Case law

Boston Waterfront Development Corp. v. Commonwealth

378 Mass. 629 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Aug 3, 1979

Roxbury, supra, note at 503, 515. 3 Nineteenth Century opinions of the Supreme Judicial Court construed this colonial ordinance as granting “only a qualified property” in the flats to the upland owner, qualified by the public … In the present state of this case we do not reach BWDC’s contention that § 31A so clearly forecloses the Commonwealth from pursuing a right of action against it for an alleged breach of the condition that the issue is moot

Walker v. President & Fellows of Harvard College

82 F. Supp. 3d 524 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Dec 30, 2014

In the phrase “all work submitted” from the Handbook, “submit” takes the object “work,” clearly in its transitive form and matching the “to give to someone for consideration or approval” definition. … Under the proper meaning of the term “submit,” there is no question that turning in a draft of an article for editing by JOLT would qualify as a “submission,” whether or not the draft was the author’s “final” draft.

Cape Ann Investors LLC v. Lepone

296 F. Supp. 2d 4 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Dec 15, 2003

The Act defines a unitary entity as one “not established for the purpose of participating in the action.” 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(5)(D). … This language clearly alleges that Merrill Lynch’s conduct caused Performance Plan to purchase covered securities and [] retain them.

Taylor v. Janigan

212 F. Supp. 794 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Dec 31, 1962

. *796 Janigan was well-qualified by reason of his background and experience to assume the duties of manager of Besco. … Defendant also says that as a question of fact plaintiffs have failed to sustain their burden of proof in this regard and have not established either that there was a material change in the business of Besco on or shortly

Beyene v. Astrue

739 F. Supp. 2d 77 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 24, 2010

A hearing officer, as a lay person, generally is not qualified to interpret raw medical data to determine a claimant’s RFC. Manso-Pizarro, 76 F.3d at 17 . … The hearing officer was not properly qualified to make this determination about Beyene’s RFC without the aid of an expert. See Roberts v.

Commonwealth v. Comtois

399 Mass. 668 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Apr 21, 1987

“There is no absolute rule of law as to the time within which the victim of a sexual assault must make her first complaint of the assault in order to qualify that complaint for admission in evidence as a fresh complaint.” … The evidence at trial established that criminal episodes occurred on three separate dates. As to each, there was proof “sufficient to go to the jury.” Id. at 171 .

Commissioners of the Bristol County Mosquito Control District v. State Reclamation & Mosquito Control Board

466 Mass. 523 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Oct 30, 2013

The board is established by G. … The 2013 amendment came after all the events at issue in this case had occurred, and clearly was not before the Superior Court judge who decided the cross-motions for summary judgment.

Jones v. Robbins

74 Mass. 329 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 15, 1857

It is there declared that “ no subject shall be arrested, imprisoned, despoiled or deprived of his property, immunities or privileges, put out of the protection of the law, exiled, or deprived of his life, liberty or estate … This most material provision is attached to and follows immediately after the declaration of the liberties and immunities of the citizen, as they are set, forth in the twelfth article of the Bill of Eights, and constitutes

Rafuse v. Stryker

61 Mass. App. Ct. 595 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Aug 13, 2004

It is well established that whether the information requested is entitled to the exemption provided by G. … The judge’s determination can only be set aside if his findings are clearly erroneous or his ruling is tainted with an error of law. See Bougas v. Chief of Police of Lexington , 371 Mass, at 61.

Boston Regional Medical Center, Inc. v. Reynolds (In Re Boston Regional Medical Center, Inc.)

298 B.R. 1 · United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Massachusetts · Aug 14, 2003

As a condition of granting such authority, the Co-Guardians were obligated to establish that the proposed transfers were “in keeping with the ward’s wishes so far as they can be ascertained.” 19 The basis of the present counterclaim … She clearly intended a gift to BRMC, and the restriction was a refinement of the gift, not a diversion.

Massachusetts Federation of Nursing Homes, Inc. v. Massachusetts

791 F. Supp. 899 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Apr 30, 1992

With respect to the second prong, a showing of a “but for” relationship between the injury and allegedly unlawful conduct clearly establishes that the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct. … In a recent opinion, this Court denied plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction and allowed the defendants' motion to dismiss the state defendants on sovereign immunity grounds.

Mazzarino v. Massachusetts State Lottery Commission

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 13, 2022

not reach defendants’ other arguments, including that plaintiff has failed to state facially plausible claims for supervisory liability, see #17 at 6-7, or that Goldberg and Sweeney in their individual capacities have qualified … immunity, see id. at 12-13. 4 Under Fed.

In Re Vitalsigns Homecare, Inc.

396 B.R. 232 · United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Massachusetts · Oct 29, 2008

On July 3, 2008 the Chapter 7 Trustee sought Court approval to establish a procedure to disclose certain information to ABC in order for ABC to conduct due diligence in connection with its anticipated offer to purchase the … Moreover the Court is mindful of the principle of statutory construction that “when two statutes are capable of co-existence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly expressed congressional intention to the contrary

Grady v. Astrue

894 F. Supp. 2d 131 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 28, 2012

Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing a reason for disqualification. Id. at 196 , 102 S.Ct. 1665 . … Since Plaintiff has not qualified as disabled for purposes of DIB or SSI, he would not qualify for purposes of Child’s Insurance Benefits.

Commonwealth v. Adams

389 Mass. 265 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · May 18, 1983

We noted that the defendant’s conduct of exposing himself in a public place “would have [clearly] warranted a verdict of guilty of the statutory offence of ‘open and gross lewdness and lascivious behavior,’ G. L. (Ter. … L. c. 272, § 16, explained that the “word ‘lewdness’ at common law mean[t] open and public indecency; but as used and qualified in the statute it has a broader sense ....

Massachusetts Ex Rel. Department of Public Welfare v. United States Department of Health & Human Services

727 F. Supp. 35 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Dec 11, 1989

The government has not established its claim of privilege with respect to these documents. … The privilege of nondisclosure not being established, this document must be revealed in its entirety. C.

Grace v. Perception Technology Corp.

128 F.R.D. 165 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Nov 16, 1989

Typicality is established by showing that the putative plaintiffs relied on the integrity of the market. Tolan v. Computervision, 696 F.Supp. 771, 778 (D.Mass.1988). … This Court is convinced that plaintiffs’ counsel will vigorously prosecute this action and are qualified to do so.

Doe, SORB No. 6969 v. Sex Offender Registry Board

Massachusetts Appeals Court · May 10, 2021

It has long been established that an administrative agency has the authority to reopen an adjudicatory proceeding. … L. c. 30A, § 14, to conclude that it allows an agency, merely by wrongly denying a person an agency hearing, to immunize its decision from judicial review.

Jackson v. Truck Drivers' Union Local 42 Health & Welfare Fund

933 F. Supp. 1124 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Aug 7, 1996

Read to its logical endpoint, the argument would hold that fiduciaries whose breach renders a plan insolvent and thus cause it to terminate immunize themselves from ERISA liability. … Any balance “which cannot be so applied” may be transferred to another qualified trust which “as in the opinion of the trustees” will “best effectuate” the purposes of the Trust.

Morton Shoe Companies, Inc. v. Herbert & Boghosian, Inc.

36 B.R. 14 · United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Massachusetts · Nov 4, 1983

It was undisputed at trial that the transfer qualified under subsections (A), (C), and (D). … The architect, however, did not certify until December 8, 1981 and January 12, 1982, clearly after the date of payment.