Case law

Durling v. Chairman, Massachusetts Parole Board

789 F. Supp. 457 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Apr 1, 1992

Those claims have clearly been exhausted. In short, I rule that the instant petition is not a “mixed” one subject to dismissal under the rationale of Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 , 102 S.Ct. 1198 , 71 L.Ed.2d 379 (1982). … under any of the firmly established exceptions to the hearsay rule.

United States v. Worcester

190 F. Supp. 548 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 25, 1961

Yet this secret aspect of the grand jury was not fully established until after the reign of Charles II. … See The Immunity Act of 1954, 18 U.S.C. § 3486 (c), upheld in Ullmann v.

Commonwealth v. Patterson

445 Mass. 626 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Dec 27, 2005

Where general acceptance is not established by the party offering the expert testimony, a full Daubert analysis provides an alternate method of establishing reliability. … Ct. 932 (1990), accepted evidence of simultaneous impressions, that case is clearly distinguishable.

Connor v. Marriott International, Inc.

Massachusetts Appeals Court · Mar 18, 2024

The plaintiffs argue that because the hotel's supposed no solicitation policy was not "clearly and conspicuously posted," they were removed in violation of § 12B. … Tellingly, the bill in which these provisions were included was titled, "An act further establishing the rights of innkeepers." St. 2000, c. 167.

Commonwealth v. Clemmey

447 Mass. 121 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jun 30, 2006

failed to inform the jurors that (1) the Act contained an exemption from its provisions for the “normal maintenance or improvement of land in agricultural use”; (2) Clemmey had expressed his belief that the trust property qualified … They also argued that the Commonwealth had exacerbated its failure by (1) introducing evidence that Clemmey was well versed in the governing statutes and regulations, leaving the impression that the land clearly fell within

North Adams National Bank v. Curtiss

278 Mass. 471 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 15, 1932

The finding that the trustee did not act imprudently or negligently in delaying the transfer of the trust estate to the trustees under the will of Sophia Curtiss cannot be said to be clearly wrong. … In that case the trustee was not acting within the scope of his powers, and the immunity clause was held to be no protection. The case of Knox v. Mackinnon, 13 App.

Cabi v. Boston Children's Hospital

161 F. Supp. 3d 136 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Feb 12, 2016

L. c. 149 § 185 because Defendants do not qualify as employers under the statute. Mass. Gen. … Based on the plain language of the statute, none of the Defendants qualify as an “employer” under the controlling definition.

Commonwealth v. Powell

33 Mass. L. Rptr. 658 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Nov 10, 2016

Under Section 3, the moving party is required to point to specific information demonstrating that he meets the qualifying criteria of Section 3(b), and submit an affidavit of factual innocence as required by Section 3(d). … The paradigmatic case, and the one that Chapter 278A was clearly designed to address, arises where the articles sought to be tested (e.g., a rape kit, murder weapon, etc.) could directly call into question the actual identity

City of Boston v. Roxbury Action Program, Inc.

68 Mass. App. Ct. 468 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Mar 16, 2007

Rather, the instrument establishes a date for performance, no later than July 31, 1974. The city’s cause of action accrued on that date when RAP failed to perform. … The city’s reliance on a single communication regarding a tax issue in 2002, many years after the limitation period had passed, hardly raises a question of fact as to whether RAP had clearly repudiated the trust.

Granada House, Inc. v. City of Boston

6 Mass. L. Rptr. 466 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Feb 15, 1997

“If the moving party establishes the absence of a triable issue, the party opposing the motion must respond and allege specific facts which would establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact in order to defeat … Article 2A, Section 2A-1. *468 Article 2A of the Code further establishes two use classifications for group homes.

Roman Catholic Bishop v. City of Springfield

760 F. Supp. 2d 172 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jan 4, 2011

The map clearly delineates the boundaries of the district, which, indeed, encompasses only the Our Lady of Hope Church. … The First Amendment clearly prohibits government from engaging in the “establishment of religion.” U.S. Const. Amend. I. What constitutes an establishment of religion is less clear.

Campbell v. Boston Housing Authority

443 Mass. 574 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 4, 2005

L. c. 258, which were enacted in 1994 (the 1994 amendments), rendered it immune *580 from suit on the plaintiff’s claims. … The plaintiff also established that she was a third-party beneficiary with respect to the Section 23 program AC contract. See Ayala v. Boston Hous. Auth., supra at 700-701.

Dean v. McKie Co.

771 F. Supp. 466 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Aug 30, 1991

In the present case, Dean has the burden to establish seaman status. Bach v. … However, as the foregoing discussions have demonstrated, this is clearly not the standard to be applied.

United States v. Heisson

217 B.R. 1 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Dec 11, 1997

Standard of Review A District Court reviewing the decision of a Bankruptcy Court applies a clearly erroneous standard to findings of fact and de novo review to questions of law. … The definition of the term “claim” does not, however, require allowance of a proof of claim to establish a claim’s existence.

Executive Risk Indemnity, Inc. v. Boston Regional Medical Center, Inc. (In Re Boston Regional Medical Center, Inc.)

285 B.R. 87 · United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Massachusetts · Apr 2, 2002

These demands — for a determination that the stay and injunctions do not enjoin payment of defense costs, and, in the alternative, for relief from the stay and injunctions to permit payment of such costs — clearly arise under … If the remaining pool were, in the end, insufficient to pay all qualified claims of insureds to coverage — a result that is entirely possible here — then the initial payments would impair the rights of the remaining insured

Neighborhood Ass'n of the Back Bay v. Federal Transit Administration

393 F. Supp. 2d 66 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 14, 2005

In short, the record establishes that the FTA complied with “both [its] substantive obligation to weigh effects in deciding whether to authorize the federal action and [its] procedural obligation to consult.” … Clearly, they understand that their proposed statutory construction would be unworkable.

McGrath v. City of Somerville

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 30, 2019

That is, the only overtime pay the plaintiffs would have received would qualify as overtime under the FLSA and thus be excluded from regular wage calculations. … Immunity from Prejudgment Interest The City further contends that it is immune from prejudgment interest on plaintiffs’ state- law claims under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231.

Calvanese v. WW Babcock Co., Inc.

10 Mass. App. Ct. 726 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Nov 21, 1980

The final determination “must be largely left to the discretion of the trial judge, and that discretion will not be interfered with unless in its exercise he clearly appears to be wrong.” Griffin v. … The reports did not qualify as hospital records under G. L. c. 233, § 79. Nor were they business records under G. L. c. 233, § 78. Contrast Poirier v. Plymouth, 374 Mass. at 210-211 .

Associated Industries of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue

378 Mass. 657 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Aug 3, 1979

But the record does not clearly show whether implementation of the Classification Act would increase or decrease either Blauvelt’s share or his tax burden in absolute terms. 8 Section 40 reads: "This act shall take effect … As so interpreted, art. 10, like art. 4, must be regarded as qualified by art. 112, as amended. 24 See Weinstock v.

Discenza v. MacDonald (In Re MacDonald)

50 B.R. 255 · United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Massachusetts · Jun 20, 1985

Since the judgment did not qualify under the terms of question 10 on the debtor’s statement of financial affairs it was not listed there. … The debtor’s failure to list a 1978 Lincoln Mark V as an asset is clearly due to the fact that the debtor does not own the vehicle. It is owned, rather, by Gordon MacDonald Associates, Inc.