Case law

Commonwealth v. Chambers

465 Mass. 520 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jun 13, 2013

. *521 Before trial, the judge ruled that, under our common-law rule of evidence established in Commonwealth v. … Harris, 464 Mass. 425 , 435 n.12 (2013) that “conduct involving only the use of nonthreatening words will not be sufficient to qualify a defendant as a first aggressor.”

Fitzgerald v. City of Lawrence

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Nov 21, 2024

Under the sham affidavit rule, “[w]hen an interested witness has given clear answers to unambiguous questions, he cannot create a conflict and resist summary judgment with an affidavit that is clearly contradictory, but … Contrary to the Defendants’ arguments, nothing in the record conclusively establishes a one-year requirement for completion of the Academy.

1A Auto, Inc. v. Director of the Office of Campaign and Political Finance

480 Mass. 423 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Sep 6, 2018

See also art. 8 of the Declaration of Rights (establishing elections as primary form of representative accountability). … Even assuming that voters, as principals, may consent to a representative that has a clearly disclosed conflict of interest by electing such an individual, see 1 S.

MacIoci v. Commissioner of Revenue

386 Mass. 752 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jul 20, 1982

At issue is the propriety of the Superior Court judge’s findings and rulings regarding (1) certification by the Commissioner of Revenue (Commissioner) that the city of Fitchburg (city) was qualified to implement differential … She clearly should have included R2, R3, and R4 data in her study, regardless of the low numbers of those parcels involved. *765 We agree.

Commonwealth v. Goulet

374 Mass. 404 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Feb 16, 1978

But because the judge did not so qualify them, a possibility remained that they would be taken to allude to the defendant’s own silence. … The background of the “long-established” Massachusetts practice to put the question to the jury is described in Commonwealth v. Harris, 371 Mass. 462, 472-474 (1976), and need not be repeated here.

Alexander v. Doyle

1 Rep. Cont. Elect. Case. 59 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · May 28, 1894

This proposition was clearly established by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. 1. “ It is no objection to an election that illegal votes were received, unless the illegal votes changed the majority. … This left the case before the committee dependent upon the allegation of fraud in false impersonation, and false registration, or registration of persons not qualified to vote, with the charge of complicity on the part of

Manning v. Abington Rockland Joint Water Works

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 4, 2019

The EEOC was clearly aware and acknowledged that there might have been other charges raised within Ms. Manning’s Complaint as to which it failed to make findings. … This request is clearly not finite, nor does it suggest a request for any kind of accommodation aside from the problematic leave itself.

Sexton v. Barnhart

247 F. Supp. 2d 15 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Feb 27, 2003

She asserts that these conditions limit her ability to work because she is unable to think clearly, concentrate or focus her attention. (A.R. at 104.) … Moreover, it is well established that the court must generally defer to credibility determinations made by an administrative law judge. See Frustaglia v.

Gaskins v. Duval

652 F. Supp. 2d 116 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 9, 2009

For example, “[w]hen a petitioner fails to raise his federal claims in compliance with relevant state procedural rules, the state court’s refusal to adjudicate the claim ordinarily qualifies as an independent and adequate … To prevail, he must demonstrate that the ruling by the single justice (which essentially adopted the analysis of the motion judge) was contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law, or that

Salmon v. Lang

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jan 28, 2021

At bottom, the First Amendment does not immunize workplace misconduct disguised in the name of free speech. … While refusing to transfer an employee may qualify as an adverse employment action, see Rutan v.

Sodexo, Inc. v. Jordan

District Court, D. Massachusetts · May 5, 2020

This information—what specific accounts qualify as “must win” and “in trouble” to Sodexo—appears to qualify under the Agreement’s definition of confidential information as it is information about Sodexo’s business plan … These documents, however, do not establish that all information was available to the public and Jordan appears to concede that there is a triable issue on whether this information qualifies as “confidential information”

Roberio v. Massachusetts Parole Board

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Oct 24, 2019

In this case, Roberio may establish the requisite risk either by demonstrating that the 1996 amendment is facially unconstitutional, meaning it "by its own terms show[s] a significant risk" of prolonging his incarceration … The Court concluded that the amendment to the Georgia law did not create a significant risk of prolonging the respondent's incarceration on its face because it was "qualified in two important respects.

Ehlert v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Nov 23, 2020

Clearly Dr. Didwania and Dr. Brusch are qualified to offer opinions with respect to infectious diseases given that both are Board certified in the field. … No major neurocognitive disorder has been adequately established.” (AR at 841.)

In Re Credit Suisse-AOL Securities Litigation

465 F. Supp. 2d 34 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Dec 7, 2006

Whatever the truth of the matter is, isolating the myriad causal factors that affect stock price is a factual question that should be decided at trial, with the help of qualified experts. … Taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, these comments are clearly sufficient to support an inference of artificial inflation.

Commonwealth v. Garcia

379 Mass. 422 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jan 8, 1980

“The practice has long been established in this Commonwealth that, when statements amounting to a confession are offered in evidence, the question whether they were voluntary is to be decided at a preliminary hearing by the … At all times during the probable cause hearing, the hearing on the motion to suppress, and the trial, Garcia had a qualified interpreter.

Commonwealth v. Echavarria

32 Mass. L. Rptr. 642 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Apr 30, 2015

Bonafacio that Isidoro identified the night of the murder clearly depict two different people. Mr. … He clearly gave the matter his careful attention after conducting thorough preparation”). Furthermore, Mr.

Boyle v. Douglas Dynamics, LLC

292 F. Supp. 2d 198 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Aug 29, 2003

“Although whether a particular set of acts, in their factual setting, is unfair or deceptive is a question of fact, the boundaries of *219 what may qualify for consideration as a c. 93A violation is a question of law.” … Clearly then, a decision to continue dealing, albeit with more competitors, does not rise to the level of a ch. 93A violation.

Faulk v. Medeiros

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 27, 2018

A state court[’s] decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law . . . if it “contradicts the governing law set forth in the Supreme Court’s … A state court’s decision involves an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law “if the state court ‘identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the

Tuttle v. Planning Board

18 Mass. L. Rptr. 381 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Oct 20, 2004

Once the moving party establishes the absence of a triable issue, the party opposing the motion must respond and allege specific facts establishing the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 17. … A party still “may qualify as a ‘person aggrieved’ if he has put forth credible evidence to substantiate a claim of injury to his legal rights which is more than speculative.” Nickerson v.

Mullaney v. City of Worcester

25 Mass. L. Rptr. 36 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Nov 14, 2008

Both capacities lie clearly within the undisputed letter and spirit of her official duties as Executive Director. See Trial Exhibit 1 at section 7, and Trial Exhibit 3 at section 12(i). … The Senior Center should not be confused with the “Age Center,” an independent, non-governmental establishment viewed by some as competition to the Senior Center. Mullaney Trial Testimony; Hoover Trial Testimony.