Case law

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  • Robinson v. Indiana University

    638 N.E.2d 435 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jul 21, 1994

    In Riggin, Ball State's board of trustees had established a university senate to advise the Board with respect to faculty employment issues. … The legislature has clearly narrowed the seope of the Open Door Law's effect as it applies to various committees.

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • Salin Bank and Trust Co. v. REVIEW BD. OF IND. DEPT. OF WORKFORCE DEV.

    698 N.E.2d 1 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jun 12, 1998

    If claimant is eligible and is qualified otherwise, she is entitled to benefits. As noted above, Salin now appeals the award of unemployment compensation benefits to Hatfield. … It is true that a claimant has the burden of establishing that a voluntary termination of employment is for good cause. Indianapolis Osteopathic Hosp. v. Jones, 669 N.E.2d 431, 433 (Ind.Ct.App.1996).

    Cited 3 timesPublished
  • Montgomery Light & Power Co. v. Town of Linden

    217 Ind. 471 · Indiana Supreme Court · Oct 8, 1940

    . *476 *475 The proposition most seriously contended for by the ■ appellant is that it was given no notice of a hearing *476 before the Board of Trustees on the petition of the qualified voters for the acquisition of the … By § 54-612, Burns’ 1933, § 14029, Baldwin’s 1934, the legislature has clearly shown that it intended by the provisions of § 98 of said Acts of 1913 even as amended by § 10, ch. 190, Acts of 1933, only to provide a notice

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • United States ex rel. Conroy v. Select Medical Corp.

    211 F. Supp. 3d 1132 · District Court, S.D. Indiana · Sep 30, 2016

    Ctr., 568 U.S. 145 , 133 S.Ct. 817, 824 , 184 L.Ed.2d 627 (2013), but the removal of a jurisdictional term for not-clearly-jurisdictional language effects a different meaning. … See Logan, 455 U.S. at 432 , 102 S.Ct. 1148 (“[T]he State remains free to create substantive defenses or immunities for use in adjudication—or to eliminate its statutorily created causes of action altogether .... ”).

    Cited 8 timesPublished
  • Linda Huffman, Individually and as Personal Rep. of the Estate of Jerry Huffman v. Dexter Axle Company & Evans Equipment Co.

    990 N.E.2d 947 · Indiana Court of Appeals · May 31, 2013

    As an Evans employee tasked to haul Dexter axles, the law clearly places Huffman in the category of a business visitor. … Buirell also held that social guests qualify as invitees. Here, there is no dispute; Huffman was not a social guest of Dexter. .

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • Stephanie Leffler v. Dustin Verbosky (mem. dec.)

    Indiana Court of Appeals · Jun 22, 2017

    A decision is clearly erroneous if it is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances that were before the trial court. Id. A. … Moreover, the trial court also clearly believed the child support issue had been settled with finality.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Knarr v. Board of School Trustees of Griffith, Indiana

    317 F. Supp. 832 · District Court, N.D. Indiana · Sep 25, 1970

    the policy that a board’s duty to hire teachers requires more than merely appointing licensed instructors; it demands that permanent appointments be made only if the teachers are found suitable for the positions after a qualifying … The evidence, however, clearly showed that membership and active participation in the union was in no way a barrier to employment or promotion in the Griffith school system.

    Cited 9 timesPublished
  • Bridgestone Americas Holding, Inc. v. Mayberry

    878 N.E.2d 189 · Indiana Supreme Court · Dec 18, 2007

    We conclude that the engineer’s affidavit adequately demonstrates that the skim stock formula qualifies as a trade secret under Ind. … This part of the balancing test requires relevance to be affirmatively re- established, providing an additional safeguard for the underlying trade secret.6 Meanwhile, it is clear from the case law that establishing

    Cited 27 timesPublished
  • Indiana Department of State Revenue v. Hardware Wholesalers, Inc.

    622 N.E.2d 930 · Indiana Supreme Court · Oct 26, 1993

    Ryan (1940), 217 Ind. 482 , 29 N.E.2d 202 (finding no evidence that term “qualified licensed engineer” used differently in two distinct acts.) … funds transactions under repurchase agreements between HWI and the bank were not “deposits ... in banks in Indiana” for purposes of exemption from the intangibles tax, and that the Tax Court’s judgment to the contrary is clearly

    Cited 3 timesPublished
  • MOORE, TRUSTEE, ETC. v. Fletcher, Etc. Admrs.

    136 Ind. App. 478 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Feb 24, 1964

    Ohio Oil Company is a corporation foreign to the State of Indiana but duly qualified to do business, there in. 2. Defendant Robert B. … E. 6 , have established criterion to determine the particularity which is required in a complaint.

    Cited 11 timesPublished
  • STATE EX REL. DEPT. OF NAT. R. v. Lehman

    378 N.E.2d 31 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jul 17, 1978

    His contrary findings, as the evidence clearly reveals, did not require a reweighing of the evidence. CHARGE: Using a state-owned vehicle for personal use. … How was it established that they were not to do it if there is no written rule or regulation. A. Well, you just did not use State property for your own personal use. That seems — Q.

    Cited 1 timesPublished
  • State v. Van Cleave

    674 N.E.2d 1293 · Indiana Supreme Court · Dec 19, 1996

    Van Cleave’s intoxication clearly did not preclude him from forming the intent required for felony murder in this case. … We do not, and need not, reweigh this evidence here because even taking it as true Van Cleave would have failed to qualify for the intoxication defense for the reasons we have discussed. 22 .

    Modified by State v. Van Cleave, 681 N.E.2d 181 (1997)Cited 92 timesPublished
  • Loren Hamilton Fry v. State of Indiana

    990 N.E.2d 429 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jun 25, 2013

    The Indiana Constitution provides a qualified right to bail, exempting murder and treason from that right when “the proof is evident, or the presumption strong.” … Clearly this standard requires something more than “probable cause,” or otherwise the exception of Article 1, § 17, would have no meaning.

    Cited 20 timesPublished
  • Dwyer v. Neal

    District Court, N.D. Indiana · Feb 15, 2022

    “Qualified immunity protects government officials from civil liability when performing discretionary functions so long as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a … To overcome a qualified immunity defense, a plaintiff must show the deprivation of a constitutional right and must also “show that the right was clearly established at the time of the violation.” Id.

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. Moore

    197 Ind. 50 · Indiana Supreme Court · Dec 8, 1925

    years, and has not been heard of or seen by any one since then; that he left no will, and thereafter letters *53 of administration on his estate were duly issued to plaintiff by the Lawrence Circuit Court, under which she qualified … would have been embraced within the subject expressed in the title, may be subsequently incorporated into such original act by a supplemental or amendatory act; and this may be done *58 without title, beyond a statement clearly

    Cited 5 timesPublished
  • DeGood Dimensional Concepts, Inc. v. John D. Wilder

    Indiana Court of Appeals · Nov 12, 2019

    A judgment is clearly erroneous if it applies the wrong legal standard to properly found facts. Id. … The record reflects that DeGood not only failed to argue at the trial court level that commissions do not qualify as wages under the Wage Claim Statute, but it also conceded as much.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • State v. Davis

    898 N.E.2d 281 · Indiana Supreme Court · Dec 18, 2008

    Involuntary commitment to a hospital for the mentally ill is clearly such a deprivation of liberty as can only be accomplished by a state in strict App. 1991) (agreeing with the “implication” of Jackson, “that it would be … Thus, because of credit time, Davis became immune from being sentenced to further confinement as of November 2006 by which time she had been confined for a total of eighteen months.

    Cited 38 timesPublished
  • Wise v. McKeever

    184 Ind. 686 · Indiana Supreme Court · May 10, 1916

    The complaint alleges, in substance, that in the year 1912, the requisite number of qualified persons petitioned the Board of Commissioners of Huntington County to improve a certain highway in • Dallas Township which passes … S. 1881, clearly applies to save the township’s right to reimbursement in this ease and to compel the city or town to discharge the liability imposed.

    Cited 4 timesPublished
  • Ray v. Indiana & Michigan Electric Co.

    606 F. Supp. 757 · District Court, N.D. Indiana · May 11, 1984

    The Fort Wayne municipal utility thus established is known as “City Light.” 9. … Because I & M was clearly a party to Mishawaka this prerequisite is not in doubt and will not be discussed in the text. 4 .

    Cited 3 timesPublished
  • Cody A. Stinson v. State of Indiana

    126 N.E.3d 915 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jun 12, 2019

    A trial court may admit hearsay that qualifies under the excited utterance exception. See Ind. Evidence Rule 803(2). … To establish fundamental error, the defendant faces the heavy burden of showing that the alleged error was so prejudicial to his rights as to make a fair trial impossible. Ryan v.

    Cited 3 timesPublished

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