Case law
Opinions from 1658 to today.
9,602 results
0.62s
Cooper's Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Simmons
94 Wash. 2d 321 · Washington Supreme Court · Sep 25, 1980
The term does not have such an established meaning consistent with only one characterization of a particular item. … For instance, in this case the legislative purpose clearly appears from the following analysis.
Cited 28 timesPublishedIn re the Parental Rights to B.P.
188 Wash. App. 113 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Jun 4, 2015
The Department has established RCW 13.34-.180(l)(f) by clear[,] cogent[,] and convincing evidence. 39. [H.O.] clearly loves [B.P.] and wants to parent her. … Practitioners consider such observations to be crucial in order to render a qualified, professional opinion as a mental health expert.
Cited 6 timesPublished179 Wash. 2d 224 · Washington Supreme Court · Nov 27, 2013
. *266 ¶98 Such restrictions on who may qualify for domestic partnership might lead to results perceived to be unfair or arbitrary. … Thus, for purposes of our opinion, the notarized agreements among the parties were established facts.
Cited 49 timesPublishedKramarevcky v. Department of Social & Health Services
122 Wash. 2d 738 · Washington Supreme Court · Dec 2, 1993
The facts in West clearly render the case inapplicable in this instance. See Harbor Air Serv., Inc. v. … The majority's holding that substantive eligibility is not a requirement for establishing the injury element of estoppel is, thus, clearly incorrect when a party is asserting estoppel against the government.
Cited 111 timesPublishedCarstens Packing Co. v. Southern Pacific Co.
58 Wash. 239 · Washington Supreme Court · May 3, 1910
Clearly, its enactment was prompted by a concern for the public welfare. … But both these elementary principles are subordinate to and qualified by the doctrine that neither by comity nor by the will of contracting parties can the public policy of a country be set at naught.
Cited 17 timesPublished142 Wash. App. 777 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Jan 23, 2008
435 (2000) and Blakely , 10 because the State’s charging information failed to “allege the existence of the condition precedent to the application” of the RCW 69.50.408(1) sentencing-doubling provision, namely, his prior qualifying … Because McNeal cannot show a disadvantage flowing from this new sentencing procedure on remand, he does not establish an ex post facto violation. V.
Cited 18 timesPublishedDiamond Parking, Inc. v. City of Seattle
78 Wash. 2d 778 · Washington Supreme Court · Jan 8, 1971
unless there is maintained at or near the entrance of said garage a sign designating each rate to be charged for such parking or keeping and the hours applicable thereto and the name of the licensee and such sign shall be clearly … The court’s opinion will allow the surviving corporate entity to enter a licensed field of activity without applying and qualifying for a license, for under the aegis of the Uniform Business Corporation Act it may achieve
Cited 13 timesPublishedKUSTURA v. Department of Labor and Industries
142 Wash. App. 655 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Jan 22, 2008
Fernandez, 155 Wash.2d 585, 593 , 121 P.3d 82 (2005) ("`[U]nless a contrary intention appears in the statute, qualifying words and phrases refer to the last antecedent.'") … But Marintorres involved interpreter costs for a defendant in the criminal context where the government clearly initiates the proceedings and does not apply here.
Cited 21 timesPublished102 Wash. App. 882 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Oct 12, 2000
The statute qualifies threat by requiring the threat be one “of force or violence.” “Violence” includes numerous definitions. Webster’s, supra, at 2554. … The trial court did not err by concluding it was unnecessary for the State to establish that Mr. Avila intended to convey his threats to Mr. Kimes.
Cited 31 timesPublishedFidelity Mort. Corp. v. Seattle Times Co.
128 P.3d 621 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Jan 27, 2006
. ¶ 12 Further, Fidelity has failed to establish that the acts complained of constitute unfair or deceptive acts. … Fidelity contends that certain statements accompanying the chart qualify as misleading advertisements under Hartigan.
Cited 3 timesPublishedDistrict Court, E.D. Washington · Aug 19, 2025
The party appealing the ALJ’s decision generally bears the burden of 11 establishing that it was harmed. Shinseki v. … disorders, but genetic disorders, and, 13 therefore, should not be included in the immune system listings.
Cited 0 timesUnknown221 F. 694 · District Court, W.D. Washington · Dec 24, 1914
Liberty implies the absence of arbitrary restraint, not immunity from reasonable regulations and prohibitions imposed in the interests of the community.” … Rights of property, like all other social and conventional rights, are subject to such reasonable limitations in their enjoyment as shall prevent them from being injurious, and to such reasonable restraints and regulations, established
Reversed on other grounds by Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590 (1917)Cited 11 timesPublishedHTK Management, L.L.C. v. Seattle Popular Monorail Authority
155 Wash. 2d 612 · Washington Supreme Court · Oct 20, 2005
RCW 35.95A.050(1). 28 Our case law establishes that condemnation procedures may be fairly implied if necessary to effectuate the legislature’s intent. … The Transit Way Agreement between the City of Seattle and Monorail establishes conditions under which Monorail may use the city's rights-of-way. Fully quoted infra p. 646.
Cited 38 timesPublished10 P.3d 486 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Oct 12, 2000
The statute qualifies threat by requiring the threat be one "of force or violence." "Violence" includes numerous definitions. Webster's, supra, 2554. … The trial court did not err by concluding it was unnecessary for the State to establish that Mr. Avila intended to convey his threats to Mr. Kimes.
Cited 30 timesPublishedAustin K. Fite, V. City Of Puyallup
Court of Appeals of Washington · Nov 9, 2021
principles The business records exception to the hearsay prohibition states, A record of an act, condition or event, shall in so far as relevant, be competent evidence if the custodian or other qualified … Indeed, one witness clearly stated that “I did not see [Fite] stop before crossing the road.” 11 RP at 1874.
Cited 0 timesPublishedDistrict Court, W.D. Washington · Oct 10, 2025
Third, they argue their 19 actions are covered by qualified immunity. See Dkt. 44 at 6. Defendants’ first two arguments 20 resolve this matter, and the Court declines to reach the third. 21 A. … Because the Court finds no constitutional violation 4 occurred, it need not reach Defendants’ qualified immunity argument. 5 CONCLUSION 6 For
Cited 0 timesUnknownTown of Woodway v. Snohomish County
172 Wash. App. 643 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Jan 7, 2013
The majority rule provides that development is not immune from subsequently adopted regulations until a building permit has been obtained and substantial development has occurred in reliance on the permit. … The Task Force was established in 1993 by executive order 93-06.
Cited 8 timesPublishedHenry Broderick, Inc. v. Baker
151 Wash. 1 · Washington Supreme Court · Feb 14, 1929
It clearly appears from respondent’s testimony and from the instrument itself that the agreement was intended by respondent to be definite and complete, and that the same did not contemplate further negotiation between the … Duryee, called as a witness on the part of respondent, testified that appellant read the earnest money receipt when the same was presented to him on the morning of November 16, but, on cross-examination, qualified his testimony
Cited 9 timesPublishedDistrict Court, W.D. Washington · Apr 26, 2022
The USMEPCOM Chief Medical Officer and the USAREC Command Surgeon 17 subsequently determined Suhanec was medically qualified for enlistment. … Accordingly, because Plaintiff has failed to establish negligent hiring, Defendant 8 retains sovereign immunity and Plaintiff’s suit fails. 9 III.
Cited 0 timesUnknownIn Re the Detention of Danforth
173 Wash. 2d 59 · Washington Supreme Court · Nov 10, 2011
Danforth moved for summary judgment, arguing that his actions did not constitute a “recent overt act” to qualify him for commitment proceedings under former RCW 71.09-.020(10) (2006), recodified as RCW 71.09.020(12). … Ed. 2d 664 (1969) (holding that statutes that criminalize pure speech “must he interpreted with the commands of the First Amendment clearly in mind”).
Cited 25 timesPublished
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