Case law

SR v. MJ

Indiana Court of Appeals · Mar 16, 2017

The trial court’s findings of fact are clearly erroneous if the record lacks any evidence or reasonable inferences to support them. … The adoption court, however, made an initial determination that Mother had sufficient income and did not qualify for appointed counsel.

In Re Hedge

394 B.R. 463 · United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Indiana · Sep 17, 2008

In the present matter, the VA disability payments qualify as “current monthly income” to the Hedges. The payments, made by the United States government, are paid by an entity as that term is defined in § 101(15). … That is because the statute clearly draws a distinction, in the precise language used by Congress in establishing the means test formula, between “applicable” expenses on the one hand and “actual” expenses on the other.

Joe E. Jackson, Jr. v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

Indiana Court of Appeals · Apr 30, 2018

An abuse of discretion occurs when a decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the trial court. Id. … Here, the parties stipulated that Jackson had a prior qualifying conviction and could not lawfully possess a firearm. Tr. Vol. 2 at 75; State’s Ex. 1.

Harris v. ECP Healthcare, P.C.

954 F. Supp. 1295 · District Court, S.D. Indiana · Feb 7, 1997

treatment, and has therefore failed to establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment. … Courts have consistently held that the anti-retaliation protections of Title VII do not immunize employees from disciplinary termination for violations of company policy, irrespective of whether the violations were committed

Bastin v. First Indiana Bank

694 N.E.2d 740 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Apr 27, 1998

Despite the availability of the weekly auction average through various secondary sources, the Note clearly permits First Indiana to use the Index figure that is made available by the Federal Reserve Board. … The statements in Geddes' affidavit also qualify as hearsay under Ind.Evid.Rule 801(c). 9 .

American Cyanamid Co. v. Stephen

623 N.E.2d 1065 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Nov 8, 1993

Aware of the carry over problems created by Scepter, American Cyanamid established a settlement program in 1988 to compensate farmers for crop damage due to Seepter use. … Thus, our review is limited to the second inquiry, ie., whether the conclusions of law and judgment are clearly erroneous. The judgment of the trial court will be reversed only if it is clearly erroneous.

Louisville, New Albany & Chicago Railway Co. v. Nicholai

4 Ind. App. 119 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Mar 1, 1892

A verbal contract is as obligatory as a written one, when established. The only difference is in the manner and in the certainty of the proof. … The rigorous accountability to which common carriers of goods and- baggage have been held as against all losses, save of the kind we have named, has been relaxed so far as to allow that liability to be qualified to some extent

Indiana Education Employment Relations Board v. Board of School Trustees of Delphi Community School Corp.

174 Ind. App. 481 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Oct 18, 1977

Section 5 of the Act clearly contemplates that the discussion of the factors enumerated therein are to be on behalf of all members of the school employees’ bargaining unit. … Contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege or immunity; or 3. In excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations, or short of statutory right; or 4.

TAYLOR

District Court, S.D. Indiana · Jun 9, 2026

Plaintiff claims that while the Tribe is nominally in the business of consumer lending, in reality the Tribe is the cat's paw of non-Tribal predatory lenders seeking to cloak usury in tribal sovereign immunity. … "Unless the parties clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise," this issue of arbitrability is decided by the court. AT&T Technologies Inc. v. Communications Workers of America, 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986).

Coleman v. Keebler Co.

997 F. Supp. 1094 · District Court, N.D. Indiana · Feb 5, 1998

O’Boisie also contends that the Plaintiff was never a qualified individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, could perform the essential functions of the packer’s job, and, at the very least … Clearly Keebler can afford to satisfy any judgment the Plaintiff may secure in this case. 9 Finally, the continuity factor weighs in favor of O’Boisie.

Johnston v. State

702 N.E.2d 1085 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Dec 9, 1998

Nowhere is the distinction between ‘void’ and ‘voidable’ more clearly brought into focus than in the area of jurisdiction. … By its qualifying language, restricting the effect of the judgment to the particular party involved, I can only construe the holding in Stidham to say that such a judgment is voidable rather than void.

JWP Zack, Inc. v. Hoosier Energy Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc.

709 N.E.2d 336 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Apr 13, 1999

Zack claims that the Mother Agreement is the contract that establishes the basic relationship between the parties and that its limitation of liability clause limits any liability Zack may have to Hoosier. … In dissimilar settings, our supreme court has held: “The work product privilege is a qualified one and can be waived. What constitutes a waiver of the privilege depends upon the circumstances.

Paul J. Kinnaman v. State of Indiana

Indiana Court of Appeals · Mar 16, 2012

Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law … The State notes he had qualified in that court as an expert in other trials and asserts he “could and would have qualified as a skilled witness,” and “likely could have qualified as an expert” had the issue been raised.

In the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: H.A., A.A., Ri.A., and Ro.A. (Minor Children), and R.A. (Father) v. The Indiana Department of Child Services (mem. dec.)

Indiana Court of Appeals · Feb 19, 2019

We do not find that this statement qualified as an excited utterance. See, e.g., Bryant v. State, 984 N.E.2d 240, 247 (Ind. Ct. … We will set aside the trial court’s judgment only if it is clearly erroneous. Id.

Harden v. Raffensperger, Hughes & Co., Inc.

933 F. Supp. 763 · District Court, S.D. Indiana · Jul 3, 1996

This Court’s earlier orders revealed its determination of the type of notes that would qualify for § 11 standing in this case, but the definition of the certified class does not clearly articulate that determination. … Commonwealth Edison Co., 892 F.2d 509, 512 (7th Cir.1989) (a material error in a prospectus usually is enough to establish § 11 liability).

Bushouse v. Local Union 2209, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers

164 F. Supp. 2d 1066 · District Court, N.D. Indiana · Oct 2, 2001

Accordingly, Bus-house qualified for the Charity Option and has been provided that option since April 2001. … At least one court has concluded that the requirement under § 19 that an individual have church membership to qualify for the charity option is unconstitutional. See Wilson v.

Medical Assurance Co. v. Weinberger

295 F.R.D. 176 · District Court, N.D. Indiana · Feb 7, 2013

To meet the qualified immunity from discovery based on Rule 26(b)(3), the materials sought must be: “(1) documents and tangible things; (2) prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial; and (3) by or for a party or … Materials or investigative reports developed in the ordinary course of business do not qualify as work product.

Indiana Gas & Electric Company v. Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission

75 N.E.3d 568 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Apr 27, 2017

We also concluded that the Commission was not authorized to establish a presumption of eligibility in a seven-year TDSIC plan. Id. at 9. … that the legislative intent in enacting the TDSIC statute was to provide a timelier process for utilities to recover their costs, and a broader application of the word “update” would support that intent by qualifying

Matlock v. Davis

District Court, N.D. Indiana · Sep 14, 2020

The face of Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint fails to establish diversity jurisdiction. First, it speaks in terms of the parties’ respective “residences.” … All of these reasons combined, lead to the inevitable conclusion that Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint does not establish the existence of diversity jurisdiction.

Robinson v. State, ex rel. Martin

60 Ind. 26 · Indiana Supreme Court · Nov 15, 1877

. *28 It is alleged, generally, that, on the 13th day of Octooer, 1874, the said Robinson was elected trustee of said township for the term of two years, and that, on the 27th ■day of the same month, he duly qualified as … As both the civil and school townships have only limited powers as regards the incurring of pecuniary liabilities, we think there was an additional reason why the facts relied on as establishing set-offs in favor of Robinson