Case law
Opinions from 1658 to today.
10,000+ results
2.78s
Malec v. City of Belleville, Illinois
407 Ill. App. 3d 610 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Feb 7, 2011
Whether the parcel here qualifies as “vacant land” under the TIF Act does not depend on how the land was controlled. This section clearly and plainly provides that “vacant land” means a parcel that has been subdivided. … The land clearly meets the criteria under the TIF Act to be considered subdivided and therefore vacant.
Cited 7 timesPublishedConstruction Equipment Federal Credit Union v. Roberts (In Re Roberts)
149 B.R. 547 · District Court, C.D. Illinois · Jan 21, 1993
In 1984, the qualifying statutory language was eliminated. … The court addressed the question of whether the credit union qualified as a nonprofit institution under § 523(a)(8).
Cited 11 timesPublished98 F. Supp. 3d 946 · District Court, N.D. Illinois · Apr 14, 2015
Standard of Review Every Rule 56 movant bears the burden of establishing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact (Celotex Corp. v. … On that premise Sansone was not a “qualified individual” who was entitled at that point to a reasonable accommodation.
Cited 5 timesPublishedAppellate Court of Illinois · Oct 28, 2002
To this end, " ' "[w]here the spirit and intent of the General Assembly in adopting an act are clearly expressed and its objects and purposes are clearly set forth, courts are not bound by the literal language of a particular … Inasmuch as respondent is the party challenging the constitutionality of a statute, he bears the burden of clearly establishing the constitutional violation. See People v.
Cited 0 timesPublished8 Ill. 518 · Illinois Supreme Court · Dec 15, 1846
This, however, is not out of regard to the one who claims immunity from having violated the law, but it is because he who complains is equally guilty. In the case of Holman v. … Here, then, we see, that although a trust may be created in violation, and clearly in fraud of the law, still the trustee shall not be permitted to hold the trust estate discharged of the trust, although the cestui que trust
Cited 8 timesPublishedWalker v. Woodward Governor Co.
631 F. Supp. 91 · District Court, N.D. Illinois · Feb 26, 1986
Dowling, 459 F.2d 190 (7th Cir.1972), defendant contends that at least in the Seventh Circuit a plaintiff may not establish a “conspiracy” for Section 1985(3) purposes between a corporate entity and its own supervisor-agents … Thus, the third Dombrowski exception is clearly inapplicable here. Neither does plaintiff specifically allege the personal, racial animus requisite to the first Dombrowski exception.
Cited 14 timesPublished74 B.R. 146 · District Court, N.D. Illinois · Feb 2, 1987
UNR maintains that under the government contract specification defense, 1 UNR is absolutely immune from any liability to the selected claimants. … Yet, a precedent established in a federal district court in Pennsylvania — a court well versed in the law of Pennsylvania which governs this motion — will be as valuable as one established by this court.
Cited 12 timesPublishedPerez v. Transformer Manufacturers, Inc.
35 F. Supp. 3d 941 · District Court, N.D. Illinois · Mar 24, 2014
a genuine dispute as to whether he is a qualified individual with a disability. … Perez can use either the direct or indirect method of proof to establish retaliation. Id.
Cited 4 timesPublished684 F. Supp. 548 · District Court, C.D. Illinois · May 13, 1988
Clearly, Plaintiff’s continuous service was not broken by his resignation from Rehabilitation because he began work at Revenue the very next day. … We further note that the issue Plaintiff does press in his motion for summary judgment would likely have resulted in a favorable outcome for Defendants based on the affirmative defense of qualified immunity. .
Cited 0 timesPublished2019 IL 124676 · Illinois Supreme Court · Nov 21, 2019
service credit for a period of up to 4 years spent in active military service for which he does not qualify for credit under Section 14-105,[1] provided that (1) he was not dishonorably discharged … Thus, the Pension Code clearly differentiates between regular service and permissive service credit.
Cited 10 timesPublishedLombardo v. Reliance Elevator Co.
Appellate Court of Illinois · Jun 30, 2000
But the failures of the bank and the maintenance company do not establish a defense for WS against plaintiff 's claim. Rather, they establish grounds for WS's counterclaims. … The burden of establishing the qualifications of an expert witness is on the proponent of his testimony, and it is within the discretion of the trial court to determine whether the witness has been qualified.
Cited 0 timesPublished78 Ill. App. 3d 858 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Nov 27, 1979
Gilroy was offered immunity by the State in return for his testimony at defendant’s trial. … Moreover, the defect dotes not qualify as an exception under Supreme Court Rule 451(c) (58 Ill. 2d R. 451(c)) because it is not a substantial defect.
Cited 16 timesPublishedFranciscan Communities v. Hamer
975 N.E.2d 733 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Aug 28, 2012
Justices Burke and Freeman also joined in the plurality opinion’s conclusion that the taxpayer failed to establish that it was a charitable institution. … The DOR’s determination that VL was operated with a view to profit was not clearly erroneous.
Cited 20 timesPublished183 Ill. App. 3d 452 · Appellate Court of Illinois · May 24, 1989
Clearly, the legislature intended that, if an attorney is to be appointed, the appointment be made at the time the hearing is set, and not merely at the hearing itself. (In re Elkow (1988), 167 Ill. … Where, as here, respondent affirmatively establishes that she desired to confer with counsel, but was denied that opportunity, we will not find that the failure to comply with section 3 — 805 is harmless error.
Cited 5 timesPublishedChicago & Eastern Illinois Railroad v. Zapp
209 Ill. 339 · Illinois Supreme Court · Apr 20, 1904
The mere fact the data were first placed upon the loose sheet or paper or blank form does not necessarily establish that it constituted the record. … Counsel for the appellant do not now urge that the court erred in marking the instruction “refused. ” It was clearly erroneous and ought not to have been given.
Cited 7 timesPublishedEqual Employment Opportunity Commission v. Consolidated Services Systems
777 F. Supp. 599 · District Court, N.D. Illinois · Sep 4, 1991
The trial judge’s selection of the appropriate variables required to determine a suitable pool for comparison purposes is generally a question of fact and is reversible only if clearly erroneous. … The EEOC’s anecdotal evidence simply establishes that Consolidated did not offer jobs to these four individuals.
Cited 5 timesPublished2 Ill. 476 · Illinois Supreme Court · Dec 15, 1838
principle of criminal law, or rule of proceeding, has been clearly violated. … From this section there can be no doubt whatever, that an alien is not qualified to serve as a juror in any case.
Cited 4 timesPublishedKuipers v. Drake Tower Apartments, Inc.
District Court, N.D. Illinois · Aug 6, 2025
Qualified individual To sustain an ADA accommodation claim, besides establishing that they have a disability, a plaintiff must show that he is "qualified," or in other words … Even if the Kuipers were able to establish that they were qualified individuals, the evidence shows, without any genuine factual dispute, that Drake Tower was still justified in rejecting masking-plus-testing as a reasonable
Cited 0 timesUnknown583 F. Supp. 934 · District Court, N.D. Illinois · Mar 30, 1984
“Severity” as a Requirement of Disability “Severity” is an element that must be shown to establish a disability and entitle a claimant to social security benefits. … That is of course an insupportable finding as to McCullough: It clearly is not supported by substantial evidence.
Cited 14 timesPublishedEqual Employment Opportunity Commission v. Staffmark Investment LLC
67 F. Supp. 3d 885 · District Court, N.D. Illinois · Sep 4, 2014
Mota’s statement can only establish Mota’s state of mind, not Sony’s. b. … Qualified to Perform Essential Services The ADA only protects a “qualified individual with a disability.” 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(m).
Cited 2 timesPublished
Ask Donna