Case law

Perales v. City and County of San Francisco Sheriff Department

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Dec 26, 2017

review of the complaint and may dismiss if it is malicious, frivolous, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune … “The term ‘frivolous’ is used to denote not only a claim wholly lacking in merit but also a suit that, for whatever reason, clearly can’t be maintained.” Okoro v.

Peterborough Oil Co., LLC v. Department of Environmental Protection

474 Mass. 443 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jun 6, 2016

In particular, under such an expanded definition, any hazardous material mixed with oil would appear to qualify for less stringent treatment under the oil exemption. … In response, DEP clearly explained that the exclusion was not intended to include "all gasoline," stating the "proposal was not extended to additives."

May v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.

10 F. Supp. 249 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Feb 15, 1935

This qualified property right is undoubtedly capable of being transferred by will and by assignment, but it cannot be transferred in gross or at large like rights in a patent. United Drug Co. v. … It is clearly apparent that, after an attorney acting for the plaintiffs had suggested to the defendant that it might be for its interest to pay plaintiffs for the privilege of using its own registered trade-marks, the Guptill

Morales Posada v. Cultural Care, Inc.

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Aug 13, 2021

Cultural Care is entitled to derivative sovereign immunity. … Cultural Care’s policies, as alleged by Plaintiffs, are clearly designed to enforce the government’s regulations, but they are also broader than is strictly required by the regulations.

Bournewood Hosp. v. MASS COMM'N AGAINST DISCRIMINATION

371 Mass. 303 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Nov 4, 1976

Even though it is well established that "[c]ourts of equity, in certain cases under ... [their] general powers, allow counsel fees," Sears v. Nahant, supra at 240 ; Loyal Protective Life Ins. Co. v. … This woman, although qualified to perform the job, had no previous experience at a psychiatric hospital, and was not required to serve any trial period before receiving the weekly salary just mentioned.

A.W. Chesterton Co. v. Massachusetts Insurers Insolvency Fund

445 Mass. 502 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Dec 12, 2005

Within three days of receiving notice, in November, 1987, of Chesterton’s asbestos-related claims under the Midland policy, the Fund responded by expressly reserving its rights as to whether the claims qualified as covered … Cifrino, 328 Mass. 549, 557 (1952) (“It is well established in the Commonwealth that loches does not operate to bar a claim simply because the events which established rights in the plaintiff occurred long ago”).

Marshal House, Inc. v. Rent Control Board of Brookline

358 Mass. 686 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Feb 10, 1971

We stated in the previous Marshal House case that the Legislature might conclude that an emergency existed in certain areas, as it clearly did here as to Brookline in passing c. 843. We said in Russell v. … The result would be a less uniform pattern of rent control Statewide than presently exists, 6 but one which like this one would be constitutionally immune from attack, for it would be a product of differing local needs and

Monsarrat v. NEWMAN

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Feb 26, 2021

By determining that Newman’s entitlement to two affirmative defenses was clearly established on the face of the Complaint itself, the court necessarily found that plaintiff Jonathan Monsarrat’s claims were, … Newman’s counsel, moreover, raised the issue of immunity under 47 U.S.C. § 230 in response to Monsarrat’s March 19, 2020 demand letter, and taking into account that Monsarrat’s counsel had litigated the Small Justice

Allen v. National Institutes of Health

974 F. Supp. 2d 18 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 30, 2013

The FSRA “follows guidelines established by federal agencies for conducting and reporting risk assessments and has been performed by using available scientific data and established methods of analyses.” Id. … The chapter would benefit if it were to state clearly up front that the results of some calculations cannot be reported because of security concerns.

Commonwealth v. DiPadova

460 Mass. 424 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Aug 22, 2011

The defendant stated that he had used crack cocaine on the night of the murder, but did not indicate clearly whether he did so before or after killing the victim. … Voluntary consumption of alcohol or drugs, intoxication and even alcoholism or drug addiction do not qualify as “mental disease[s] or defect[s]” in the McHoul formulation; as a result, a defendant whose lack of substantial

Commonwealth v. Seay

376 Mass. 735 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Dec 4, 1978

A qualified individual may obtain a "firearm identification card” under G. L. c. 140, § 129B, that allows him to possess a firearm legally. G. L. c. 140, § 129C. G. L. c. 269, § 10 (h). … The interest of an apartment dweller in defending himself — the only apparent reason for allowing him to carry a firearm in his own dwelling *743 in the first place — is clearly attenuated when he passes his doorway to enter

Commonwealth v. Kenneally

10 Mass. App. Ct. 162 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Jul 1, 1980

The warrant did not exceed the foundation of probable cause established by the affidavit. Judge’s Instructions. … As such it may not be as immune from challenge as the language, “doubt based upon a reason,” standing alone, now appears to be. Compare Commonwealth v.

Rodden v. Savin Hill Enterprises, LLC

33 Mass. L. Rptr. 442 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Apr 21, 2016

In the present case, the Complaint does not allege that Rodden was denied clearly identifiable earned compensation for past services to Savin Hill. … The established elements of a tortious interference claim are as follows.

Commonwealth v. Carlos Cuba

Massachusetts Appeals Court · Nov 6, 2025

"[2] Estrada was qualified as an expert in fingerprint identification. … It is not enough for a fingerprint expert to avoid testifying that the match is one hundred percent certain; the Commonwealth has an affirmative duty to establish on direct examination that the expert's testimony is only

AngioDynamics, Inc. v. Biolitec, Inc.

974 F. Supp. 2d 1 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Aug 27, 2013

A judge’s ordinary efforts at courtroom administration — even a stern and short-tempered judge’s ordinary efforts at courtroom administration — remain immune.” Id. … As the transcript indicates, however, the court “carefully considered” this argument, which was "very forcefully and very clearly” set forth in Defendants’ memorandum, prior to oral argument (Dkt. No. 233, Tr.

Enos v. Secretary of Environmental Affairs

48 Mass. App. Ct. 239 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Nov 22, 1999

MEPA’s area of concern clearly is the protection of the environment from damage caused by projects having an environmental impact. … Affairs, 402 Mass. 611, 614 (1988), 13 the court wrote that “[t]he purpose of MEPA was to protect the environment, and that, therefore, an allegation of a violation of MEPA or a regulation pursuant to MEPA qualified under

Duff-Kareores v. Kareores

474 Mass. 528 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jun 15, 2016

Soon after the birth of their first child, at around the time that Christopher completed his medical training and began  4 employment as a fully qualified … The thrust of Christopher's argument is that the judge's erroneous calculation of the length of the parties' marriage, based on their economic marital relationship, "clearly controlled" all of the judge's findings.

MEDEROS v. Murphy

762 F. Supp. 2d 209 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 15, 2010

Merits of the Petition A writ of habeas corpus may not issue unless the adjudication by the state court either (1) “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established … Rather, it is well-established that ICE “may decline to institute proceedings, terminate proceedings, or decline to execute a final order of deportation.” Reno v.

Radford Trust v. First Unum Life Insurance Co. of America

321 F. Supp. 2d 226 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jun 15, 2004

Julian Klapowitz (“Dr.Klapowitz”) for the purpose of completing some immunization forms, and he mentioned his schizophrenia to Dr. Klapowitz. … Proof of actual attendance by a physician was a prerequisite for continuing receipt of benefits once a claimant qualified, not for establishing the date when disability began. 18 After interpreting the Policy’s terms, the

Saltonstall v. Sanders

93 Mass. 446 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Nov 15, 1865

The law upon this matter appears very clearly in the judgments of Lord Hardwicke, which are of the highest authority, both from his unsurpassed mastery of the principles of equity jurisprudence, and as having been delivered … laws of the land would admit of, or to any person or persons,” and in such shares and manner as the trustees should think fit or as the laws admitted of, is to the same effect; and manifests no intention to overrule or qualify