Case law

Chatman v. Gentle Dental Center of Waltham

973 F. Supp. 228 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Aug 22, 1997

Granting the motion is appropriate only where it appears clearly from the complaint that the plaintiff cannot recover under any theory, under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations. Id. B. … , the SJC held that these claims were not barred, stating that "[w]here a fellow employee commits an intentional tort not related to the interests of the employer ... the policies behind the [Act] would not be served by immunizing

Diaz v. Johnson

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Apr 29, 2019

To establish standing, a protestor must establish that (1) it is an actual or prospective bidder and (2) it has a direct economic interest in the procurement. … By failing to allege either that his claim is for less than $10,000.00 in damages, or that he clearly waives any amount of monetary damages over $9,999.99,10 Mr.

Arthurs v. Stern

427 F. Supp. 425 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 3, 1977

In De Vita , therefore, plaintiff had the choice of either asserting his privilege with impunity, or testifying with immunity. Neither option is available to the plaintiff here. … Kordel, 397 U.S. 1 , 90 S.Ct. 763 , 25 L.Ed.2d 1 (1970), is clearly distinguishable from the situation before this court.

Bellingham Massachusetts Self Storage, LLC v. Town of Bellingham

Massachusetts Land Court · Jul 15, 2021

That interpretation of the statute ignores the language of the first two sentences of § 5, where the Legislature clearly set forth the procedure for initiating zoning amendments. … Paturzo "as being the names of qualified voters in the Town." Town Of Bellingahm's [sic] Summary Judgment Record Appendix ("D. App."), Ex. 50. It is not clear why the Town undertook this exercise.

Duval v. Callaway Golf Ball Operations, Inc.

501 F. Supp. 2d 254 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Aug 7, 2007

According to Defendant, long-established common law principles preclude a plaintiff from attempting to rescind a release after accepting the benefits thereunder. See, e.g., Vasapolli v. … Oubre clearly renounced her rights under the agreement and tendered back the monies received. See id.

In Re Lupron® Marketing & Sales Practices Litigation

295 F. Supp. 2d 148 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Nov 25, 2003

As the First Circuit concluded, “[t]he two 1997 letters are inadequate to establish a closed period of continuous criminal activity. … The plaintiff clearly set out á general scheme, which very plausibly was meant to defraud the plaintiff, and also probably involved interstate commerce.

Clarke v. Stanwood

166 Mass. 379 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jun 16, 1896

Dean, 3 Allen, 579 , and Baker’s case, 8 Cush. 109 , as in effect qualifying, if not overruling, Barclay v. Phelps and Agawam Bank v. Morris, ubi supra. We do not so regard them. … In the case of an insolvent firm, their rights in that regard, and in the choice of assignees and the matter of discharge, are fully protected and established by proof against the firm; and it certainly would be a hardship

United States v. Shields

597 F. Supp. 2d 224 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Feb 12, 2009

Plaud concluded that Shields’ past treatment also did not qualify as a risk reducer in this case. (Id. at 128.) Finally, Dr. … Tomich was qualified to testify about his own assessment of Mr. Shields and the assessment tools that he utilized, but that he was not qualified to testify about statistical matters. See United States v.

American Automobile Insurance v. J.P. Noonan Transportation, Inc.

12 Mass. L. Rptr. 493 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Nov 16, 2000

Although the two may have slightly different characteristics, nomenclature is less important than establishing functional boundaries. Bank Brussels Lambert v. … The Insurers contend each of those documents was prepared in anticipation of litigation and thus is immune from discovery.

Commonwealth v. Stroman

Massachusetts Appeals Court · Aug 17, 2023

Census 2 The indictment alleged three prior convictions for violent crimes, which would qualify the defendant as an "armed career criminal" under G. L. c. 269, § 10G (c), see Commonwealth v. Johnson, 102 Mass. … The evidence of his background, per se, clearly had no bearing on his credibility. "Evidence of nationality, race, or color cannot be introduced to affect the credibility of individual witnesses."

Copeland v. New England Marine Insurance

43 Mass. 432 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 15, 1841

, whose duties and powers are as distinctly defined and well established as those of the master. … He must be qualified, in point of general capacity, for the office of master. Robinett v. Ship Exeter, 2 Rob. 261 .

McKenna v. First Horizon Home Loan Corp.

429 F. Supp. 2d 291 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 31, 2006

These questions establish the existence of commonality required by Rule 23. … Mem., Appendix C, and the court is satisfied that they are qualified to vigorously prosecute this case.

Commonwealth v. Pon

469 Mass. 296 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Aug 15, 2014

As part of this burden of proof, the defendant must establish that "he or she risks suffering specific harm if the record is not sealed." Id. at 152. See Pokaski, 868 F.2d at 507 n.18. … With the passage of at least some time, however, the potential damage resulting from public availability is done, and the record may exist in the databases of third-party background check services, immune in practice

Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren Bridge

24 Mass. 344 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jan 12, 1830

For it does not bind the crown in its power of qualifying the right granted, by subsequent modifications which the public good may require. … By the 12th, “no subject shall be deprived of his property, immunities, privileges or estate, but by the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land.”

Duguay v. Spencer

462 F. Supp. 2d 115 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Nov 3, 2006

. § 2254 (d): the state adjudication either 1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States … A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established Supreme Court precedent if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite that reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law or if the state court decides

COMMONWEALTH v. RICHARD M. CORBETT.

101 Mass. App. Ct. 355 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Jul 8, 2022

While the report did not cite a clearly identifiable disease affecting the defendant's memory, such as Alzheimer's disease, it stated that the defendant had been diagnosed in September 2016 with attention deficit hyperactivity … Only the most disabling of conditions, we emphasize, would qualify under the standard we announce today." Sorden, 36 Cal. 4th at 69 .

Smaland Beach Association, Inc. v. Genova

94 Mass. App. Ct. 106 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Sep 25, 2018

The group established a neighborhood of summer camps they called Smaland. … See Paine, 108 Mass. at 169 ("The general rule of construction of all grants of land bounded by water of any kind is now well established, that, unless qualified by restrictive words, they pass the soil towards the centre

Commonwealth v. Sees

374 Mass. 532 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 3, 1978

If the ordinance at issue here applied to other than drinking establishments, it would clearly be unconstitutional on its face as an impermissible restriction on expression in the performing arts. … and similar establishments."

In the Matter of Troy

364 Mass. 15 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jul 26, 1973

Of course, we do not imply that judges should be immune from criticism arising out of their exercise of judicial discretion and judgment. … Taken cumulatively, they clearly require the result we have reached.

Crop Production Services, Inc. v. Albert

18 Mass. L. Rptr. 97 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Jul 20, 2004

At trial, the documentary evidence establishing the principal balance at $360,635.00 was essentially uncontroverted. … While the jury was entitled to determine the contested amounts assessed, it overstepped its function in reducing the amount clearly obligated under the note as a matter of law.