Case law

Commonwealth v. Ramos

406 Mass. 397 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jan 9, 1990

“In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a ‘distinctive’ group in the community; (2) that the representation … opined, were inconsistent with having been made by someone carrying a bleeding body. 8 General Laws c. 234A, § 3 (1988 ed.), provides: “Juror service in the participating counties shall be a duty which every person who qualifies

Forsyth School for Dental Hygienists v. Board of Registration in Dentistry

404 Mass. 211 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 2, 1989

According to Lobene’s affidavit, California now requires that all dental hygienists be trained in the administration of local anesthesia and of nitrous oxide analgesia before they can qualify to sit for the registration examination … The regulations clearly have a rational relation to the promotion of safety and health, and the school does not challenge their general validity.

United States v. 434 Main Street, Tewksbury, Massachusetts

961 F. Supp. 2d 298 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jan 24, 2013

To establish Mr. … If that testimony is credible, the property should clearly be forfeited.

In re Wilcox

94 F. 84 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Apr 29, 1899

This statute, while re-establishing the right of the petitioning joint creditor to receive a dividend out of the separate estate equally with the separate creditors, would seem clearly to abolish the other exception to the … to general equity, and then to limit and qualify it by a number of arbitrary exceptions, in order to meet the particular equities of particular cases.

Levy v. Acting Governor

436 Mass. 736 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · May 7, 2002

Mihos and Levy point out that the annual report qualified the statements it contained. … That qualifying language, however, does not support their position that reliance should not have been placed on the Authority’s increasing tolls in January, 2002.

Hudson v. Dennehy

538 F. Supp. 2d 400 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 5, 2008

On May 12, 2004, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. 7 On July 23, 2004, the court issued a Memorandum and Order finding defendants exempted by qualified and official immunity from any claims for monetary damages … A plaintiff, however, must establish that the exercise forms a legitimate part of his or her profession of faith. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(a).

Crease v. Babcock

40 Mass. 334 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Nov 15, 1839

but which were inconsistent with, if not subversive of the ends for which the corporation was established. … This qualified prolongation of the existence of the corporate body, is in the nature of an administration of its estate. All rights under the defunct corporation were fixed at its dissolution.

Custody of a Minor

13 Mass. App. Ct. 290 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Mar 12, 1982

They were unable to establish a stable home, 3 perhaps because of disapproval of the mother’s family. … Grey works there two and a half days a week. *302 All three have strong academic and professional credentials and are obviously well qualified as experts.

Doe, SORB No. 496501 v. Sex Offender Registry Board

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jul 17, 2019

In a criminal case, where guilt must be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, we require that each element of the offense be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See Commonwealth v. … Second, even where the findings are not explicit, the underlying facts of the case may so clearly dictate the appropriate classification level that a reviewing court may determine that a remand for explicit findings is not

Stornanti v. Commonwealth

389 Mass. 518 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jun 20, 1983

Finally, he argued that, in the absence of a grant of immunity, compliance with the subpoena would violate his rights under both Federal and State Constitutions. 4 On appeal, Stornanti claims that he could not have been required … Our ruling in Hughes is clearly inapplicable to this case. Unlike the defendant in Hughes , Stornanti has voluntarily agreed to enter the Medicaid program.

Head v. Porter

48 F. 481 · U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Massachusetts · Dec 3, 1891

He is bound to establish it. The state is a political corporate body, can act only through agents, and can command only bylaws. … Railroad Co., has become the established law of the supreme court, and it is under this head the present case falls.

Hunneman Real Estate Corp. v. Norwood Realty, Inc.

54 Mass. App. Ct. 416 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Apr 9, 2002

Where intention is clearly stated or evident, the analytical focus generally turns to whether the inchoate or unresolved aspects of the parties’ agreement are “essential” or “material.” … The express covenant to “negotiate the full purchase and sale agreement and consummate the agreements contemplated” in the letter of intent is not qualified by a disclaimer as was that in Schwanbeck v.

Rauseo v. Army Corps of Engineers

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 26, 2019

A waiver of sovereign immunity must be unequivocal and Sections 505(a)(2) and 1449(a) of the CWA and the SDWA explicitly waive sovereign immunity with respect to nondiscretionary … It is clearly established, however, that an agency’s decision not to prosecute or take enforcement action is “generally committed to an agency’s absolute discretion”. Heckler v.

LAUREN WOODWARD v. BOARD OF REGISTRATION IN NURSING & Another.

Massachusetts Appeals Court · Dec 31, 2025

statutorily immunized from the plaintiff's claims under the defense set forth in G. L. c. 149, § 105A (d). … A self-evaluation that is conducted so as to achieve certain pre-determined results [i.e., to find no disparities] or to justify known disparities likely will not qualify as good faith"). See also Garcia v.

One to One Interactive, LLC v. Landrith

18 Mass. L. Rptr. 85 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Jul 8, 2004

In the term sheet, the parties clearly stated all the material contractual commitments to which they were binding themselves and, just as clearly, they eachfor a time at least followed those commitments. … The parties mutually acknowledge that their agreement is qualified and that they, therefore, contemplate the drafting and execution of a more detailed agreement.

Reliance Insurance v. Commissioner of Insurance

31 Mass. App. Ct. 581 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Nov 22, 1991

L. c. 175, § 113H (1988 ed.), as a residual market mechanism to provide motor vehicle liability insurance to qualified drivers who would otherwise be unable to obtain motor vehicle insurance in the voluntary market. … The official summary of the regulations provides: “211 CMR 54.00 establishes procedures which shall constitute the administrative process by which insurers authorized to write motor vehicle insurance may initiate the process

Gregory Hayward v. Bernadette McCaffrey.

Massachusetts Appeals Court · May 7, 2025

But there is no such asymmetry; the language of the addendum clearly states that neither party intends to be bound. … The limited 4 record before us does not clearly establish the absence of a dispute of material fact on that point.

King v. LONG BEACH MORTGAGE COMPANY

672 F. Supp. 2d 238 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Dec 9, 2009

Further, being an assignee of the FDIC does not give Chase any special immunity from section 1641(c). … TILA requires that creditors “clearly and conspicuously” disclose the consumer’s right to rescind. 15 U.S.C. § 1635 (a).

Niarchos v. City of Beverly

831 F. Supp. 2d 423 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 26, 2011

When the Shorewood police temporarily took Jonathan into custody, he was clearly not a pre-trial detainee. Id. Similarly, in Schoenfield v. … Laws ch. 258, § 10 (j), which seems to immunize the municipality from liability.

WINDROCK TRUST COMPANY, LLC, Trustee v. PLANNING BOARD OF LINCOLN.

Massachusetts Appeals Court · Nov 20, 2024

That decision was not immune from review (and may have even failed on review), but the time for seeking that review expired approximately forty years before the trust filed suit in this case.4 See G. … Futility of the amendment, however, qualifies as a "good reason." See Doherty, supra (futility "good reason" for denying motion to amend [citation omitted]).