Case law

Opinions from 1658 to today.

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  • Fogelman v. Town of Chatham

    2 Mass. Supp. 687 · Massachusetts Land Court · Sep 11, 1981

    Hemond are qualified by education and work experience in relevant fields to render an opinion on wetland vegetation. … Section 3.44 is clearly tied into the bounds of a Conservancy District.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Waters v. Earthlink, Inc.

    22 Mass. L. Rptr. 527 · Massachusetts Superior Court · May 11, 2006

    Commonality Waters successfully establishes commonality in this case. … There is a sufficient relationship to establish typicality in this case.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • United States v. Dimasi

    810 F. Supp. 2d 347 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Aug 30, 2011

    The basic law concerning extortion under color of official right in violation of § 1951 is clearly established. See Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 268-69 , 112 S.Ct. 1881 , 119 L.Ed.2d 57 (1992); United States v. … The law relating to extortion under color of official right, which involves payments to a public official, is well-established.

    Cited 1 timesPublished
  • Nickerson-Reti v. Bank of America, N.A.

    District Court, D. Massachusetts · May 17, 2018

    I do not qualify for the offer.” … Wigod clearly acknowledges that the bank’s signature on the TPP is what obligated it to follow through with a modification agreement.

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • Taylor v. Town of Freetown

    479 F. Supp. 2d 227 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 29, 2007

    There is certainly a disputed fact question as to whether Officer Ashley was qualified in light of his prior record of misconduct. The problem is that Plaintiffs protected speech was five years earlier. … The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has emphasized that to establish tortious interference something more than intentional interference must be established. United Truck Leasing Corp. v.

    Cited 13 timesPublished
  • Cocchi v. Morais Concrete Service, Inc.

    2015 Mass. App. Div. 49 · Massachusetts District Court, Appellate Division · Mar 17, 2015

    Rosen, 235 Mass. 244, 249 (1920). 4 However, a subsequent promise given in exchange for the other party’s prior performance does not qualify as consideration. See Henry W. Savage, Inc. v. … Such findings must be ‘clearly erroneous’ and regard must be given ‘to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.’ Mass. R. Civ. P., Rule 52(c).

    Cited 1 timesPublished
  • Conklin v. Perdue

    15 Mass. L. Rptr. 283 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Sep 17, 2002

    In 1993, the two then determined to join together and establish a consulting firm to advise businesses on strategic alliances. … This clearly was not a large project. Cyber House’s billings only totaled $4,800. But, as an example of CPI’s strained financial circumstances, even that amount was not fully paid.

    Cited 1 timesPublished
  • Bennett v. SAINT-GOBAIN CORPORATION

    453 F. Supp. 2d 314 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 29, 2006

    She qualified her findings as subject to an examination of the original documents when they became available. 15 Wilk informed Mesher of these conclusions. … In addition, it is undisputed that after the filing of the grievance, Mesher signed a positive performance evaluation and approved a raise for Bennett, both of which are clearly inconsistent with the claim that he was motivated

    Cited 7 timesPublished
  • Geanacopoulos v. Philip Morris Usa, Inc.

    33 Mass. L. Rptr. 308 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Feb 24, 2016

    I find that he is well qualified and that his testimony was supported by the evidence. Dr. … Philip Morris’ own research from as early as 1974, concluded that with respect to the lowered tar *311 and nicotine descriptor on each pack of Marlboro Lights, “[t]he ‘lowered’ line clearly means less tar . . . and better

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • StandWithUs Center for Legal Justice v. Massachusetts Institute of Technology

    District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 30, 2024

    To establish standing, plaintiffs must, “for each claim that they press and for each form of relief that they seek,” “establish each part of a familiar triad: injury, causation, and redressability.” … Plaintiffs look to § 1985(3), which prohibits conspiracies undertaken to deprive, “either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • Commonwealth v. Thompson

    89 Mass. App. Ct. 456 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Jun 3, 2016

    While determining that the underlying evidence did not qualify as consciousness of guilt evidence, the court did not address whether the evidence should not have been admitted in the first place or whether it (or comments … While Rennie is not excluded, the evidence clearly indicates the defendant's knowing participation, such as the payments for her rent and EZ Pass.

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • Buiaroski v. State Street Corporation

    District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 23, 2024

    The Plan is an employee welfare benefits plan under ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1), established for the benefit of employees of State Street. Id. ¶¶ 3, 9. State Street is the Plan sponsor and the Plan administrator. … The Supreme Court has cautioned that while Section 514 preemption is “clearly expansive,” courts must nevertheless assume that ERISA does not supersede “‘the historic police powers of the States . . . unless that was the

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • McCarthy v. Mills

    26 Mass. App. Ct. 223 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Jul 20, 1988

    The purchase of the locus and the establishment of the building as a three-unit condominium had been arranged by the Seuss and Mills couples. … We have been referred to no evidence which would show this finding to be unsupported or which would cause this ruling to be clearly erroneous.

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • Caldwell v. Dubois

    999 F. Supp. 199 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 31, 1998

    Similarly, regarding juror 4-5, the Appeals Court concluded that the Commonwealth *207 failed to establish a neutral basis for its challenge. Id. at 577 , 634 N.E.2d 124 . … Again, the record clearly supported the prosecutor’s rationale.

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • Duggan v. Martorello

    District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 30, 2022

    They also establish that Big Picture Loans’ and Ascension’s contacts with Massachusetts would be considered sufficient to subject those entities to specific personal jurisdiction in this forum. … The SJC has further acknowledged, in connection with its discussion of the Massachusetts anti-usury statute, that “[t]he public policy against usury is clearly a matter for grave legislative concern.”

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • MacDonald v. Old Republic National Title Insurance

    882 F. Supp. 2d 236 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 31, 2012

    This is a “double-edged sword” for title insurers, as they can both immunize themselves from claims by carefully checking the title, but losses related to clouded title will be directly or indirectly caused by the insurer … Similarly, the harm here is clearly one that the legislature intended to prevent.

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • Markell v. Sidney B. Pfeifer Foundation, Inc.

    9 Mass. App. Ct. 412 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Mar 24, 1980

    She had no business training or experience, but she entrusted her business affairs to qualified professionals in whose hands her inheritance prospered. … Sidney Pfeifer was clearly the moving force behind the foundation.

    Overruled on other grounds by Cleary v. Cleary, 427 Mass. 286 (1998)Cited 99 timesPublished
  • Brison v. Smith

    District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 14, 2023

    Even after the surgical treatment of Brison’s hand, the extent of his hand fracture, and his later infection to the injury site, qualify as serious. … an unreasonable professional judgment exercised—even though it does not rest on any established sinister motive or “purpose” to do harm.

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • Helming & Co. v. RTR Technologies, Inc.

    76 F. Supp. 3d 363 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jan 6, 2015

    Moreover, the underlying action “arose from” the relationship established by the Agreement between the parties, which included the indemnification provision. … H & C is clearly correct. To begin with, “an accord and satisfaction requires a voluntary, mutually assented to exchange of money for a release.” Malave v. Carney Hosp., 170 F.3d 217, 222 (1st Cir.1999).

    Cited 1 timesPublished
  • Niemic v. UMass Correrctional Health

    89 F. Supp. 3d 193 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 2, 2015

    Furthermore, in order to qualify as a constitutional violation, the medical care provided must have been “so inadequate as to shock the conscience.” Feeney, 464 F.3d at 162 (quoting Torraco v. … As mentioned above, this Court declines to second-guess nurse practitioner Schnabel’s medical judgment without sufficient evidence that Niemic’s medical treatment was “so clearly inadequate as to amount to a refusal to provide

    Cited 7 timesPublished

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