Case law
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117 N.J. 210 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Oct 25, 1989
Officer Kelly turned State’s witness and testified under a grant of immunity. N.J. S.A. 2A:81-17.3. The other officers were acquitted of all charges, and defendant was acquitted of aggravated assault. … To down *220 grade the offense and impose a lesser sentence, a trial court must be clearly convinced that the mitigating factors substantially outweigh the aggravating factors. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1f(2).
Cited 348 timesPublishedIn the Matter of the Competitive Solar Incentive
New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Apr 23, 2024
The qualifiers, "until," "after," and "unless" relate to preconditions for the waiver process itself, which does not apply to the county limit. … N.J.S.A. 48:3-119(f) employs the "unpreserved" qualifier for the county limit only, whereas the Statewide limit does not.
Cited 0 timesPublishedAmerican Express Travel Related Services Co. v. Sidamon-Eristoff
755 F. Supp. 2d 556 · District Court, D. New Jersey · Jan 14, 2011
essential and historical attribute that belongs to the State as a sovereign, and thus, the state officials are immune from this suit. … As such, Defendants are not immune from suit. II.
Cited 15 timesPublished26 F. Supp. 3d 304 · District Court, D. New Jersey · Jun 16, 2014
For the Energy Star program, DOE has established minimum standards for energy and water efficiency. Qualified machine models must use approximately 37% less energy and 50% less water than standard models. FAC ¶ 2. … The FAC alleges that DOE requires that Energy Star-qualified washers exceed certain minimum standards for energy efficiency.
Cited 53 timesPublishedReiser v. Pension Commission of the Employees Retirement System
147 N.J. Super. 168 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Dec 7, 1976
When statutes relating to the same subject matter are repugnant or inconsistent, and the latter statute is clearly intended to prescribe the only rule which should govern the case, it will be construed as repealing the earlier … Plaintiff contends that this hodge-podge, crazy-quilt of varied distinctions in the class of widows who can qualify for pension benefits is completely without rhyme or reason; that the classifications are established by the
Cited 5 timesPublishedMorgan v. Air Brook Limousine, Inc.
211 N.J. Super. 84 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Mar 17, 1986
Indeed the Appellate Division, recognizing the scope of the Act and its well-defined terms, recently concluded that a business entity is a "person" under § 1 of the Act and "may qualify as a consumer" for purposes of the … Merenoff, 76 N.J. 535 (1978), which eliminated interspousal immunity as a defense.
Cited 19 timesPublished98 N.J. 321 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jan 17, 1985
established. … On the other hand, if an institutionalized, elderly person had not clearly expressed his wishes before becoming incompetent but the burdens of the patient’s continued existence with the treatment so clearly outweighed its
Cited 227 timesPublishedNew Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Dec 13, 2019
It did not seek to qualify Maringanti as an expert, but instead offered her lay testimony as the children's treating dentist. … Thus, the trial court was permitted to rely upon the testimony of Maringanti, the children's treating dentist, without qualifying her as an expert.
Cited 0 timesUnpublished29 N.J. Super. 361 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jan 6, 1954
It "may be a device or process which is clearly anticipated in the prior art or one which is merely a mechanical improvement that a good mechanic can make. … An express agreement on the part of an employee to observe secrecy is not necessary to the establishment of a confidential relationship.
Cited 18 timesPublishedReese Cadillac Corp. v. Glens Falls Insur. Co.
59 N.J. Super. 118 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jan 12, 1960
The court went on to say: "So the qualifying word `conclusive,' as used in the statute, supra, is not to be regarded in a sense that imports to it a quality that will not tolerate challenge or contradiction; but rather in … To be sure, the fact that the shortages were caused by the dishonesty of plaintiff's employee or employees may be established by circumstantial evidence, but the evidence to establish that fact must be of such a nature that
Cited 10 timesPublishedDeBlasio v. Groff (In Re Groff)
301 B.R. 644 · United States Bankruptcy Court, D. New Jersey · Feb 24, 2003
The debtor’s guilty plea qualifies as “actual litigation”, and her conviction represents a valid and final judgment. … The question becomes whether the provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:40-22 clearly indicate a legislative intent to impose strict liability against the defendant, or whether the statute requires the defendant to “know” that if she
Cited 5 timesPublishedLAMPON-PAZ v. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
District Court, D. New Jersey · Sep 19, 2022
The government invokes sovereign immunity, a jurisdictional defense. In general, the United States and its agencies are immune from civil suit. See Dep’t of the Army v. Blue Fox, Inc., 525 U.S. 255, 260 (1999). … Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). 10 The complaint very clearly seeks only an injunction. To the extent Mr.
Cited 0 timesUnknownPennsylvania Railroad v. Department of Public Utilities
14 N.J. 411 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Feb 1, 1954
Under Pennsylvania’s practice a man must familiarize himself with the physical characteristics of the road before he qualifies as engineman and to keep qualified he must make a trip over the territory once a year. … Similarly, one railroad requires engineers in road passenger service, absent for 90 days or more, to make a qualifying run under the supervision of a road foreman; another requires a qualifying run after an absence of 120
Cited 29 timesPublishedExxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp.
941 F. Supp. 2d 513 · District Court, D. New Jersey · Sep 30, 2005
Because there is no demonstrated intent to refrain from parallel litigation, the Court is further convinced that the non-binding provisions do not qualify as “arbitration” within the Third Circuit’s interpretation of the … Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(a), non-dispositive matters decided by a Magistrate Judge are reviewed under a “clearly erroneous or contrary to law” standard.
Cited 4 timesPublishedEVANGELISTA v. THE HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF CAMDEN
District Court, D. New Jersey · Oct 22, 2024
Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 256 (2006) (citations omitted). 10 Defendants’ Motion is generally premised on a defense of qualified immunity. … A government official is entitled to qualified immunity where either (1) a constitutional right is not violated; or (2) the constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of the official’s actions.
Cited 0 timesUnknownDuffy v. Charles Schwab & Co., Inc.
123 F. Supp. 2d 802 · District Court, D. New Jersey · Dec 21, 2000
Schwab argues that these counts depend entirely upon whether Duffy can establish misappropriation by Schwab and that Duffy cannot establish a claim for misappropriation because Duffy’s submission to Schwab was not novel, … The test for determining whether an idea is sufficiently novel to warrant protection has not been clearly defined in New Jersey.
Cited 33 timesPublishedARCHIE v. HAMILTON TOWNSHIP MUNICIPAL COURT
District Court, D. New Jersey · Feb 7, 2022
He argues the second exception is likewise inapplicable because he had jurisdiction and because his actions during these proceedings were clearly judicial actions. (Id.) … It is well established that a “[pro se] complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Montgomery v.
Cited 0 timesUnknownCollege of Medicine, NJ v. Morrison
141 N.J. Super. 104 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · May 3, 1976
Morrison qualified as a veteran within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 38:16-1 by reason of her tour of duty with the United States Public Health Service during the Korean War. Cf. Miele v. McGuire, 53 N.J. … The College was established under the Medical and Dental Education Act of 1970, which became effective on July 1, 1970. N.J.S.A. 18A:64G-1 and N.J.S.A. 18A:64G-2.
Cited 3 timesPublished376 N.J. Super. 29 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Mar 16, 2005
Here, [Hudson] clearly, and it couldn't be more clear, set forth her understanding of the agreement and clearly satisfied Judge Locascio on her understanding of the agreement. … These cases, however, do not bestow special protection or immunity from the doctrine of judicial estoppel on a litigant such as Hudson who claims to have perjured herself to obtain judicial approval of her marital settlement
Cited 20 timesPublishedNew Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Apr 23, 2024
A-3290-21 6 The principles we articulated in DiVencenzo resonate clearly with the facts before us and are dispositive. … As to co-defendant Kee, our careful review of this record reveals no facts which would defeat his affirmative defense of qualified immunity. See Will v. Mich.
Cited 0 timesUnpublished
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