Case law

Powell v. Pittsfield, City of

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Dec 14, 2020

Plaintiff expected this injury to qualify for injury on duty (“IOD”) status, but the City of Pittsfield determined it did not. … As to the § 1985 conspiracy claim in particular, the Municipal Defendants would be entitled to qualified immunity under the principles of Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1867-69 (2017). (See Dkt. No. 172 at 28.)

Boston Gas Co. v. Century Indemnity Co.

454 Mass. 337 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jul 24, 2009

“Excess . . . insurance over a qualified purely self-insured retention of risk would not be considered ‘primary;’ the self-insurance itself is the ‘primary’ layer.” Id. at § 5:3, at 2. … In such a case both policies clearly cover the entire loss.” (Citations omitted.) Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. United Ins. Co., 138 N.J. 437, 470 (1994).

Bassett v. Jensen

District Court, D. Massachusetts · May 11, 2020

The designs on the tabletops also qualify to the extent the color and placement of the stenciled designs are original to Bassett. See Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. … It found that “the principal four-to-five-second segment in which almost all of the poster is clearly visible, albeit in less than perfect focus, reenforced [sic] by the briefer segments

Timmins Software Corporation v. EMC Corporation

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Nov 24, 2020

Plaintiff argues this qualifies as “unfair acts and practices and . . . unfair methods of competition within the meaning of Massachusetts General Laws 93A.” Id. … Thus, Count III clearly meets the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). IV.

Board of Trustees of the IUOE Local 4 Pension Fund v. Alongi

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Dec 7, 2022

Mem. at 5).4 Plaintiffs respond that defendant has failed to establish good cause because she did not diligently seek to amend. A. Fed. R. Civ. … Defendant’s proposed counterclaim for interference with rights is clearly part of the same case or controversy as the fiduciary-duty claim.

FWK Holdings LLC v. Shire PLC (Direct Purchaser Antitrust Class Action Complaint)

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 24, 2019

The class proposed here is clearly ascertainable. “Rule 23 does not set forth a mere pleading standard. A party seeking class certification must affirmatively demonstrate his compliance with the Rule.” … “To meet the predominance requirement, the party seeking certification must show that ‘the fact of antitrust impact can be established through common proof’ and that ‘any resulting damages would likewise be established

In re Biogen Inc. Securities Litigation

193 F. Supp. 3d 5 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jun 23, 2016

PML is an infection that is particularly dangerous for individuals with a weakened immune system. … “There is no set pattern of facts that will establish scienter; it is a case-by-case inquiry.” ACA Fin., 512 F.3d at 66.

Doe v. Cavanaugh

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 22, 2020

The court ruled that A.M.’s note received First Amendment protection whether it qualified as “political” or not. Id. at 23-24. … Claimants bear the burden of establishing, “‘from the text of [the law] and from actual fact,’ that substantial overbreadth exists.” Virginia v.

Hightower v. City of Boston

822 F. Supp. 2d 38 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 29, 2011

Finally, and most importantly, the statement in the Harrington Declaration upon which Hightower focuses in no way suggests that it would be futile for her to apply for any type of restricted permit that would clearly fall … Memo, D. 45 at 18 (“[t]he correct category for Hightower is simply, ‘law-abiding Bostonian fully qualified to possess firearms.’ All people in this category should expect to have their applications treated equally.

Eggiman v. Bank of America, N.A.

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 27, 2023

The parties clearly have a contractual agreement covering the commercial conduct at issue in this case. … Compl. ¶ 157], as Eggiman suggests, is clearly an expansion of the express terms of the contract.

Greene v. State of Massachusetts

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Oct 16, 2020

She names eighteen defendants, although she does not clearly identify which claim is being asserted against each defendant. … “A person’s domicile is the place where he has his true, fixed home and principal establishment, and to which, whenever he is absent, he has the intention of returning.” Id. (quoting Rodríguez-Díaz v.

Edwards Lifesciences CardiAQ, LLC v. Kenneth Perry

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 31, 2019

The TCT Sketch also does not clearly show reversing anchors. In fact, the anchors in the TCT Sketch do not appear to reverse. CardiAQ Facts ¶¶ 20–21. … See Ethicon, Inc., 135 F.3d at 1460 (“[O]ne does not qualify as a joint inventor by merely assisting the actual inventor after conception of the claimed invention.”). V.

Kravetz v. United States Trust Co.

941 F. Supp. 1295 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 7, 1996

In their reply memorandum in support of their' motion for summary judgment, the defendants claim that “[bjeeause [the plaintiffs’ conduct] establishes that this case is frivolous, that the plaintiffs were never able to support … Smith Barney Shearson, Inc., 76 F.3d 1245 (1st Cir.1996), the trustee and participants in an ERISA qualified pension and profit sharing plan brought an action against its brokers for breach of fiduciary duty and fraud.

Advent Technologies, Inc. v. Kaye

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Apr 29, 2024

Mass. 2008) (“extensive post-contract communications that relate to the operation of the contract itself” may also qualify as transacting business). a. … Advent Inc. has therefore failed to establish personal jurisdiction under subsection (c). 3. Mass. Gen.

Burger v. Berryhill

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 31, 2019

The ALJ also noted that the record did not contain evidence from these providers on or before the date last insured establishing disabling symptoms. … In that regard, the plaintiff contends that the three letters from his treatment providers in 2017 “clearly demonstrate [his] case in 2014, while he was insured” for disability benefits.

Consumer Financial Protection Bureau v. Commonwealth Equity Group, LLC

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 30, 2024

Romanettes (i) and (ii) provide that before they may accept any payment, telemarketers must first allow the time frame in which they indicated their services would be complete to expire and then provide consumers with qualified … 9 Restitution is legal in nature where it “impos[es] a merely personal liability upon the defendant to pay a sum of money,” but equitable in nature where the plaintiff seeks money or property that can “clearly

Commonwealth v. Correia

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jun 12, 2023

Although rap lyrics do not qualify as bad act evidence,12 here, the defendant's lyrics conveyed ideas or acts that 12 We have considered rap lyrics to be bad act evidence on at least one other occasion. … In Kendrick, 351 Mass. at 211, "excessive force" is described as "unreasonable and clearly excessive in light of the existing circumstances" or "manifestly disproportionate."

R. Susan Woods

United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Massachusetts · Feb 4, 2020

In the First Circuit, it is axiomatic that “emotional damages qualify as ‘actual damages’” under § 362(k), and that, in appropriate circumstances, “[a]n honest accounting of actual damages ... must include the psychological … Rather, the Debtor was forcibly removed from her home and temporarily deprived of many of her personal possessions as a result of the eviction — an action that clearly ran afoul of § 362(a), which enjoins both “the

Samah

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jan 8, 2026

While the amended complaint does not use the term “constructive discharge” and instead refers to Samah’s “separation” and “termination,” it clearly seeks to invoke the constructive discharge doctrine. … Those elements are that “(1) the plaintiff must be a member of a protected class; (2) [he] must be qualified for [his] job; (3) [he] must suffer an adverse employment action at the hands of [his] employer; and (4) there

Ortiz v. O'Malley

District Court, D. Massachusetts · May 14, 2025

Accordingly, in reviewing the ALJ’s non-severity determination, the Court more accurately asks “whether the ALJ had substantial evidence to find that [pursuant to SSR 85-28] the medical evidence clearly established that … May 4, 2011) (agreeing with Webb, 433 F.3d at 687, and stating that “an ALJ may find that a claimant lacks a medically severe impairment only when his conclusion is ‘clearly established by medical evidence’”) (citation