Case law

Haraden

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 10, 2026

Plaintiff expressed interest in re- establishing rheumatology care, so Dr. … and for establishing a right to lump-sum death payment.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1(h).

Gaines v. Matesanz

272 F. Supp. 2d 121 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 22, 2003

A review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 first requires a federal court to determine whether there was “clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” at the time the state court conviction … Relief may be granted if the state court decision was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of’ such clearly established Federal law. Id. at 384 , 120 S.Ct. at 1508 .

Markell v. State Tax Commission

4 Mass. Supp. 215 · Massachusetts Appellate Tax Board · Jan 26, 1983

Thus, it is apparent that the legislature clearly contemplated that dividends whether arising out of the conduct of a trade or business or otherwise were to be taxed as Part A adjusted gross income and not under Part B adjusted … This principle was established in Higgins v. Commissioner, 312 U.S. 212 , (1941) and has been adhered to since. Whipple v. Commissioner, 373 U.S. 193, 200 (1963) ...

Rrk v. Sgp

400 Mass. 12 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · May 14, 1987

No threshold showing of a constitutionally based claim was established. … s position to seek to establish his paternity or visitation rights with regard to a child born while S.G.P. was married to another man. G.L.c. 209C, § 5( a ).

Trent Partners & Associates, Inc. v. Digital Equipment Corp.

120 F. Supp. 2d 84 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Dec 22, 1999

It would be hard to imagine a statement that more clearly shows that Keller’s oral representations would not be legally binding. … By their very terms both of these elements clearly fall into “established common law ... concepts] of unfairness.” VMark, 37 Mass. App. Ct. at 620, 642 N.E.2d 587 .

Realty Central, LLC v. Re/Max of New England, Inc.

16 Mass. L. Rptr. 709 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Aug 12, 2003

Here, there was clearly no acceptance by Re/Max in the manner called for by the Franchise Agreement. … The evidence clearly establishes that the plaintiffs were alerted to any possible discrepancy between the alleged oral misrepresentations and the Franchise Agreement prior to executing the Franchise Agreement, both by Hummer

Steinhilber v. McCarthy

26 F. Supp. 2d 265 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Nov 3, 1998

In other words, the jury’s verdict that Carol Steinhilber failed in her burden of establishing that Dr. … Ordinarily, what the average qualified specialist knew or reasonably should have known is established with expert testimony. Harnish v. Children’s Hospital Medical Center, 439 N.E.2d at 243 . The expert testimony of Dr.

Custody of a Minor (No. 3)

378 Mass. 732 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Aug 9, 1979

The result reached by the judge was clearly warranted, and probably required, on the evidence before him. … 301-392 (1976) — and thus eligible for marketing only after the filing and approval of a new drug application —because it falls within the statutory definition of a "drug [that] is not generally recognized, among experts qualified

Commerce Industry Insurance v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. (In Re Malden Mills Industries, Inc.)

277 B.R. 449 · United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Massachusetts · May 10, 2002

Fair, 902 F.2d 140, 142 (1st Cir.1990) (reviewing denial of summary judgment when coupled with denial of qualified immunity); Acevedo-Garcia v. Vera-Monroig, 204 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir.2000). … In the instant case the facts are not well-established; they are vigorously contested.

In Re Guild

269 B.R. 470 · United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Massachusetts · Nov 8, 2001

The bankruptcy code does not define “reasonably necessary” nor is the term clearly defined in case law. “Whether income is ‘reasonably necessary’ for the debtors’ maintenance and support is open to interpretation.” … The Taylor court held “[i]t is within the discretion of the bankruptcy court judge to make a decision, based on the facts of each individual case, whether or not the pension contributions qualify as a reasonably necessary

M.D. v. Department of Developmental Services

83 Mass. App. Ct. 463 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Apr 1, 2013

The answer, we hold, is a qualified yes.” Id. at 587 . See id. at 596-597 . The decision reflected the *467 modem trend favoring the mainstreaming of the disabled into society. … Regs. § 1.01(6)(c) (1998) (governing the form and content of claims; requiring the notice of claim to “state clearly and concisely the facts upon which the Party is relying as grounds . . .”).

Atlas Tack Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance

48 Mass. App. Ct. 378 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Dec 22, 1999

The consent judgment required in part that Atlas Tack submit and implement by certain deadlines “a comprehensive plan prepared by qualified professional engineers, knowledgeable in the field of water pollution, for the complete … Ct. 465, 479-481 (1997), the court in Augat required no further showing of prejudice where the record clearly established that the insured’s breach undermined the purpose of the voluntary payment clause — that of giving the

Martino v. American Airlines Federal Credit Union

121 F. Supp. 3d 277 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Aug 18, 2015

AAFCU filed an opposition ■ and cross-moved for summary judgment establishing that it has no liability. … For a security interest to qualify for the exception under section 226.12(d)(2) the following conditions must be met: i.

McNeely v. Board of Appeal of Boston

358 Mass. 94 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jul 3, 1970

A denial of a permit would work a substantial hardship on Suffolk by imposing a limitation on its corporate purpose to furnish educational facilities and instruction to qualified students and the general public.” … Financial hardship to the owner alone is not sufficient to establish “substantial hardship” and thereby justify a variance. Everpure Ice Mfg. Co. Inc. v. Board of Appeals of Lawrence, 324 Mass. 433, 438 .

Goldman v. Feinman (In Re Goldman)

192 B.R. 1 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jan 18, 1996

At the same time, the last sentence, qualifying the exemption of this third category, was added. 1992 Mass. Acts c. 153, § 30. Goldman’s argument as to the amendments’ significance is not completely clear. … Moreover, at the same time as the IRA language moved to a clearly distinct phrase, the Legislature added the income limitation sentence following that phrase.

Goldstein v. Brigham & Women's Faulkner Hospital, Inc.

80 F. Supp. 3d 317 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jan 23, 2015

Chapter 151B clearly requires that a lawsuit must be filed within three years of the alleged unlawful practice, even if the MCAD has not finished its review of the related complaint. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 9. … Goldstein separately contends that the denial of her requests to Mazaka for more hours to qualify for full employer contributions to her benefits was a discriminatory decision.

FRANCIS HENNESSEY & Another v. CAPE COD ORTHOPEDICS AND SPORTS MEDICINE, P.C. & Another.

Massachusetts Appeals Court · Apr 10, 2025

The materials in the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, establish the following facts. … "The information a physician reasonably should possess is that information possessed by the average qualified physician or, in the case of a specialty, by the average qualified physician practicing that specialty."

Rhone v. Energy North, Inc.

790 F. Supp. 353 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Dec 27, 1991

Rhone’s pleadings, however, clearly go beyond merely alleging that Black and Schroeder are officers of Energy. … It qualified this statement, however, by noting that not all corporate wrongdoing would be covered by section 1962(a): “[s]ubsection (a) requires a showing of the source of income and proof that funds were channeled into

Commonwealth v. Stewart

454 Mass. 527 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Aug 14, 2009

In addition, the statement must clearly be “that of the witness, rather than the interrogator,” i.e., the statement must not be coerced and must be more than a “mere confirmation or denial of an allegation by the interrogator … For that reason alone, his grand jury testimony did not qualify under the Daye limitation.

Goodhue v. State Street Trust Co.

267 Mass. 28 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Apr 1, 1929

The administrator was appointed and duly qualified on August 11, 1925. The estate is insolvent and has been so represented in the Probate Court. … Sumner, 17 Mass. 110 , 113, as follows: '' The general rule is perfectly well established, that the delivery of possession is necessary in a conveyance of personal chattels, as against every one but the vendor.