Case law

Januchowski v. Northern Indiana Commuter Transportation District

905 N.E.2d 1041 · Indiana Court of Appeals · May 7, 2009

The governmental entity seeking to establish immunity bears the burden of proving that its conduct comes within the ITCA. Peavler v. Monroe County Bd. of Comm'rs, 528 N.E.2d 40, 46 (Ind.1988). … We have held that Indiana's qualified consent to suit applies to FELA claims because FELA claims are tort claims. 6 Oshinski, 843 N.E.2d at 544 .

J.A.W. v. State

650 N.E.2d 1142 · Indiana Court of Appeals · May 15, 1995

In addition, Toepp's motion alleged that he was entitled to absolute judicial immunity from suit or in the alternative that he was entitled to qualified immunity and immunity under the provisions of the Indiana Tort Claims … After considering Defendants' motions for more definite statement, Ind.Trial Rule 12(E), the trial court ordered JAW. to amend his complaint in order to more clearly identify the nature of his § 1983 claims.

Slagle v. State

182 Ind. App. 5 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Aug 29, 1979

An expert can be “qualified” by evidence of formal training or practical experience. Culley v. State (1979), Ind.App., 385 N.E.2d 486 . … There, in a waiver hearing, the defendant clearly waived her right to object to the admission of the results of a polygraph test.

M.O. Ex Rel. C.O. v. Indiana Department of Education

635 F. Supp. 2d 847 · District Court, N.D. Indiana · Mar 31, 2009

immunity. … the heartland of what these cases have established as quasi-judicial adjudicatory functions.”

Scruby v. Waugh

476 N.E.2d 533 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Apr 18, 1985

Scruby, establishes that he was not a patient within the meaning of the Act. We do not agree. Rather, we determine that Waugh was a patient of Dr. … Bo-naventura on Detterline’s behalf, Detter-line qualified as a “patient” of Dr. Bona-ventura as the term is defined in 16-9.5-1 — 1(c).

State v. International Business MacHines Corp.

964 N.E.2d 206 · Indiana Supreme Court · Mar 21, 2012

On the other hand, an exception might be established since it is reasonable to expect any chief executive to have unique personal first-hand knowledge or experience in the management of a project of such magnitude as this … IBM also argues that even if the 1852 Legislature did intend to immunize a governor against non-subpoena means of compulsion, the subsequent re-adoption of this statute after the promulgation of the Indiana Trial Rules evinces

Hochstedler v. St. Joseph County Solid Waste Management District

770 N.E.2d 910 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jun 28, 2002

In reviewing an alleged violation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, our supreme court has established a two-part test. Collins v. Day, 644 N.E.2d 72, 80 (Ind.1994). … Because Resolution 5-97 is constitutional, the small claims court's judgment is not clearly erroneous. IIL.

State v. Reynolds

774 N.E.2d 902 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Aug 19, 2002

However, Reynolds did not establish at hearing that no offense was committed. … We presume that a statute is constitutional, and the presumption continues until clearly overcome by a showing to the contrary. Kleiman, 590 N.E.2d at 662 .

Keskin v. Munster Medical Research Foundation

580 N.E.2d 354 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Oct 31, 1991

The immunity provision protects "evaluation of patient care," not contractual arrangements by a hospital's board of directors. … We have already determined that the administrative procedures outlined in Hospital's by-laws do not apply to Keskin's claims; further, Yornell is clearly distinguishable on its facts.

Klepinger v. Board of Comm.

143 Ind. App. 155 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jul 26, 1968

The Flowers case clearly demonstrates that a distinction should now be made between the governmental and proprietary functions of counties on the same basis as it is made for cities. … Fortune, 3 Fla. 19 , the Men of Devon decision was very clearly explained and distinguished.

Klepinger v. Bd. of Comm. Co. of Miami

143 Ind. App. 178 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jul 26, 1968

The Flowers case clearly demonstrates that a distinction should now be made between the governmental and proprietary functions of counties on the same basis as it is made for cities. … Fortune, 3 Fla. 19 , the Men of Devon decision was very clearly explained and distinguished.

O'BRIEN

District Court, S.D. Indiana · Dec 9, 2025

Qualified Immunity Standard "[Q]ualified immunity shields officials from civil liability so long as their conduct 'does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional … Thus, to overcome qualified immunity, Mr. O'Brien must show that: (1) the Defendants violated his statutory or constitutional rights; and (2) the right was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.

Rhoades v. Penn-Harris-Madison School Corp.

574 F. Supp. 2d 888 · District Court, N.D. Indiana · Aug 5, 2008

Qualified immunity B. State claims barred by Ind.Code § 34 — 13—3—5(b) ANALYSIS I. Liability of PHMSC A. … Qualified immunity does not exist if the facts, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, show that defendants’ conduct violated a consti tutional right, and that constitutional right was clearly established at

Baxter v. State

727 N.E.2d 429 · Indiana Supreme Court · Apr 24, 2000

The rule regarding jury separation during deliberations is well established and strict. … The trial court’s finding that no harm resulted to Baxter was not clearly erroneous. VI.

State ex rel. School City v. Swanson

182 Ind. 582 · Indiana Supreme Court · Dec 29, 1914

It does not 'protect or secure the privileges or immunities of citizens against the power of the state in which they reside, but merely guaranties privileges and immunities to citizens of other states. 2. … This is a mere administrative detail so clearly within the legislative discretion to classify that it can not well be questioned.

Van Eaton v. Fink

697 N.E.2d 490 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jul 24, 1998

Instead, she maintains that qualified privilege applies. … Because Van Eaton has failed to designate material which could establish that Fink abused her qualified privilege, we conclude that the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Fink. Affirmed.

Smithson v. HOWARD REGIONAL HEALTH SYSTEM

933 N.E.2d 1 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Aug 2, 2010

"If the evidence permits conflicting reasonable inferences as to material facts, the governmental unit has failed to establish its immunity." Bules v. Marshall County, 920 N.E.2d 247, 250 (Ind.2010). … The Smithsons have failed to establish prejudice from Howard Regional's omission to plead governmental immunity in its answer. 3 . All dates refer to 2005. 4 . Measurements are in inches and degrees Fahrenheit. 5 .

Strange v. Board of Commissioners

173 Ind. 640 · Indiana Supreme Court · Mar 16, 1910

This section is akin to the provision of §1 of the 14th amendment, as respects privileges and immunities, but the former is held not to make the privileges and immunities (the rights) enjojred by citizens of the several states … The rule of ejusdem generis does not apply when the prior or specific words exhaust the class, for 'there is nothing of the remaining terms to qualify; and following the rule that all parts of a statute shall, if possible

Rodenbeck v. Indiana, Leaking Underground Storage Tank Division of the Department of Environmental Management

742 F. Supp. 1442 · District Court, N.D. Indiana · Jul 19, 1990

Clearly, Ex Parte Young does not negate the State’s Eleventh Amendment immunity, but merely prohibits a state official from using the name of the State to enforce a statute which is void because unconstitutional. … The Court clearly only held that Congress intended to override Eleventh Amendment immunity where a State was sued to recover cleanup costs under CERCLA.

Parke County v. Ropak, Inc.

526 N.E.2d 732 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Aug 2, 1988

The appellant is correct that a party seeking to prove fraud must establish a right to rely. Plymale, at 761. … Rather, subsection (13) provides that a government entity will be immune from liability for misrepresentation only where the misrepresentation was unintentional; conversely, no immunity will apply to any intentional misrepresentation