Case law

Adoption of Cadence

81 Mass. App. Ct. 162 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Jan 24, 2012

In making such an order, the judge may, among other options, “transfer temporary or permanent legal custody” to “any person . . . qualified to give care to the child.” Ibid. … The purpose of the home study is to guide the judge’s decision regarding whether the placement candidate is “qualified to give care to the child.” G. L. c. 119, § 26(h)(2)(i).

Innis v. Robertson

67 Mass. App. Ct. 388 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Sep 15, 2006

One need not have obtained a judgment in order to qualify as a creditor for fraudulent conveyance purposes. See Shapiro, Perlin & Connors, Collection Law § 14:6 (3d ed. 2000). In Re Tracey, 88 B.R. 512, 517 (Bankr. D. … Nor are we persuaded by the defendants’ contention that the judge’s findings that George was insolvent at the time of the challenged conveyances, or that he would thereby be rendered insolvent, were clearly erroneous.

Lexington Insurance v. CareCore National, LLC

32 Mass. L. Rptr. 445 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Jul 18, 2014

Moreover, Lexington was clearly aware of the issues of “relatedness” at the time since that issue was specifically flagged in its the reservation of rights letter it issued back in 2006 following CareCore’s notice to Lexington … Indeed, much of what Count v. seeks to recover is not for indemnity against liability but for defense costs, and it is well established that the duty to defend is much broader than the duty to indemnify.

Robinson v. Ensign

72 Mass. 300 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Sep 15, 1856

He clearly had a special property in the same, under the finding of the jury, which would authorize the maintaining of an action against the proper party. … With us, deputy sheriffs are officers of the government; known and recognized as such by our statutes; treated as civil officers; holding appointments as such ; and *305 required to qualify for the discharge of their duties

In re Charles Street African Methodist Episcopal Church

480 B.R. 66 · United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 11, 2012

CSAME alleges that OneUnited solicited other parties’ votes in *69 bad faith and in violation of the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code; CSAME does not contend — and clearly it is not the case — that OneUnited, by its premature … Even if CSAME were to prove its allegations in that regard, it would not establish bad faith.

Selewich v. Finch

312 F. Supp. 191 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Dec 31, 1969

On September 7, 1966, plaintiff filed an application for establishment of a period of disability under § 216(i) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 416 (i) (Supp. … Sloane, M.D., a qualified ophthalmologist, who described her vision as 20/50 in the better eye.

Blackstone v. Cashman

448 Mass. 255 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jan 18, 2007

The plaintiffs in these cases did not establish anything amounting to improper motive or means under Geltman . See Weber v. … Community Teamwork, Inc., supra at 782 (only evidence considered was that defendant fired plaintiff in rude manner and replaced her with someone arguably less qualified); Shea v.

Howland v. Harris

12 F. Cas. 734 · U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Massachusetts · Oct 15, 1827

But upon such payment of duties in cash, he is clearly entitled to a delivery of such newly imported goods, for the act authorizes and countenances no detention of goods except for the duties payable on the same. … In my judgment it would be a most dangerous precedent, to give to the general words of a proviso, which, in ordinary acceptation, only qualifies the enacting clause, so broad and sweeping a construction as that contended

Godette v. Stanley

490 F. Supp. 2d 72 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · May 16, 2007

The court also notes in the alternative that the officers would receive qualified immunity for conducting the search as Plaintiff does not allege facts from which the court can reasonably infer that the arresting officers … The court also noted that although a medical expert’s testimony is not necessary to establish claims for emotional distress, Plaintiff must still provide sufficient evidence to support his claim of harm. But cf.

Manisy v. Maloney

283 F. Supp. 2d 307 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 4, 2003

In the alternative, Respondent argues that the ineffective assistance of counsel count fails to state a claim since the state court adjudication was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme … Thus, “a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly

Erickson v. Thomas

23 Mass. L. Rptr. 295 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Oct 26, 2007

At the time, Erickson was qualified under HUD, Section 8 housing and was re-approved for an amount to cover her rent on the New Braintree cottage. … Clearly, the parties in the instant action are identical to those in the prior cases. The second question then is whether the claims in the two actions are the same. I conclude that they are.

Chiaraluce v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Wareham

89 Mass. App. Ct. 290 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Apr 8, 2016

We accept the facts as found by the trial judge, unless they are clearly erroneous, Colony of Wellfleet, Inc. v. Harris, 71 Mass. App. … On appeal to this court, we reversed, concluding that the locus did not qualify for grandfathering under § 6 because it lacked the requisite fifty feet of frontage. Nielsen v. Board of Appeals of Wareham, 69 Mass.

Matulewicz v. Planning Board

438 Mass. 37 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Oct 25, 2002

The clause provides three alternatives for qualifying. See note 4, supra. Only clause (a) (lots with frontage on public way or way maintained and used as such) is relevant to this appeal. … The portion of Fredrickson Road at issue here clearly was not proved to be a public way.

Chambers v. Gold Medal Bakery, Inc.

464 Mass. 383 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Feb 8, 2013

We do not purport to be fact-finders on the initial issue whether specific documents qualify as attorney-client privileged or work product protected. … It does not immunize underlying facts available from another source from discovery just because a client disclosed the facts to an attorney. See M.S. Brodin & M.

Justice-Hughes v. Quaside, Inc.

29 Mass. L. Rptr. 112 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Sep 27, 2011

Justice-Hughes a duty to warn against dangerous conditions, and that GF/Health Systems qualifies, under M.G.L.c. 231, §85K, for limitation of tort liability afforded to certain charitable organizations. … Systems is a Georgia corporation conducting business in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts under a Foreign Corporation Certificate. 9 While the articles of incorporation under which GF/Health Systems operates in Georgia clearly

Commonwealth v. Sylvain

466 Mass. 422 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Sep 13, 2013

McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 415 (1990) (constitutional rule that is “susceptible to debate among reasonable minds” qualifies as new rale). … Although we consider the retroactivity framework established in Teague to be sound in principle, the Supreme Court’s post Teague expansion of what qualifies as a “new” rule has become so broad that “decisions defining a constitutional

Rass Corporation v. The Travelers Companies, Inc.

90 Mass. App. Ct. 643 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Nov 10, 2016

To establish waiver, Rass must to demonstrate that the payment amounted to the intentional relinquishment of a known right. See Rotundi v. … Butler, 424 Mass. 413, 420 (1997) (judge's c. 93A findings will not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous). c.

Commonwealth v. Snow

363 Mass. 778 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jun 27, 1973

But then, I submit, the same immunity should extend to that customer's briefcase within his arm's reach, and by reasonable analogy, his overcoat on a hook on the wall. … United States, 331 U.S. 145 , which was later qualified in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 .

Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. A.L.J.A., Inc.

905 F. Supp. 36 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Nov 3, 1995

Section 2-401(3)(a) clearly applies. Caffrey Ford and A.L.J.A. did not exchange the certificate of title at the time of sale. … Any other interpretation would defeat the purposes of establishing a comprehensive certificate of title registry.

City of Lynn v. Thompson

50 Mass. App. Ct. 280 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Oct 23, 2000

. § 1983 (1994) establishes a remedy against anyone acting “under color of any statute, *287 ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State” who violates the civil rights of any citizen or other person. … With regard to the taxpayer’s interest, there is no clearly defined, by statute or otherwise, strong public policy of not subjecting a municipality and its citizens to financial risk in circumstances such as these.