Case law
Opinions from 1658 to today.
9,602 results
2.85s
Jones v. Robert E. Bayley Construction Co.
36 Wash. App. 357 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Jan 5, 1984
Public policy requires that an intent to waive the employer's immunity be clearly expressed. Glass v. Stahl Specialty Co., 97 Wn.2d 880, 886 , 652 P.2d 948 (1982); Calkins v. Lorain Div. of Koehring Co., 26 Wn. … "The agreement need only clearly express an intent to provide for indemnification." Noia v. Ferrell-Penning, Inc., supra. Clause L clearly expresses an intent to provide for indemnification.
Overruled on other grounds by Brown v. Prime Construction Co., 102 Wash. 2d 235 (1984)Cited 10 timesPublished101 Wash. 2d 270 · Washington Supreme Court · Feb 23, 1984
The court found the statute granted immunity from discovery to medical staff committee records, stating: Literally, section 1157 establishes an immunity from discovery but not an evidentiary privilege in the sense that medical … A sponsor of the bill replied, "'[T]he answer to that question is clearly "no."'" House Journal, 42d Legislature (1971), at 877.
Cited 62 timesPublishedDistrict Court, W.D. Washington · Oct 2, 2023
Courts may grant qualified 6 immunity on the ground that a purported right was not clearly established by prior case law. 7 Reichle, 566 U.S. at 664. 8 Plaintiffs … Villegas, 541 F.3d at 957. 19 However, where qualified immunity determinations rest solely on the “clearly 20 established” prong, Monell liability may still lie if such a constitutional violation occurred. 21
Cited 0 timesUnknown83 Wash. 2d 599 · Washington Supreme Court · Apr 18, 1974
I believe the text of RCW 4.92.090 abolishing governmental immunity and the case law that has interpreted it, clearly establish that our state has waived its immunity from tort liability. … We declined to adopt this "technical construction" of section .090 which clearly stated the legislative intent to waive its tort immunity.
Cited 30 timesPublishedJ & B Development Co. v. King County
100 Wash. 2d 299 · Washington Supreme Court · Sep 15, 1983
The concept of "sovereign immunity," on the other hand, provides generally that despite the existence of apparent duty a municipal corporation, in the exercise of governmental functions, is immune from tort liability. … The concept of "sovereign immunity," while recognizing the existence of a tort, denies all liability within the limits of the immunity. W. Prosser, *304 supra.
Overruled on other grounds by Taylor v. Stevens County, 111 Wash. 2d 159 (1988)Cited 115 timesPublished229 P.3d 752 · Washington Supreme Court · Apr 1, 2010
A single invidiously discriminatory governmental act' is not `immunized by the absence of such discrimination in the making of other comparable decisions.'" … under Batson was clearly erroneous.
Cited 28 timesPublished158 P.3d 86 · Court of Appeals of Washington · May 15, 2007
Clearly, the Legislature did not intend inmates to have unfettered, immediate access to their wages during their incarceration. C. … Neither absolute nor qualified immunity extends to § 1983 suits for declaratory relief such as this one. See, e.g., Orellana v.
Cited 19 timesPublishedChamber of Commerce of the United States v. City of Seattle
274 F. Supp. 3d 1140 · District Court, W.D. Washington · Apr 4, 2017
The Court finds that the Chamber has raised serious questions regarding both prongs of the immunity analysis. B. … of its qualifying drivers.
Cited 0 timesPublishedOoh! Media LLC v. Spokane Transit Authority
District Court, E.D. Washington · Sep 22, 2020
Qualified immunity shields officials from civil liability so long 5 as their conduct “does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional 6 rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” … Even so, the Court finds that Defendant Meyer is 1 entitled to qualified immunity because the First Amendment right asserted by 2 Defendants was not clearly established.
Cited 0 timesUnknown3 Wash. 2d 243 · Washington Supreme Court · Mar 21, 1940
State, 197 Wash. 79 , 84 P. (2d) 372 , “Every reasonable presumption must be indulged in favor of the constitutionality of this statute, and the burden rests upon appellant to establish clearly its invalidity.” … I, § 12, of the state constitution, prohibiting the granting of special privileges and immunities; Kaufman v.
Cited 13 timesPublished59 Wash. App. 303 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Sep 17, 1990
We conclude from these authorities that the significant factor which establishes an entrant upon real property as a business visitor, for purposes of qualifying that person as *309 an invitee, is whether the entrant was invited … The rationale for the court's imposition of a duty to warn of natural conditions in Tarshis clearly stemmed from the plaintiff's status as an invitee of the hotel.
Overruled by Tincani v. Inland Empire Zoological Society, 124 Wash. 2d 121 (1994)Cited 17 timesPublishedFlying T Ranch, Inc., V. Stillaguamish Tribe Of Indians
Court of Appeals of Washington · Jun 3, 2024
In the absence of comprehensive legislation by Congress regulating tribal sovereign immunity, the United States Supreme Court has upheld tribal sovereign immunity for claims for which the FSIA clearly waived foreign nations … It is clearly necessary that the territorial sovereign reserve the authority to determine title disputes notwithstanding a foreign putative owner’s claims of immunity, because the operation of the local action rule would
Cited 0 timesPublishedSayan v. United Services Automobile Ass'n
43 Wash. App. 148 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Mar 26, 1986
He urges on us an argument accepted by the Supreme Court of Louisiana, that the words "legally entitled to recover" in that state's UMC statute "mean simply that the plaintiff must be able to establish fault on the part of … Clearly, the phrase "legally entitled to recover", without more, conjures up two equally reasonable concepts.
Cited 41 timesPublished62 F. Supp. 3d 1215 · District Court, W.D. Washington · Oct 17, 2014
“The proponent of a claim to absolute immunity bears the burden of establishing the justi *1220 fication for such immunity.” Antoine v. … “To qualify for absolute immunity, the function performed must be a judicial act with ‘a sufficiently close nexus to the adjudicative process.’
Cited 3 timesPublishedChambers-Castanes v. King County
100 Wash. 2d 275 · Washington Supreme Court · Sep 15, 1983
While this may be true in a broad sense, we have consistently held that absent a clear legislative intent or clearly enunciated policy to the contrary, these duties are owed to the public at large and are unenforceable as … All we need decide is whether the facts described, if established, would entitle appellants to relief under the allegations in their complaints. (Footnote omitted.) See also Grimsby v.
Cited 162 timesPublishedHordon v. Kitsap County Sheriff's Department
District Court, W.D. Washington · Jul 27, 2020
“Law is 21 ‘clearly established’ for the purposes of qualified immunity if every reasonable official would 22 have understood that what he is doing violates the right at issue.” Wilk v. … QUALIFIED IMMUNITY 2 Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint also addresses the issue of qualified immunity in these 3 ways: at Amended Complaint (Dkt. 20, ¶ 4.31, at 11), he alleges
Cited 0 timesUnknown168 Wash. 2d 645 · Washington Supreme Court · Apr 1, 2010
Ed. 2d 196 (2005). ¶26 In my view, the trial court’s consideration of systematic discrimination in its analysis of whether Rhone established a prima facie case of discrimination under Batson was clearly erroneous. … Here, the trial court did not appear to recognize that fact and, consequently, its ruling on Rhone’s Batson challenge was clearly erroneous, having been based on a misinterpretation of the requirements to establish a prima
Cited 29 timesPublishedSATNAM S. RANDHAWA v. PHILIP MARKER and MARK FOSTER
District Court, E.D. Washington · Jul 14, 2026
The Court’s 25 qualified immunity analysis may proceed in any order. … Moreover, 15 Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because it is not clearly established 16 that a one-time employment decision based on suspected food theft would amount 17 to a constitutional violation.
Cited 0 timesUnknownDistrict Court, W.D. Washington · Mar 31, 2022
As Reed accurately points out, they do not substantively address the “second 13 prong” of the qualified immunity test: whether a reasonable official would have known 14 that their conduct violated a clearly established … established, thus entitling Defendants to qualified immunity even if they 15 violated Reed’s constitutional rights.
Cited 0 timesUnknown85 Wash. 2d 671 · Washington Supreme Court · Jul 24, 1975
In assessing this claim, the touchstone for our analysis is the due process clause which commands that the prohibitions of a penal statute be clearly drawn and defined as to standards of guilt. … Even if such picketing is disruptive of the educational environment or violent, the parents are immunized from prosecution by the terms of RCW 9.87.010(13).
Overruled on other grounds by State v. Smith, 93 Wash. 2d 329 (1980)Cited 22 timesPublished
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