Case law

State v. Robinson

74 N.J. Super. 305 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · May 10, 1962

Such possession conferred standing upon her, and as such her constitutional rights of privacy were clearly invaded. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 , 80 S.Ct. 725 , 4 L.Ed. 2 d 697 (1960). … In the instant case there is nothing to establish that the search was directed against this defendant.

Suesserman v. Newark Bd. of Adjustment

61 N.J. Super. 28 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Apr 12, 1960

None of the remaining findings of the board could in present circumstances qualify as such a special reason. The defendant Steiner relies on Mistretta v. City of Newark, 33 N.J. … similar to the present one, differs however in the material respect that in that case there was an extensive finding as to the benefit the proposed off-street parking facilities would confer upon the surrounding area which clearly

Sudersan v. Royal

386 N.J. Super. 246 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Dec 23, 2005

Here, defendant's income was low enough to qualify for a full rent subsidy of $818 per month. In other words, 100% of her rent was paid by the Section 8 subsidy program. … Clearly the trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant plaintiff the relief ordered. For that reason, we vacate the judgment of possession and dismiss plaintiff's summary dispossess action.

Fasolo v. Pensions Div. Trustees

181 N.J. Super. 434 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jul 2, 1981

Subsequently a series of ordinances were passed by the borough establishing the salary for the position. … Yet a municipal judge clearly is subject to little municipal control, though PERS agrees that for purposes of N.J.S.A. 43:15A-6 r his salary is compensation.

PRB Enterprises, Inc. v. South Brunswick Planning Board

205 N.J. Super. 225 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Nov 8, 1985

While proposed uses may be identified by qualifying labels, i.e., “neighborhood” retail sales of goods and services, “low traffic generating” is an elusive concept without standards to identify its meaning. … Even if it had, the Municipal Land Use Law requires that the ordinance provide that such conditional uses be granted by the Planning Board “... according to definite specifications and standards which shall be clearly set

Guild v. Mayor of Newark

87 N.J. Eq. 38 · New Jersey Court of Chancery · Nov 20, 1916

Pennington; (2) because the gift has been qualified in such a Avay that the city cannot lawfully accept it. The first objection is not supported by the authorities. … It sinrply takes the estate given to it—that is, a qualified fee— which will revert to the heirs of the donor when the particular use is discontinued.

Banks v. Fauver

801 F. Supp. 1422 · District Court, D. New Jersey · Sep 11, 1992

immunity doctrine. … immunity doctrine, and the Eleventh Amendment.

Mortimer v. Board of Review

99 N.J. 393 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jun 4, 1985

Section 19(u), however, did not accord the same *396 exclusivity to the monetary alternative test, since employees qualifying under that standard could not calculate the average weekly wage on the basis of the most recent … However, what the amendment clearly conveys is a disavowal by the Legislature of the method of calculation approved in Schatz with respect to claimants who worked more than 20 base weeks in the base year.

Leonardo Arias v. Elite Mortgage Group, Inc

New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jan 23, 2015

The judge reasoned that the bank was not required to provide plaintiffs with a loan modification, based on its determination that they did not qualify for one. … Id. at 557 n.2. 9 A-4599-12T1  The summary judgment record clearly establishes that plaintiffs failed

In Re Commitment of DS

359 N.J. Super. 28 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Dec 13, 2002

In re Commitment of W.K., 159 N.J. 1,2 , 731 A.2d 482 (1999); citing Krol, supra, as establishing the standard for such commitments. … [The factual findings are omitted from the published edition of the opinion as not qualifying for publication under R. 1:36-2(d)].

Luchejko v. City of Hoboken

207 N.J. 191 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jul 27, 2011

There is no call to upset the well-established and longstanding difference in the duties imposed on residential versus commercial property owners. … With those principles clearly understood, the panel properly concluded that because the property in issue was used solely for religious purposes it was not “commercial” under Stewart.

62-64 Main Street, L.L.C. v. Mayor of Hackensack

221 N.J. 129 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Mar 23, 2015

As a result, according to H2M, the Main Street property now qualified as an area in need of redevelopment under only three sections of the LRHL, N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-5(a), (b), and (d), and the Moore Street parking lot now qualified … It found that nine other properties did not qualify.

HINES v. VERIZON WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS

District Court, D. New Jersey · Jul 12, 2024

Such attachments clearly do not constitute a “short and plain statement” showing Plaintiff is entitled to relief and thus mandate dismissal in violation of Rule 8. See Roy v. … Plaintiff fails to allege a nexus between Defendant’s alleged conduct and the state to qualify Defendant as a state actor.”

Koseoglu v. Wry

431 N.J. Super. 140 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Apr 22, 2013

The charge explained the jury’s obligation to make credibility determinations for all witnesses, including those qualified as experts. … Generally, “[t]o establish a prima facie case of negligence in a medical-malpractice action, a plaintiff must present expert testimony establishing (1) the applicable standard of care; (2) a deviation from that standard of

Palatine I v. Planning Board of the Township of Montville

133 N.J. 546 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Aug 5, 1993

Likewise, the building permit clearly stated that it expired after six months' suspension or abandonment of construction. … In my view, neither Palatine's nor the Court's position is consistent with established principles of equitable estoppel.

Citro v. Reilly

99 N.J. Super. 215 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Feb 5, 1968

Defendants, in answer to the complaint, allege compliance with all applicable laws and further urge that their predecessors in office established a procedure which they followed as the established procedure. … They are clearly violative thereof and were unlawful. O’Donnell v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of the County of Morris, 31 N. J. 434 (1960), is factually directly on point with the instant case.

Kansel v. Unemployment Compensation Commission

135 N.J.L. 245 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Feb 25, 1947

Kansel lias been the owner and operator of a printing establishment at 249 West Kinney Street, "Newark, since January 1st, 1912. … S. 43:21-19 (g) is so clearly controlling on the facts developed and in the law as applied in the cases cited.

Kenney v. Scientific, Inc.

212 N.J. Super. 6 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jan 13, 1986

Although generators which are public entities are immune under N.J.S.A. 59:9-2c from the award of punitive damages, all other defendants enjoy no such immunity. Thus, if the trier of fact should determine under Berg v. … This court trusts that its discussion will clearly reveal that in granting the motion to strike the demands for trial by jury, it has no intention of flouting constitutional requirements, but believes that constitutional

Kane v. Hartz Mountain Industries

278 N.J. Super. 129 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Dec 13, 1994

He left what was clearly a judicial function to the unbridled discretion of the jury. … It is well established that an employee's contributory negligence is generally available as a defense when the employee sues a third person in an ordinary negligence action.

Township of Princeton v. Bleiman

142 N.J. Super. 217 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jun 8, 1976

Of course, it is not enough to show merely that legal votes were rejected; it must also be established that the number was “sufficient to change the result.” N. J. S. A. 19:29-1(e). … Section 3 of the statute clearly provides that Every person appointed by the governing body * * * to fill a vacancy, either for the unexpired term or temporarily, shall have the qualifications required by statute to permit