Case law

Aduayi v. PHH Mortgage Services

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 8, 2024

1363305, at *4 n.2 (determining that two alleged failures to respond were not enough to establish a pattern or practice). … The parties do not dispute that the letters also clearly contained information sufficient for Defendants “to identify[] the name and account of the borrower.”

City Council v. City of Boston

386 Mass. 171 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · May 7, 1982

did) approve a “debit transfer” if the department receiving the services of a hosted entity “accepted the charges therefor as proper and relevant to his or her department or division and if the documentation therefor was clearly … This rule is qualified in two respects.

Duggan v. Martorello

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 21, 2021

However, the Settlement Agreement is silent with respect to the source of the cash that Big Picture Loans and Ascension will use to establish the Settlement Fund. (Def. Ex. 1 at ¶ 10.1). … By establishing a cap on collections, the Settlement Agreement ensures that borrowers will not be required to pay more than 2.5 times the original principal amount of their loans.

DiMarzo v. American Mutual Insurance

389 Mass. 85 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · May 4, 1983

Bay State Nat’l Bank, 384 Mass. 310 (1981), and we are unable to say that the conclusions of the judge were clearly erroneous. E. Damages. … We conclude that there was sufficient evidence to warrant the judge’s finding that the expert witnesses were qualified. 21 C. Business records.

Ryba v. LaLancette

417 F. Supp. 2d 199 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 1, 2006

, and therefore cannot establish that either defendant was negligent. … The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the applicability of the doctrine.

Commonwealth v. Deane

458 Mass. 43 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Sep 20, 2010

Mere presence is insufficient to establish joint venture liability. Id. … In his closing argument, the prosecutor stated, “[Tjhe shoe . . . which clearly are women’s shoes, you will have them in the jury room, have blood all over the front, blood that [the defendant] admits is Ravenell’s.”

Lawless v. Town of Freetown

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Aug 15, 2024

For the following 1 Lawless also sued the members of its Board of Selectmen for violation of her due process rights, but that claim was defeated on grounds of qualified immunity. See Lawless v. … That is because once the constitutional violation is established, nominal damages are “awarded by default until the plaintiff establishes entitlement to some other form of damages, such as compensatory or statutory damages

Filler v. Lernout

236 F. Supp. 2d 161 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jan 13, 2003

Plaintiffs argue that a scheme or course of business under Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) can include misleading financial statements that might also qualify as predicates for Rule 10b-5(b). Cf. Peil v. … By establishing reliance, plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts to support transaction and loss causation. See e.g., Newton v.

Picquet v. Swan

19 F. Cas. 609 · U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Massachusetts · May 15, 1828

If the party chooses to appear and take upon himself the defence of the suit, that might vary the case, for he may submit to the local jurisdiction, and waive his personal immunity. … Such an intention, so repugnant to the general rights and sovereignty of other nations, ought not to be presumed, unless it is established by irresistible proof.

Commonwealth v. Helfant

398 Mass. 214 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Aug 13, 1986

L. c. 233, § 201, providing no defendant shall be convicted solely on the testimony of an immunized witness). … “It is well established that a witness may explain, modify, or correct damaging testimony that was elicited on cross-examination.” Commonwealth v. Mandeville, 386 Mass. 393, 400 (1982), and cases cited.

Dagan v. Jewish Community Housing for the Elderly

5 Mass. L. Rptr. 36 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Dec 15, 1995

Clearly, the Dagans’ idle on-call time was spent predominantly for their own benefit, not JCHE’s. … Here, the Dagans were employees at Golda Meir House, a housing complex devoted entirely to providing housing to the elderly at below-market prices by qualifying for subsidies from the federal government.

McCarthy v. Mass General Brigham Incorporated

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 15, 2024

MGB argues that “to establish the existence of a ‘physical impairment’ under the ADA, [McCarthy] must show that her symptoms . . . were caused by ‘an underlying physiological disorder or condition.’” … Accordingly, “for obesity to qualify as a physical impairment--and thus a disability—under the ADA, it must result from an underlying physiological disorder or condition.”

In re M.C.

481 Mass. 336 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Feb 5, 2019

This clearly is not a case in which the "proceedings cannot be reconstructed sufficiently to present the [petitioner's] claims." … M.C. also argues that the four cassette tapes he received containing audio recordings of the hearing do not qualify as "a cassette copy of an original recording, or any portion thereof," of the hearing on the petition for

Marram v. Kobrick Offshore Fund, Ltd.

442 Mass. 43 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jun 10, 2004

The defendants assert that, as a matter of law, they are immune from the plaintiff’s claims because (1) Marram purchased shares in the offshore fund solely on the basis of written representations contained in documents, whose … Loss, Commentary on Uniform Securities Act draftsmen’s commentary to § 410 (g), at 151 (1976) (provisions prohibiting waiver “are clearly advisable in view of the frequent disparity of bargaining power and sophistication

Crowley v. Local No. 82, Furniture & Piano Moving, Furniture Store Drivers, Helpers, Warehousemen, & Packers

521 F. Supp. 614 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 13, 1981

The court declared that 29 U.S.C. § 411 (a)(3) states clearly that dues payable to a local labor organization may be increased only according to the methods provided in Section 411(a)(3)(A), and not by the regular convention … (ii) A member otherwise qualified to run for office must be nominated at the nomination meeting by a member in good standing other than the nominee and seconded by a member in good standing other than the nominee.

Frankina v. First National Bank of Boston

801 F. Supp. 875 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 1, 1992

The undisputed evidence establishes, however, that the Bank ceased funding this employee organization as part of a widespread economic strategy to reduce costs and discretionary overhead. … As a second exception, Massachusetts courts have imposed liability on an employer for terminating an at-will employee if the method of termination is in violation of a clearly established public policy. See Hobson v.

Kain v. Department of Environmental Protection

474 Mass. 278 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · May 17, 2016

We conclude that although the RGGI program and amendments thereto are very important to the over-all regional scheme of reducing carbon dioxide emissions, they do not qualify as a regulation under § 3 (d). … Here, applying the literal interpretation of the definition of "regulations" would require us to ignore the over-all language and purpose of the statute, as well as the Legislature's clearly expressed intent.

LUZ HARVEY & Another v. ELIAS ASSED (And a Consolidated Case).

Massachusetts Appeals Court · Jun 28, 2024

This seems to place him clearly in the category of being a 'non- resident' of MA, requiring compliance with G. L. c. 90 § 3C. As Plaintiff has not established compliance with G. … Initially there was, "to a large extent, immunity from all legal responsibility on the part of such nonresident" drivers (quotation and citation omitted). Pawloski v. Hess, 250 Mass. 22, 26 (1924).

Brady v. State Ballot Law Commission

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Aug 3, 2020

At least three candidates who used the application qualified to appear on the ballot. … In so doing, the court was not somehow authorizing the Secretary to establish "regulations" or impose additional restrictions on candidates.

Avery v. Heckler

584 F. Supp. 312 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Apr 12, 1984

Its analysis, which encompassed standing, sovereign immunity and exhaustion of remedies, is applicable here. … The substantial hardship requirement is clearly satisfied.