O'BRIEN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

WILLIAM O'BRIEN, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 1:23-cv-02015-JPH-CSW

)

JACKSON, )

BISHOP, )

SHAW, )

KOENIG, )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff William O'Brien alleges that Defendants Lt. Johnathan Jackson,

Ofc. Alexzander Koenig, Ofc. Alex Shaw, and Ofc. Chance Bishop violated his

Eighth Amendment rights by depriving him of the "basic necessities to clean

himself" for a week while he was in restricted housing at Pendleton Correctional

Facility ("PCF"). Dkt. 9 at 4. Defendants have moved for summary judgment on

all claims.1 Dkt. 30. For the reasons below, the Court GRANTS Defendants'

motion for summary judgment.

I.

Standard of Review

A motion for summary judgment asks the Court to find that a trial is

unnecessary because there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and,

1 Since filing his response to the summary judgment, Mr. O'Brien filed a motion for court

assistance, advising the Court about the circumstances under which he submitted

grievances to one of the Defendants. Dkt. 37. This motion, dkt. [37], is GRANTED to the

extent that the Court considers it a surreply to the motion for summary judgment.

instead, the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(a). When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the

record and draws all reasonable inferences from it in the light most favorable to

the nonmoving party. Khungar v. Access Cmty. Health Network, 985 F.3d 565,

572–73 (7th Cir. 2021). It cannot weigh evidence or make credibility

determinations on summary judgment because those tasks are left to the

factfinder. Miller v. Gonzalez, 761 F.3d 822, 827 (7th Cir. 2014). A court only has

to consider the materials cited by the parties, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3); it need

not "scour the record" for evidence that might be relevant. Grant v. Trs. of Ind.

Univ., 870 F.3d 562, 573−74 (7th Cir. 2017) (cleaned up).

A party seeking summary judgment must inform the district court of the

basis for its motion and identify the record evidence it contends demonstrates

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317, 323 (1986). Whether a party asserts that a fact is undisputed or genuinely

disputed, the party must support the asserted fact by citing to particular parts

of the record, including depositions, documents, or affidavits. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(c)(1)(A). Failure to properly support a fact in opposition to a movant's

factual assertion can result in the movant's fact being considered undisputed,

and potentially in the grant of summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).

II.

Factual Background

Because Defendants have moved for summary judgment under Rule 56(a),

the Court views and recites the evidence in the light most favorable to the

Plaintiff, Mr. O'Brien, and draws all reasonable inferences in his favor. Khungar,

985 F.3d at 572–73. The following facts are undisputed except as noted.

Mr. O'Brien did not have his personal hygiene items, including toothbrush,

toothpaste, shower shoes, washrag, his own soap, and eating utensils from

August 19, 2023, to August 25-26, 20232, and was limited to one change of

clothing per week from August 19, 2023, to September 11, 2023. At all times

relevant to this matter, Mr. O'Brien was incarcerated at PCF where Defendants

were employed.

Before August 19, 2023, Mr. O'Brien resided in O-Dorm, which is a general

population dorm. Dkt. 31-1 at 10 (O'Brien Dep.). In O-Dorm, Mr. O'Brien had

personal hygiene items—soap, shampoo, a laundry bag, toothpaste, toothbrush,

towels, shower shoes, eating utensils—and clothing items that he had purchased

from the commissary. Id. at 11–12.

On August 19, 2023, Mr. O'Brien was transferred to G Cellhouse ("GCH"),

a restricted housing unit. Id. at 12. As per protocol, staff at PCF were tasked with

packing Mr. O'Brien's personal property, creating an inventory, and then

creating a "care package" consisting of Mr. O'Brien's personal property that he

would be permitted to have upon arrival at GCH. Dkt. 31-2 at 1–2 ¶¶ 6–11 (Ofc.

Bishop Decl.); dkt. 31-1 at 15–16. Ofc. Koenig escorted Mr. O'Brien to GCH and

was responsible for giving him his care package. Dkt. 31-1 at 10. Ofc. Bishop

was the property officer in GCH. Dkt. 31-2 at 1 ¶ 4.

2 The designated evidence shows that Mr. O'Brien received some of his personal

hygiene items on August 25 and the rest on August 26.

When Mr. O'Brien was transferred to GCH on August 19, he did not receive

his care package. Dkt. 31-1 at 15. During his first week at GCH, Mr. O'Brien

complained and handed request slips to Lt. Jackson and Ofc. Bishop about

retrieving his property. Id. at 17–18. On one instance when Mr. O'Brien was

speaking to Ofc. Shaw about needing his clothing and hygiene items, he

complained about developing a rash. Id. at 31. While medical staff gave Mr.

O'Brien cream for the rash, Ofc. Shaw told Mr. O'Brien that it was not his job,

and he was too busy. Id. at 32.

On August 24, 2023, after Mr. O'Brien complained to nonparty Ofc.

Goodnight about not having received his property, Ofc. Goodnight e-mailed Ofc.

Bishop asking for Mr. O'Brien's care package. Dkt. 35-1 at 12–17 (email thread).

Ofc. Bishop then e-mailed Ofc. Jackson and others to urge them to get Mr.

O'Brien's care package to him. Id. Mr. O'Brien received his personal hygiene

items on August 25 and 26. Dkt. 31-1 at 34–35.

Inmates in GCH are offered showers and a cup of three-in-one body wash,

shampoo, and conditioner three times a week. Id. at 13; dkt. 31-2 at 3 ¶ 18.

Between August 19 and August 25, Mr. O'Brien was given the opportunity to

shower three times, dkt. 31-1 at 34, but he declined because he did not have a

towel, a washrag, or a change of clothing. Id. at 13–14, 35. He also did not have

shower shoes, which Mr. O'Brien wore for hygienic reasons. Dkt. 35 at 1, 11–12.

Mr. O'Brien received his laundry bag around September 11, 2023. Dkt.

31-1 at 35. Inmates in GCH can use the laundry bag to launder their clothes

once a week. Id. at 14. For the first week in GCH, Mr. O'Brien did not have any

change of clothes but only the clothes he was wearing. Id. at 35–36. On August

25 or 26, Mr. O'Brien received two changes of clothes along with his personal

hygiene items. Id. at 35. The three sets of clothes were not enough to keep Mr.

O'Brien clean because of the "very dirty" conditions which left his clothes ruined

from "dirt and sweat." Id. at 35. Furthermore, the clothing quickly became

drenched in sweat because it was very hot out and GCH does not have air-

conditioning or fans. Dkt. 35 at 2. Mr. O'Brien complained to Lt. Jackson several

times about his laundry bag after giving him the initial request form for the bag.

Dkt. 31-1 at 36–37. Mr. O'Brien also claims, and Defendants dispute, that Ofc.

Bishop and Ofc. Koenig were aware that he did not have his laundry bag because

of their positions and because he complained. Dkt. 35 at 3.

As a result of not having his personal hygiene items for a week and very

few changes of clothes for three weeks, Mr. O'Brien suffered from body odor,

rashes, and scars from scratching himself that lasted for several months. Dkt.

31-1 at 37–39; Dkt. 35 at 2. He sought medical help, and was prescribed the

topical cream triamcinolone, which he used from October 10, 2023, until

January 2, 2024. Dkt. 35 at 2; dkt. 35-1 at 5. He also suffered from anxiety,

vomiting, and diarrhea. Dkt. 35 at 3. Defendants dispute the severity and cause

of Mr. O'Brien's injuries. Dkt. 36 at 4.

III.

Discussion

Mr. O'Brien argues that Defendants subjected him to inhumane conditions

of confinement by depriving him of his personal hygiene items for a week and

limiting him to only three changes of clothes for three weeks. Dkt. 35 at 1.

Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment because (1) the

delay in delivering his care package and laundry bag did not create objectively

serious conditions; (2) Defendants were not subjectively aware of any serious

conditions and once they became aware, they took steps to remedy the problem;

and (3) Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. Dkt. 32. The Court

addresses qualified immunity first because it is dispositive.

A. Qualified Immunity Standard

"[Q]ualified immunity shields officials from civil liability so long as their

conduct 'does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of

which a reasonable person would have known.'" Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11

(2015) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009)). Although

qualified immunity is an affirmative defense, a plaintiff has the burden of

defeating it once defendants raise it. Archer v. Chisolm, 870 F.3d 603, 613 (7th

Cir. 2017). Thus, to overcome qualified immunity, Mr. O'Brien must show that:

(1) the Defendants violated his statutory or constitutional rights; and (2) the right

was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct. Sabo v. Erickson,

128 F.4th 836, 843 (7th Cir. 2025). Courts may exercise their discretion to

choose which element to address first. Id. (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.

223, 236 (2009)). Here, the Court begins and ends its analysis with the second

element because it is dispositive.

To be "clearly established," a constitutional right "must have a sufficiently

clear foundation in then-existing precedent." District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583

U.S. 48, 63 (2018). "Existing precedent must place the constitutional or statutory

question beyond debate" so that "every reasonable official would understand that

what he is doing is unlawful." Sabo, 128 F.4th at 844 (internal quotations and

citations omitted). Clearly established law cannot be framed at a "high level of

generality," Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011), because that would

evade the crucial question—"whether the official acted reasonably in the

particular circumstances that he or she faced." Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S.

765, 779 (2014). The right has been defined "too generally if the unlawfulness of

the officer's conduct does not follow immediately from the conclusion that [the

rule] was firmly established." Sabo, 128 F.4th at 844. "The Supreme Court's

message is unmistakable: Frame the constitutional right in terms granular

enough to provide fair notice because qualified immunity protects all but the

plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Campbell v. Kallas,

936 F.3d 536, 546 (7th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up).

Existing precedent does not have to be "directly on point" to clearly

establish a right. Id. at 545. However, to meet his burden on this element, Mr.

O'Brien must "show either a reasonably analogous case that has both articulated

the right at issue and applied it to a factual circumstance similar to the one at

hand or that the violation was so obvious that a reasonable person necessarily

would have recognized it as a violation of the law." Leiser v. Kloth, 933 F.3d 696,

701 (7th Cir. 2019). The failure to do so means that Mr. O'Brien "cannot defeat"

a "qualified immunity defense." Findlay v. Lendermon, 722 F.3d 895, 900 (7th

Cir. 2013) (reversing summary judgment denial on qualified immunity grounds

because plaintiff did not identify a sufficiently analogous case or explain why

defendant's actions were plainly excessive).

B. Application

To succeed on his Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim, a

plaintiff must show that Defendants deprived him of "the minimal civilized

measure of life's necessities." Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). The

minimal civilized measure of life's necessities includes access to showers and

hygiene items such as soap, toothpaste, and cleaning supplies. Gillis v. Litscher,

468 F.3d 488, 493 (7th Cir. 2006); Jaros v. Ill. Dept. of Corrs., 684 F.3d 667, 670–

71 (7th Cir. 2012); Board v. Farnham, 394 F.3d 469, 483–84 (7th Cir. 2005).

Furthermore, conditions are considered collectively as "[s]ome conditions of

confinement may establish an Eighth Amendment violation in combination when

each alone would not do so." Gillis, 468 F.3d at 493; see also Gray v. Hardy, 826

F.3d 1000, 1005 (7th Cir. 2016). To violate the Eighth Amendment, the

conditions of confinement must be objectively serious and create "an excessive

risk to [the inmates'] health and safety." Giles v. Godinez, 914 F.3d 1040, 1051

(7th Cir. 2019). This means that short-term deprivations do not necessarily

violate the Eighth Amendment. See, e.g., Lunsford v. Bennett, 17 F.3d 1574, 1580

(7th Cir. 1994) (24-hour delay in providing hygiene items to prisoners did not

violate the 8th Amendment where no evidence that cells were unusually dirty or

unhealthy).

"When deciding whether a public official is entitled to qualified immunity,

“‘[the Court] simply assume[s] the disputed facts in the light most favorable [to

the plaintiff], and then decide[s], under those facts, whether the [defendants]

violated any of [the plaintiff's] clearly established constitutional rights.” Board,

394 F.3d at 476. So here, the Court assumes that Mr. O'Brien was deprived of

his personal hygiene items for seven days during which he did not have any

additional clothes, was limited thereafter to one change of clothing per week for

three weeks by having a total of three sets of clothes, and during those three

weeks had the opportunity to shower with soap three times per week. Dkt. 32

at 11; dkt. 36 at 7–8.

Mr. O'Brien does not point to a reasonably analogous Supreme Court or

Seventh Circuit case showing that any reasonable correctional officer would have

known that these circumstances clearly violated a prisoner's Eighth

Amendment's right to be free of conditions that pose and unreasonable risk of

serious damage to his health. See dkt. 35 (Mr. O'Brien's response to Defendants'

motion for summary judgment). The Court has conducted its own review of

potentially applicable Supreme Court and Seventh Circuit cases, Taylor v.

Schwarzhuber, 132 F.4th 480, 487 (7th Cir. 2025), and did not find any

reasonably analogous Supreme Court or Seventh Circuit case from which "every

reasonable official would understand that what he is doing is unlawful." Sabo,

128 F.4th at 844. While there are many cases involving Eighth Amendment

claims brought by a prisoner based on the deprivation of personal hygiene items

and/or squalid living conditions, none involve facts similar enough to show that

any reasonable prison officer would have known that the circumstances here

violated Mr. O'Brien's clearly established Eighth Amendment rights.

In Board v. Farnham, 394 F.3d 469, 483–84 (7th Cir. 2005), the Seventh

Circuit affirmed the denial of summary judgment on the defendants' qualified

immunity defense when one plaintiff was denied toothpaste for three-and-a-half

weeks and another was denied toothpaste for 90% of a 126 stay in jail.3 Board

explained that in Wynn v. Southward, 251 F.3d 588, 593 (7th Cir. 2001), the

Seventh Circuit held that the defendants violated the Eighth Amendment by

depriving the prisoner of dentures for months. The court reasoned that "dental

care is one of the most important medical needs of inmates." 251 F.3d at 593.

Based on Wynn's holding, the defendant in Board "was or should have been 'on

notice' and had 'fair warning' that it would be unconstitutional for him to deny

oral hygiene products to pretrial detainees under his watch for long periods of

time." Board, 394 F.3d at 484. In Harris v. Fleming, 839 F.2d 1232, 1235 (7th

Cir. 1988), the Seventh Circuit held that a 10-day deprivation of toothbrush,

toothpaste, and soap did not violate the plaintiff's 8th Amendment rights.

The Seventh Circuit has repeatedly held that limiting prisoners to

showering only once a week does not violate the Eighth Amendment. See Jaros,

F.3d 684 at 671 (collecting cases). The Seventh Circuit has also held that

prisoners must be provided with "reasonably adequate ventilation, sanitation,

bedding, hygienic materials, and utilities." Gray, 826 F.3d at 1005. In Gray, the

court reversed summary judgment in defendants' favor where the plaintiff was

3 Even though the Board plaintiffs were pre-trial detainees, the court discusses the right

to oral hygiene by using the deliberate indifference standard from the 8th Amendment.

See Board, 394 F.3d at 481–82.

subjected to filthy and unhygienic conditions from rodents and pests for months,

826 F.3d at 1005. In Gillis, the plaintiff was not given an opportunity to shower

for nine days, during which time he was naked, had to sleep on a concrete floor

with no bedding, was provided no soap, and deprived of heat. 468 F.3d at 491–

93.

Here, Mr. O'Brien was deprived of a toothbrush and toothpaste, as well as

other personal hygiene items, for seven days, which is less than the 10 days in

Harris and far less than the number of days in Board. Mr. O'Brien was also

limited to only three sets of clothing for a period of three weeks, although he was

given the opportunity to shower with soap three times per week. The Court must

evaluate the collective impact of all the conditions Mr. O'Brien was subjected to,

Gray, 826 F.3d at 1005, so that means considering the overall impact of having

no personal hygiene items for a week, three changes of clothes for a three-week

period, and being given access to a shower and soap three times per week.

While Mr. O'Brien certainly experienced very unpleasant conditions for his

first several weeks in GCH, his lack of access to personal hygiene items was

relatively short (a week), he still had access to showers and soap three times per

week, and he had several changes of clothes. So, with respect to these conditions

of confinement, the Court cannot conclude that "every reasonable official would

understand that what he is doing is unlawful." Sabo, 128 F.4th at 844. Thus,

the above-described "[e]xisting precedent" did not "place the constitutional or

statutory question beyond debate." Sabo, 128 F.4th at 844. In the absence of

reasonably analogous precedent, Mr. O'Brien has not shown that Defendants'

conduct was "so egregious that it is an obvious violation of a constitutional right."

Leiser, 933 F.3d at 701.

For these reasons, the Court grants summary judgment on the grounds

of qualified immunity.

IV.

Conclusion

For the above reasons, Defendants' motion for summary judgment on all

claims Dkt. [30], is GRANTED. Mr. O'Brien's Eighth Amendment claims against

Defendants are dismissed with prejudice. Final judgment will issue by separate

entry.

SO ORDERED.

Date: 12/9/2025 arr Pak tanbor—

James Patrick Hanlon

United States District Judge

Southern District of Indiana

Distribution:

WILLIAM O'BRIEN

108485

PENDLETON - CF

PENDLETON CORRECTIONAL FACILITY

Electronic Service Participant — Court Only

All Electronically Registered Counsel.

12