Case law

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  • Lange v. B & P Motor Express, Inc.

    257 F. Supp. 319 · District Court, N.D. Indiana · Aug 23, 1966

    Snavely, 172 F. 212 (8th Cir. 1909). 3 The reasons which support the latter view are clearly more sound. … As lias already been mentioned, the rule is well established that evidence of prior acts of negligence is inadmissible as being both irrelevant and prejudicial to the defendant’s case. See note 4 above.

    Cited 13 timesPublished
  • Cortez Jones v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

    Indiana Court of Appeals · May 26, 2016

    Jones’ request that we reconsider well-established precedent is thus inappropriate. See id. … “An abuse of discretion occurs when a decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court.” Id.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Hyland v. Rochelle

    179 Ind. 671 · Indiana Supreme Court · Feb 13, 1913

    Much of the very able briefs of the distinguished counsel for appellants is addressed to an effort to establish the status of the judge of the City Court of the City of Indianapolis as a judge of this State and in a general … No one would claim that this court, or the Appellate Court or any probate court, or any juvenile court, or any city court could qualify as a proper tribunal for the purpose under the words used.

    Cited 23 timesPublished
  • Inland Steel Co. v. State Board of Tax Commissioners

    739 N.E.2d 201 · Indiana Tax Court · Nov 22, 2000

    These findings do not qualify as substantial evidence supporting the State Board’s final determination on this sub-issue. … However, its arguments clearly use the term to identify both superade-quate and excess construction costs.

    Cited 25 timesPublished
  • Johnson v. Capps

    415 N.E.2d 108 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jan 27, 1981

    The instant action however was not brought for the purpose of establishing or modifying a custody decree, but rather, to terminate all parental rights of the mother. … Petitioner equally clearly refers to a petitioner for adoption and Capps did not qualify as such. The majority recognizes as much in conceding that Capps does not literally come under the statute.

    Cited 27 timesPublished
  • Riddle by and Through Brewster v. Innskeep

    675 F. Supp. 1153 · District Court, N.D. Indiana · Dec 23, 1987

    The dispute is whether the defendants’ actions deprived the plaintiffs of privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States. A. … The applicability of the eighth amendment may be an academic question, in any event, since Riddle is clearly entitled to fourteenth amendment protections, which one court has deemed “more protective.”

    Cited 4 timesPublished
  • State Ex Rel. Harris v. Scott Circuit Court

    437 N.E.2d 952 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jul 20, 1982

    This Court has already established that it will issue a writ of mandate and prohibition to compel the performance of any duty enjoined by law upon a trial court. … The record clearly indicates that the respondent trial judge admitted to Gordonier that such intense conflict had developed in this case that the parties could not proceed with Hoodenpyl involved.

    Cited 7 timesPublished
  • Kenneth Kesler, M.D. v. Indiana University Health Care Associates, INC.

    Indiana Court of Appeals · Apr 25, 2024

    Additionally, Trial Rule 65(D) establishes that the trial court’s order granting a TRO shall include or be accompanied by findings under Trial Rule 52. … Here, IUHP has failed to established a valid reason why it would be unfair for Dr. Kesler to practice at Community North Hospital.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Toro Co. v. Krouse, Kern & Co., Inc.

    644 F. Supp. 986 · District Court, N.D. Indiana · Oct 1, 1986

    This order considers the issue regarding compliance with Rule 56(e) first in order to establish what facts may be considered in this motion. … This is true even if the clearly defective portions of Toro’s affidavits are considered, as they properly should not be.

    Cited 14 timesPublished
  • Budkiewicz v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Railway Co.

    238 Ind. 535 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jun 10, 1958

    In- this regard it is to be noted that the word “remain” which qualifies the “standing” of such cars is defined in- Webster’s New International Dictionary as follows: “To be left after others have been removed' or -destroyed … The diligent adherence of our courts to the doctrine -of stare decisis has established our courts as the stabiliz *556 ing force of our society.

    Cited 11 timesPublished
  • Tenta v. Guraly

    140 Ind. App. 160 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Nov 28, 1966

    This establishment of when the alleged tortious act occurred is essential because of the burden of establishing knowledge and intent as of that time. … Again this testimony, so clearly hearsay, is important. The inherent danger of hearsay evidence is illustrated by this self-serving answer.

    Cited 11 timesPublished
  • Sheldon v. Munford, Inc.

    660 F. Supp. 130 · District Court, N.D. Indiana · Mar 19, 1987

    However, a fran-B chisor shall not be considered to be competing when operating a business either temporarily for a reasonable period of time, or in a bona fide retail operation which is for sale to any qualified independent … Clearly, contracting to provide less protection is something the parties could not do under Indiana law.

    Cited 17 timesPublished
  • United Farm Family Mutual Insurance Co. v. Michalski

    814 N.E.2d 1060 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Sep 20, 2004

    In further support of its position, the court compared that act with language found in the Labor and Storage Lien Act and the Labor and Storage Lien (Small Amount) Act and noted that those two acts contained qualifying language … This, Riverside did not establish that it had acquired a valid lien against Velocity.

    Cited 22 timesPublished
  • Enyart v. Blacketor

    168 Ind. App. 214 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Feb 27, 1976

    . *230 The majority’s rationale that a traffic sign must warn of a specific hazard to qualify as a warning to motorists is not supported by reason or authority. … The court further noted: “Travelers upon public highways are not expected to first ascertain and determine whether such signs are established in strict compliance with law before respecting them.” 415 P.2d at 88 , quoting

    Cited 4 timesPublished
  • Darlage v. Drummond

    576 N.E.2d 1303 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Aug 22, 1991

    His estate was opened on April 22, 1983, with Jane Speer, Joseph's sister, qualified as the executrix under Joseph's will. The will named Cheryl and Joseph's two children as the sole devisees. … neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the witnesses' credibility; rather, we view only the evidence that supports the judgment, and will uphold the verdict if it is supported by substantial evidence of probative value establishing

    Cited 15 timesPublished
  • L.E. Services, Inc. v. State Lottery Commission

    646 N.E.2d 334 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jan 31, 1995

    The undisputed facts, as stipulated by the parties, sufficiently establish the Commission as an aggrieved party within the meaning of the CRRA. Next, LE. … We find that the doctrine of state-action immunity applies here and thus exempts Indiana from the proscriptions of the Sherman Act. C.

    Cited 28 timesPublished
  • Alabach v. Northern Indiana Public Service Co.

    164 Ind. App. 471 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jun 16, 1975

    Indianapolis Power & Light Co. (1968), 249 Ind. 498 , 233 N.E.2d 656 , 2 all of which firmly and specifically established the principle that a utility such as NIPSCO need not obtain prior Commission approval or a certificate … Illustrative of unerring judicial devotion to this rule is Graham Farms, Inc.: “As we have previously pointed out, § 3-1713, supra, [32-11-3-1, -2 (the condemnation statute)] permits any corporation qualified thereunder,

    Cited 4 timesPublished
  • Ralston v. State

    78 Ind. Dec. 890 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Oct 29, 1980

    They were clearly calculated to indicate whether Burns had changed her story rather than to prove the extent of Slaughter’s involvement. … Further, he claims that Michael was not qualified to testify as an expert because he did not have sufficient independent observation of facts to form an opinion.

    Cited 19 timesPublished
  • Collins v. Sullivan

    729 F. Supp. 621 · District Court, N.D. Indiana · Dec 8, 1989

    Claimant must be “disabled” in order to qualify for the benefits he requests. … [Y]ou [, Claimant,] have engaged in substantial gainful activity if— * * t * * •}> (2) Your work activity ... is clearly worth the amount shown in § 416.974(b)(2) when considered in terms of its value to the business, or

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Sheaff Brock Investment Advisors, LLC v. David Morton

    7 N.E.3d 278 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Apr 7, 2014

    This general rule may be altered by a written agreement or by the conduct of the parties that clearly demonstrates a different compensation scheme. Id. … Also, to qualify as a wage, the compensation must be connected to the work performed by the employee. Wank v. St. Francis College, 740 N.E.2d 908, 912 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied.

    Cited 10 timesPublished

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