Case law

James E. Easter v. State of Indiana

Indiana Court of Appeals · May 4, 2026

App. 2022) (“A finger qualifies as an ‘object’ in this context.”). … establish” the latter.

Richardson v. Calderon

713 N.E.2d 856 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jun 30, 1999

Youngs was qualified to render an opinion concerning Calderon’s mental capacity five months after the last time he saw her in a clinical setting. … to establish other facts or inferences.

Mundell v. Beverly Enterprises-Indiana, Inc.

778 F. Supp. 459 · District Court, S.D. Indiana · Nov 12, 1991

Punitive damages are an established part of the recovery available to living plaintiffs in personal injury cases. 4 However, Indiana common law prohibits the survival of a cause of action when the plaintiff dies. … The statute in the past clearly limited recovery to a narrow list of damages which were all compensatory in nature.

Whitaker v. State

778 N.E.2d 423 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Nov 13, 2002

Now, to be convicted of involuntary manslaughter the offense committed must be battery, or one that inherently poses a risk of serious bodily injury and is a Class C or D felony or Class A misdemeanor. 5 Clearly, since at … infractions standing alone amount to "reckless driving” as defined by Indiana Code Section 9-21-8-52(a), although driving "at such an unreasonably high rate of speed” as to endanger the safety or property of others may qualify

Ellenwine v. Fairley

846 N.E.2d 657 · Indiana Supreme Court · May 3, 2006

The MMA did not create or establish the medical malpractice claim; it only imposed procedural requirements on the prosecution of them. Chamberlain v. Walpole, 822 N.E.2d 959, 961 (Ind. 2005). … It was Frady, then, that established the principle that the MMA’s two-year occurrence-based statute of limitations applies to wrongful death actions based on medical malpractice.

Dunmoyer v. Wells County, Indiana Area Plan Commission

32 N.E.3d 785 · Indiana Court of Appeals · May 12, 2015

Section 1602 entitles a petitioner to judicial review upon a showing that the petitioner qualifies under: (1) Section 1603 concerning standing; (2) Section 1604 concerning exhaustion of administrative remedies; (3) Section … that the petitioner has been prejudiced by a zoning decision that is: (1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity

State of Indiana v. Axel Domingo Diego

Indiana Court of Appeals · Nov 5, 2020

[9] If the State intended to appeal the suppression order under subsection 6, it was required to clearly state as much in its Notice of Appeal. … However, while “[i]t is well- established that we may reconsider a ruling by our motions panel,” we are reluctant to overrule the motions panel except in rare circumstances. Wise v.

State, Civil Rights Commission Ex Rel. Belzer v. Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc.

702 N.E.2d 370 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Nov 30, 1998

Clearly the Act’s legislative policy is not to place an aggrieved party in a worse position than the party would have been in but for the submission of a complaint to the ICRC. … According to the ICRC, Belzer qualifies as an “aggrieved party” and thus has standing to assert a claim under the Act.

Indiana High School Athletic Ass'n v. Martin

731 N.E.2d 2 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jun 14, 2000

Thus, Martin sought a hardship exception to the transfer rule so that she would be allowed to play varsity sports. 3 However, IHSAA determined that under the IHSAA Eligibility Rules, Martin qualified for only limited eligibility … Clearly, there was evidence before the trial court that Martin suffered emotional and physical ailments.

Kurt Hinkle v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

Indiana Court of Appeals · May 20, 2016

The appellate court must accept the post- conviction court’s findings of fact and may reverse only if the findings are clearly erroneous. … Rather, it enters into the determination of whether the likelihood of a different outcome qualifies as prejudice in the Strickland sense.” Coleman v.

City of Elkhart v. No-Bi Corp.

428 N.E.2d 43 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Nov 23, 1981

In that case, a railroad wished to lower the grade on tracks on which it already had an established right of way. … Clearly, the holding in Hadley justifies the admission of the evidence challenged here.

Trusteeship of Creech v. Russellville Bank

130 Ind. App. 611 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jun 19, 1959

Her will was duly probated and an executor appointed and qualified on the 26th day of April, 1938. The administration of the estate was completed and the executor was discharged on May 8, 1940. … A vested interest under a trust is established by the same general principles as apply to the common law life estate. The character of the corpus — real, personal, tangible, or intangible, is immaterial.

James Bogner v. Teresa Bogner

29 N.E.3d 733 · Indiana Supreme Court · Apr 28, 2015

The order will only be set aside if clearly erroneous. … of the Guidelines “had intended for non-overnight visits in which the noncustodial parent provides the children with transportation from school and to and from their activities, feeds them, and does homework with them to qualify

Eldon E. Harmon v. State of Indiana

971 N.E.2d 674 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jun 28, 2012

established. … The evidence presented at trial was clearly sufficient to support a Class B felony conviction, and Harmon concedes as much on appeal.

In re Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of H.M. (Minor Child), and A.M. (Mother) v. Indiana Department of Child Services (mem. dec.)

Indiana Court of Appeals · Jun 20, 2018

At the end of this second stay, Mother earned a certificate of completion, which was qualified because she did not meet the program requirements for class attendance. … [27] Mother argues that the trial court’s conclusion that termination is in the best interests of Child is clearly erroneous.

Palmer v. State

173 Ind. App. 208 · Indiana Court of Appeals · May 31, 1977

The burden is upon the moving party to establish that no material facts are in genuine issue. Tapp v. Haskins (1974), 160 Ind. … The established rule in this State is that: “Statutes are to be construed as having a prospective operation unless the language clearly indicates that they were intended to be retrospective. (Citations omitted.).

Die & Mold, Inc. v. Western

448 N.E.2d 44 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Apr 26, 1983

It is well established in other jurisdictions, however, that a vacation with pay is, in effect, additional wages. In re Wil-Low Cafeterias, Inc. v. Siegel, (2nd Cir.1940) 111 F.2d 429 ; Monroe v. … The court stated: "In the case at bar, all employees who had been in the service of the appellee for not less than one year prior to June 1, 1951, qualified for vacation pay.

Florian v. GATX RAIL CORP.

930 N.E.2d 1190 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jul 19, 2010

To the contrary, both implementation schedules clearly provide for the fact that not all freight cars will have the required sheeting applied immediately. … would cereate an inefficient incentive to reconstruct or recondition old products rather than build new ones, in order to reduce expected liability costs; for under such a regime a product rebuilt after ten years would be immunized

Northside Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Bradley

462 N.E.2d 1321 · Indiana Court of Appeals · May 7, 1984

DISCUSSION AND DECISION Issue I: Shield Law The shield law is IND.CODE 34-3-5-1 as follows: “Newspapers, television and radio stations — Press associations — Employees and representatives — Immunity. … However, a witness is not exonerated from answering because he judges that in doing so, he would incriminate himself; that is, “his say-so does not of itself establish the hazard of incrimination”. Hoffman v.

Marriage of Sanjari v. Sanjari

755 N.E.2d 1186 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Oct 4, 2001

Child Support Order Reversal of a trial court's child support order is merited only where the determination is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Fields v. … Accordingly, Amir has failed to establish that he was prejudiced by the exclusion of Uzell's testimony. We find no abuse of discretion. E.