Case law

Massachusetts General Hospital v. Inhabitants of Belmont

233 Mass. 190 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jun 19, 1919

This statute does not establish a clearly hostile discrimination against a particular corporation or person or class outside the limits of general usage, but on the contrary is within a custom respecting classification touching … The standard established by the law is fair cash value, having reference to any and all uses to which the property is reasonably adapted.” In Lodge v.

PDC-El Paso Meriden, LLC v. Alstom Power, Inc.

14 Mass. L. Rptr. 643 · Massachusetts Superior Court · May 31, 2002

Contentions of the Movants Both ABB Ltd. and Alstom Power N.V. contend that they are not qualified to do business in Massachusetts, do not regularly do business in Massachusetts, do not solicit business in Massachusetts and … Alstom Power N.V. purposefully established minimum contacts in the Commonwealth. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474-75 (1985).

Bates v. Commander, First Coast Guard District

297 F. Supp. 193 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 7, 1969

Petitioner had the burden of establishing that he was conscientiously opposed as a matter of religious training and belief to participation in war of any kind. … It does include a belief which occupies in the life of the objector the same place as an orthodox belief in God holds in the life of an objector clearly qualified for exemption on the ground of conventional religious beliefs

Carabetta v. Board of Appeals

73 Mass. App. Ct. 266 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Dec 4, 2008

Ct. at 903 (if municipal zoning code purports to establish more generous zoning provisions than those contained in G. L. c. 40A, § 6, it must do so expressly). … There is no argument that lot 3 qualifies for relief under § 6. Neither the parties nor the judge directly address whether the lots maintained separate identities.

Caperci v. Rite Aid Corp.

43 F. Supp. 2d 83 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 4, 1999

I will discuss each argument in turn, recognizing that, in each instance, the burden is on Rite Aid to establish its entitlement to the exemption. 1. … This premise is clearly false, however, at least, as here, where no claim is made that the employer is utilizing sham employment practices for the sole purpose of evading the regulations.

Sivieri v. Commonwealth, Department of Transitional Assistance

16 Mass. L. Rptr. 531 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Jun 26, 2003

an acceptable level, and was terminated by the employer in favor of a similarly qualified individual). … Therefore, Sivieri’s claim of hostile work environment sexual harassment is not time-barred. 1 Sivieri’s allegation of retaliation against DTA is not as clearly related to her MCAD complaint of sex discrimination as is her

Commonwealth v. Feliz

481 Mass. 689 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 26, 2019

We "accept subsidiary findings based partly or wholly on oral testimony, unless clearly erroneous." Commonwealth v. Tremblay, 480 Mass. 645, 646 (2018). … See Cory, 454 Mass. at 560 (retroactive application of GPS monitoring to individuals placed on probation for qualifying sex offenses before G.

Adoption of Varnell

Massachusetts Appeals Court · May 6, 2026

The MPA replaces gendered and outdated language, simplifies establishing legal parentage, and recognizes de facto and intended parents. See G. … She ruled that the child retained the right to inherit, obtain social security benefits (assuming he otherwise qualifies), have his father on his birth certificate, and pursue visitation with

Kozdras v. Land/Vest Properties, Inc.

382 Mass. 34 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Dec 3, 1980

In the absence of proof of intentional wrongdoing, however, I believe that the Legislature intended that a decree of registra *56 tion, once final, be immune to collateral attack. 2 I am not unsympathetic to the Kozdrases … L. c. 185, § 101, did not escape the Legislature’s attention; the Assurance Fund established by G.

Legalbriefs, Inc. v. Foley & Lardner LLP

Massachusetts Superior Court · Feb 28, 2025

In November, 2023, LegalBriefs established a "relationship representing" Doe, a partner at another large law firm who had expressed an openness to leaving that firm if the right opportunity presented itself. … Thus, LegalBriefs was demanding a material change to the contract, something it clearly reorganized Foley enjoyed the prerogative to accept or reject in its discretion.

Watros v. GREATER LYNN MENTAL HEALTH & RETARD.

37 Mass. App. Ct. 657 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Nov 22, 1994

GLMHRA's motion clearly stated its reliance on the entire record, as well as the pleadings, as the basis for its arguments against the Watroses' standing. … To qualify for that limited class, a plaintiff must establish — by direct facts and not by speculative personal opinion — that his injury is special and different from the concerns of the rest of the community.

Filippone v. Mayor of Newton

16 Mass. App. Ct. 417 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Jul 28, 1983

There is, in the law of other jurisdictions, a clear, pervasive and well-established distinction between obligations of indemnity “from loss” and “from liability.” … Clearly then, this termination was an action within the ‘scope of his employment’ as a city official.” The plaintiffs admit that this statement is “basically true.”

South Street Nominee Trust v. Board of Assessors of Carlisle

70 Mass. App. Ct. 853 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Dec 19, 2007

However, where, as here, the statutory language is not free of ambiguity, courts are bound to apply the “well-established principle that tax laws are to be strictly construed, and ambiguities in tax statutes are to be resolved … Although not expressly defined by the statute, “classification” is defined by a regulation to mean “the tax status attaching by operation of law to all land qualifying under [chapter 61,] which qualification is duly certified

Howard M. Kahalas, PC v. Schiller

164 F. Supp. 3d 241 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Feb 18, 2016

Plaintiff concludes that Defendant clearly made disparaging comments such that John Tuscano would tell Plaintiff that Defendant was not impressed. (internal quotation marks omitted). … Whether a particular set of acts is unfair or deceptive is a question of fact but “the boundaries of what may qualify for consideration as a [Chapter] 93A violation is a question of law.” Arthur D. Little, Inc. v.

Patterson v. Liberty Mutual Insurance

48 Mass. App. Ct. 586 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Feb 18, 2000

That ruling was clearly erroneous and arbitrary. Only “documents included in the medical records” require objections at the conference level, 452 Code Mass. … Patterson makes no effort to demonstrate that the unintroduced reports would have qualified under the business records exception to the hearsay rule, see G.

United States v. Zolot

968 F. Supp. 2d 411 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 11, 2013

Caplan is not qualified to determine the cause of death. The contention that only a forensic pathologist or medical examiner is qualified to determine the ultimate cause of death is unpersuasive. … Articles on the subject of pain management note that the “norms of drug taking and the epidemiology of aberrant drug-taking behavior have not been clearly established.

Ross v. Ross

129 Mass. 243 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Sep 28, 1880

It is a general principle, that the status or condition of a person, the relation in which he stands to another person, and by which he is qualified or made capable to take certain rights in that other’s property, is fixed … The ratio decidendi is most clearly brought out by Mr. Justice Littledale and by Chief Justice Tindal. Mr.

Rauseo ex rel. Suffolk/Medford Realty Trust v. Massachusetts Port Authority

16 Mass. L. Rptr. 770 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Aug 7, 2003

In response to this suggestion, I want to affirm Massport’s position, which was clearly stated in the June 20 letter. … There is nothing in the summary judgment record establishing that Massport, in any way, conveyed to CZM a position on the Trust’s petition other than as described in the June 20, 2001, letter.

Abel v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board

17 Mass. L. Rptr. 215 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Dec 17, 2003

Abel for her work as the Director of the Inter-generational Music Program qualifies as “regular compensation” as defined by ch. 32, §1. There is no question that Ms. … TRB emphatically states and quotes in its memorandum that “the statutory intent is clearly to exempt irregular payments of compensation from the retirement base.” Hallett v. CRAB, 431 Mass, 66, 70 (2000).

Berry v. Commonwealth

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 12, 2026

Ostrander, 441 Mass. 344, 354, cert. denied, 543 U.S. 867 (2004) (cross-examination of defendant's expert on voluntariness of confession "is an inadequate substitute for actual testimony from another qualified expert who … Nor has he included the record materials necessary to assess whether the motion judge's implicit finding on that point was clearly erroneous. See Sabree v.