Case law

Amy Pawle v. Sean Donovan.

Massachusetts Appeals Court · Dec 5, 2024

In doing so, we defer to the judge's factual findings, "absent a showing that they are plainly wrong or clearly erroneous." Id. … [and] is close to immune from reversal." Johnston v. Johnston, 38 Mass. App. Ct. 531, 536 (1995).

Phillips v. City of Methuen

818 F. Supp. 2d 325 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Oct 11, 2011

Plaintiffs conspiracy claim in Count II rests on the alleged violation of his rights in Count I. 73 It is well established that, “in the context of a continuing conspiracy to violate civil rights, the statute of limitations … [Supervisory duties, conferred on a discretionary basis, do not qualify as a property interest.” 79 Furthermore, in the event that a plaintiff has a right to a “benefit” conferred by state law, he cannot succeed in alleging

Adoption of Lurleen.

Massachusetts Appeals Court · Aug 12, 2025

We do not agree, however, that the inverse conclusion follows -- that the absence of a docket entry showing that inquiry was made affirmatively establishes that it was not made. … The father does not challenge any of those findings as clearly erroneous.

In Re Pharmaceutical Industry Average Wholesale Price Litigation

491 F. Supp. 2d 20 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jun 21, 2007

It is true that the same entity can sue as a plaintiff under § 11 in one case, and be immune to suit under § 11 in a different case. See Boston Hous. Auth. v. … Class 3 consumers who made co-payments clearly have a claim under § 9. 50 .

Martignetti v. Haigh-Farr, Inc.

425 Mass. 294 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jun 24, 1997

In this instance, we have recognized that the 1992 amendments “more clearly defined the nature of an action under § 4 of [c. 21E].” Oliveira v. … Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1496, 1513-1514 (11th Cir. 1996) (party not qualifying as “innocent” may only bring claim against other responsible parties under § 113, not § 107); Control Data Corp. v. S.C.S.C.

Buoi v. United States

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Aug 8, 2025

A defendant has no burden to establish a defense of good faith. … The instructions clearly specified that intent to defraud was an element of the wire-fraud charges.

Skyhook Wireless, Inc. v. Google, Inc.

30 Mass. L. Rptr. 417 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Sep 28, 2012

As to the loss of sales to consumers here, the undisputed facts establish that mobile devices are marketed worldwide. … Clearly, that is not the law.

Legoff v. Trustees of Boston University

23 F. Supp. 2d 120 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 28, 1998

A motion to dismiss should be granted “ ‘only if it clearly appears, according to the facts alleged, that the plaintiff cannot recover on any viable theory.’ ” Garita Hotel Ltd. Partnership v. Ponce Fed. … Several months later, she was not hired for a position for which, she alleges, she was the most qualified applicant. She has alleged sufficient facts to make out a prima facie case of retaliation.

In re Lee

472 B.R. 156 · United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Massachusetts · Jun 4, 2012

A “Qualified Raymond Lee Family Member” is defined as “any of the spouse, descendants, heirs, legatees or devisees of Raymond C. … Lee that are qualified for employment by Oasis Development Enterprises, Inc. in a managerial capacity equivalent to that of a managing director.”

Commonwealth v. Hudson

417 Mass. 536 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Apr 14, 1994

Karen Schwartz, a psychologist who qualified as an expert on sexually abused children, described posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Dr. … The expert testimony in Dockham and Mamay was clearly relevant to the critical question of the credibility of the key witnesses, and was therefore held admissible.

Picker International Corp. v. Imaging Equipment Services, Inc.

931 F. Supp. 18 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 5, 1995

The fact that Picker may not always have kept the manuals loeked-up at customer sites does not qualify this conclusion. … Francis Hospital. *43 The manner of Quinn’s training does not qualify this conclusion.

Hannon v. Original Gunite Aquatech Pools, Inc.

385 Mass. 813 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Apr 20, 1982

These provisions, printed in block letters, were clearly readable. Aquatech sent a tracked vehicle to excavate. The operator soon encountered water and buried stumps, and was unable to continue. … The brochure stated that “[b]efore the pool qualifies as a full-fledged ‘Aquatech Pool’, however, it must be designed and constructed to the highest quality specifications.”

Moe v. Sex Offender Registry Board

467 Mass. 598 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 26, 2014

If the statute is retroactive, we look to see whether the Legislature clearly intended it to be retroactive. Where it so intended, we determine whether retroactive application is constitutional. 1. … The impairment of a vested substantive right certainly qualifies as a new legal consequence that would render a statute retroactive, but it is not the only new legal consequence that would do so.

Brissette v. Franklin County, Sheriff's Office

235 F. Supp. 2d 63 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jan 6, 2003

Analysis Given the court’s lengthy findings of fact, it will not be necessary to recapitulate in detail the evidence that clearly establishes the existence of a work environment hostile to female correctional officers at … This can be accomplished “by demonstrating that she is a member of a protected group who has been denied an employment opportunity for which she was otherwise qualified.” Id.

Den Norske Bank v. First Nat. Bank of Boston

838 F. Supp. 19 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Nov 17, 1993

Schwartz’s averment fails to establish as a matter of law, however, that paragraph 11 applies to default situations. … MaGee has been qualified to testify as an expert in similar matters in three separate court proceedings in the past two years. (Docket Entry # 13, ¶ 1). 10 . "Tranche" and "tranches" are not identified. 11 .

MORGAN ROE v. NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY, KATHERINE ANTONUCCI, ROBERT JOSE, BRIANA R. SEVIGNY, MARY WEGMANN & MADELEINE ESTABROOK

Massachusetts Superior Court · Mar 26, 2019

The lack of foreseeable harm in this case likewise demonstrates that Plaintiff cannot establish another essential element of her negligence claim, viz ., that any acts or omissions of NU were the proximate cause of her injuries … Plaintiff contends that RAs at NU qualify as "student employees," and that the University can thus be held vicariously liable for the torts they commit within the scope of their employment.

McCauley v. UMass Correctional Health Care

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Aug 29, 2018

Accordingly, McCauley has not established that Atkins exhibited deliberate indifference to his needs. … immunity, D. 127 at 8-13; D. 133 at 17-19, and the applicability of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act to MPCH.

Daniels v. Wal-Mart Associates, Inc.

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Feb 18, 2021

Daniels also endured “neuropathy in her extremities, hot flashes, eating difficulties, lowered immune system defenses[,] . . . headaches,” and joint aches. Id. … App’x 330, 338 (6th Cir. 2009) (no retaliation claim where there was no FMLA qualifying reason for taking the time off).

Monahan v. Winn

276 F. Supp. 2d 196 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Aug 12, 2003

The statute in fact burdens the BOP with a duty (albeit a “qualified” one). Prows v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 981 F.2d 466, 469 (10th Cir.1992); Howard, 248 F.Supp.2d at 544 ; Ferguson v. … Id. at 509 , 115 S.Ct. 1597 (“[S]ueh conjectural effects are insufficient under any threshold we might establish under the Ex Post Facto Clause.”).

Xerox Financial Services Life Insurance v. Sterman (In Re Sterman)

244 B.R. 499 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Nov 9, 1999

About a month later, the plaintiffs filed a motion in this action seeking to establish an equitable interest in the Sterman residence and to reach the asset and apply it to reduce the debt. … The sale of the Mayflower Group stock falls outside the relevant statutory period and by itself does not qualify as a basis for denial of a discharge.