Case law
Opinions from 1658 to today.
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1.82s
846 F. Supp. 723 · District Court, N.D. Indiana · Feb 11, 1994
Clearly, the Agreed Entry represents an outcome at least comparable, if not far superior, to that which plaintiffs might achieve by proceeding to trial. … Kashani are well-qualified for their role as class counsel in this litigation.
Cited 10 timesPublishedJoel Granberry v. Bright Ideas in Broad Ripple, Inc., and Beverly J. Middaugh
Indiana Court of Appeals · Sep 25, 2014
Statutory Immunity We turn first to the provisions of Indiana law concerning reporting child abuse. … To the extent Granberry’s complaint relies upon the need to establish bad faith in Middaugh’s report to defeat any claim of immunity as a result of Coffy’s alleged bad reputation, we cannot conclude he has pleaded facts
Cited 0 timesUnpublishedIndiana Gas Co., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co.
951 F. Supp. 780 · District Court, N.D. Indiana · Oct 2, 1996
This case law clearly supports LMI’s position. … Rather, under the definition leaching or migration would qualify as the “happening or series of happenings arising out of ... [the] event.”
Vacated on other grounds by Indiana Gas Company, Inc. v. Home Insurance Company, 141 F.3d 314 (1998)Cited 7 timesPublished657 N.E.2d 157 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Feb 14, 1996
This is not the stuff of which fundamental rights qualifying as liberty interests are made. Id. at 491 U.S. at 125 , 109 S.Ct. at 2344 . … Clearly, the Agreed Entry which established paternity of R.S. over D.S. was a private contract between the parties.
Vacated by K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399 (1996)Cited 2 timesPublishedIndiana Department of Highways v. Dixon
541 N.E.2d 877 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jul 25, 1989
Applicability of the AAA The Administrative Adjudication Act (AAA) (repealed effective July 1, 1987) established “a uniform method of administrative adjudication by all agencies of the state of Indiana ... … To the contrary, the petition only omitted one of the grounds for review under subsection 14(a): that the agency action was “[c]on-trary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity.”
Cited 29 timesPublished127 N.E.3d 1221 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jun 20, 2019
Applying the plain meanings of the terms, we conclude that an injury to the mind, as alleged here by the State, does not qualify as a bodily injury. … It was Keith's burden on appeal to establish that the trial court overlooked mitigating evidence that was both clearly supported by the record and significant. Green v. State , 65 N.E.3d 620 , 636 (Ind. Ct.
Cited 3 timesPublished919 N.E.2d 118 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Dec 29, 2009
We have little trouble considering that the constructive trust's real estate in this case qualifies as a "presently fixed right to future enjoyment." Id. … The trial court, in its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of Dissolution of Marriage, concluded very clearly that "5.
Cited 21 timesPublished957 N.E.2d 1033 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Dec 5, 2011
We will reverse only if a trial court’s decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Id. … Further, the defendant must establish that he was prejudiced because of the trial court’s denial of his motion. Id. at 387 .
Cited 11 timesPublished14 N.E.3d 792 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jul 30, 2014
summary judgment as a matter of law unless the plaintiff can establish, by expert testimony, a genuine issue of material fact for trial. … The court also granted by separate order a motion to exclude the expert testimony of Plaintiffs' expert, on grounds that he was not properly qualified to offer expert medical testimony. 951 N.E.2d at 859-860 . .
Cited 7 timesPublished835 F. Supp. 468 · District Court, N.D. Indiana · Oct 6, 1993
, may not enforce the laws or ordinances of the state or any political subdivision unless the officer has, within one (1) year from the date of appointment, successfully completed the minimum basic training requirements established … Since the Plaintiff was appointed as Deputy Town Marshal in 1965, he qualifies for the exception for officers appointed before July 6, 1972.
Cited 0 timesPublishedMichael L. Bowling v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)
Indiana Court of Appeals · Jun 30, 2015
The appellate court must accept the post-conviction court’s findings of fact and may reverse only if the findings are clearly erroneous. Id. … decided two years after Bowling’s guilty plea, holding that where the intermediate step is so near the end of the manufacturing process that the final product is present in the chemical compound, that substance qualifies
Cited 0 timesPublishedPaternity: James A. Barnhart v. Sara E. Davis Whitcomb
Indiana Court of Appeals · Jul 26, 2017
required that its students be vaccinated but, pursuant to Indiana Code section 20-34-3-2, the school allowed an unvaccinated student to attend if a parent executed a form claiming a religious objection to immunization … A judgment is also clearly erroneous when the trial court applies the wrong legal standard to properly found facts. In re D.J. v.
Cited 0 timesPublishedCassidy v. Indiana State Board of Registration & Examination in Optometry
244 Ind. 137 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jun 26, 1963
“That by the use of signs and a newspaper advertisement in the November 31, 1960 issue of the Chesterton Tribune and the October 31, 1960 issue of the Portage News, Plaintiff held himself out as qualified for the practice … But can it be said that a lawyer, whose office space adjoins the offices of a bank or loan association which advertises its business, with most of his busi *149 ness being related to that establishment, is thereby guilty
Cited 7 timesPublishedMatter of Public Law No. 305 and Public Law No. 309
263 Ind. 506 · Indiana Supreme Court · Sep 19, 1975
Public Law No. 305 provides for the establishment of “small claims docket” in certain circuit and superior courts and provides for the establishment of a “county court” in certain counties. … As above discussed, the legislature clearly created these new judgeships as additions to the “unified systems.”
Cited 41 timesPublished152 Ind. App. 50 · Indiana Court of Appeals · May 3, 1972
This authority includes the authority to establish a height regulation and to establish a probationary period. … It clearly appears that the Legislature did not intend to make any distinction between “probationary” firemen and regular firemen except for purposes of establishing their minimum compensation.
Cited 6 timesPublishedArnett v. Tuthill Corp., Fill-Rite Div.
849 F. Supp. 654 · District Court, N.D. Indiana · Mar 30, 1994
However, she is incorrect when she characterizes her evidence as direct, for it is clearly circumstantial. … Jenkins’ and Clemens’ testimony clearly establishes that Clemens made the requisite comparison of Burns and Arnett. (Clemens Dep., p. 42-44; Jenkins Dep., pp. 44-48). He then made his recommendation to Jenkins.
Cited 3 timesPublishedYbarra v. Wexford of Indiana LLC Director
District Court, N.D. Indiana · Mar 21, 2025
Ybarra states that the x-ray images “clearly show” two foreign bodies, he has not provided any evidence to contradict the radiologists’ conclusions that both x-rays came back negative. … He cannot now qualify for equitable tolling to raise these claims late. Though the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, “a plaintiff can plead himself out of court.
Cited 0 timesUnknown254 Ind. 420 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jul 29, 1970
In most cases it is not possible to establish the identity of an exhibit in question by a single witness. … (I)t is necessary to establish a complete chain of evidence tracing the possession of the exact and original exhibit to the final custodian.
Cited 11 timesPublished179 Ind. App. 1 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Dec 29, 1978
Lovko as an expert witness, the trial court possesses wide discretion in determining if a witness is qualified to testify as an expert, Snow v. … This case is clearly distinguishable from Husband’s cited case of Indiana Union Traction Company v.
Cited 26 timesPublishedMedical Assurance of Indiana v. McCarty
808 N.E.2d 737 · Indiana Court of Appeals · May 20, 2004
Additionally, as established by our decision in Patel, Barker is entitled to recover $1.5 million for these injuries, or one $750,000 maximum statutory recovery for each injury. … The legislature could have chosen to require a health care provider to pay up to $100,000.00 for each "injury or death of a patient" resulting from an occurrence of malpractice, but it clearly did not do so.
Cited 14 timesPublished
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