, 1970

    DeVAULT was the duly elected, qualified and acting Trustee of Calumet Township, Lake County, Indiana; that JERRY N. … Our Supreme Court has clearly indicated that: ‘A verdict based merely upon suspicion, opportunity, probability, conjecture, speculation, and unreasonable inferences of guilt gleaned from the vague circumstances in the record

    Cited 5 timesPublished
  • Jackson v. Luellen Farms, Inc.

    877 N.E.2d 848 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Dec 12, 2007

    Jackson did not qualify his signature as President of Hartford Packing Company, Inc. [[Image here]] 31. … Although Jackson clearly had some motive to sign the Note, the Note was not supported by consideration. See Brown, 114 Ind.App. at 408 , 52 N.E.2d at 641 .

    Cited 16 timesPublished
  • Clark v. Metro Health Foundation, Inc.

    90 F. Supp. 2d 976 · District Court, N.D. Indiana · Mar 28, 2000

    The defendants reply that they clearly met the burden because the undisputed evidence at trial established that the defendants invited Ms. … Paradise were too unimportant in the defendants’ corporate schemes to qualify as “managerial agents,” but the argument is unpersuasive. Larry Butler (the President of both the Metro corporations) and Ms.

    Cited 1 timesPublished
  • Citizens Action Coalition of Indiana, Inc. v. Southern Indiana Gas and Electricity Company

    70 N.E.3d 429 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Feb 14, 2017

    Intervenors have failed to establish that the IURC abused the broad discretion granted it. … While it sets out the requirements of such a petition, 170 I.A.C. 1- 1.1-22 does not establish a standard of review.

    Cited 6 timesPublished
  • Nirmal Joshi, M.D. v. Apollo Medical Group, LLC Nirmal Joshi, M.D. v. Ayman Elfar, M.D. and Candido Guiao, M.D. (mem. dec.)

    Indiana Court of Appeals · Oct 5, 2017

    engaging in any other business or venture, whether or not competitive, 1 The Operating Agreement distinguishes between “Managers” and “Members,” though each of the three doctors in this case qualify … Joshi first argues that the trial court erred by finding that Apollo established a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits of its claims.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • O'NEAL v. KRUEGER

    District Court, S.D. Indiana · Jul 22, 2020

    Section 39-17-417 clearly prohibits conduct “relating to narcotic drugs.” 21 U.S.C. § 804(22). … Texas Health and Safety Code § 481.115 clearly prohibits conduct “relating to narcotic drugs.” 21 U.S.C. § 804(22).

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • BOYD v. MARION COUNTY SHERIFF

    District Court, S.D. Indiana · Sep 30, 2024

    The Court must dis- miss the complaint if it is frivolous or malicious; fails to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; or seeks monetary damages against a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. … Boyd must clearly identify the federal constitutional or statu- tory provision giving rise to his claims and/or the state of each defendant’s citizenship for purposes of diversity jurisdiction.

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • City of Hammond v. Board of Zoning Appeals

    152 Ind. App. 480 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jun 22, 1972

    But when the Legislature has not made that authorization, courts should not be asked to do so by changing the long established and generally understood meaning of ‘aggrieved’ in order to attain a result the Legislature has … We hold that the City’s complaint did not demonstrate a'personal or pecuniary interest which would qualify it as an “aggrieved” party within the meaning of the statute. *490 *489 V.

    Cited 30 timesPublished
  • Eaton Corp. v. Appliance Valves Co.

    634 F. Supp. 974 · District Court, N.D. Indiana · May 3, 1984

    This case was tried by a very experienced and highly competent trial counsel who were thoroughly qualified to deal with all questions of prior art. … All that is required to show obviousness is that the applicant make his claimed invention merely by applying knowledge clearly present in the prior art.

    Cited 23 timesPublished

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