Case law

Doud v. Hodge

146 F. Supp. 887 · District Court, N.D. Illinois · Jun 12, 1956

This conduct is clearly not of such a nature as to bar the plaintiffs from relief. … Nor do we suggest that the legislature could not establish reasonable standards of financial responsibility which all would be required to meet to qualify for an exemption.

Levin v. Greco

415 B.R. 663 · District Court, N.D. Illinois · Sep 16, 2009

A district court reviews bankruptcy decisions under Rule 8013 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure; questions of fact are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard, while questions of law and mixed questions of … The question on appeal turns on a strictly legal issue: whether a child representative in Illinois state court proceedings qualifies for the domestic support exception to discharge under the Bankruptcy Act.

In Re Brilley

148 B.R. 39 · United States Bankruptcy Court, C.D. Illinois · Aug 18, 1992

The United States Supreme Court recently ruled that a Chapter 7 debtor’s interest in an ERISA — qualified retirement plan was excluded from the bankruptcy estate under § 541(c)(2). Patterson v. … Clearly, an IRA is not a true spendthrift trust. In a true spendthrift trust, the settlor of the trust cannot establish the trust for his own benefit.

Osborne v. Leonard

99 Ill. App. 2d 391 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Sep 19, 1968

The plaintiff states that the verdict completely disregards proper elements of damages which she claims were clearly established by the evidence. … This was clearly a violation of Supreme Court Rule 234. Christian v. New York Cent. R. R., 28 Ill App2d 57, 170 NE2d 183 .

People v. Caballero

Illinois Supreme Court · Dec 4, 1997

Thus, defendant cannot establish that the disparate treatment of himself and Aviles was unreasonable or unwarranted. … Clearly, the result defendant seeks was not "dictated" by existing precedent, where this court rejected his original claim that his jury should have been "life qualified." Caballero, 102 Ill. 2d at 45 - 46.

People v. Mason

219 Ill. App. 3d 76 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Sep 12, 1991

Such evidence is admissible in cases where the proffered evidence is so clearly connected with the main issue in the case at bar as to tend to prove the accused guilty of the offense charged. (People v. … Such evidence has no relevance when a court decides whether a witness is qualified under section 115 — 14 to testify.

Quality Saw & Seal, Inc. v. Illinois Commerce Commission

374 Ill. App. 3d 776 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Jun 27, 2007

Section 2.3 does not specify a threshold amount of material to be “moved, removed, or otherwise displaced” for it to qualify as excavation. … Also, Quality Saw does not attempt to establish the ambiguity of section 2.3 before resorting to regulations, foreign statutes, and cases as interpretive aids.

People Ex Rel. Board of Trustees of Chicago State University v. Siemens Building Technologies, Inc.

387 Ill. App. 3d 606 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Dec 24, 2008

However, the State’s contention that section 35 “is clearly the ‘true up’ where the documented savings are compared with the annual payment and the provider is required to ‘pay the difference’ ” is not what the statute provides … Qualified providers means people that are qualified, yes, to do the energy conservation work, but we also want qualified lenders. We clarify this in the bill.

Burroughs v. Hills

564 F. Supp. 1007 · District Court, N.D. Illinois · Mar 8, 1983

Defendants have argued that plaintiffs do not satisfy *1012 the criteria for implication of a private right of action established in Cort v. … Here, plaintiffs seek to hold HUD itself to the standards it has established. See Estrada v. Hills, 401 F.Supp. 429, 437-38 (N.D.Ill. 1975).

Ruiz v. City of Chicago

366 Ill. App. 3d 947 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Jun 29, 2006

Based on review of these documents and his experience as a paramedic, Ligouri opined that he was qualified to testify as to the standard of care in Cook County, Illinois. … However, as discussed below, we do not find this to be the case and review the trial court’s decision to exclude Ligouri under an abuse of discretion standard as clearly outlined in Gill and Sullivan.

People v. Westefer

169 Ill. App. 3d 59 · Appellate Court of Illinois · May 2, 1988

The State responds that the testimony was hearsay and clearly designed to place defendant’s alibi before the jury without calling defendant to testify. … The State further maintains that there was adequate evidence to establish a proper foundation and chain of custody and that there was sufficient evidence to establish the connection between the work pants, the paper bag,

Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer

578 F. Supp. 147 · District Court, N.D. Illinois · Dec 23, 1983

That provision clearly allows for FDIC liability if the requisite four conditions are met. … actions sounding in tort, not contract, as to which courts have held Congress did not waive sovereign immunity to such claims: FDIC v.

American National Fire Insurance Co. v. National Union Fire Insurance Co

Appellate Court of Illinois · Sep 5, 2003

Camosy failed to do so and its actions clearly violated the notice provision in section 2(c)(1). … EX POST FACTO LAWS AND IMPAIRING CONTRACTS No ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts or making an irrevocable grant of special privileges or immunities, shall be passed." Ill. Const. 1970, art.

People v. Carey

104 N.E.3d 1150 · Illinois Supreme Court · Jan 19, 2018

Therefore, the indictment, read as a whole, clearly informed defendant that the State intended to prove that he possessed a firearm at the time of the shooting. … In support, defendant contends that the State failed to prove that the inoperable and unloaded .22-caliber derringer qualified as a “firearm.”

Frakes v. Peoria School District No. 150

2014 IL App (3d) 130306 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Jul 29, 2014

Section 24-12(b) clearly provides that if a school board has vacancies for the next school term, only teachers in Groups 3 and 4 have recall rights. 105 ILCS 5/24-12(b) (West 2012). … to the inception of the 2012-13 school year and after funding became certain based on final enrollment information received before the 2012-13 school year began. ¶ 29 In my view, the pleadings did not establish

Davis v. Lake County Jail

District Court, N.D. Illinois · Mar 29, 2021

immunity. … Qualified immunity protects public officials from being monetarily liable unless the evidence shows “(1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly established’ at

Phaup v. Pepsi-Cola General Bottlers, Inc.

761 F. Supp. 555 · District Court, N.D. Illinois · Apr 5, 1991

In each instance, the most important criterion that Fitzpatrick must be able to show is that she was qualified, both to establish her prima facie case and thereafter to refute Pepsi’s explanation — which it advances in both … situations — that she was not qualified.

In RE ESTATE OF ROY v. Roy

202 Ill. Dec. 492 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Jul 19, 1994

The first and third factors enunciated in Nixon are clearly not applicable here. However, the second factor set forth in Nixon is crucial to our analysis. … It clearly provides that a disabled person is allowed to bring a petition naming a guardian (755 ILCS 5/lia — 3(a) (West 1992)) but that choice is subject to the statutory criteria for qualifying as a guardian listed in section

Alcorn v. City Of Chicago

District Court, N.D. Illinois · Sep 28, 2022

Defendants assert that Officer Wlodarski is protected by qualified immunity. Qualified immunity “shields federal and state officials from money damages.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011). … To overcome qualified immunity, a plaintiff must establish a violation of a constitutional right, and the court must decide if the right at issue was “clearly established” at the time of the alleged misconduct.

People v. Landgham

182 Ill. App. 3d 148 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Apr 11, 1989

As discussed previously, Illinois courts have rejected the argument that death-qualified juries are conviction prone. In addition, the supreme court has held that there is no need to “life-qualify” a jury. … The evidence will show you that clearly.”