Case law

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  • McGovern Physical Therapy Associates, LLC v. Metropolitan Property & Casualty Insurance

    802 F. Supp. 2d 306 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 29, 2011

    regard, McGovern alleges that Metropolitan’s use of Ingenix databases to conduct “fee audits” as a substitute for a physical examination of the patient and/or an individualized review of his or her medical records by a qualified … It is well established that the mere refusal to pay a bill because one disputes its amount does not give rise to Chapter 93A liability. See Commercial Union Ins. Co. v.

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • Island Properties, Inc. v. Martha's Vineyard Commission

    372 Mass. 216 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 23, 1977

    Such a district must qualify in any case as possessing unique resources (natural, historical, ecological, scientific, or cultural) of regional or Statewide significance; or as having marginal soil or topographic conditions … A detailed ground water monitoring program is established.

    Cited 10 timesPublished
  • Deo-Agbasi v. Parthenon Group

    229 F.R.D. 348 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Aug 16, 2005

    This clearly appears to be such a case. Plaintiffs submissions do not suggest any basis to invoke the doctrine of equitable tolling. … Fodor Contracting Corp., 843 F.2d 808, 811 (4th Cir.1988) (“[Wjhen the party is blameless, his attorney’s negligence qualifies as a ‘mistake’ or as ‘excusable neglect’ under Rule 60(b)(1).”); Smith v.

    Cited 7 timesPublished
  • Small v. Massachusetts Institute of Technology

    584 F. Supp. 2d 284 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Feb 29, 2008

    Defendant does not dispute that Small has established a prima facie case. Defendant’s legitimate nondiscriminatory reason is not insubstantial. … Her August 2000 internal griev-anee is too remote in time to establish a causál connection. 13 . Defendant also cites Mole. v.

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • Slaven v. Russo

    District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 31, 2020

    However, there is support for neither of the alternative propositions to the theory of unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent. … “The clearly established federal law governing ineffective assistance of counsel claims is the framework established by Strickland [v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688 (1984)].”

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • Daynard v. Ness, Motley, Loadholt, Richardson & Poole, P.A.

    178 F. Supp. 2d 9 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Dec 3, 2001

    Did the plaintiff work so closely with the defendant as to form a “joint venture” immune from the regulations on fee splitting? … On the other hand, although most lawyer codes on the subject require that a fee-splitting agreement be in writing (and the absence of a writing is a disciplinary violation), when the fact of such agreement is clearly established

    Cited 12 timesPublished
  • Life Skills, Inc. v. Harleysville Insurance Company

    District Court, D. Massachusetts · Aug 13, 2024

    Dies argued that the damage clearly met the Policy’s definition of “Collapse” and thus warranted coverage. [Id.] After reviewing Mr. … In insurance coverage disputes, the insured bears the initial burden of establishing coverage, then the burden shifts to the insurer to establish an exclusion from coverage. Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v.

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • Commonwealth v. Manning

    367 Mass. 605 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · May 2, 1975

    The "established law" on which the court's opinion rests is part of a legal tradition, established by men, that the *614 complaining woman in a rape case is fair game for character assassination in open court. … There are cases in which the situation is clearly aggravated by extrinsic *617 violence, but the jury is still lenient to the defendant." Kalven & Zeisel, The American Jury, 249-251 (1966).

    Cited 16 timesPublished
  • Strategic Energy, LLC v. Western Massachusetts Electric Co.

    529 F. Supp. 2d 226 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jan 4, 2008

    According to WMECO, the error it made qualifies as an “estimating error” for which section 9E protects it from liability. … Strategic clearly contends in its complaint that this was a failure in WMECO’s performance of “meter-reading and data transmission” (Compl. ¶ 44), not its estimation, and sufficiently supports that allegation with an email

    Cited 3 timesPublished
  • UniFirst Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance

    28 Mass. L. Rptr. 86 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Feb 15, 2011

    On the particular facts presented, however, the Court determined that “the record clearly establishes that Augat’s breach of the voluntary payment provision undermined that purpose.” Id. … The fault is mostly, but not entirely, that of plaintiffs counsel, who has inserted into the statement voluminous argument, which belongs only in memoranda of law, along with repeated meaningless qualifying language (to the

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Baron v. Smith

    285 F. Supp. 2d 96 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 30, 2003

    These statements about what Company’s management “expect[ed] to be able” to achieve in the bankruptcy were clearly “forward-looking statements,” identified as such in compliance with the’ PSLRA. … The pre-PSLRA case law established that scienter includes certain kinds of recklessness.

    Cited 5 timesPublished
  • Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk District

    466 Mass. 655 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Dec 24, 2013

    Our desire for a clearly defined standard for assessing the retroactivity of a particular rule, coupled with “our concern that the finality of convictions not be unduly disturbed,” Sylvain, supra at 433, led to our adoption … Sylvain, ante 422, 432-434 (2013) (Sylvain), we declined to adopt the Supreme Court’s jurisprudential expansion of what qualifies as a “new” rule, articulated in decisions issued after Teague v.

    Cited 139 timesPublished
  • Massachusetts v. Bull HN Information Systems, Inc.

    16 F. Supp. 2d 90 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Aug 7, 1998

    If the Attorney General is barred from pursuing this action on standing grounds, the waivers would be functionally immunized from legal challenge. … Conclusion In sum, I find that the Commonwealth has alleged sufficient facts to establish parens patriae standing in this suit.

    Cited 16 timesPublished
  • Fulgiam v. Kenneway

    District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 8, 2019

    The fact there are no on-point Supreme Court cases that clearly establish ten-print cards as testimonial might be a sufficient answer to Mr. Fulgiam’s claim. … The absence of such Supreme Court cases on point implicitly speaks at a minimum to the absence of clearly established contrary Supreme Court rulings at the time the SJC decided Mr.

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • Spacco v. Bridgewater School Department

    722 F. Supp. 834 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Aug 22, 1989

    Primary Effect The fact that government conduct has a secular purpose, however, does not immunize it from scrutiny to determine whether it nevertheless has a constitutionally impermissible effect. … (“When prominently displayed on a public building that is clearly marked and known to be such, the cross dramatically conveys a message of governmental support for Christianity, whatever the intentions of those responsible

    Cited 9 timesPublished
  • Hayat ex rel. BTU Holdings Co v. Al-Mazeedi

    28 Mass. L. Rptr. 243 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Jan 11, 2011

    They are dependent on establishing a special factual relationship between the directors and the shareholders in the particular case. … These duties may arise in special circumstances which replicate the salient features of well-established categories of fiduciary relationships.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Access Cardiosystems, Inc. v. Fincke (In Re Access Cardiosystems, Inc.)

    404 B.R. 593 · United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Massachusetts · Apr 17, 2009

    suppliers were being added to exploit new credit lines and that these new suppliers were, at times, “less qualified, second and third tier suppliers, and some were added before they were qualified by the company.” … Fincke testified that the meaning of “manufacturing stability” depends on a particular company’s state of production and its progression- — what qualifies as “stable” for one company may not so qualify for another.

    Cited 21 timesPublished
  • In Re Industrial Commercial Electrical, Inc.

    304 B.R. 24 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jan 27, 2004

    Rogers, was most helpful and clearly meets the test for “credible evidence.” … “If those allegations set forth all the necessary facts to establish a claim and are not self-contradictory, they prima facie establish the claim.

    Cited 1 timesPublished
  • Campana v. Board of Directors of Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency

    399 Mass. 492 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 23, 1987

    The judge’s findings are not clearly erroneous and are amply supported by the record. See Freyermuth v. Lutfy, 376 Mass. 612, 615 (1978). See also Mass. R. Civ. P. 52 (a), 365 Mass. 816 (1974). … A member must meet the requirements as to length of service and age to qualify under this section. See Appendix. The parties have stipulated that the plaintiff does meet these requirements.

    Cited 13 timesPublished
  • First National Bank of Boston v. Attorney General

    362 Mass. 570 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Nov 9, 1972

    An analysis of the Legislature's intent in passing this amendment clearly indicates that such a construction is unreasonable. … A corporation, we have held, is not a `citizen' within the meaning of the privileges and immunities clause. Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168 .

    Cited 25 timesPublished

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