Case law

Motor Vehicle Administration v. Loane

420 Md. 211 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Jun 22, 2011

Respondent nonetheless contends that subsection (a)(2) of the Statute “clearly establishes that the Implied Consent Law only applies on a highway or private property used by the public in general. … The motorist argued in that case that the MVA must establish as part of its prima facie case for license suspension that the blood alcohol test was administered by a “qualified person,” as that term is defined in C.J. § 10

Sass v. Andrew

152 Md. App. 406 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · Sep 17, 2003

That finding is not clearly erroneous. … Clearly, then, Sass made no affirmative misrepresentations by Andrew on which Andrew relied.

Baker v. Montgomery County

201 Md. App. 642 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · Oct 27, 2011

Thát has a speed limit that was established using generally accepted traffic engineering practices; or (ii) In a school zone established under Section 21-803.1 of this subtitle. (2)(i) A speed monitoring system operator shall … (i) Chief judge to establish procedures for issuance of cita tions.

United States v. Elliott

676 F. Supp. 2d 431 · District Court, D. Maryland · Dec 23, 2009

Clearly, the Government has a strong interest in obtaining the records related to the defendant’s blood alcohol concentration on the day of the accident. … Finally, the defendant argues that the records should be suppressed because the Government has not established the probable cause necessary to support their production.

Ewachiw v. Director of Finance of Baltimore City

70 Md. App. 58 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · Jan 19, 1987

In the first place, we are not dealing with a procedure established for the benefit of civil defendants but rather with a management device created primarily for the benefit of the court system itself, enabling it to clear … For Judge Ward to have done what is regularly done by his colleagues in Baltimore City hardly qualifies as a clear abuse of discretion. As the Court of Appeals noted, in Stanford v.

Edmonds v. State

372 Md. 314 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Dec 18, 2002

As such, the trial court’s determination is entitled to deference and therefore is not clearly erroneous. … Because of the deference due this factual finding, we hold that the trial court was not clearly erroneous.

Collins v. State

52 Md. App. 186 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · Jul 13, 1982

The requirement of general acceptance in the scientific community assures that those most qualified to assess the general validity of a scientific method will have the determinative voice.” … This professional should also be able to qualify as an expert in order to aid the court in evaluating the procedures followed.

Nana-Akua Takyiwaa Shalom v. Payless Shoesource Worldwide, Inc.

921 F. Supp. 2d 470 · District Court, D. Maryland · Feb 5, 2013

The relevant time period for evaluating the adequacy of the employee’s job performance, however, is clearly not immediately after the event that prompted termination. See Bradford v. Conbraco Indus., Inc., Civ. … Index Journal Co., 647 F.2d 441, 448 (4th Cir.1981) (Title VII “was not intended to immunize insubordinate, disruptive, or nonproductive behavior at work.

Chavis v. Blibaum & Assoc. Moore v. Peak Mgmt.

476 Md. 534 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Aug 27, 2021

If the language of the statute is unambiguous and clearly consistent with the statute’s apparent purpose, our inquiry ordinarily comes to an end, and we apply the statute as written, without resort to other rules of construction … In support of their argument, they refer to the passage in Spencer where the court states that the term “knowledge” in the [MCDCA] does not immunize debt collectors from liability for mistakes of law.

Haigley v. Department of Health

128 Md. App. 194 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · Sep 9, 1999

Clearly, *214 the Department’s exegesis of H.G. §§ 4-101 and 4-102 has controlled its application of the provisions of the PIA. … The Department is with *228 out authority to circumvent the PIA’s disclosure provisions in the name of administrative efficiency, nor may it become a fortress of secrecy immune from the PIA by virtue of its mission to investigate

Jones v. Pohanka Auto North, Inc.

43 F. Supp. 3d 554 · District Court, D. Maryland · Sep 2, 2014

The broad definition of “credit grantor” under CLEC does not qualify as an express imposition of aiding and abetting liability for violations thereof. See Baltimore-Washington Tel. … They also argue that the Po-hanka Automotive Group qualifies as an “association,” which also is included in the definition of “credit grantor” under CLEC.

Berry & State Farm v. Queen

469 Md. 674 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Jul 27, 2020

More broadly, State Farm responds that the uninsured motorist statute clearly and unambiguously does not provide coverage for loss of use damages. … It is well established that [t]his Court provides judicial deference to the policy decisions enacted into law by the General Assembly.

Noble Motor Co. v. United States

231 F. Supp. 702 · District Court, D. Maryland · Jul 22, 1964

In other words, it is claimed that the Secretary lacked statutory authority to establish this requirement, and that the requirement is unnecessary and unreasonable. … The taxpayer filed the statement and the tax returns, but it failed in the statement' to set forth the facts showing that it qualified under § 1361(b) and it failed to make the agreement.

Conaway v. Limbo

District Court, D. Maryland · Aug 15, 2023

, acting under color of state law, “subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction _ thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities … Conduct is not actionable under the Eighth Amendment unless it transgresses bright lines of clearly established pre-existing law. See Maciariello v.

Proctor & Gamble Manufacturing Co. v. Independent Oil & Chemical Workers

386 F. Supp. 213 · District Court, D. Maryland · Nov 25, 1974

Thereupon, the Company terminated Grievant and the following notation was entered on her employment record: “Jane returned for her return to work physically qualified after operation. … Since “cause” is nowhere clearly defined in the Agreement, this court cannot say with certainty that the Board’s definition thereof was clearly erroneous.

Bowman v. Baltimore City Board of School Commissioners

173 F. Supp. 3d 242 · District Court, D. Maryland · Mar 24, 2016

-Although, Bowman did. not explicitly state it was racial discrimination, she did not have to be so explicit when the context clearly conveyed the purported racial impetus. … The Board qualifies as a “local educational agency” under 28 U.S.C. § 7801 (26)(A), which constitutes a "program or activity” under Title VI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-4a(2)(B). .

Tabs Associates, Inc. v. Brohawn

59 Md. App. 330 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · Jun 7, 1984

The trial court’s dismissal of Tabs’ claim that Mary Brohawn had violated the covenant not to compete, based on its conclusion that Tabs failed to present a prima facie case, was, therefore, clearly erroneous. … Goldberger, 231 Md. 1, 6-8 , 188 A.2d 155 (1963), the Court of Appeals said: While a person may not be restrained from engaging in any business or vocation (useful to the community) which he is qualified to conduct or perform

Kouadio v. State

235 Md. App. 621 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · Feb 15, 2018

The baby had no pulse, and the paramedics were unable to intubate Amir or establish access for an IV line. … State, supra, 417 Md. 31, which also is not cited, though it clearly is on point. See Md. Rule 19-303.3(a)(3).

Blaine v. Blaine

336 Md. 49 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Aug 26, 1994

He contends that the trial court was clearly erroneous in granting indefinite alimony to Ms. Blaine. Dr. … In Turrisi , we recognized that the legislative intent clearly favored rehabilitative alimony.

Jordan v. State

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · Jan 30, 2026

In his view, “the very existence of more than one arrow key clearly told the jury that there were other mail carrier robberies. … at 638). 31  “[When] establishing whether a group of activities qualifies as a modus operandi, a court may consider each characteristic of the method used as a whole,