Case law

Thompson v. State

119 Md. App. 606 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · Feb 5, 1998

Arguendo, the evidence was legally sufficient to establish both an assault on and a theft (of narcotics) from Lyray Simpson as part of the “eleven thirty incident.” … Arguendo, the evidence was legally sufficient to establish an assault on Shannell Stewart as part of the “eleven thirty incident.”

United States v. Kim

902 F. Supp. 2d 763 · District Court, D. Maryland · Oct 2, 2012

Kehoe, 516 F.2d 78 (5th Cir.1975) cert. denied 424 U.S. 909 , 96 S.Ct. 1103 , 47 L.Ed.2d 313 (1976), the Government notes that such a tactical approach did not immunize the defendant from a subsequent prosecution under a … Moreover, on these facts the Government has failed to establish a prima facie case showing Defendant’s driver’s license was suspended, and if so, that he was aware of the suspension.

Emory v. State

101 Md. App. 585 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · Sep 29, 1994

The first question is that of who is it who must be persuaded clearly and convincingly. … This is the “clearly erroneous” standard of appellate review. It was explicitly spelled out by State v.

King v. Heselbach

District Court, D. Maryland · Mar 24, 2023

on his claims against Heselbach and Ellifritz; (3) King failed to properly allege or establish a due process claim relating to the disciplinary proceeding; (4) King failed to allege or properly establish a retaliation … As □ matter of procedural due process, inmates have a “qualified right to obtain and present video evidence surveillance,” unless the “government establishes that providing the inmate with access to such evidence would

Stannard v. McCool

198 Md. 609 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Dec 7, 1951

This statement is qualified by comment (e) thereunder, which states: “Actor’s knowledge of other’s expectancy. … created the twelve thousand dollar contract or of the contract, entered into between the appellant and the Nowland heirs, and that knowledge being essential to a recovery of a judgment in this case, the trial judge was clearly

Van Teslaar v. Bender

365 F. Supp. 1007 · District Court, D. Maryland · Oct 17, 1973

Relying upon the record, plaintiff states that the evidence clearly establishes that he was not informed of the substance of the complaint until charges had been formally served on him. (See tr. 146-173). … Heffner, 420 F.2d 809 at 811 (4th Cir. 1969) that “An agency of the government must scrupulously observe rules, regulations, or procedures which it has established.

MedImmune, Inc. v. Centocor, Inc.

271 F. Supp. 2d 762 · District Court, D. Maryland · Jul 16, 2003

Medlmmune has benefited from immunity from suit and Centocor has equally benefited from royalty payments. … The Court disagrees, finding only one: Med-Immune’s breach of the licensing agreement.

Cumberland Insurance Group v. Delmarva Power

226 Md. App. 691 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · Feb 1, 2016

The spoliation doctrine is well-established in Maryland. See Klupt v. Krongard, 126 Md. App. 179 (1999). … We concluded that the trial court’s findings were not clearly erroneous, and then addressed the sanction of dismissal. Given that Mr.

Melton v. Baltimore City Police Dept.

District Court, D. Maryland · Apr 29, 2025

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” … As the Amended Complaint is currently pleaded, then, the Individual Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity for claims relating to the evidence hold. III.

Wooten-Bey v. State

308 Md. 534 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Feb 9, 1987

State, 308 Md. 337 , 519 A.2d 735 (1987), McAuliffe, J., speaking for the Court, clearly explained the crime of murder as it exists in Maryland. … These qualifying malevolent states of mind are: 1) the intent to kill, 2) the intent to do grievous bodily harm, 3) the intent to do an act under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life (

Hinton v. State

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · Mar 29, 2023

Finally, the Court addressed “a common view among at least some practitioners that the entry of a nolo contendere plea by a person on probation immunizes that person against a later violation of probation, and as a result … The proffer of facts is clearly hearsay.

Mayor of Baltimore Ex Rel. Lehigh Structural Steel Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co.

171 Md. 667 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Feb 17, 1937

. * * *” It is suggested by the appellant that the words “is liable” relate to and qualify the entire contract, rather than the words “material furnished etc.,” and is used only to identify the obligation of the surety. * … First, while a public policy which is definite, well-known, and clearly established may be invoked to destroy a contract, or possibly to aid in its interpretation, it cannot be invoked to alter or amend it. 13 C.

Brantner v. Watkins

227 Md. 626 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Feb 22, 1962

The fact that the evidence did not establish that the child was in a position of imminent peril in the street within the unobstructed view of the driver distinguishes this case from Miller v. … The facts of this case clearly place it within the second situation and within the ambit of such cases as Cocco v. Lissau, 202 Md. 196 , 95 A. 2d 857 (1953), and Lenehan v. Nicholson, supra.

Board of Appeals v. Marina Apartments, Inc.

272 Md. 691 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Oct 25, 1974

It is important to keep clearly in mind the distinction between such an administrative review and an inquiry intended to serve as a basis for an independent decision whether or not a building permit should be issued." … it might not qualify as a "local law."

Panghat, M.D. v. Department of Veterans Affairs

District Court, D. Maryland · Mar 27, 2020

However, plaintiff failed to satisfy these conditions precedent to Maryland’s waivers of sovereign immunity. … However, the letter qualified that plaintiff’s appointment could end via “notice of termination per the UMSOM Scholar Fellow Policy.” Id.

Toomey v. Shipley

172 Md. 463 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · May 24, 1937

amended, section 5 included the following provision: “For the purpose of paying the interest and providing for the retirement of the bonds as herein provided and the annual rental for fire hydrants for the water supply to be established … Board of *469 Supervisors, 137 Md. 281 , 112 A. 301 , it was clearly the intention of the Legislature to overcome that objection by the later enactment.

State Board of Physicians v. Bernstein

167 Md. App. 714 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · Mar 8, 2006

Lyles was a biased witness, as he “is clearly on one side of [the CRNA collaboration] debate.” The ALJ observed that Dr. … In the case at bar, we are not dealing with a clearly erroneous factual finding or the erroneous admission of evidence.

Limouze v. M. M. & P. Maritime Advancement, Training, Education & Safety Program

397 F. Supp. 784 · District Court, D. Maryland · Jun 10, 1975

Maritime Advancement, Training, Education and Safety *786 Program [MATES Program] was established pursuant to an Agreement and Declaration of Trust, dated January 6, 1967 (paper 12, Exh. A). … Where a trustee in the administration of the trust makes a contract with a third person, the trustee is personally liable on the contract unless such liability is clearly excluded in the contract.

Owlfeather-Gorbey v. Bennett

District Court, D. Maryland · Jun 27, 2019

The bar for establishing imminent danger, though high, is not insurmountable. … In sum, Gorbey has not established that he is in imminent danger of a physical harm and he is therefore not entitled to proceed in forma pauperis.

City Chevrolet Co. v. Wedeman

30 Md. App. 637 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · Mar 26, 1976

The trial judge sustained that objection and accepted the witness “as qualified to testify as to what automobiles sell for within his range of knowledge.” … “Such a relation clearly did not exist between the fraudulent act and the alleged damages in this case.” Judgment in favor of Ella Wedeman against The City Chevrolet Company for compensatory damages of $500.00 affirmed.