Case law

United States v. Baskerville

491 F. Supp. 2d 516 · District Court, D. New Jersey · Jun 6, 2007

Thus, both factual scenarios presented by the government on this motion may still qualify the Defendant for a death sentence. IV. … Significantly, in § 3591, the term "offense” is clearly distinguished from the term “act.”

In the Matter of Tanaya Tukes

449 N.J. Super. 143 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Feb 23, 2017

relevant law; (2) whether the decision is supported by substantial credible evidence in the record; and (3) whether in applying the law to the facts, the administrative agency clearly … Applying these principles here, we discern no basis for disturbing the Commission's decision establishing appellants' layoff rights.

Galante v. Teaneck Dept. of Health

70 N.J. Super. 362 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Nov 16, 1961

By an act of the State Legislature approved June 29, 1935 ( L. 1935, c. 307, p. 971; R.S. 45:4A-1-35) the Legislature created and established the State Department of Beauty Culture Control governed by a Board of Beauty Culture … While the ordinance is invalid only as to the provisions relating to beauty shops, the provisions are not clearly severable but so integrated with the provisions relating to the licensing of barber shops, authorized under

Gregg v. Township Committee

232 N.J. Super. 34 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Mar 30, 1989

Although the award of fees is discretionary, it was clearly the intent of Congress in passing section 1988 that fees be awarded as a matter of course. See Zarcone v. … Turning first to good faith, it is well-established, and both parties agree, that the good faith of a defendant, standing alone, may not justify a denial of attorney's fees under section 1988. See Hutto v.

State v. REB

385 N.J. Super. 72 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Apr 27, 2006

In this case, we first question whether Guenther established a "new rule." … Defense counsel countered, however, that he "heard fairly loud and clearly [the judge's] voice indicating that the boy couldn't be any more heartbroken. I heard that very clearly and I don't hear the best."

New Jersey Division of Youth and Family Services v. N.D., J.P. and A.J. in the Matter of E.D.

435 N.J. Super. 488 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · May 8, 2014

The Division makes a similar argument here, which the precedent established in A.L. compels us to reject. … In this regard, we note that Edgar's premature delivery and low birth weight might be interpreted by a qualified expert as being related to Natalie's ingestion of cocaine.

Albrecht v. Correctional Medical Services

422 N.J. Super. 265 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Sep 30, 2011

In Nagim the judge held that the AOM Statute protected a firm comprised of licensed persons even though it did not qualify as a licensed person itself. 369 N.J.Super. at 109 , 848 A. 2d 61 . … As a result, CMS failed to establish that it was entitled to the limited protections available to professional corporations. Summary judgment was improvidently granted to it on this ground.

Ohoud Establishment for Trade & Contracts v. Tri-State Contracting & Trading Corp.

523 F. Supp. 249 · District Court, D. New Jersey · Sep 22, 1981

If there is an indication that the goods themselves were defective at the time of delivery to the carrier, then the carrier is statutorily immune from liability. … Such a demarcation has been established by both the state law within this district and the accumulated discussions on the limitations of consequential commercial damages. As the court in Rickards v.

Ross v. Transport of New Jersey

114 N.J. 132 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Feb 1, 1989

N.J.S.A. 39:6-54 from any insurance obligation as a government agency or instrumentality, then this is consistent with policy considerations that limit the potential liability of government agencies through some type of immunity … An uninsured motorist is clearly “another *146 person” for whom the public entity may not be held liable. [ 202 N.J.Super. at 575 .]

Jarvis v. a & M RECORDS

827 F. Supp. 282 · District Court, D. New Jersey · Apr 27, 1993

If it really were true that for infringement to follow a listener must have to confuse one work for the other, a work could be immune from infringement so long as the infringing work reaches a substantially different audience … The amount of profits must then be apportioned so that plaintiff receives only those profits clearly related to the infringing work.

Fobe Associates v. Mayor and Council of Demarest

74 N.J. 519 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Mar 23, 1977

J. 428 (1970), established that multi-family housing does have the type of significant impact on the general welfare which is necessary to qualify as a “special reason” for granting a (d) variance: We specifically hold, as … We concluded that “[a] facial showing of invalidity is thus established, shifting to the municipality the burden of establishing valid superseding reasons for its action and non-action.” Id.

Eyrich for Eyrich v. Dam

193 N.J. Super. 244 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jan 24, 1984

Clearly then, both plaintiffs, and particularly Mr. … Falzone was subsequently qualified by Caputzal v.

THE HUDSON RIVER WATERFRONT CONSERVANCY OF NEW JERSEY, INC. v. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

District Court, D. New Jersey · Mar 31, 2025

to the River Establishments. … Plaintiff’s state law claim under the Public Trust Doctrine; and (ii) Plaintiff’s claims against NJDEP are barred by sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution.

Flanigan v. Munson

175 N.J. 597 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Apr 3, 2003

Defendant qualified as administrator of Flanigan’s estate shortly after his wife’s death. Salberg then visited defendant’s home. … Lastly, we caution courts generally that a constructive trust is a powerful tool to be used only when the equities of a given ease clearly warrant it. This is such a case.

Cesar Carit Ruiz v. William T. Bourke

New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Mar 31, 2025

The plaintiff "bears the burden of establishing those elements 'by some competent proof.'" Davis v. … Further, '[t]his immunity [is not] disturbed by the exercise of merely such general superintendence as is necessary to insure that the []contractor performs his agreement . . . .'

State v. Johnson

216 N.J. Super. 588 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jan 22, 1987

Lytwym's testimony clearly qualifies as a prior identification. Cf. State v. Sinclair, 49 N.J. 525, 546-547 (1967) (statements which bear on issues other than identification should not be admitted). … The testimony was clearly adverse as he stated that defendant was not the guilty party. See Gallicchio at 545 .

Thomas Saccone v. Board of Trustees of the Police and Firemen's Retirement System (071841)

219 N.J. 369 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Sep 11, 2014

On the death of a member, the spouse and any qualifying child or children receive the prescribed survivors’ benefits. … The statewide PFRS was established, which covered all new police and fire employees.

State v. Atlantic City & Shore Railroad

77 N.J.L. 465 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Mar 1, 1909

Under its articles of association it clearly had this *473 liberty. … The effect of this is not substantially modified by the device of leaving a few so-called “qualifying shares” outstanding in the names of individuals.

Yocham v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp.

736 F. Supp. 2d 875 · District Court, D. New Jersey · Aug 31, 2010

Both the district court and Court of Appeals held that the fraud-on-the-FDA exception to the general statutory immunity was preempted by federal law, but that the exception was severable and the general statutory immunity … Thus, concern about “an extraneous pull on the scheme established by Congress” is sufficient to find preemption. Buckman, 531 U.S. at 353 , 121 S.Ct. 1012 .

State v. Abbott

64 N.J. Super. 191 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Nov 21, 1960

Super., at p. 307 ) The broad language in Goldberg was subsequently qualified by an opinion upholding, in a prosecution for assault with intent to kill, a jury charge which read: "If the injury apprehended could be otherwise … In its 1951 revision of Title 2 of our Revised Statutes, the Legislature clearly classified the various degrees of assault and battery, providing gradations unknown at the common law. See State v.