Case law

Bey v. Tufts

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 11, 2024

Bey contends that he was arrested and “was clearly being held to answer for an alleged crime by state trooper Tufts without a presentment or indictment of a grand jury and [he] was deprived of [his] liberty and property … To establish that an arrest lacked probable cause, the plaintiff must show that the police officers acted unreasonably in arresting him. Holder, 585 F.3d at 504.

KES Brockton, Inc. v. Department of Public Utilities

416 Mass. 158 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Aug 13, 1993

To establish standing to seek review under G. L. c. 25, § 5, a petitioner must show “either that the Department did in fact exercise its discretion pursuant to G. … “To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it.

Gillette Co. v. Norelco Consumer Products Co.

946 F. Supp. 115 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Nov 27, 1996

a defense immunizing a manufacturer from liability for false advertising claims. … Insofar as its closeness claim is concerned, Norelco has specifically qualified the claim in its advertisements, with a notation about the acclimation period.

Healer v. Department of Environmental Protection

75 Mass. App. Ct. 8 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Aug 20, 2009

Specifically, the administrative magistrate found that the plaintiffs “did not establish that Bauer’s training as a geologist or his work experience qualify him to provide expert opinion on how the concen *19 trations of … The regulations provide: “Establishment of Discharge Limits.

In re Credit Suisse-AOL Securities Litigation

253 F.R.D. 17 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 26, 2008

Indeed, plaintiffs claims in this case do not present a novel legal theory, but rather a novel application of an already established theory. … Moreover, plaintiff has satisfied the Court that it took sufficient care in choosing counsel and discussing a fee arrangement and that counsel is sufficiently qualified and experienced to conduct the litigation.

Commonwealth v. LeClair

445 Mass. 734 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jan 11, 2006

According to one such commentator, “[t]he courts have quite consistently held that the killing of [one known to be an innocent bystander] does not qualify as manslaughter, apparently upon the assumption that a reasonable … Clearly, the moments leading up the killing were emotionally charged.

Liberty Mutual Insurance v. Black & Decker Corp.

383 F. Supp. 2d 200 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Aug 25, 2004

The “deemer” clause clearly states that cessation of exposure, not substantial cleanup, is the event that triggers the policy. … Connor would qualify as an expert witness.

Cotter v. City of Boston

193 F. Supp. 2d 323 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 21, 2002

Clearly it was not, otherwise this litigation would never have taken place. … The promotion decisions elevated three qualified officers to the rank of sergeant at the expense of ten officers, including the Plaintiffs, who, although qualified, had no right or entitlement to be promoted.

Bowman v. Heller

420 Mass. 517 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jun 13, 1995

Speech concerning a limited purpose public figure will qualify for the actual malice standard set forth in New York Times Co. v. … Although I find the content of the caricatures to be totally repulsive, even “the most repulsive speech enjoys immunity provided it falls short of a deliberate or reckless untruth.” Linn v.

United States v. Mueffelman

400 F. Supp. 2d 368 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Nov 14, 2005

While CCFC explained many of the risks of the program in its promotional materials, it clearly left out critical facts. … Nor is fraudulent intent established by evidence that a person made a mistake of judgment or an error in management or was careless.” 17 .

Real Estate Bar Association for Massachusetts, Inc. v. National Real Estate Information Services

459 Mass. 512 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Apr 25, 2011

On the other hand, NREIS’s preparation of settlement statements and other mortgage-related forms for its lender clients *525 clearly does not constitute the unauthorized practice of law. … Protective Ass’n , 295 Mass, at 372 (establishing legal rights of others and drafting documents by which such rights are established are practice of law). See also LAS Collection Mgt. v.

Guardianship of Hurley

394 Mass. 554 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Apr 16, 1985

The plaintiff also filed a complaint which clearly alleged a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . A single justice transferred that complaint to the Probate Court at the defendants’ suggestion. … The plaintiff is also entitled to a reasonable attorney’s fee for time spent in establishing a fee and time spent on appeal of the fee. Stratos, supra at 325 .

City of Lawrence v. Commissioners of Public Works

318 Mass. 520 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Sep 14, 1945

Even if he was not a de jure officer, he may have been a de facto officer, and evidence or the established fact that he was not the former would be insufficient to establish that he was not the latter, on the ground that … insufficient, without more, to establish the fact that he was not at least a de facto officer.

Hancock v. Commissioner of Education

443 Mass. 428 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Feb 15, 2005

For example, in July, 2004, the Legislature established a Department of Early Education and Care. St. 2004, c. 205. … In Springfield, only seven per cent of seniors qualified, and in Lowell, only thirteen per cent qualified. Minorities Lagging in Tuition Program, Boston Globe, Dec. 11, 2004, at A1 and A7.

Commonwealth v. Godfroy

420 Mass. 561 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jun 15, 1995

Section 5, as in effect at the time the defendant pleaded guilty, provided in relevant part: “If, after a person’s sixty day period of observation, the report filed with'the court by the two qualified examiners clearly indicates … No waiver has been established. We now consider the appropriate remedy. In Commonwealth v.

COMMONWEALTH v. AMBROSE A., a Juvenile

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Dec 20, 2024

Even if one of the six specific reasons is established by the requisite quantum of proof, expungement is not automatic. Instead, the judge must also determine whether expungement "is in the best interests of justice." … That is clearly not the situation we face here. Both rape of a child by force and assault and battery remain criminal acts regardless of the age of the person who commits them. See G.

Commonwealth v. Laltaprasad

475 Mass. 692 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Oct 14, 2016

The court answered that § 3 (e) was clearly intended, "at some time, to empower judges with discretion to impose a sentence below a mandatory minimum sentence established by statute." Id. at 322. … The defendant's criminal record, before the sentencing judge in connection with the Commonwealth's motion to reconsider the sentence, clearly qualifies the defendant as a subsequent offender.

Zenon v. Guzman

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jan 8, 2018

The Supreme Court has established a two-prong test to determine whether an act is “judicial” for purposes of establishing immunity. … Under this line of authority, Defendant is clearly immune from suit in this court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Godfrey v. Massachusetts Medical Service

359 Mass. 610 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jun 11, 1971

Section 4 clearly grants to the defendant the discretion to enter into contracts with podiatrists. See Answer of the Justices, 346 Mass. 787, 790 . … It is well established that legislation will be upheld “[ujnless . . . [it] cannot be supported upon any rational basis of fact that reasonably can be conceived to sustain it.” Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v.

Commonwealth v. Valdez

475 Mass. 178 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Aug 17, 2016

An immigration judge will preside over the removal proceedings, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1) (2012), at which the noncitizen has the burden of establishing that he or she “is clearly and beyond doubt entitled to be admitted … The Federal statute governing the inadmissibility of noncitizens, 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(2), does not identify the crimes that qualify as “involving moral turpitude.”