Case law

State v. Yarbrough

210 P.3d 1029 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Jun 30, 2009

Although Dudley could see that someone was holding a gun, he could not clearly see who that person was. … And Ringer's testimony was "otherwise admissible" because he was clearly qualified as a gang expert given his extensive training and years of experience and his testimony was helpful to the jury as it provided the context

Grey v. Leach

244 P.3d 970 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Dec 13, 2010

(3) "by any act or omission, caused or contributed to the release *974 or threatened release of a hazardous substance at the facility." [13] Only the third limitation is at issue here. ¶ 14 The Leaches contend that they qualify … on the unexpressed subjective intent of the parties." [25] Clear and unambiguous contracts are enforced as written. [26] Words used in a contract are given their ordinary, usual, and popular meaning unless the agreement clearly

In re the Disciplinary Proceeding Against Anschell

149 Wash. 2d 484 · Washington Supreme Court · May 29, 2003

Bolusan’s aunt] and him a grant of immunity.” Decision Papers at 11 (Finding of Fact 5). … However, the unchallenged findings establish that he failed to take action in Ms.

State v. Johnston

143 Wash. App. 1 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Oct 25, 2007

Johnston’s claims are correct, he still cannot establish that the trial court abused its discretion. There was clearly a serious potential for a conflict of interest. Ms. … He claims that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to seek dismissal due to a violation of the speedy trial rule. ¶67 While not clearly explained in Mr.

Miller v. Apfel-Wilson (In Re Apfel-Wilson)

165 B.R. 939 · United States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Washington · Mar 29, 1994

The second and third elements are clearly satisfied in this ease. More troublesome is the first element, which requires that the identical, determinative issues were in fact litigated in the prior proceeding. Beagles v. … Further, in In re Kirsh, 973 F.2d 1454 (9th Cir.1992), the Ninth Circuit established a requirement that the plaintiffs reliance on the debtor’s statements be justified.

State of Washington v. Francisco Gonzalez-Gonzalez

Court of Appeals of Washington · May 3, 2016

"The trial court's determination' s to the defendant's resources and ability to pay is essentially factual and should be revie ed under the clearly erroneous standard.'" State v. Bertrand, 165 Wn. … Gonzalez-Gonzalez was indigent and thu qualified for publicly funded counsel both for trial and on appeal, Mr. Gonzalez-Gonza ez testified that he was employed helping a mechanic at the time of his arrest.

Washington State Building & Construction Trades Council v. Spellman

518 F. Supp. 928 · District Court, W.D. Washington · Jun 26, 1981

First, it clearly excludes federal waste or facilities from any action taken under a regional compact. … Finally, the Initiative will clearly have more than an incidental effect on interstate commerce.

Rucker v. Healthpoint

District Court, W.D. Washington · May 11, 2022

To establish 25 diversity jurisdiction, no defendant must have the same citizenship as any plaintiff, and 26 the amount in controversy must exceed $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs. … This fails to establish federal question 7 jurisdiction under the well pleaded complaint rule.

Lummi Nation v. Golder Associates, Inc.

236 F. Supp. 2d 1183 · District Court, W.D. Washington · Dec 2, 2002

Withey’s attempt to testify to facts and matters that are clearly outside his personal knowledge and/or that constitute legal opinions. … Defendants’ privileges and immunities and equal protection challenges fail: *1196 2.

State v. Oyen

78 Wash. 2d 909 · Washington Supreme Court · Feb 11, 1971

We are satisfied that, in the full context of RCW 9.87 .010(13), the kind of loitering condemned as unlawful is fully qualified by ascertainable standards and is amply spelled out in terms readily understandable to the average … The place of the enjoined loitering is clearly confined to premises dedicated and devoted to educational purposes and the public premises immediately 'adjacent thereto. Loitering elsewhere is not barred by the statute.

Vonage America, Inc. v. City of Seattle

216 P.3d 1029 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Sep 3, 2009

City of Seattle, 164 Wash.2d 35 , 186 P.3d 1032 (2008), which held that Comcast's broadband cable modem business qualified as an Internet service, exempt from tax under the moratorium. … Because of the bundled nature of Vonage's records, it is clearly difficult for the company to provide this information after the service has occurred, but the Code places the burden on the taxpayer to establish the correct

In Re Washington Public Power Supply System Securities Litigation

673 F. Supp. 411 · District Court, W.D. Washington · Apr 30, 1987

School Bd. of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218, 231 , 84 S.Ct. 1226, 1233 , 12 L.Ed.2d 256 (1964) (Closing of public schools on the “grounds of race and opposition to desegregation do not qualify as constitutional.”); Gomillion … The legislative purpose here was not cloaked in deceit or hidden by subterfuge, but rather was proudly and clearly proclaimed.

City of Bellevue v. East Bellevue Community Council

138 Wash. 2d 937 · Washington Supreme Court · Sep 9, 1999

RCW 35.14 provides that a community council elected by qualified voters residing within the service area governs a *945 community municipal corporation. RCW 35.14.020. … This record plainly establishes that while the Community Council may have misconceived its role under RCW 35.14.040 to some extent, in that it sought to show the City’s actions were improper, its decision clearly was not

James C. Fuda, Doriane Beaupre & Chad Beaupre, Apps./cross-resps. v. King County, Resp./cross-app.

Court of Appeals of Washington · Oct 9, 2017

In order for a decision to qualify as discretionary, the State must show that the decision was the outcome of a conscious balancing of risks and advantages. Id. at 214-15. … Therefore, even if we held that discretionary immunity does not apply, reversal on the guardrail issue would not be warranted, because Fuda has not established cause in fact.

Adams v. State

71 Wash. 2d 414 · Washington Supreme Court · Jun 15, 1967

Clearly, it was the failure of the afternoon shift to follow the doctor’s orders in this latter respect, not in the former, that we are concerned with in this case. … It is well established that, on the question of foreseeability, the pertinent inquiry is not whether the actual harm sus *423 tained by Mrs.

State v. Morgan

99 P.3d 411 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Oct 25, 2004

The court clearly instructed the jury that a superseding, intervening cause relieves the defendant of liability because it breaks the causal chain. … But the fact that a jury instruction is modeled from a pattern instruction does not render it immune from judicial scrutiny.

United States v. Vallejo

660 F. Supp. 535 · District Court, W.D. Washington · Apr 3, 1987

Rather than establish a federal method for foreclosure on the property that was the subject of the loan, the VA regulations at issue here contemplate that foreclosure actions will be conducted under applicable state law. … Gish, 559 F.2d 572 (9th Cir.1977), may also be distinguished because the Small Business Administration regulations at issue there expressly precluded anti-deficiency laws that provide a total local immunity.

Griffin v. Eller

922 P.2d 788 · Washington Supreme Court · Sep 5, 1996

Clearly, these amendments were intended to broaden the forms of relief available to victims of discrimination. … of employed persons worked for such establishments.

In Re Washington State Apple Advertising Commission

257 F. Supp. 2d 1290 · District Court, E.D. Washington · Mar 31, 2003

Clearly, a local school board does not need to demonstrate a compelling state interest every time it spends a taxpayer’s money in ways the taxpayer finds abhorrent. … Glickman thus established that, at least in that factual setting, the assessments were not speech restrictions, but were, instead, economic regulations.

State v. Duncalf

177 Wash. 2d 289 · Washington Supreme Court · May 2, 2013

We reasoned, as to the degree of harm element, that in order to convict, the State had to prove the defendant inflicted great bodily harm and the statute did not establish a range of great bodily harm. … As to the harm element, the State advances the argument, similar to that advanced in Stubbs, that for second degree assault a range of potential injury that could qualify as substantial bodily harm exists.