Case law

ADOPTION OF CORA (And Three Companion Cases).

Massachusetts Appeals Court · Jun 22, 2026

Ct. 620, 626 (1998) 15 was the father's lack of familiarity with and inability to provide for these needs, "clearly establish parental unfitness." … Ct. 120, 125 (1984) (specialized needs of particular child combined with parental deficiencies "may clearly establish unfitness"). 2. Best interests of the children.

Commonwealth v. Drumgold

423 Mass. 230 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jul 18, 1996

Such an examination clearly threatened to evoke incriminatory answers. … Also, Z’s remarks in reaction to being told that juror W was in favor of a mistrial do not qualify as an extraneous disturbing influence.

Securities Exchange Commission v. Durgarian

477 F. Supp. 2d 342 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 6, 2007

not fall within the category of manipulative devices envisioned by the Supreme Court: The defect in the SEC’s allegations is that market timing arrangements are not the kind of sham transactions which have been held to qualify … Therefore, if proven to be false, Durgari-an’s certifications are clearly material.

Vaiano v. Experian Information Solutions Inc.

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Aug 12, 2025

Section 1681g(a) obligates consumer reporting agencies to, upon request, “clearly and accurately disclose to the consumer . . . … Experian contends that these claims must be dismissed because they fall within the “qualified immunity” from certain state-law claims afforded by FCRA in 15 U.S.C. § 1681h(e). Thornton v.

Noonan v. Winston Co.

902 F. Supp. 298 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 25, 1995

These Boit methods clearly anticipate that some discovery will be conducted prior to the court’s determination of the jurisdictional question. … Where a plaintiff is clearly unable to establish jurisdiction as a matter of state law, it is the better practice to end the inquiry without addressing constitutional concerns. See Ticketmaster —New York, Inc. v.

Articulate Systems, Inc. v. Apple Computer, Inc.

66 F. Supp. 2d 105 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Aug 23, 1999

: “Well, the art is clearly software programming that uses operating systems to create application software. … Rudnicky’s Declaration does not clearly and convincingly establish a prima facie case for the invalidity, on grounds of indefiniteness, of the ’303 patent.

Ruiz v. Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp.

447 F. Supp. 2d 23 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 17, 2006

Defendants are not judicially estopped from arguing that the Contract as a whole has a three-year term with membership under that Contract renewable on a monthly basis because that position is not “clearly inconsistent” with … The burden of establishing liability under Chapter 93A is demanding, however.

REDER ENTERPRISES v. Loomis, Fargo & Co. Corp.

490 F. Supp. 2d 111 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jun 1, 2007

Put simply, this case, in the court’s opinion, is clearly a “dispute arising out of’ the MCA and, hence, covered by that contract’s broadly-worded forum-selection clause. … It is well-established that “[a] final judgment in one State, if rendered by a court with adjudicatory authority over the subject matter and persons governed by the judgment, qualifies for recognition throughout the land,

Wilson v. McClure

135 F. Supp. 2d 66 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jan 30, 2001

Indeed, other courts within this district have awarded lower fees to similarly qualified individuals. … The First Circuit has clearly indicated that “such enhancements will be rare.” Lipsett, 975 F.2d at 942 .

Correia v. Department of Public Welfare

414 Mass. 157 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jan 13, 1993

The regulations provide that to qualify for disability benefits, an applicant must show that he or she: (A) is under age sixty-five; (B) has a disability expected to last sixty days or more; (C) meets the department’s medical … At the same time, he must allow the agency to exercise its discretion within the legal requirements. 14 To this end, and with an eye to the difficulty of crafting an order which both clearly details the illegalities that

Costa v. Fall River Housing Authority

71 Mass. App. Ct. 269 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Feb 27, 2008

She participates in the Federal Housing Choice Voucher Program popularly known as “section 8” assistance. 4 Under its terms, Costa qualified as a low-income recipient of rental assistance from a local public housing authority … HUD requires PHAs to “adopt a written administrative plan that establishes local policies for administration of the program.” 24 C.F.R. § 982.54 (a) (2007).

Chomerics, Inc. v. Board of Assessors

6 Mass. App. Ct. 394 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · May 31, 1978

This rule rests on the principle, established by Sioux City Bridge Co. v. … We cannot say that the trial judge was clearly wrong in refusing to accept this testimony as determinative of the establishment of such a class.

Britton v. Maloney

981 F. Supp. 25 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 26, 1997

. § 1983 , a plaintiff must show that: (1) the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color or law; and, (2) the conduct deprived a person of clearly established rights, privileges or immunities secured … Here, the defendant-officers acted under color of law; the dispute centers around the second requirement — what clearly established federal rights were implicated. The plaintiff makes two Fourth Amendment claims.

Nationwide Mutual Insurance v. Bent

10 Mass. L. Rptr. 727 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Nov 9, 1999

(hereinafter “A&F”), and Custom Qualify Pools, Inc. (hereinafter “CQP”). A&F provides transportation on a contractual basis to school systems in the area and it parks its buses on the premises. … “Clearly, the manifest design of homeowners’ insurance is to protect homeowners from risks associated with the home and activities related to the home.” Worcester Mutual Ins. Co. v. Marnell, 398 Mass. 240, 245 (1986).

Isham v. Perini Corp.

665 F. Supp. 2d 28 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Oct 7, 2009

The Supreme Court has instructed that, to qualify as strong, “an inference of scienter must be more than merely plausible or reasonable — it must be cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing inference of nonfraudulent … The remaining “insider” sales of non-defendants are also unavailing because, again, insider sales cannot establish scienter on their own.

Szulik v. State Street Bank & Trust Co.

935 F. Supp. 2d 240 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 25, 2013

and would mislead the plaintiffs about the true value of assets contained in their portfolio. 7 Even if State Street had *265 no specific obligation to value the plaintiffs’ assets, the Joint Account Agreement “does not clearly … The' complaint establishes that the parties’ relationship was based on the Custody Account Agreements.

Idak Corp. v. Hiam (In Re Idak Corp.)

19 B.R. 765 · United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Massachusetts · Apr 6, 1982

Such a result would clearly be contrary to the policy of the Bankruptcy Act. … Furthermore, the statement by Debtors’ counsel did not clearly identify what rights the Debtors intended to waive.

Commonwealth v. Mitchell

Massachusetts Appeals Court · Jul 10, 2023

Clearly, the juror's assessment in this regard was incorrect. … This finding was clearly erroneous.

Fruzzetti v. Easton Police Officers

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Feb 28, 2024

Feeney, 495 U.S. 299, 304, (1990) (The Supreme Court “has drawn upon principles of sovereign immunity to construe the Amendment to ‘establish that an unconsenting State is immune from suits brought in federal courts … To establish a § 1983 claim based on a municipal custom, the custom “must be attributable to the municipality[,]” Whitfield v.

Fleet National Bank v. Federal Deposit Insurance

843 F. Supp. 787 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Feb 1, 1994

The Bank depended upon its occupancy of the headquarters building to establish a successful banking business, and was thus vitally interested in the continuation of the loan financing. … The terms of the Agreement clearly provide that the pledged collateral secured the pledgor’s (to wit, the Bank’s) obligations to Fleet. The Agreement defined those obligations as obligations pursuant to the subleases.