Case law

Fobe Associates v. Mayor and Council of Demarest

74 N.J. 519 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Mar 23, 1977

J. 428 (1970), established that multi-family housing does have the type of significant impact on the general welfare which is necessary to qualify as a “special reason” for granting a (d) variance: We specifically hold, as … We concluded that “[a] facial showing of invalidity is thus established, shifting to the municipality the burden of establishing valid superseding reasons for its action and non-action.” Id.

Trust Co. v. Jefferson Trust Co.

14 N.J. Misc. 656 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Aug 20, 1936

Whether this established principle was violated by the parties depends very much upon the construction of the statutes involved and whether the defendant did not sign the agreements primarily for its own safety and benefit … The agreements referred to in the complaint in the instant case were evidently fairly and honestly made for a purpose that was clearly within the corporate powers of the group.

Christopher Burgos v. State of New Jersey (075736)

222 N.J. 175 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jun 9, 2015

The State also raised arguments based on sovereign immunity and the non-justiciability of political questions. … The language in Chapter 78 clearly establishes the intent of the Legislature and Governor to create an enforceable contractual right to funding of the pension system -- a point 12 not

Town of Secaucus v. City of Jersey City

19 N.J. Tax 10 · New Jersey Tax Court · May 19, 2000

It is well-established that in construing a statute, one must first consider its plain language. … Here, the intent of the parties, as clearly expressed in the Ordinance and thé Financial Agreement, was that, commencing in year six of the term of the Financial Agreement, TPI pay an annual service charge in excess of 2%

State ex rel. J.L.A.

262 N.J. Super. 78 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Feb 24, 1993

a period not to exceed 3 years upon such written conditions as the court deems will aid rehabilitation of the juvenile; (4) Transfer custody of the juvenile to any relative or other person determined by the court to be qualified … No one shall be punished for a crime unless both that crime and its punishment are clearly set forth in positive laws.

Eyrich for Eyrich v. Dam

193 N.J. Super. 244 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jan 24, 1984

Clearly then, both plaintiffs, and particularly Mr. … Falzone was subsequently qualified by Caputzal v.

State v. Ferguson

273 N.J. Super. 486 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · May 11, 1994

This section shall not apply to any person less than 26 years of age at the time of sentencing who qualifies for a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment without eligibility for parole, pursuant to subsection c. of N.J.S.2C … For each degree of crime the Code establishes ordinary sentences within the maximum and minimum range found in 2C:43-6(a).

Chandoke v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.

843 F. Supp. 16 · District Court, D. New Jersey · Feb 2, 1994

However, “a distinctive physiognomy is not essential to qualify for § 1981 protection." Id. 3 . Chandoke has testified that his last name "could sound as a British name. It’s not a typical Indian name." … In such a case, evidence of an accent would clearly support a racial discrimination claim. 7 . Defendant favorably compares E.E.O.C. v.

Housing Authority of Newark v. Commissioner, Department of Institutions & Agencies

136 N.J. Super. 136 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jun 30, 1975

In such cases, after the relative has been found unable to manage the funds under pre-established standards, protective payments may be arranged. … Clearly, here, as under the provisions of 45 CFR § 234.60 , the Housing Authority could not possibly qualify as a protective payee.

In re Lamictal Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litigation

18 F. Supp. 3d 560 · District Court, D. New Jersey · Jan 24, 2014

The opinion clearly did at least one thing. … But such a reading would far too greatly constrict parties’ power to settle, a power the Actavis court clearly meant to keep intact.

Arena v. Saphier

201 N.J. Super. 79 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · May 1, 1985

We recognized, however, that the resulting waiver was a qualified one and was dependent upon the extent to which the information sought was relevant to the issue presented. … In all fairness, a patient should not be permitted to establish a claim while simultaneously foreclosing inquiry into relevant matters.

Lawrence v. Bauer Publishing & Printing Ltd.

176 N.J. Super. 378 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Nov 14, 1980

The testimony of Romankow and Hartnett, witnesses called by defendants, clearly demonstrates that the reporter misinterpreted their comments. … It is not significant that defendants used the qualified "charges may loom" rather than the unconditional "charges have been made" or "will be made." The capacity to destroy reputations is equally great. See Coleman v.

State v. Young

77 N.J. 245 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jul 20, 1978

On September 18, 1973, the victim still alive, defendant was forever immune to prosecution for murder under the common law of New Jersey as it then stood. … Stat. 14:29 (1974). [1] Uncontradicted testimony of the medical examiner clearly established that the underlying cause of the victim's death was the gunshot wound to the cervical cord.

In Re Holmes

346 N.J. Super. 372 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jan 14, 2002

Although the statute appears straightforward, "it must be read in light of the broad purpose of the election laws to prevent disenfranchisement of qualified voters," In re Gray-Sadler, 164 N.J. 468, 476 , 753 A. 2d 1101 ( … In comparison, here, the event—unprecedented, unparalleled and unpredictable, national in scope, and of far-reaching consequence—has been indisputably established as the direct cause for a one-day delay in the delivery of

Caullett v. Stanley Stilwell & Sons, Inc.

67 N.J. Super. 111 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Apr 21, 1961

Thus, to qualify as a covenant properly affecting the subject property, the deed provision must define in some measurable and reasonably permanent fashion the proscriptions of and limitations upon the uses to which the premises … This is so because whatever the *118 effect of the burden of the covenant, its benefit is clearly personal to the grantor, securing to him a mere commercial advantage in the operation of his business and not enhancing or

State v. Hackett

166 N.J. 66 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jan 18, 2001

That is a significant change because in Bottigliero, White and South there was clearly some degree of inducement present. … Other states have recognized that juries are quite qualified to determine whether the statutory standard of endangering has been met. See, e.g., State v.

State v. Johnson

216 N.J. Super. 588 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jan 22, 1987

Lytwym's testimony clearly qualifies as a prior identification. Cf. State v. Sinclair, 49 N.J. 525, 546-547 (1967) (statements which bear on issues other than identification should not be admitted). … The testimony was clearly adverse as he stated that defendant was not the guilty party. See Gallicchio at 545 .

Brock v. Gerace

110 F.R.D. 58 · District Court, D. New Jersey · Mar 6, 1986

The defendant in this civil proceeding thus also has the burden of establishing non-waiver of the privilege. Id. … Smith, 580 F.Supp. 1418 (D.N.J.1984) [holding that federal prosecution was untainted by use of defendant’s immunized testimony before a state investigative afecncy, under Kastigar v.

Investors Bank v. Javier Torres (082239) (Bergen County & Statewide)

Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jul 1, 2020

Amicus curiae the New Jersey Business and Industry Association cites Appellate Division cases holding that a plaintiff in foreclosure may establish standing either by showing its possession of the note or establishing that … It is uncontested that the terms of the Note were established by the digital copy submitted to the trial court.

STUDENT PUBLIC INT. RESEARCH GROUP v. Byrne

86 N.J. 592 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jul 20, 1981

The question to be answered is simply whether the legislator was qualified for appointment at the time the appointment was made. Obviously Mrs. Curran was so qualified. … The ban clearly does not apply to an increase in compensation which is proposed subsequent to the appointment. [ 42 Op. Att'y Gen. 35 (1968).]